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We  are  told  that  as  many  as  75%  of  soldiers  did  not  return  fire  during  
World  War  II.    Though  there  is  some  historical  truth  in  this  claim,  what  
should  be  of  greater  interest  is  the  controversy  around  it.    The  idea  that  
would  we  do  nothing  in  great  physical  danger,  especially  when  there  no  
cost  to  fight,  challenges  the  very  notion  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  rational  
human.      As  such,  this  thesis  is  less  about  the  phenomena  of  combat  
passivity,  than  it  is  about  the  challenge  it  presents  to  rational  choice  
theory,  a  challenge  that  it  cannot  survive.    That  we  do  not  choose  
according  to  outcome  but  according  to  how  we  think  we  will  feel  is  hardly  
a  new  idea.  In  its  current  state,  however,  emotion  remains  an  irreducible  
'black-­‐box'  for  social  theory,  with  terms  like  'fear'  and  'regret'  being  both  
ill-­‐defined  and  culturally  loaded.    Drawing  from  a  number  of  fields  
including  therapeutic  psychology,  anthropology  and  the  philosophy  of  
emotion,  this  thesis  proposes  the  precept  cognito  ergo  sentio.    Our  
thoughts  always  produce  feelings.    Even  if  we  do  not  name  them  
emotions,  we  choose  based  on  these.    This  manifests  in  two  reproducible  
ways:  via  schemas  -­‐  whether  or  not  an  event  or  object  or  experience  or  
person  'fits'  -­‐  and  by  assignation,  whether  the  self  or  other  is,  or  will  be,  to  
blame  for  a  schemic  violation  (or  completion).    This  approach  explains  
both  irrational  and  rational  choice,  as  well  as  the  way  in  which  we  can  
imagine  future  feeling  states  within  anticipated  scenarios.    In  the  case  of  
violence  and  passivity,  we  will  examine  three  such  invocations:  schemic  
breaks  (lack  of  fit,  or  'fear'),  causal  assignation  of  the  self  (or  'shame'),  and  
causal  assignation  of  the  external  (or  'anger').    Each  of  these  thinking  
modalities  generates  a  feeling  which  in  turn  determines  a  choice  in  the  
individual,  whether  to  fight,  freeze,  slaughter,  surrender  or  even  break  
down.    
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Introduction:  Rationality  under  Fire  
  
S.L.A.  Marshall  contended  that  during  World  War  II,  only  20  percent  
of  soldiers  in  live  combat  returned  fire.  Although  there  is  some  
controversy  around  this  assertion  (see  Chapter  1),  the  core  theory  is  
sound:  even  when  faced  with  imminent  death,  human  beings  usually  do  
not  resist  or  fight  back.  This  violates  a  fundamental  belief  about  ourselves:  
that  we  would  act  rationally  to  protect  our  lives.  Yet  many  soldiers  do  fire  
back;  soldiers  will  sometimes  fire  under  orders,  and  they  will  sometimes  
resist  orders  if  they  consider  them  unethical.  Soldiers  may  even  massacre  
innocent  people  against  orders,  or  under  them.  Worse  yet,  war  is  the  
longstanding  institution  that  violates  individual  self-­‐interest,  at  least  for  
the  soldier  fighting  it.  One  offers  to  kill  or  give  up  one's  life  for  the  sake  of  
honor,  or  the  abstract  interests  of  the  group.    
The  variety  of  behavior  between  violence  and  passivity  offers  us  a  
challenge.  Sometimes  we  act  in  our  interests,  and  sometimes  we  do  not.  
What  is  the  fulcrum  of  this  choice?  If  we  do  act  emotionally,  how  can  this  
be  usefully  described,  other  than  in  heavily  overdetermined  terms  like  
'fear'  or  'panic'  or  'vengeance'  or  even  'injustice'?  Despite  the  fact  that  
many  of  these  behaviors  would  not  be  considered  rational  in  either  the  
conventional  or  academic/economic  sense,  I  propose  that  the  structure  of  
rational  choice  can  help  explain  both  self-­‐interested  and  self-­‐destructive  
behaviors.  We  choose  neither  to  outcome,  nor  to  feel  outcome,  but  
according  to  how  we  anticipate  we  will  feel.  This  remains  an  optimal  
choice,  one  that  operates  under  both  cognitive  and  feeling  functions:  how  
we  imagine  our  feelings.  Like  the  quickly  discarded  Christmas  present,  it  
matters  not  whether  these  outcomes  are  achieved,  but  that  we  choose  
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either  because  we  think  that  a  positive  feeling  might  be  achieved,  or  that  
a  negative  feeling  might  be  avoided.    
Before  outlining  how  this  formulation  might  take  shape,  it  is  
imperative  to  answer:  why  use  rationality  as  a  model?  There  are  several  
potential  arguments  for  doing  so.  First,  rationality  has  a  long  history  of  
studying  aberrations.  This  arguably  begins  with  Max  Weber's  inclusion  of  
the  early  human  practice  of  magic  as  rational  or  'predominantly  economic'  
(Weber,  1963:  A.1.b).  Rationality  as  an  academic  field  has  a  history  of  
utilizing  a  case  study  that  might  not  initially  seem  sensible—e.g.  family  
dynamics,  voting,  the  buying  of  lottery  tickets—which  it  then  attempts  to  
include  within  the  existing  causal  or  economic  framework.  Especially  
relevant  is  the  new  work  on  the  'rational'  suicide  bomber;  this  literature  
following  9/11  is  extensive  (see  Llussheand  Tavares,  2007  for  an  overview,  
and  Chapter  2  where  it  will  be  discussed  further).  The  case  study  of  
passivity  and  violence  presents  like  challenges  to  rationality,  and  so  
follows  the  established  practice,  like  many  social  sciences,  of  exceptions  
rebuilding  the  rule.    
Rationality,  secondly,  is  especially  relevant  to  violence  as  a  subject  
because  of  its  instrumental  nature.  The  field  of  rationality  itself  derives  
from  economics  as  far  back  as  ancient  Sumeria  (Rutger,  1999),  with  the  
understanding  that  one  cannot  choose  rationally  unless  one  has  a  scale  
with  which  to  weigh  a  decision.  In  fact,  most  current  interest  in  bounded  
rational  choice  is  in  relation  to  the  way  in  which  many  actors  will  choose  
non-­‐advantageous  economic  outcomes  (less  money)  for  seemingly  no  
reason.  Examples  include  the  New  York  taxi  drivers  who  drive  less  in  the  
rain  when  there  are  more  opportunities  to  make  money,  and  more  in  the  
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sun  when  there  are  fewer  (Camerer  et  al.,  1997).  The  measurement  of  
money,  hours  worked  and  rain  vs.  no  rain  are  concrete  variables  from  
which  we  can  then  determine  which  action  is  more  rational  than  the  
other.  This  case  study  of  violence  and  passivity  has  an  even  starker  scale:  
life  or  death,  the  calculus  without  which  no  other  choice  is  even  possible.    
Furthermore,  rationality  has  the  quality  of  comprehensibility:  'the  
highest  measure  of  "self-­‐evidence"'  (Weber,  1981:  151).  Raymond  Boudon  
described  rationality's  appeal:  'behavior  is  rational  when  it  can  be  
explained  beginning  "X  had  good  reasons  for  doing  Y  because..."  without  
risking  objection,  and  without  oneself  having  the  feeling  of  having  said  
something  incongruous'  (Boudon,  quoted  in  Norkus,  2000:  266).  Extending  
Boudon's  formulation,  I  would  construct  it  as  X  does  Y  to  get  Z.  The  appeal  
of  rationality  lies  in  the  way  it  describes  an  action  motivated  by  a  
comprehensible  goal,  as  it  relies  on  our  most  basic  form  of  reasoning:  
cause  and  effect.  Whether  or  not  the  goal  is  achieved,  it  is  always  
perceived.  In  economic  theory,  the  subject  acts  for  gain,  or  to  avoid  loss.  
At  first,  our  case  studies—about  life,  death,  violence  and  avoiding  
violence—seem  like  a  contradiction  in  these  terms,  in  that  Z  (the  goal)  is  
death  or  murder.  This  is  the  challenge  this  thesis  must  tackle:  how  to  
explain  these  choices  and  maintain  the  structure  of  rationality,  its  clear  
causal  nature,  and  its  appeal  as  an  explanandum.  
The  fourth  motivation  acts  tangentially  to  this  appeal;  rationality  is  
communicable.  This  is  slightly  different  to  causal  simplicity,  in  that  it  
speaks  to  the  goal  of  the  thesis,  which  is  not  merely  to  be  written.  Writing  
is  meaningless,  literally,  when  ideas  fail  to  be  understood.  Although  
rational  choice,  especially  the  heuristics  and  biases  school,  is  violating  this  
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basic  tenet  in  favor  of  cute  anecdotes,  its  appeal  still  remains  in  the  way  
cause  and  effect  can  be  easily  grasped,  not  least  because  it  is  how  we  
perceive  our  own  actions.  A  useful  theory  requires  more  than  just  
evidence  and  rigor;  it  must  attempt  to  be  understood.  If  one  must  choose  
between  two  theories  of  equal  weight,  the  one  that  is  more  easily  
comprehensible  has  a  greater  chance  of  social  impact.    
This  simplicity  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  expediency.  As  we  plunge  
into  violence,  rationality  and  emotion,  the  severe  limitations  of  human  
comprehension  will  emerge.  A  causal  glance  at  identity,  Dunbar's  number,  
the  cognitive  miser,  and  many  other  concepts  and  observations,  makes  it  
increasingly  clear  that  human  beings  have  a  limited  ability  to  cognate  in  
real  time.  Even  the  famous  rule  of  five  plus  or  minus  two—referring  to  the  
number  of  objects  that  we  can  hold  in  present-­‐time  consciousness—has  
now  been  downgraded  to  four  (Dehaene,  1997,  see  Chapter  5).  As  per  the  
previous  paragraph,  the  explanation  must  be  understood,  but  this  works  
in  a  dual  sense:  if  a  theory  is  unnecessarily  complex,  it  is  probably  
incorrect.  This  is  not  a  corollary  of  Occam's  razor,  but  a  statement  about  
cognition  in  general.  If  we  as  human  beings  cognate  simply,  it  is  unlikely  
that  a  complex  theory  would  correctly  explain  our  beliefs,  choices  and  
actions.    
The  sixth  appeal  of  rational  choice  is  its  focus  on  the  individual.  At  
first,  this  may  seem  counterintuitive  in  regard  to  social  theory,  which  
deals,  naturally  enough,  with  sociality  or  groups.  In  fact,  the  majority  of  
writing  in  violence  studies  falls  under  a  social  milieu.  Although  there  are  
many  authors  who  have  written  on  the  subject  of  violence,  two  will  be  
considered  in  detail:  Randall  Collins  and  Steven  Pinker,  two  of  the  few  
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who  have  dealt  with  the  phenomenon  of  combat  passivity  in  any  depth.  
Both  these  perspectives,  although  very  different,  describe  violence  
sociologically.  For  Collins,  'violence  is  hard'  and  the  individual  engages  in  it  
to  resolve  emotional  entrainment  via  the  participation  of  groups  or  
institutions  (Collins,  2008).  For  Pinker,  violence  is  Hobbesian,  part  of  our  
nature,  although  he  still  maintains  a  sociological  perspective.  The  
socializing  effects  merely  work  in  the  other  direction:  the  rise  of  the  
centralized  states  is  'the  first  form  of  social  organization  that  shows  signs  
of  design  for  reducing  violence  within  its  borders'  (Pinker,  2011:  167).  
In  opposition  to  the  sociological  perspective  (also  known  as  the  
'macro'  perspective),  this  thesis  will  utilize  methodological  individualism.  
The  historical  details  of  rates  of  fire,  multiple  loaded  muskets,  and  
individual  accounts  demonstrate  both  passivity  in  firing,  with  inconsistent  
conclusions.  We  see  a  variation  in  behavior,  which  is  where  the  
sociological  perspective  loses  some  ground.  From  the  pro-­‐  and  anti-­‐  
Marshall  camps,  we  are  confronted  with  a  dualist  interpretation  of  the  
findings:  'Soldiers  do  fire  back!',  countered  with  an  equally  strident  'No  
they  don't!'.  In  fact,  what  Marshall  is  saying  is  that  soldiers  tend  to  not  
fire,  but  exhibit  different  actions  under  different  circumstances.  Marshall  
notes  the  way  in  which  almost  all  soldiers  will  fire  under  direct  orders;  the  
one  exception  to  a  low  rate  of  fire  was  the  instance  where  'all  junior  
leaders  constantly  "ride  herd"  on  troops  with  the  specific  mission  of  
increasing  their  fire'  (Marshall,  1947:  51).  On  the  other  hand,  we  know  
from  the  results  of  battles  that  some  fire  perfectly  well  without  
supervision,  just  as  a  certain  percentage  will  not  fire  under  supervision.  
This  leads  us  to  what,  at  first,  seems  like  a  contradiction:  that  violence  and  
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passivity  can  be  understood  as  both  situational  and  as  a  function  of  
individual  choice.    
Methodological  individualism  allows  explanations  from  both  macro  
and  micro  points  of  view.  This  is  the  'doctrine  that  all  social  phenomena  
(their  structure  and  their  change)  are  in  principle  explicable  only  in  terms  
of  individuals—their  properties,  goals,  and  beliefs'  (Elster,  1982:  454).  The  
advantage  of  methodological  individualism  is  that  it  can  subsume  the  
sociological  perspective.  It  can  explain  a  situation  as  a  function  of  
individual  interpretation  and  belief,  allowing  us  to  include  both  individual  
choice  and  situational  pressures.  It  is  the  variation  within  methodological  
individualism  that  allows  a  more  cogent  explanation.  This  resolves  a  
significant  theoretical  problem;  despite  what  many  social  theories,  
including  rationality,  might  propose,  it  is  impossible  to  explain  individual  
behavior  using  aggregate  data.    
  
The  Rational  Emotion  and  the  Emotional   Imagination  
    
The  final  and  most  important  motivation  for  using  a  rational  choice  
paradigm  is  what  Jon  Elster  refers  to  as  its  'explanatory  power'  (Elster,  
2007;  1984).  This  is  best  outlined  by  Raymond  Boudon:  'I  am  not  saying  
that  socialization  is  a  worthless  notion,  nor  that  there  are  no  socialization  
effects,  but  merely  that  the  notion  is  descriptive  rather  than  explanatory.  
It  identifies  and  christens  various  correlations  between  the  way  people  
have  been  raised  and  educated  and  their  beliefs  and  behavior,  but  does  
not  explain  them'  (Boudon,  2009:  180).  Although  this  was  written  against  
descriptions  in  psychological  explanations,  'descriptiveness',  in  all  fields,  
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abounds.  The  current  fashion  in  rationality  allows  for  biases,  such  as  the  
availability  bias,  which  allows  that  a  subject  will  choose  according  to  what  
is  familiar  or  'available'  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979).  As  it  does  not  
provide  an  explanation  for  the  bias,  or  even  a  format  according  to  which  
the  choice  of  a  bias  would  be  made,  this  school  of  rationality  becomes  like  
the  socialization  Boudon  outlines:  it  names,  but  does  not  explore.  This  is  
the  question  that  will  be  asked  of  current  theories,  including  this  one,  and  
it  must  remain  at  the  forefront  of  the  entire  inquiry:  is  it  descriptive,  or  
explanatory?    
As  such,  this  thesis  does  not  belong  in  rational  choice  per  se,  but  
within  the  philosophy  of  social  science.  It  is  akin,  although  not  
comparable,  to  the  works  of  Jon  Elster  and  Raymond  Boudon,  upon  both  
of  which  this  thesis  will  draw.  It  could  be  said  that  this  field,  as  broad  as  it  
is,  has  two  agendas.  The  first,  like  all  social  science,  is  to  'explain  social  
phenomenon'  (Elster,  2007:  3).  Outside  of  a  specific  field,  such  as  
anthropology,  international  relations,  sociology  of  violence  and  so  on,  it  
further  seeks  to  do  so  via  a  critique  or  analysis  of  the  current  fields  of  
social  theory  themselves:  'an  inquiry  loosely  organized  around  the  
problem  of  scientific  status  of  social  knowledge'  (Turner  and  Roth,  2007:  
2).  Like  the  philosophy  of  science,  the  philosophy  of  social  science  is  
epistemological  in  nature,  a  rigorous  application  of  logic  to  our  behavior,  
as  well  as  the  understanding  of  it.    
This  field  further  allows  for  a  strong  interdisciplinary  aspect—the  
inclusion  of  rational  choice,  philosophy  of  emotion,  anthropology,  history,  
military  history,  psychology,  experimental  psychology,  neurobiology,  
sociology  of  violence,  and  so  on.  Under  the  philosophy  of  social  sciences,  
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the  use  of  a  wide  variety  of  academic  disciplines  serves  two  purposes:  
firstly,  access  to  a  wider  dataset,  meaning  greater  confirmation  or  
refutation  of  particular  conclusions;  secondly,  fields  like  rational  choice  or  
violence  studies  may  embody  the  same  components  that  they  are  seeking  
to  analyze,  and,  in  turn,  provide  their  own  dataset.  In  this  case,  this  thesis  
is  an  attempt  not  only  to  explain  behavior,  but  to  do  so  via  a  greater  
understanding  of  the  nature  of  human  reliance  on  causality,  a  concept  
deeply  embedded  in  all  forms  of  social  science.    
What  this  necessitates  is  both  a  critique  and  appropriation  of  rational  
choice  theory.  Appropriation  as  the  basic  structure  (actors  choosing  
optimally)  remains  central,  and  critique  in  the  sense  that  even  the  causal  
structure  of  rationality  must  be  seen  within  the  context  of  feeling.  Nothing  
can  be  optimal  without  being  preferable,  and  nothing  can  be  preferred  
without  the  accompanying  feeling.  We  choose,  as  per  above,  optimally.  
The  alteration  proposed  above  is  minor,  that  we  choose  not  according  to  
outcome,  or  even  anticipated  outcome,  but  according  to  anticipated  
feeling  outcome.  This  is  not  a  new  or  even  radical  idea,  proposed  before  
under  decision  affect  theory  (Mellers  et  al.,  1999;  1997),  as  well  as  
decision  regret  theory  (Bell,  1982;  Loomes  and  Sugden,  1982)—both  
economic  studies  of  payouts  under  gambling  risk.  In  the  case  of  the  
former,  the  subjects  choose  according  to  future  pleasure;  in  the  case  of  
the  latter,  they  are  disinclined  to  choose  according  to  future  regret.  Both  
studies  call  for  a  'better  understanding  of  emotions'  (Mellers  et  al.,  1999:  
343).  
If  anticipated  feeling  state  theory  is  not  a  unique  contribution  to  the  
philosophy  of  social  science,  what  will  be?  One  hopes  the  answer  will  be  
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the  introduction  of  a  new  model  of  emotions  based  on  agency  and  
causality.  Emotion  has  a  troubled  history  in  the  social  sciences,  often  seen  
as  an  irreducible  'black  box'  (Rouse  and  Morris,  1986;  Gigerenzer,  2001).  
The  black  box  refers  to  something  that  cannot  be  opened,  which  cannot  
be  further  understood.  If  someone  says  'he  did  that  because  he  was  angry'  
or  'she  did  that  because  she  was  ashamed',  the  terms  are  not  defined,  
objective,  or  even  understood  across  cultures,  or  even  within  a  single  
culture,  in  the  same  way.  Emotion  is,  for  most  social  sciences,  a  fruitless  
terminus,  a  series  of  subjective,  and  often  culturally  particular,  categories:  
shame,  irritation,  love,  fear,  anxiety,  joy,  humor,  worry,  anger,  vengeance,  
suspicion,  satisfaction,  guilt,  and  so  on.  It  is  a  long  list,  with  ill-­‐defined  
variables:  'The  lack  of  agreement  about  what  emotions  are  is  paralleled  by  
the  lack  of  agreement  on  what  emotions  there  are'  (Elster,  1999:  241,  
emphasis  in  original).2    
To  explain  emotion,  it  is  necessary  to  jettison  it.  To  do  this,  one  must  
clearly  distinguish  between  feeling  and  emotion—a  distinction  that  
already  has  a  tradition  in  philosophy  of  emotion  (Solomon,  2001;  Lyons,  
1980),  psychology  (Barrett,  2006;  Barrett  et  al.,  2007;  Russell,  2003),  and  
even  neurobiology  (Damasio,  2003).  Emotions  are  'intentional';  that  is,  
they  have  an  object  and  a  reason.  Feelings  are  what  we  experience  in  the  
present,  immediately:  'the  idea  of  the  body  being  in  a  certain  way'  
(Damasio,  2003:  84).  Emotions  are  complex  intentional  thoughts  that  
                                                
1.  It  should  be  noted  that  Jon  Elster,  upon  whom  a  great  deal  of  this  thesis  rests,  said  
the  following  a  year  earlier:  'There  is  a  large  degree  of  consensus  in  the  scholarly  
literature  on  what  emotions  there  are,  and  a  quite  good  agreement  on  what  emotions  
are'  (Elster,  1998:  48).  The  statement  regarding  'a  large  degree  of  consensus'  is  less  
accurate,  as  will  be  outlined  in  Chapter  4.  
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produce  feelings  (Solomon  calls  them  'judgements';  Nussbaum  calls  them  
'judgements  of  value';  Elster  calls  them  'cognitive  antecedents').  Feelings  
are  the  body  in  its  state,  many  times  the  result  of  emotional  cognitions,  
but  distinct  from  them  nevertheless.  
Within  this  model,  we  are  always  feeling  something,  either  bodily,  or  
through  an  association  with  a  particular  cognitive  state,  or,  as  is  usually  
the  case,  a  combination  of  both.  The  current  paradigm  asks  if  we  are  in  an  
emotional  state  or  not,  and  then  asks  which  emotion  we  act  under,  even  if  
this  is  a  historically,  individually  and  culturally  defined  index  of  terms.  This  
model  instead  assumes  that  we  are  always  thinking  and  feeling  
something,  and  asks:  what  is  the  thought  and  what  is  the  feeling?  Under  
the  precept  cognito  ergo  sentio  (I  think,  thereupon  I  feel),  our  thoughts  
produce  feelings,  even  if  we  do  not  name  them  emotions.  This  is  a  
constant,  inescapable  and  'normal'  state.  The  brain  continually  cognates,  
and,  even  if  slight,  the  thoughts  produce  some  type  of  effect.  A  perceived  
object—a  banana  peel  on  the  ground,  a  stranger,  a  friend,  a  warm  fire—is  
more  than  just  'there'.  It  has  associations,  either  fond  or  fearful.    
This  is  even  more  true  of  causal  events:  examples  include  a  woman  
wearing  white  after  Labor  Day,  a  lottery  ticket  paying  out,  a  train  being  
late,  or  a  plane  being  shot  out  of  the  sky.  Causal  attributions  have  an  even  
stronger  effect.  Within  this  paradigm,  nothing  is  neutral.  For  the  last  five  
millennia,  we  have  been  desperate  to  distinguish  between  reason  and  
passion.  Nevertheless,  if  the  rational  choice  is  a  desirable  one,  it  must  
produce  feeling.  Given  the  way  in  which  we  define  particular  emotions,  it  
may  be  possible  to  distinguish  between  emotional  and  non-­‐emotional  
states,  at  least  within  a  particular  culture,  or  a  particular  historical  
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moment.  However,  given  the  nature  of  embodied  and  experiential  
consciousness,  it  is  not  possible  and  not  useful  for  academic  purposes  to  
distinguish  between  non-­‐feeling  and  feeling  states.  We  are  always  feeling  
something.  
It  is  not  enough  to  simply  say  that  human  beings  are  feeling  beings.  It  
is  necessary  to  describe  in  useful  and  reproducible  terms  how  those  
feelings  are  generated.  Although  the  evidence  and  arguments,  both  
theoretical  and  historical,  will  make  up  the  next  seven  chapters,  there  are  
two  important  features  of  this  model  to  consider  at  this  juncture,  however  
shallowly.  Thoughts  (sometimes)  have  (at  least)  two  stages:  apprehension  
and  attribution.  Specific  interpreted  causal  conclusions  lead,  consistently  
and  explicably,  to  specific  feelings.  
The  first  will  be  defined  as  a  'schema',  a  word  with  roots  in  the  
cognitive  psychology  of  PTSD.  What  does  'schema'  mean,  exactly?  
Schemas  'are  organizers  of  information  processing  whose  forms  both  
speed  up  appraisal  and  fill  in  for  missing  information'  (Horowitz,  1990:  
303),  a  concept  possibly  originating  with  the  work  of  Jean  Piaget  (Piaget,  
1937).  It  is  perhaps  more  clearly  understood  via  Mary  Douglas'  famous  
concept  of  dirt  as  matter  out  of  place:  'a  shared  need  to  transcend  the  
everyday  limits  of  cognition  by  closing  the  metaphysical  gaps  in  our  
classificatory  system'  (Fardon,  2002:  99).  Given  the  limits  of  present  time  
consciousness,  an  apprehension  either  is,  or  is  not,  a  binary  that  speaks  to  
our  need  or  compulsion,  or  at  least  consistent  action  to  categorize  
(Cooper,  2007;  Festinger,  1962).  When  the  perception  fits,  there  is  order;  
when  it  does  not,  it  is  dirt—a  violation.    
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After  this  stage—confirmation  or  violation—the  next  stage  is  the  
perfectly  unexceptional  construction  of  causality.  If  something  has  
happened,  it  must  have  a  cause.  Taking  a  cue  from  cognitive  models  of  
anger  (Averill,  1983;  Aristotle,  1954;  Powers  and  Dagleish,  2008),  it  follows  
that  the  event  must  also  have  a  motive,  and  thus  an  agent.  What  are  
typically  understood  as  emotions  are,  in  fact,  very  concisely  defined  casual  
attributions.  When  a  schemic  violation  takes  place  (e.g.  a  building  
collapses,  a  shoe  is  found  on  the  kitchen  counter,  or  a  football  team  
loses),  we  respond  with  a  negative  feeling  state,  just  as  we  might  respond  
with  a  positive  one  when  the  confirmation  of  a  schema  is  achieved.  In  the  
sense  of  sequential  time,  this  break  or  achievement  appears  as  causal.  If  it  
led  us  to  feel,  it  follows  that  there  was  intent;  if  there  was  intent,  it  
follows  there  was  an  agent.  Emotions  like  anger  and  impulses  like  
obeisance  occur  under  attributions  to  an  external  agent,  even  if  that  agent  
is  an  institution  or  an  abstract  object.  Likewise,  if  we  attribute  the  schemic  
break  to  ourselves,  the  feeling  intensifies  with  self-­‐attribution:  this  is  
shame  or  guilt  (or  other  unnamed  feelings).  We  avoid  these  feelings  and  
the  situations  that  provoke  them.    
We  furthermore  avoid  the  thoughts  that  provoke  (or  might  provoke)  
those  feelings.  Jon  Elster,  who  has  written  extensively  on  rational  choice  
(see  Chapter  2)  notes  the  way  in  which  it  is  difficult  to  utilize  the  rational  
choice  model  if  the  subject  is  self-­‐deluded,  what  he  calls  'self-­‐deception'  
or  'wishful  thinking'.  Appropriate  for  this  subject,  this  phenomenon  is  a  
major  factor  in  the  suppression  of  truth  in  Hitler's  Final  Solution.  Quoting  
Walter  Laqueur's  history  of  this  denial  The  Terrible  Secret:  'while  many  
Germans  thought  that  the  Jews  were  no  longer  alive,  they  did  not  
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necessarily  believe  that  they  were  dead'.  Elster  concludes  that  this  'failure  
may  be  due  to  defective  cognition  or,  as  is  probable  in  the  present  case,  to  
affective  pressures'  (Elster,  2001a:  152).  These  'affective  pressures'  have  
no  'easy  answer'.  With  a  feeling  choice  model,  however,  this  operates  
under  an  optimal  future  feeling  state.  If  one  anticipates  the  outcome  
according  to  feeling,  this  can  apply  to  instrumental  outcome  as  well  as  
belief  outcome.  There  is  no  real  reason  to  distinguish  the  two;  for  the  
individual,  they  are  both  felt  in  any  case,  both  internally.  In  other  words,  
thoughts  are  the  means,  the  feelings,  and  the  end.  
The  AFST  approach  presents  many  advantages,  most  of  which  will  be  
detailed  along  the  way  and  in  the  conclusion,  when  the  model  has  been  
fully  outlined.  Possibly  the  most  important  is  the  way  in  which  it  helps  
situate  emotion  and  feeling  within  a  model  of  choice,  which  Elster  
considers  the  most  important  single  aspect  to  any  social  theory:  'Even  
though  I  am  critical  of  many  rational-­‐choice  explanations,  I  believe  the  
concept  of  choice  is  fundamental'  (Elster,  2007:  6;  see  also  Little,  1992).  
This  is  a  statement  with  which  I  must  agree  in  its  entirety.  In  relation  to  
this  thesis,  choosing  does  not  refer  to  what  we  will  feel,  but  how  we  think  
we  will.  Understanding  feelings  as  causal  cognates  resituates  the  process  
of  choice.  When  choosing,  we  imagine  outcomes,  or  scenarize,  and  these  
scenarios  take  shape  within  a  framework  as  cause,  effect  and  agency.  We  
know  (or  at  least  anticipate)  the  negative  feelings  when  a  negative  
outcome  is  assigned  to  ourselves,  just  as  we  know  the  positive  feelings  
when  a  negative  outcome  is  assigned  to  others.    
There  are  two  variables  in  emotional  theory  that  can  easily  be  
applied  to  choice:  valence  and  arousal  (Yik  et  al.,  1999;  Smith  and  
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Ellsworth,  1985).  The  former  refers  to  the  general  'rating'  of  a  feeling;  
shame  may  rate  as  high  negative,  while  embarrassment  rates  as  low  
negative  (Elster,  1999).  Arousal,  then,  is  how  much  that  particular  emotion  
is  activated  ('activation'  can  be  considered  another  term  for  arousal).  
Although  the  specificity  of  this  approach,  in  regard  to  what  and  how  many  
dimensions  of  emotion,  is  hardly  resolved  (Fontaine  et  al.,  2007);  it  could  
be  said  that  feeling  states  can  at  least  be  comparable.  It  is  not  necessary  
to  say  that  one  is  'high  versus  low  positive  affect  and  high  versus  low  
negative  affect',  but  that  one  state  could  be  seen  as  preferable  to  the  
other.  Besides  avoiding  the  culturally  and  historically  specific  language  of  
emotion,  the  point  of  low  or  negligible  arousal  or  valence  is  not  that  one  is  
negative  and  the  other  positive  but,  in  terms  of  choice,  that  they  could  be  
compared.  This  is  as  simple  as  choosing  between  two  slices  of  cake:  one  is  
slightly  larger;  the  other  has  more  frosting.  The  actual  affect  in  such  a  
choice  is  fairly  low  (certainly  compared  to  combat),  but  a  choice  can  be  
made  based  on  the  anticipated  feeling  state.    
Beyond  choice,  however,  the  cognate  feeling  model  also  allows  for  a  
more  concise  description  of  emotion.  Two  issues  within  emotional  theory  
present  as  semantic,  but  are  strong  indeed.  The  first  is  that  one  term  
could  incorporate  many  and  significantly  different  feelings.  For  example,  
anger  can  refer  to  the  violation  and  attribution  of  an  agent,  which  is  
largely  seen  as  negative.  On  the  other  hand,  a  strong  component  of  anger  
is  pleasure  in  the  fantasy  of  revenge.  Rather  than  being  named  anger,  this  
is  better  understood  as  a  schemic  break  followed  by  an  external  
attribution,  or  the  scenarization  of  the  repair  of  that  same  break.  These  
are  specific  (although  still  delineated)  thoughts  that  consistently  
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reproduce  the  same  feelings,  instead  of  a  broad  over-­‐determined  single  
designation.  By  stating  the  exact  violation  and  the  exact  attribution,  we  
are  able  to  improve  our  understanding  of  what  a  particular  individual  is  
thinking  and  feeling,  and  how  they  can  be  expected  to  choose.  
  What  may  matter  even  more  for  this  thesis  is  the  description  of  
those  feelings  that  are  not  called  emotions,  but  probably  are.  If  emotions  
are  complex  intentional  thoughts  that  produce  some  type  of  affect,  this  
allows  us  to  include  desires  that  are  normally  privileged  beyond  the  
emotional  canon,  such  as  the  desire  to  be  rational,  or  to  have  more  
money  and  power,  the  excitement  of  discovery  or  being  right,  or,  in  the  
case  of  violence,  the  pleasure  of  killing  and  even  the  desire  simply  to  
survive.  Some  of  these  thoughts  are  understood  as  normal,  natural  or,  for  
our  intentions,  rational;  some  are  not  even  considered  at  all.  Yet  each  is  a  
thought,  or  more  specifically,  an  intention  that  produces  a  feeling,  
meeting  the  basic  criterion  for  emotion.  Within  a  cognate  feeling  model,  
the  rational  and  irrational  choice  can  be  equally  understood—the  
structure  is  substantively  identical.    
Perhaps  the  greatest  unnamed  emotion  is  eunomia—the  pleasure  in  
knowing.  This  is  a  feeling  that  motivates  us  daily,  hourly  even.  It  is  possibly  
the  most  significant  feeling  reason  behind  academia  (including  this  thesis  
and  this  sentence),  and  yet  remains  unexamined,  without  even  the  
courtesy  of  being  given  a  name.  Yet  the  moment  of  sense  when  we  know  
(or  think)  something  to  be  true  is  powerful  indeed.  This  could  be  no  more  
true  of  rationality,  which  relies  on  a  reliable  causal  universe.  David  Hume  
has  noted  that  cause  and  effect  cannot  be  proven  unless  you  already  
believe  in  cause  and  effect.  Although  there  is  much  reliable  Newtonian  
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science  that  rests  on  causal  principles,  for  the  social  sciences  we  instead  
ask:  why,  if  cause  and  effect  has  no  logical  basis,  does  it  remain  a  constant  
of  cognition?  The  answer  may  seem  tautological  at  this  point,  but  it  is  
hoped  by  the  end  there  will  be  some  explanatory  sense  to  it:  we  believe  in  
causality  because  it  feels  good  to  do  so.  At  the  very  least,  it  feels  bad,  
terrible  even,  not  to.    
  
There  Are  No  Rational  Motives  
  
This  thesis  will  attempt  to  incorporate  emotion  into  rational  choice.  To  
do  this,  it  is  necessary  to  reformulate  the  general  and  diffuse  cultural  
concepts  of  emotion  so  that  they  can  be  understood  as  future  feeling  
states.  Choice  takes  place  in  anticipation,  and  the  various  scenarios  we  
envision  carry  with  them  various  expectations  of  a  feeling  outcome,  even  
if,  as  with  revenge  or  attempts  to  find  safety,  that  feeling  may  not  actually  
be  achieved  or  avoided.  The  situation  within  choice  necessarily  focuses,  
though  not  exclusively,  on  the  types  of  feelings  that  can  be  generated  by  
specific  causal  cognates,  such  as  future  states  of  blame,  either  directed  at  
the  self  or  at  others,  or  at  satisfaction  when  a  particular  schemic  break,  
however  insignificant,  is  repaired.  As  such,  it  is  largely  a  work  within  the  
philosophy  of  emotion,  itself  within  the  philosophy  of  social  science:  the  
attempt  to  describe  the  currently  obscure  mechanics  of  emotion  within  a  
causal,  attributional  and  choice-­‐based  model.  Rational  choice  provides  the  
structure  for  this  theory  (we  do  X  to  feel  Y),  but  not  the  academic  
discipline.  It  is  not  a  new  model  of  choice,  but  an  attempt  to  more  
concisely  and  completely  describe  the  culturally  contingent,  dismissed,  
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and  highly  contested  terms  of  emotion  through  a  matrix  of  thought  and  
associated  feeling.    
As  such,  we  will  be  discussing  many  emotions  and  many  feelings,  but  
not  all.  The  focus  is  on  building  a  choice  model,  which  means  that  feeling  
cognates  that  are  easily  anticipated  in  scenarios,  like  future  states  of  
blame,  or  resolutions  of  vengeance,  are  necessarily  given  priority.  There  
are  some,  like  humor,  aesthetics,  forgiveness  and  romantic  love,  that  fit  
within  this  model  that  will  be  barely  addressed,  if  at  all.  There  are  some,  
like  compassion,  love  and  gratitude,  that  simply  do  not  fall  under  this  
paradigm.  Bodily  feelings  like  sickness  and  hunger  can  fit  into  the  feeling  
aspect  model,  and  even  be  a  part  of  choice  (especially  in  combat),  but  
these  will  not  be  theorized.  Furthermore,  the  state  of  'mood'  (the  current  
feeling  state)  and  its  effect  on  outcome  or  even  cognitive  ability  will  be  
given  short  shrift.  There  is  some  attention  on  this  subject  in  the  chapter  
covering  schemic  breaks,  but  the  focus  remains  on  how  future  states  are  
cognated,  and  how  that  affects  preference  and  choice.    
Even  as  an  analysis  of  various  fields  of  social  science,  it  remains  
necessary  to  engage  in  a  classical  literature  review  for  some  of  these  fields  
in  regard  to  both  their  relevance  to  the  case  study—i.e.  violence  and  
passivity—as  well  as  their  own  theoretical  underpinning.  The  first  chapter  
will  introduce  one  of  the  case  studies  (soldiers  who  do  not  fire)  both  the  
evidence  for  the  existence  of  passivity  as  a  phenomenon  and  its  situation  
as  a  controversy.  Chapters  2  and  3  review  the  fields  of  rationality  and  the  
sociology  of  violence,  respectively.  They  will  cover  the  way  in  which  the  
current  academic  areas  succeed  and  fail  at  describing  violence  at  an  
explanatory  level.  The  structure  of  these  particular  approaches  will  
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provide  further  examples  and  evidence  of  the  way  in  which  seemingly  
neutral  discourses  are  themselves  imbued  with  feeling.  
Chapter  4  begins  with  a  very  brief  overview  of  the  philosophy  of  
emotion,  and  the  specific  areas  of  research  from  which  this  thesis  will  
draw.  What  then  follows  is  an  elucidation  of  the  processes  of  cognate  
feeling,  related  in  order  of  how  human  beings  themselves  may  experience  
them.  Each  of  these  stages  is  applied  to  the  cases  of  violence  and  passivity  
in  turn.  Chapter  5  details  the  first  step,  apprehension,  the  attempt  to  
categorize  a  perception,  and  the  strong  feelings  (sometimes  called  terror)  
that  are  associated  with  the  experience  of  chaos  and  unknowing.  Chapter  
6  details  the  negative  feelings  associated  with  self-­‐designated  agency  
(blame/shame/guilt),  which  can  be  scenarized  easily  as  a  state  to  avoid.  
Chapter  7  details  some  aspects  of  other  designated  casualty  (anger),  and  
how  the  repair  of  a  schemic  break,  whether  assigned  to  another  or  not,  
generates  a  positive  feeling.  Violence  may  be  hard,  but  the  imagination  of  
its  completion,  especially  with  the  fantasy  of  ourselves  as  the  actor,  can  
be  a  strongly  positive  feeling.  Its  lack  of  a  conventional  name  as  an  
emotion  should  not  contradict  the  consistent  reality  of  the  feeling.    
There  are  risks  that  come  with  this  theory  of  feeling,  of  linking  a  
specific  model  of  causal  attribution  with  so  many  emotions.  It  may  be  too  
simple  and  too  abstract  at  the  same  time.  As  it  has  changed  over  the  years  
of  its  writing,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  it  will  change  again.  If  it  fails  for  the  
reader,  I  would  ask  one  indulgence:  take  emotion  seriously.  This  is  
intended  in  both  meanings  of  the  word.  Emotion  is  something  that  can  be  
taken  seriously  in  the  sense  that  there  is  enough  structure  to  be  studied,  
understood  and  usefully  debated.  If  this  seems  implausible,  then  at  least  
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heed  the  plea  that  emotion  is  more  crucial  than  we  currently  hold.  Philip  
Slater's  proclamation  that  there  are  no  rational  motives  (Slater,  2011)  is  as  
irrefutable  as  something  can  be  in  the  social  sciences,  and  yet  the  vast  
majority  of  the  literature  treats  this  central  motivation  as  unnecessary,  
and  spends  equally  wasteful  time  dividing  and  distinguishing  what  are  
structurally  identical  processes:  reason  and  feeling.  Fear  of  the  irrational  
(itself,  by  definition,  a  feeling)  motivates  much  more  behavior  than  
economists,  political  scientists,  anthropologists  and  even  psychologists  are  
willing  to  acknowledge.  Emotion  is  nothing  to  be  afraid  of.       
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Chapter  1:   Resistance  to  Violence  
  
To  discuss  a  challenge  to  rationality,  we  must  first  decide  if  such  a  
challenge  has  any  legitimacy.  The  idea  and  history  of  irrational  violence,  
either  criminal  or  state-­‐based,  has  been  studied  and  documented  at  
length.  There  is  little  dispute  that  many  times  we  act  violently  both  against  
the  interests  of  others  and  ourselves:  'a  central  problem  in  international  
relations  dubbed  the  "war  puzzle":  rational  statesispute  that  many  times  
we  act  violently  both  against  the  interests  of  others  and  ourselves:  'a  
central  problem  in  international  relations  dubbed  the    of  the  literature  
treats  this  central  motivation  as  e-­‐based  modebargain  reflecting  their  
relative  power'  (Johnson  et  al.,  2006:  2513).  
Less  stable  is  the  phenomenon  of  combat  passivity  or  even  victim  
passivity,  which  has  the  double  disadvantage  of  being  understudied  as  
well  as  controversial.  For  whatever  reason,  violence  against  self-­‐interest  
makes  some  sense;  inaction  less  so,  especially  according  to  the  rational  
perspective  (sic)  on  fear,  which  ostensibly  manifests  as  fight  or  flight.  The  
question  remains:  is  non-­‐firing  or  passivity  a  real  phenomenon?  The  
following  will  act  as  both  an  answer  to  this  question  and  an  examination  
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More  Right  than  Wrong:  SLAM's  Combat  Theories  
  
In  1947,  S.L.A.  Marshall  published  Men  Against  Fire,  a  short  book  
based  on  interviews  conducted  with  soldiers  in  the  fields  of  combat  during  
World  War  II.  Subtitled  'The  Problem  of  Battle  Command  in  Future  War',  
Lt.  Gen.  Marshall's  intent  was  to  bridge  the  gap  between  how  
commanders  thought  soldiers  behaved  under  fire,  and  how  they  actually  
did.  Not  an  academic—Marshall  was  an  ex-­‐reporter  with  the  acronymic  
nickname  'SLAM'  (Chambers,  2003)—his  conclusions  were  nevertheless  
semi-­‐sociological  in  nature,  locating  him  in  the  then-­‐nascent  field  of  
combat  psychology  and  motivation.  His  book  contains,  for  example,  one  of  
the  first  voicings  of  the  concept  of  the  'fighting  for  soldier  next  to  you',  
(Wong  et  al.,  2003;  Stouffer  et  al.,  1949),  where  it  was  noted  that  the  
bond  between  the  combatants  was  a  stronger  motivation  than  ideology  or  
command:  '[m]en  do  not  fight  for  a  cause  but  because  they  do  not  want  to  
let  their  comrades  down'  (Marshall,  1947:  161).    
However,  the  claim  that  made  him  famous  was  the  assertion  that  
during  active  combat,  only  15–20  percent  of  soldiers  would  return  fire  
(Marshall,  1947:  51).  This  is  not  to  say  that  soldiers  were  shirking  their  
duties;  some  would  call  point,  or  reload  for  those  who  were  firing  
(Grossman,  1996:  10;  Dyer,  2006:  14;  Holmes,  2003:  197),  all  the  while  
under  fire  and  in  equal  (or  statistically  speaking,  greater)  danger  as  the  
'active  firers':  'They  were  not  malingerers.  They  did  not  hold  back  from  the  
danger  point'  (Marshall,  1947:  59).  It  is  vital  not  to  view  this  information  
from  a  safe  academic  perspective;  these  are  real,  dangerous,  fluid,  ugly  
and  terrifying  battlefields,  where  each  second  of  hesitation  puts  the  
soldier  another  second  closer  to  a  violent  death  or  maiming.  Here,  
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Marshall  recounts  the  Makin  Island  Fight:  'The  enemy,  crazed  on  Sake,  
began  a  series  of  banzai  charges  at  dusk,  and  the  pressure  thereafter  was  
almost  unremitting  until  dawn  came.  The  frontal  gun  positions  were  all  
directly  assaulted  with  sword  and  bayoneta  Half  of  the  American  guns  
were  knocked  out  and  approximately  half  of  the  occupants  of  the  forward  
foxholes  were  either  killed  or  wounded.  Every  position  was  ringed  with  
enemy  dead'  (Marshall,  1947:  55).  Yet  Marshall,  to  his  own  surprise,  finds  
the  same  rate  of  fire,  even  in  this  most  intense  battle.  
The  one  community  that  believed  Marshall's  claim—and  from  some  
perspectives,  the  only  one  that  mattered—was  the  United  States  Army.  
After  World  War  II  and  Korea,  the  army  switched  to  a  Skinnerian  style  
pop-­‐and-­‐shoot  conditioning,  in  which  paper  targets  appeared  suddenly  
and  soldiers  were  repeatedly  told  to  fire  on  sight.  This  was  later  refined,  as  
the  targets  became  more  human-­‐like  (rather  than  simple  round  shapes),  
and  would  appear  and  disappear  quickly,  creating  an  automatic  response  
to  fire  (Grossman,  1996:  253).  According  to  David  Grossman  (Grossman,  
1996;  Grossman  et  al.,  2000),  this  raised  the  firing  rate  from  Marshall's  
claim  of  20  percent  during  World  War  II  to  90  percent  during  Vietnam.  
Grossman's  data  is  confirmed  by  Moskos  in  Vietnam  (1975)  and  Little  in  
Korea  (Little,  quoted  in  Holmes,  2003:  325).    
In  the  last  two  decades,  Marshall's  assertion  has  come  under  
increasing  scrutiny,  more  so  today  than  when  it  was  initially  published  
(Field,  2009).  One  of  Marshall's  first  critics,  Roger  Spiller,  correctly  pointed  
out  that  his  methods  were  barely  rigorous  and  could  not  be  verified  
(Spiller,  1988).  Although  Marshall  claimed  to  have  amassed  800  notebooks  
of  post-­‐combat  interviews,  a  review  of  his  collected  papers  at  the  US  Army  
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Military  History  Institute  at  Carlisle  Barracks  found  them  to  contain  'a  
couple'  (Chambers,  2003:  121).  There  have  been  numerous  counterclaims,  
including  examples  of  Canadian  soldiers  undergoing  Marshall-­‐style  post-­‐
battle  interviews  who  were  found  to  have  fired  'too  much'  (Engen,  2008:  
126).  If  we  hold  that  The  New  York  Times  and  Newsweek  (and  possibly  
Wikipedia)  represent  the  conventional  wisdom  of  our  time,  where  once  
we  believed  Marshall's  fire  ratio  conclusion  to  be  correct,  we  now  think  
his  conclusion  specious  (Halloran,  1989;  Thomas,  2007).  
As  is  often  the  case  with  conventional  wisdom,  neither  the  old  nor  
the  new  is  correct.  Critics  and  proponents  of  Marshall  have  one  thing  in  
common:  an  unwillingness  to  acknowledge  legitimate  concerns  raised  by  
either  side.  Authors  like  Gwynne  Dyer  and  David  Grossman,  who  use  
Marshall  to  bolster  their  view  that  soldiers  are  inherently  pacifistic,  
conspicuously  fail  to  mention  what  seems  to  be  very  strong  evidence  that  
Marshall  fabricated  his  data.  This  is  in  contrast  to  sociologist  Randall  
Collins,3  who  is  more  than  willing  to  admit  Marshall's  faults  (Collins,  2008:  
47).  It  does  not  help  matters  that  Grossman  has  had  a  post-­‐9/11  
Dershowitzian  about-­‐face,  where  he  argued  for  the  humanity  of  the  
soldier  and  the  deleterious  effects  of  training  to  kill  (Grossman,  1996).  He  
now  uses  the  same  evidence  to  advocate  for  better  ways  to  train,  as  long  
as  they  are  within  the  hands  of  legitimate  authority  like  the  police  and  the  
military  (Grossman,  2008).  In  either  incarnation,  critiques  of  Marshall  
remain  unacknowledged.    
                                                
2.  We  will  address  Collins'  work  in  greater  detail  in  the  following  chapter.  
3.  For  purposes  of  historical  verification,  it  bears  noting  that  this  incident  was  actually  
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Reading  further  into  this  subject,  it  was  discovered  that  Marshall's  
critics  may  have  even  more  ammunition  (so  to  speak)  than  they  thought.  
David  Grossman,  one  of  Marshall's  great  supporters  whose  work  is  often  
quoted  as  proof  of  the  soldier's  natural  disinclination  to  fight,  turns  out  to  
be  an  extremely  poor  researcher.  He  cites  the  following  pieces  of  evidence  
as  confirmation  of  Marshall's  conclusion:  'Paddy  Griffith's  data  on  the  
extraordinarily  low  killing  rate  among  Napoleonic  and  American  Civil  War  
regiments  [and]  Richard  Holmes'  assessment  of  Argentine  firing  rates  in  
the  Falklands  War'  (Grossman  et  al.,  2000:  191).  Upon  reading  Holmes'  
book,  I  was  disenchanted  to  find  that  the  assessment  was  as  follows:  
'When  I  explained  [Marshall's  thesis]  to  a  group  from  2  Para,  there  was  
immediate  recognition  that  it  applied  to  the  Argentineans,  whose  snipers  
and  machine  gunners  had  been  very  effective  while  their  individual  
riflemen  had  not'  (Holmes,  2003:  326).  It  would  be  a  stretch  to  say  that  
this  'assessment'  merits  even  anecdotal  status.  
Turning  to  Paddy  Griffith's  work,  it  is  true  that  Griffith  noted  the  low  
rate  of  fire  among  Civil  War  troops.  Griffith's  purpose  was  tangential  to  
Marshall's;  he  was  interested  instead  in  disproving  that  'the  rifle  musket  
revolutionized  tactics',  this  view  being  representative  of  a  commonly  held  
tradition  among  military  historians  that  the  technology  changes  the  fight.  
To  Griffith,  '[t]his  is  demonstrably  false,  simply  by  reference  to  the  short  
range  and  long  duration  of  the  firefights'  (Griffith,  1989a:  189).  Despite  
Grossman's  assertion,  however,  Griffiths  did  not  mention  the  Prussian  
Army  firing  tests,  upon  which  Grossman's  conclusion  rests.  It  is  very  likely  
that  knew  about  these  tests,  as  it  is  common  knowledge  among  historians  
(Chandler,  1973;  Holmes,  2011:  198),  but  he  did  not  write  about  it,  at  least  
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not  in  either  Battle  Tactics  of  the  Civil  War,  which  Grossman  cites,  or  
Military  thought  in  the  French  army,  1815–51,  which  Grossman  does  not  
cite  (Griffith,  1989a;  1989b).    
Although  neither  Marshall  nor  Grossman  can  be  called  academically  
rigorous,  this  does  not  mean  that  their  argument  is  invalid,  only  that  their  
data  is  misplaced.  Marshall's  critics  have  relied  on  what  is  often  called  
strawman  logic;  simply  put,  your  methods  are  wrong,  and  therefore  your  
conclusions  are  wrong.  As  it  happens,  what  might  be  called  the  Prussian  
Argument  (since  its  provenance  is  for  the  time-­‐obscure)  works  perfectly  
well  on  its  own,  despite  the  above  incorrect  attribution.  Combining  all  
sources,  the  argument  is  as  follows.  
The  late  18th  century  and  early  19th  century  saw  the  flourishing  of  
face-­‐to-­‐face  rifle  combat.  In  a  bizarre  and  perversely  wasteful  mixture  of  
the  phalanx  formation  and  the  recent  invention  of  the  rifle,  large  numbers  
of  men  were  ordered  to  stand  in  line,  usually  between  50  and  100  yards  
apart,  and  shoot  at  each  other  until  one  side  was  weakened  enough  for  
the  other  to  declare  victory  (or  create  a  rout,  see  Chapters  3  and  7).    
This  phenomenon  dwindled  during  the  American  Civil  War,  when  
soldiers  finally  realized  the  advantage  of  taking  cover  under  rifle  fire  (Dyer,  
2006:  245).  During  the  Napoleonic  era,  however,  the  period  of  face-­‐to-­‐
face  firing  happened  to  coincide  with  the  rise  of  statistics  and  record  
keeping.  This  means  that  we  have  a  fairly  accurate  picture  of  four  
important  numbers:  how  well  soldiers  fired  under  practice  conditions,  
how  many  soldiers  there  were  on  the  field,  how  far  apart  they  were,  and  
how  long  the  battle  lasted.    
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To  give  an  idea  of  the  relative  accuracy  under  practice  conditions,  
below  is  a  useful  example  of  a  target  from  the  American  Civil  War.  
    
These  are  not  the  blunderbusses  of  the  17th  century,  which  required  
a  mass  effect  approach.  The  rifles  used  miniunderbusses  of  t-­‐rifled  barrels  
with  helical  grooves  allowing  for  increased  accuracy  over  distance  
(Westwood,  2005:  83).    
The  Prussian  Argument  works  because,  whoever  made  it,  it  can  be  
easily  quantified.  At  the  end  of  the  18th  century,  the  Prussian  Military  
tested  their  men's  accuracy  by  erecting  a  canvas  sheet,  100  foot  by  6  foot,  
to  simulate  a  line  of  men  (Chandler,  1973:  342).  It  should  be  no  surprise  
that  they  found  that  the  closer  they  got,  the  more  accurate  the  firing  was:  
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at  225  yards,  their  accuracy  was  25  percent;  150  yards  increased  to  40  
percent;  and  at  75  yards,  the  range  at  which  most  battles  took  place,  the  
men  fired  with  60  percent  accuracy.  If  we  imagine  100  men  in  this  line  
(remembering  that  they  were  at  least  two  ranks  deep),  that  would  mean  
60  hits,  as  depicted  below.  
  
It  would  stand  to  reason  that  accuracy  on  the  battlefield  would  be  
lower  than  in  the  calm  of  training.  Given  the  confusion  of  battle,  it  would  
seem  impossible  to  assess  how  accurately  the  opposing  troops  were  firing.  
This  would  be  true,  except  that  what  we  do  know  is  how  long  the  battles  
would  take—often  hours  before  there  were  any  decisive  casualties.    
With  a  reload  rate  of  about  20  seconds,  it  would  take  less  than  a  
minute  to  hit  every  man  on  the  field  if  the  60  percent  rate  of  accuracy  was  
perfectly  reproduced.  If  we  take  attrition  into  account  (that  the  other  side  
is  doing  the  same  firing,  and  losing  a  proportional  amount  of  men),  a  fight  
under  training  accuracy  would  take  about  two  minutes.  The  battle  time  of  
Waterloo  is  fixed;  we  know  one  section  to  have  lasted  five  hours  
(Hougoumont  Farm),  and  another  section  six  hours  (Wellington's  reverse).  
With  time  as  a  constant,  now  accuracy  becomes  the  variable.  As  time  
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increases,  assuming  consistent  firing  (see  next  paragraph),  it  follows  that  
accuracy  must  diminish.  This  is  true,  but  what  is  surprising  is  by  how  
much.  Extrapolating  from  the  time  difference,  what  we  would  have  after  
the  first  volley  is  a  sheet  that  looks  like  this:  
  
One  could  introduce  a  third  variable:  number  of  shots  actually  fired,  
but  as  per  the  record  keeping  above,  this  is  also  a  known  value.  According  
to  Griffith's  (among  other  historians')  assessment  of  the  amount  of  
ammunition  used  in  the  Civil  War,  it  would  reside  anywhere  from  one  
hundred  to  one  thousand  shots  for  each  casualty  (Griffith,  1989a:  85).  
Griffith's  is  not  the  highest  estimate—Holmes  gives  an  overview  that  
ranges  from  500  to  3,000  (Holmes,  2003:  167).  This  is  a  stronger  
confirmation  of  Marshall's  conclusion,  since  the  Napoleonic  battles  did  not  
involve  men  in  cover,  on  the  own,  etc.,  but  instead  men  facing  each  other,  
usually  fewer  than  50  yards  apart.  Here,  every  second  of  delay  is  a  risk,  
and  yet  they  are  missing  at  what  can  only  be  called  an  astounding  rate.    
As  a  possible  corollary  to  Marshall's  findings,  it  could  be  that  soldiers  
do  fire,  but  inaccurately.  Dave  Grossman  additionally  notes  that  the  
majority  of  rifles  recovered  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  were  found  
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unfired  and  often  even  loaded.  During  the  civil  war,  the  standard  weapon  
was  a  muzzle-­‐loading  rifled  musket.  Before  the  mass  production  of  the  
self-­‐contained  bullet,  rifles  required  the  user  to  tear  the  pre-­‐weighed  
paper  packet  of  gunpowder,  fill  with  the  powder,  compress  the  padding  
with  a  tamp,  loading  the  bullet,  and  so  on,  with  musket  rifles  requiring  
between  9  and  22  steps  to  load  (Griffiths,  1989a:  55).  This  was  a  process  
that  took  between  20  and  30  seconds  (Grossman,  1996:  22).  Of  the  27,  
574  rifles  recovered  at  Gettysburg,  24,000,  or  87  percent,  were  loaded.  Of  
these,  18,000  had  two  or  more  loads,  with  the  fullest  rifle  having  22  loads.  
Grossman  theorizes  that  the  best  explanation  for  this  is  that  the  majority  
of  soldiers  were  loading,  not  firing,  and  then  loading  again  and  again,  
mechanically  and  according  to  drill.  Even  discounting  the  single  loads,  at  
least  half  the  men  facing  a  line  of  fire  would  automatically  load  and  reload  
their  weapons  without  firing  back  (Grossman,  1996;  2008).  
Griffith  counters  that  these  rifles  were  discarded  because  they  were  
useless,  and  estimates  the  number  of  actual  misloads  to  be  nine  percent  
(Griffiths,  1989a:  91).  Ultimately,  this  discovery  fails  to  rise  to  the  
evidentiary  challenge.  Firstly,  from  a  mathematical  perspective,  both  
Griffith  and  Grossman  fail  to  show  their  work.  Who  was  recovering  the  
rifles?  Why  nine  percent  misloads?  What  were  the  criteria  for  the  soldier  
leaving  them  behind,  besides  the  obvious,  mortal,  one?  On  the  one  hand,  
the  plentiful  amount  of  rifles  during  the  Civil  War  meant  that  it  would  be  
easy  to  jettison  one  and  take  another.  On  the  other  hand,  the  best  
explanation  for  a  'recovered'  rifle  would  be  a  soldier  who  had  died,  
meaning  the  sample  population  that  qualify  for  X  (those  who  abandon  
their  rifles)  are  mostly  deceased.  Given  that  who  dies  and  who  lives  in  this  
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type  of  standoff  battle  is  essentially  random,  a  sample  of  found  rifles  
would  be  statistically  correlative  to  those  carried  away.  If  so,  Grossman's  
conclusion  would  be  based  on  a  random  sample;  if  more  than  half  the  
soldiers  were  loading  their  rifles  and  not  firing  them,  this  is  a  significant  
finding.    
The  second  problem  with  this  conclusion,  on  both  sides,  is  the  data.  It  
seems  the  original  source  cannot  be  found.  Dodge  (the  earliest  source,  
1865)  quotes  J.G.  Dudley,  the  Master  Armorer  for  Washington;  Benton,  
like  many  that  follow,  does  not  cite  a  source  (Dodge,  1865;  Benton,  J.G.  
1867:  241).  Curiously,  early  20th-­‐century  writers  seem  to  drop  the  zero  
and  use  2,400  as  the  number  of  rifles  that  were  recovered  loaded,  a  
substantial  difference  (Minnigh,  1924;  Gilbert,  1922:  144).  The  
conveniently  round  numbers  after  the  suspiciously  accurate  '27,574'  
should  also  cause  us  to  be  wary  of  the  data.  I  am  inclined  to  believe  
Grossman's  conclusion:  the  higher  numbers  are  from  more  sources  closer  
in  time  to  the  original;  furthermore,  as  we  do  not  know  how  the  sample  
was  collected,  random  is  the  best  default.  In  the  end,  however,  there  are  
too  many  variables  to  draw  a  conclusive  result,  and  instead  I  would  use  
the  case  study  of  the  recovered  rifle  as  an  example  of  chasing  the  
conclusion.  In  these  controversial  arenas,  any  conclusion  tends  to  find  its  
evidence,  rather  than  the  other  way  around.    
  
The  Stopped  Clock:  Evidence  from  Other  Areas  
  
Where  does  this  author  stand  on  the  conclusions  of  S.L.A.  Marshall?  
It  is  fair  to  say  that  Marshall  failed  to  engage  with  even  the  most  cursory  
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empiricism,  very  probably  fabricated  most  of  his  data,  and  exaggerated  
what  were  only  casual  observations.  Given  the  evidence  from  other  fields,  
however,  he  may  have  just  been  happily  correct,  as  'SLAM  was  more  right  
than  wrong'  (Collins,  2008:  52).  The  Prussian  Argument  satisfies  some  
empirical  criteria,  but  what  confirms  Marshall's  general  conclusion  is  the  
vast  amount  of  historical  evidence  spanning  across  time,  culture  and  
situation.  This  thesis  will  explore  these  examples  in  greater  depth,  but  it  is  
important  to  give  enough  of  a  sample  here  to  argue  that  inaction  in  the  
face  of  violence  is  common  enough  to  be  a  legitimate  phenomenon.    
A  gruesome  but  relevant  example  occurred  during  the  pre-­‐holocaust  
in  the  Eastern  Europe—the  'Holocaust  by  bullets'  (Desbois,  2008),  so-­‐
called  because  of  the  sub-­‐organized  and  personal  nature  of  the  violence.  
Obergruppenfy  bullets'  (Desbois,  2008),  so-­‐called  because  of  the  sub-­‐
organized  and  personal  nature  of  the  vig'  (Rhodes,  2002:  114)  at  Rumbula  
in  Latvia  and  Babi  Yar  in  the  Ukraine.  In  order  to  save  time  (as  well  as  
create  a  dehumanizing  situation  to  ease  the  violence),  victims  were  led  to  
mass  graves,  and  then  asked  to  lie  down  on  those  who  had  been  shot  
before,  thereupon  to  be  shot  themselves.  At  the  same  time  in  Kaunas,  
Lithuanian  Friekorps  were  funneling  men  to  the  deaths  at  the  hands  of  
recently  released  convicts:    
'On  the  concrete  forecourt  of  the  petrol  station  a  blond  man  
of  medium  height,  aged  about  twenty-­‐five,  stood  leaning  on  
a  wooden  club,  resting.  The  club  was  as  thick  as  his  arm  and  
came  up  to  his  chest.  At  his  feet  lay  about  fifteen  to  twenty  
dead  or  dying  people.  Water  flowed  continuously  from  a  
hose  washing  blood  away  into  the  drainage  gully.  Just  a  few  
steps  behind  this  man  some  twenty  men,  guarded  by  armed  
civilians,  stood  waiting  for  their  cruel  execution  in  silent  
submission.  In  response  to  a  cursory  wave  the  next  man  
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stepped  forward  silently  and  was  then  beaten  to  death  with  
the  wooden  club  in  the  most  bestial  manner,  each  blow  
accompanied  by  enthusiastic  shouts  from  the  audience4'  
(Rhodes,  2002:  47).  
    
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  dangerous  to  use  instance  of  genocide  as  an  
example  of  passivity.  It  smacks  of  victim  blaming  in  an  instance  where,  in  
fact,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  we  would  behave  any  differently.  Our  
empathic  comprehension  in  turn  locates  this  behavior  in  the  matrix  of  
obedience,  a  topic  this  thesis  will  address  in  Chapter  6.  At  this  juncture,  
what  we  can  say  is  that  inaction  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  at  Baba  Yar  and  
Kaunas  is,  from  a  causal  perspective,  a  more  extreme  example  than  
soldiers  under  fire.  Marshall's  veterans  faced  the  risk  of  death,  but  were,  
in  fact,  statistically  unlikely  to  see  it;  the  Ukrainians  and  Lithuanians  here  
faced  certain  death,  and,  unlike  the  20  percent  of  soldiers  who  fire  back,  
do  not  resist  at  all.    
The  point  of  describing  these  events  in  such  detail  is  to  challenge  the  
notion  that  Marshall  challenges:  that,  despite  their  beliefs,  human  beings  
tend  not  to  fight  for  their  lives,  even  when  there  is  no  cost  to  do  so.  One  
could  argue  that  in  cases  of  genocide,  an  untrained  civilian  population  
come  face-­‐to-­‐face  with  an  armed  and  trained  militia.  Historically,  
however,  there  are  numerous  instances  of  mass  murder  perpetrated  
against  trained  soldiers.  After  the  fall  of  Nanking,  the  50,000  Japanese  
troops  were  able  to  kill  the  90,000  Chinese  troops  who  had  survived,  
again,  without  significant  resistance.  It  was  something  that  Japanese  
                                                
3.  For  purposes  of  historical  verification,  it  bears  noting  that  this  incident  was  actually  
photographed.  
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commander  General  Nakajima  himself  did  not  expect:  'It  is  tremendously  
difficult  even  just  to  disarm  them...  It  would  be  disastrous  if  they  were  to  
make  any  trouble'  (Chang,  1997:  90).  Such  behavior  can  be  found  with  
captured  Soviet  POWs  (Goldhagen,  2009:  133;  Jones,  2010),  the  sack  of  
Carthage  (Kiernan,  2007;  Hoyos,  2010),  and  even  hitmen  (Hoffman  and  
Headley,  cited  in  Collins,  2008:  459).  Although  it  is  not  possible  to  make  a  
statistical  claim  to  this  effect,  those  who  are  trained  in  violence  are  
seemingly  no  more  likely  to  resist  than  those  who  are  not.    
Although,  to  my  knowledge,  there  has  not  been  a  study  specific  to  
crime  victimology,  or  a  collate  study  to  compare  the  different  data  
collected,  we  find  a  similar  percentage  of  passivity  and  resistance  in  
peacetime  citizenry.  In  her  study  of  rape-­‐avoidance  strategies,  Sarah  
Ullman  found  that,  generally,  about  25  percent  of  victims  use  any  force  
against  their  attacker  (Ullman,  2007:  417).  Likewise,  Robert  Ressler  found  
about  14  percent  resistance  in  victims  of  so-­‐called  organized  killers  
(Ressler  et  al.,  1986).  On  the  one  hand,  we  can  note  the  victims  do  not  
know  if  they  are  going  to  die  (save  for  the  exceptional  cases  of  targeted  
killers),  which  would  mean  that  not  resisting  is  understandable.  On  the  
other  hand,  it  is  important  to  note  that  so  few  even  resist  by  running  (as  
part  of  the  apocryphal  fight  or  flight  response),  especially  given  that  less  
than  11  percent  of  attackers  use  any  weapon  (Bachman,  1998:  11).  Nor  
can  it  explain  the  phenomenon  of  'immobility',  where  victims  simply  
freeze  and  become  non-­‐responsive  (Ullman,  2007:  414).    
If  each  of  these  cases  introduces  new  evidence  that  people  under  
threat  of  death  only  occasionally  act  in  self-­‐defense  or  in  their  personal  
best  interest,  there  is  a  reasonable  (technically  an  emotional)  explanation  
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for  this:  they  were  terrified.  Griffith  describes  the  following  situation  for  
the  soldier  in  a  two-­‐rank  firing  line:  'soldiers  in  each  rank  almost  touching  
each  other's  elbows,  [t]hey  would  naturally  jostle  and  shove  each  other  as  
they  drew  their  ramrods  and  pushed  home  their  cartridges.  Anyone  in  the  
second  rank  would  have  to  lean  forward  to  fire  through  the  space  
between  the  two  men  in  the  front  rank,  who  would  receive  a  flash  and  a  
cloud  of  smoke  in  their  eyes  and  a  numbing  explosion  at  the  level  of  their  
ears'  (Griffith,  1989a:  89).    
It  is  only  natural  that  soldiers  would  behave  differently  in  combat  than  
in  training,  just  as  anyone  behaves  differently  when  afraid.  The  cognitive  
effects  of  extreme  stress  has  been  called  'peritraumatic  dissociation',  with  
'a  lack  of  association  in  one’s  thoughts  and  perceptions  oneme  stress  has  
been  called  'peritraand  Brunson,  2009:  122).  Human  beings  under  
extreme  stress  perform,  and  perceive,  differently  than  they  might  in  
training,  or  in  everyday  life.  Initially  studied  as  a  significant  factor  in  
incidents  of  PTSD  (Marmar  et  al.,  1998;  Marmar  et  al.,  1994),  this  has  
recently  been  a  topic  of  study  in  real  time.  That  is  to  say,  the  
disassociation  that  occurs  during  stress  is  as  significant  during  
performance  as  it  is  after  the  fact.  In  the  arguably  less  stressful  (certainly  
less  prolonged)  occurrence  of  police  shootings,  this  lack  of  association  
manifested  specifically  in  spatial  distortions  (time  slowing  down  or  
speeding  up)  and  aural  focusing  (either  no  sound  or  heightened  sound  of  
specific  objects  or  noises),  and  so  on  (Klinger  and  Brunson,  2009;  see  also  
Schade  et  al.,  1989).  Only  six  percent  of  police  officers  involved  reported  
no  distortions  (Klinger  and  Brunson,  2009:  129).    
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This  could  potentially  nullify  the  Marshall  argument,  as  peritraumatic  
dissociation  of  this  kind  would  explain  the  above  case  studies  as  well  as  
provide  an  explanation  for  the  length  of  face-­‐to-­‐face  firing  battles  in  the  
Napoleonic  era.  Yet,  for  the  larger  consistent  phenomenon  of  human  
passivity,  we  must  ask:  so  what?  From  a  measurable  point  of  view,  what  
the  soldiers  or  victims  or  leaders  are  feeling  does  not  matter  as  much  as  
what  they  did.  In  the  case  of  the  Napoleonic  soldier,  we  know  both  that  
they  were  firing  and  that  they  were  not  hitting  their  targets.  A  dissociative  
explanation  does  not  clarify  why  fear  would  cause  them  to  be  more  
inaccurate,  or,  more  to  the  point,  why  fear  would  cause  them  to  be  so  
inaccurate.  A  reduction  of  99  percent  is  not  minor,  especially  given  the  
fact  that  each  second  the  soldier  delays  is  another  moment  of  danger.  
Engen  notes  that  the  post-­‐combat  interviews  of  Canadian  Soldiers  
indicated  that  they  fired  at  a  much  higher  rate  than  Marshall's  20  percent  
(Engen,  2008).  However,  if  these  soldiers  were  not  firing  on  target,  or  
even  deliberately  firing  away  from  their  targets,  for  the  purposes  of  
discussion  of  passivity,  this  finding  is  meaningless.  If  fear  is  supposedly  
fight  or  flight,  why  is  neither  working?  If  fear  is  at  work  here,  is  there  a  
useful  definition  that  can  explain  this  behavior?  Or  is  there  some  other  
feeling  or  thought  at  play  entirely?    
Although  the  answers  to  these  questions  will  come  during  subsequent  
chapters,  what  can  be  said  at  this  point  is  that  some  individuals  
threatened  with  violence  will  not  act  violently  for  their  own  self-­‐interests,  
at  least  in  great  enough  numbers  to  merit  study.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  
large  enough  percentage  to  say  that  a  choice  is  being  made.  It  would  be  
tempting  to  frame  this  in  instrumental  terms:  that  X  fired  and  Y  did  not.  If  
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seen  under  a  rational  choice  paradigm,  the  choice  not  to  fire  is  difficult  to  
credit;  both  the  large  (meaning  society)  and  small  (within  the  military  unit)  
group  pressure  is  telling  them  to  fire,  as  well  as  the  authority  figure  under  
direct  command.  Beyond  that,  there  is  the  individual's  desire  to  survive  
within  the  zero  sum  game  of  combat:  kill  or  be  killed.  How  is  this  choice  
made?    
While  Chapter  3  will  address  more  conventional  views  on  violence  and  
reactions  to  it,  the  following  chapter  covers  this  phenomenon  (as  well  as  
the  phenomenon  of  violence)  from  a  rational  choice  perspective.  How  
could  dying  or  killing  be  seen  as  rational  within  differing  rational  choice  
perspectives,  or,  sometimes,  how  is  it  seen?  Most  importantly,  what  do  
these  theories  tell  us  about  apprehension  itself,  and  about  the-­‐feeling  
based  process  of  making  a  rational  choice.    
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Chapter  2:    Is   Rationality  Emotional?  
  
Within  this  thesis,  the  structure  of  emotions  (defined  as  any  feeling  
generated  by  a  thought)  has  two  components:  apprehension  and  
attribution.  The  two  fields  under  review—rational  choice  and  the  
sociology  of  violence—usefully  demonstrate  each  of  these  components  in  
order.  Rationality  requires  a  formulation  of  schemic  order,  just  as  
sociological  theories  of  violence  (dealt  with  in  the  following  chapter)  
require  a  causal  agency—someone  or  something  to  blame.  These  will  be  
addressed  in  the  same  order  that  they  are  in  cognition;  before  we  ask  
'who  did  it?',  first  we  must  determine  'What  is  that?'.  
Rationality,  despite  its  placement  in  the  reason/passion  divide,  
maintains  a  strong  associated  feeling  in  relation  to  cognitive  order,  that  
we  'want  to  be  rational'.  This  construction  can  be  seen  as  schemic:  that  
certain  orderings  of  causality  (such  as  the  cause  and  effect  demanded  by  
rationality)  have  a  feeling  component  within  them;  that  we  desire  sense;  
or,  at  least,  that  we  shun  anything  perceived  as  a  violation  of  that.  First,  
we  will  address  the  case  study  of  passivity  and  violence  within  established  
frameworks  of  rational  choice,  finding  some  partially,  but  not  wholly,  
satisfactory  explanatory  value  within  these  schools.  The  way  in  which  
academic  systems  fail  to  explain  how  we  fail  to  fight,  or  fight  when  there  is  
no  need,  will  lead  to  an  understanding  of  the  weaknesses  at  the  core  of  
rational  choice:  that  the  desire  for  causal  order  is  central  to  both  these  
theories,  and  the  behavior  they  attempt  to  explain.    
               §  §  §  
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Surely,  actions  that  lead  to  an  individual's  death,  and  which  achieve  
no  other  goal,  are  the  sine  non  qua  of  irrationality.  In  fact,  calling  these  
actors  'irrational'  would  be  in  keeping  with  the  current  state  of  any  
number  of  rationality  theories.  Although  the  concept  of  passivity  and  tonic  
immobility  has  not  been  discussed  specifically  within  a  rational  choice  
framework,  there  are  many  behaviors  that  relate.  Violence  is  a  classically  
'rational'  behavior  in  terms  of  war  and  the  state.  The  idea  that  violence  
was  a  means  to  an  end  may  be  one  of  the  oldest  social  concepts,  the  self-­‐
interested  actor  at  work.  Strict  rational  choice  approaches  criminal  
violence  from  the  same  perspective—that  the  best  way  to  deal  with  crime  
is  as  if  the  criminal  is  seen  as  a  rational  actor.  Suicide,  the  seemingly  
inexplicable  behavior  of  a  subject  that  is  self-­‐interested,  has  also  been  the  
topic  of  debate  within  rationality  circles,  understood  as  the  desire  to  gain  
'social  capital',  or  as  a  function  of  available  means.  Finally,  entries  on  
suicide  bombing  and  rationality  have  exploded  in  the  last  10  years,  largely  
as  a  reaction  to  the  typical  depiction  of  the  suicide  terrorist  as  'irrational'.  
This  doesn't  form  a  matrix  per  se,  but  it  could  be  seen  in  the  classical  
rational  schema,  like  so:  
            End               Means    
Violence:           death  of  other;         outer  directed  violence.  
Suicide:           death  of  self;         inner  directed  violence.  
Suicide  bombing:     death  of  self  and  other;     outer  and  inner  directed  violence.  
Passive  reaction:     death  of  self;         no  violence.  
  
This  thesis  will  investigate  four  seemingly  divergent  rationality  
schools:  Gary  Becker's  strict  rational  choice  theory,  Habermas'  
communicative  rationality,  Jon  Elster's  elaborate  and  highly  critical  version  
from  the  philosophy  of  social  science,  and  Max  Weber's  early,  and  one  
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might  say,  untainted,  formulation.  The  order  of  these  presentations  is  
important.  Although  not  historical,  it  is  chronological,  moving  in  order  of  
increasing  critique,  from  total  embrace  to  high  skepticism.  Despite  the  
actual  timeline,  Gary  Becker  offers  the  most  brute  force  version  of  
rationality,  just  as  Habermas  emerges  as  a  critique  to  that  form  in  the  
incorporation  of  sociality.  Jon  Elster,  writing  contemporarily,  has  a  
generous  'toolbox',  incorporating  modern  takes  of  heuristics  and  biases,  
game  theory,  and  so  on.  Furthermore,  Elster  allows  emotion  into  choice,  
and  has  written  extensively  on  the  topics  of  emotion  and  rationality.  
Finally,  despite  writing  before  any  of  the  others,  Max  Weber's  version  of  
rationality  paradoxically  offers  the  greatest  flexibility  in  interpretation.  
Like  Elster,  Weber  maintains  a  strong  suspicion  of  rationality,  as  well  as  a  
willingness  to  engage  affect.  The  significant  difference  is  Weber's  
formulation  of  verstahen  ('understanding'),  which  allows  for  a  sequential  
and  explicable  interpretation  of  feeling.  
Each  section  will  contain  an  account  of  their  particular  brand  of  
rationality,  how  it  relates  to  or  critiques  the  other  brands,  and  how  it  is  
critiqued  itself  by  the  others.  The  section  will  then  continue  to  discuss  
how  each  is,  or  could  be,  applied  to  the  case  study  of  violence  and  
passivity,  with  particular  attention  given  to  the  topic  of  suicide  bombings,  
and  how  each  application  fits,  or  fails  to.  The  criterion  that  each  theory  
will  undergo  originates  from  Raymond  Boudon  (see  introduction),  and  
ultimately  from  rationality  itself:  is  it  explanatory  or  descriptive?  If  not  
explanatory,  why  not?  This  approach  will  reveal  two  flaws  of  rational  
choice  in  its  current  state.  The  first  is  a  failure  to  address  (or  to  treat  as  
irrelevant)  the  ends,  and  that  rationality  in  each  case  only  operates  in  
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terms  of  the  structure  of  its  means.  The  second  is  a  philosophical  
unwillingness  to  engage  its  core  and  unquestioned  dependency  on  
causality.    
    
Homo  Economus:  Gary  Becker  
  
It  would  not  be  difficult  to  argue  that  rational  choice  theory  has  its  
origins  in  economics.  Some  propose  that  the  earliest  form  of  rational  
thought  existed  in  tandem  with  early  Sumerian  and  Egyptian  bookkeeping  
practices;  just  as  they  were  being  taught  numbers,  the  clerks  were  told  
how  to  deal  with  equals,  superiors  and  inferiors,  combining  the  'ideal  with  
the  practical'  (Rutgers,  1999:  2).  This  historically  connects  the  rise  of  
economics  with  the  advent  of  the  rational.  Gary  Becker,  one  of  RCT's  main  
proponents  and  founders,  summed  it  up  for  his  1992  Nobel  Prize  
acceptance  speech:  '[m]y  research  uses  the  economic  approach  to  analyze  
social  issues  that  range  beyond  those  usually  considered  by  economists'  
(Becker,  1993:  385).  In  this  case,  we  are  not  necessarily  approaching  this  
school  from  a  critical  point  of  view,  only  trying  to  identify  what  makes  this  
particular  rationality  distinct  from  the  others  to  be  discussed  below.  
As  such,  an  economically  minded  approach  has  its  costs,  to  be  sure,  
but  also  its  benefits.  While  Adam  Smith  may  not  be  the  'father'  of  
economic  theory,  it  may  be  useful  to  consider  Smith's  postulate  of  supply  
and  demand,  given  both  his  popularity  in  the  canon,  as  well  as  Becker's  
own  admission  of  Smith's  influence  (Roberts,  2006).  We  are  able  to  
overstep  the  controversy  surrounding  his  'invisible  hand'  thesis  (that  
society  is  regulated  by  the  economic  self-­‐interest  of  its  component  agents)  
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because  Smith  represents  ideas  that  are  explicable  for  rational  choice.  
Take,  for  example,  the  way  in  which  unit  price  has  been  conceptualized:  
'The  market  price  of  every  particular  commodity  is  regulated  by  the  
proportion  between  the  quantity  which  is  actually  brought  to  market,  and  
the  demand  of  those  who  are  willing  to  pay  the  natural  price  of  the  
commodity'  (Smith,  1904:  1,7  and  8).  
Here  we  have  one  variable  (price)  being  determined  by  two  others  
(due  to  a  desire  to  conserve  money  on  the  part  of  the  buyer,  juxtaposed  
with  a  desire  to  increase  money  on  the  part  of  the  seller).  Whether  or  not  
Smith  has  accurately  described  how  the  market  self-­‐regulates  according  to  
the  baker  and  brewer,  he  has  explained  a  social  phenomenon  in  terms  of  
what  rational  choice  theorists  would  call  utility  maximization,  where  
desire  for  capital  is  the  easily  graspable  utility.  This  is  Becker's  attraction  
to  rational  choice  as  a  theory—that  it  eschews  'black  boxes...inscrutable,  
often  capricious  tastes'  (Becker  and  Stigler,  1977:  76)  that  one  encounters  
when  using  terms  like  'norms'  and  'psychological  constraints'.  This  is  not  
unlike  Boudon's  (and  this  thesis')  preference  for  the  explanatory  over  the  
descriptive.  
This  form  of  interpretation  is  then  applied  to  non-­‐economic  
phenomena,  as  was  Becker's  own  work  on  crime.  What  motivates  an  actor  
to  commit  asocial  and  violent  acts  had  been,  and  remains,  understood  by  
'descriptive'  paradigms:  '(the)  special  theories  of  anomie,  psychological  
inadequacies,  or  inheritance  of  special  traits'  (Becker,  1974:  2).  Instead  of  
the  traditional  and  self-­‐perpetuating  explanations  of  poverty,  cycles  of  
violence,  sociological  factors,  the  character  of  the  poor,  and  even  evil,  
rational  choice  offers  the  economic  model,  used  here  to  mean  that  
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behavior  is  understood  by  utility  maximization  and  preferences.  Although  
initiated  by  Becker  and  others,  it  was  the  logistical  formulation  of  Cohen  
and  Felson  (1979)  and  Meier  and  Miethe  (1979)  that  came  to  be  
implemented  in  social  policy  as  situational  crime  prevention  (SCP).  Here,  
crime  is  not  a  psychological  or  moral  defect,  but  a  function  of  the  
'convergence  of  several  factors:  risky  situations,  suitable  targets,  
motivated  offenders,  and  an  absence  of  capable  guardians'  (Ullman,  2007:  
416).  One  can  see  the  power  of  the  rational  choice  perspective,  not  only  in  
the  explanatory  sense,  but  in  its  measurable  efficacy:  police  using  this  
perspective  have  reduced  crime  (Clarke,  1997;  Cornish  and  Clarke,  2003).  
How  then,  might  such  an  approach  address  the  case  studies  of  tonic  
immobility?  We  have  an  advantage  here  in  that  rationality  theories  (with  
the  possible  exception  of  Jürgen  Habermas')  are  designed  to  explain  
specific  phenomena,  and,  in  fact,  fail  and  succeed  according  to  a  particular  
case  study  under  scrutiny.  War,  terrorism,  family  dynamics,  shopping  
behavior,  crime,  drug  addiction,  voting—the  list  of  behaviors  under  review  
is  seemingly  endless,  the  exception  being,  naturally  enough,  this  case  
study  of  passivity  under  threat  of  death.  Violence  can  sometimes  be  
explained  through  the  opportunity  model,  which  views  crime  is  rational,  
and  needs  only  societal  constraints  to  contain  it.  We  are  presented  with  
the  less  than  useful  idea  that  passivity  and  non-­‐productive  violence  is  
simply  irrational,  which  is  the  black  box  we  have  been  attempting  to  
avoid.  
However,  if  we  consider  suicide  and  suicide  terrorism,  we  have  case  
studies  in  which  the  end  result  is  the  same:  the  actor  dies.  RCT  has  seen  a  
massive  amount  of  literature  arise  around  the  topic  of  suicide  terrorism  
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(Argo,  2009;  Berman  and  Laitin,  2005;  Benmelech  and  Berrebi,  2007;  
Gupta  and  Mundra,  2005;  Hafez,  2006;  see  Lluss00and  Tavares,  2007  for  
an  overview),  and  in  what  ways  the  behavior  can  be  considered  rational.  
Similar  to  the  suitable  targets'  hypothesis  above,  Bermin  and  Laitin  posit  a  
correlation  between  'hard  targets'  and  suicide  bombing  as  a  rational  
strategy  to  overcome  the  discrepancy  between  technologically  advanced  
states  and  non-­‐state  actors  (Berman  and  Laitin,  2005).  More  along  
Beckerian  lines,  Efraim  Benmelech  and  Claude  Berrebi  propose  a  
relationship  between  human  capital  and  success  of  attacks,  that  older,  
better-­‐educated  suicide  bombers  are,  by  and  large,  more  effective  
(Benmelech  and  Berrebi,  2007).  
Another  relational  argument  is  found  in  suicide  itself,  the  initial  
application  of  which  was  by  Hamermesh  and  Soss  (1974),  providing  the  
following  formula:  
Um  =  U  {C  (m,  YP)  -­‐  K(m)}  >  O  
  
where  YP  is  permanent  income,  U  is  utility,  m  age,  and  K  cost  of  
maintenance.  The  point  of  these  formulas  may  seem  perplexing,  or  even  
deliberately  obfuscating,  but  the  idea  behind  the  economic  approach  is  to  
take  measurable  variables  and,  by  aggregating  mass  data,  discover  which  
variables  are  positively  correlated  and  which  are  negatively  correlated.  
The  subscript  variable  (m)  refers  to  one  individual's  data  so  that  the  
entirety  of  the  group  in  question  can  be  inputted  at  once.  From  this,  one  
can  extract  which  variables  affect  the  outcome  (O,  usually  expressed  as  a  
threshold,  i.e.  if  greater  than  1,  the  outcome  is  reached;  if  less  than  one,  
failed).  Assuming  that  the  factors  (or  social  capital)  have  been,  or  can  be,  
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accurately  measured,  one  can  determine  whether  there  is  a  correlation,  
and  how  strong  it  is.  This  with  the  caveat  that  correlative  relationships  are  
not  necessarily  causal;  if  for  example,  old  age  is  positively  correlated  with  
suicide  rates,  as  it  has  been  in  Hamermesh  and  Soss'  study,  this  could  be  a  
function  of  disease,  higher  rates  of  senility,  and  so  on.  
Let  us  anticipate  an  RCT  perspective  that  addresses  combat  passivity.  
We  take  as  our  case  study  the  combat  reaction  during  the  Battle  of  
Gettysburg  during  the  American  Civil  War  (Barton  and  Logue,  2002;  
Griffiths  1986;  Grossman,  1996).  Of  the  27,574  muskets  recovered  from  
the  battlefield,  more  than  90  percent  of  were  found  to  be  loaded,  and  50  
percent  of  those  more  than  once.  From  this,  combined  with  the  speed  at  
which  breech-­‐loading  rifles  may  be  reloaded,  Dave  Grossman  calculates  
that  at  least  70  percent  of  the  soldiers  were  not  effective  firers  
(Grossman,  1996:  136).  This  is  despite  the  tactics  of  the  day,  which  
involved  standing  in  a  line  facing  one's  enemy  30–60  yards  apart,  and  
shooting  until  the  battle  was  decisive.  
There  are  two  arguments  to  be  made:  one  from  a  classical  
perspective  of  economics,  and  the  second  from  the  concept  of  'human  
capital'.  Let  us  briefly  address  the  latter.  Human  capital,  according  to  Gary  
Becker,  is  the  combination  of  social  capital  and  personal  capital  (Becker,  
1994;  1996;  Becker  and  Rubenstein,  2011;  Bolton,  2005),  or  'the  extension  
of  the  utility-­‐maximizing  approach  to  include  endogenous  preferences'  
(Becker  1994:  2).  Rather  than  abandon  the  'utility  maximization'  approach,  
Becker  argues,  for  example,  that  actions  that  put  individuals  at  personal  
disadvantage  may  increase  'social  capital'.  In  the  case  of  his  theories  of  
family  dynamics,  economics  play  a  part  in  making  a  decision  to  divorce,  
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but  other  factors,  such  as  'feelings  of  duty'  and  altruism,  can  be  seen  as  
forms  of  capital  to  be  increased  and  decreased  for  the  individual  (Becker,  
1996:  138).  
It  could  be  said  that  the  best  argument  using  this  model  might  be  
along  the  lines  that  shared  humanity  is  a  form  of  social  capital.  
Evolutionary  arguments  have  been  made  for  animal  behavior  that  
'empathy  is  a  phylogenetically  continuous  phenomenon'  (Preston  and  De  
Waal,  2002:  2).  For  our  case  study,  and  somewhat  anecdotally,  Gwynne  
Dyer  notes  how  the  Christmas  Truce  of  1914  emphasized  that  individual  
soldiers  had  more  in  common  with  each  other  than  either  their  countries  
or  their  superior  officers  (Dyer,  2006).  Rationality  has  studied  empathy  (as  
a  function  of  non-­‐rational  behavior)  in  so-­‐called  helping  behavior,  where  
people  risk  their  own  lives  for  others  with  no  self-­‐interested  gain,  and  at  
increased  risk.  In  this  case,  'a  sense  of  belonging  to  humankind'  (Opp,  
1997;  see  also  Kroneberg  et  al.,  2010;  Varese  and  Yaish,  2000;  Staub,  
1993)  is  a  semi-­‐established  form  of  social  capital  within  the  field  of  RCT.  
It  would  be  easy  to  critique  the  seemingly  arbitrary  assignation  of  a  
number  to  a  particular  human  capital,  like  conformity,  or  empathy.  This  
remains,  however,  a  classically  human  practice:  'The  fact  that  there  is  no  
reliable  way  of  assigning  numbers  to  intrinsic  levels  of  satisfaction  or  
dissatisfaction  does  not  prove  that  the  idea  is  meaningless,  any  more  than  
our  inability  to  quantify  and  compare  the  levels  of  satisfaction  of  different  
individuals  shows  that  the  idea  of  interpersonal  comparison  of  welfare  is  
meaningless'  (Elster,  2009:  200).  Unfortunately,  even  without  what  may  
be  called  numerical  bias,  numerating  a  desire  or  action  or  value  does  not  
actually  promote  any  greater  expiation.  However  numerical  it  is  
      -­‐46-­‐  
 
expressed,  if  we  propose  that  all  behavior  is  interest,  then  all  behavior  is  
desire,  which  becomes  its  own  tautology:  this  is  no  different  than  saying  
'people  are  motivated  by  their  motivations'.  'Valuesed,  if  we  propose  that  
all  behavior  is  interest,  then  all  behavior  io  explain  how  they  change  we  
should  have  to  introduce  additional  psychological  mechanisms  that  have  
nothing  to  do  with  rationality'  (Heath,  quoted  in  Scott,  1999:  8).  
Even  if  we  assume  that  social  capital  can  be  numerated,  we  run  into  
a  second  problem,  which  I  will  attempt  to  demonstrate  using  classically  
economic  RCT.  If  we  look  at  the  Civil  War  case  study,  there  are  many  
factors  that  can  be  counted:  age,  individual  wealth,  rank,  position  of  
soldier  in  formation,  and  so  on.  We  are  assuming  information  that  we  do  
not  have  on  hand,  since  these  were  rifles  acquired  after  the  battle,  but  
this  is  a  theoretical  argument  in  any  case.  The  easiest  and  most  empirical  
variable  would  be  position  on  the  battlefield.  It  has  been  demonstrated,  
for  example,  that  the  presence  of  a  commanding  officer  increases  the  fire  
rate  of  a  non-­‐commissioned  soldier  (Grossman,  2008;  Collins,  2010;  
Marshall,  1947).  We  will  draw  the  simplest  formula:  
            1  
Rm=  11ill    
             Dm  
  
Where  R  are  the  rounds  recovered  and  D  is  the  distance  of  an  
individual  soldier  (m)  from  the  commanding  officer.  This  could  get  more  
complex  according  to  class,  difference  in  rank,  etc.,  but  because  we  don't  
actually  have  the  data,  there  would  be  little  point  in  constructing  it.  Here,  
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we  are  just  trying  to  show  that  a  formula  describing  an  inverse  correlation  
between  authority  distance  and  firing  rate  is  possible  and  testable.  
A  reasonable  (or  rational)  enough  argument,  but  we  have  
unfortunately  closed  the  loop  of  what  is  descriptive  and  what  is  
explanatory—the  'costs'  of  an  economic  argument.  Economic  theory,  by  
virtue  of  its  subject,  must  always  in  some  way  address  what  can  be  
counted  or  measured.  Even  if  we  accept  the  above  are  causal  and  not  
correlative,  the  problem  arises  in  the  exaggeration  that  occurs  when  this  
numerical  practice  is  employed.  Sociologist  James  Scott  has  written  about  
the  concept  of  'legibility',  the  tendency  for  social  projects  to  over-­‐
prioritize  the  countable,  and  the  comprehensible  over  the  more  nebulous,  
but  very  real,  alternate  aspects  of  human  behavior.  Scott  links  this  
practice  to  the  near-­‐empty  Brasilia  housing  project,  and  the  disastrous  
Stalinist  agricultural  reforms  (Scott,  1998,  see  final  chapter).  The  practice  
of  over-­‐  and  undercounting  is  also  known  as  the  availability  heuristic  
(Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979;  Elster,  2009),  and  is  something  to  which  
even  statisticians  are  subject  (Sunstein,  2005).  
This  is  not  to  say  that  rational  choice  is  incorrect,  merely  a  partial  
theory,  something  to  which  theorists  seemed  more  attune  during  its  
infancy:  'In  no  sense  do  we  claim  that  the  individual  agony  in  suicide  
stems  from  what  is  solely  an  economic  calculation;  the  majority  of  suicides  
can  perhaps  be  explained  on  non-­‐economic  grounds'  (Hamermesh  and  
Soss,  1974:  97).  In  rational  choice  and  its  application,  the  perception  
magnifies  the  observable  over  the  intangible,  to  the  point  at  which  a  very  
minor  correlation  is  perceived  and  acted  upon  as  a  major  causal  link.  This  
is  not  a  mere  theoretical  problem,  but  leads  to  significant  gaps  in  even  the  
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most  basic  empirical  research  and  its  subsequent  application.  Crime,  for  
example,  is  certainly  reduced  by  a  certain  (calculable)  amount  by  addition  
of  cameras,  or  changes  in  neighborhood  lighting.  Unfortunately,  this  may  
be  worse  than  a  panacea,  due  to  a  phenomenon  in  criminology  called  
displacement:  while  supervised  neighborhoods  do  have  improved  crime  
rates,  closer,  poorer  and  unsupervised  neighborhoods  have  an  increase,  
or  the  limited  scope  of  SCP  (situational  crime  prevention)  favors  'street'  
crime  over  abuse,  organized  crime,  and  so  on  (Hayward,  2007;  Grabosky,  
1996).  
If  we  were  to  apply  an  RCT  approach  to  the  case  study  of  passivity,  
we  have  the  advantage  of  its  default  position  of  explicability;  it  would  not  
assume  such  a  behavior,  or  any  behavior,  would  be  irrational.  
Nevertheless,  we  would  get  a  partial  explanation,  at  best,  where  the  
actual  motives  of  the  actors  may  be  missed,  overlooking  explanatory  
causes  in  favor  of  visible  ones.  With  the  current  RCT  approach,  we  are  
limited  as  to  what  data  can  be  numerated,  but  we  still  attempt  to  
incorporate  all  behavior  as  a  'total  theory'.  Psychologist  R.J.  Herrnstein  
argues  that  the  concept  of  RCT  is  itself  a  rationalization:  'We  start  with  a  
paradox,  which  is  that  the  economic  theory  of  rational  choice...accounts  
only  poorly  for  actual  behavior,  yet  it  comes  close  to  serving  as  the  
fundamental  principle  of  the  behavioral  sciences...  The  theory  of  rational  
choice,  I  conclude,  is  normatively  useful  but  is  fundamentally  deficient  as  
an  account  of  behavior'  (Herrnstein,  1990:  356).  It  is  through  this  
normative  aspect  that  we  relocate  this  concept  to  Jsrgen  Habermas.  
  





Although  Jlthough:  Communicativeative  aspect  that  we  relocate  this  
concept  to  Js  fundamentally  deficient  as  an  account  of  bestrong  critic  of  
instrumental  rationality,  precisely  because  of  its  unproblematic  stance  
towards  its  own  societal  construction:  'The  acceptance  or  rejection  of  
basic  statements  rests,  in  the  last  instance,  on  a  decision;  but  the  
decisions  are  not  made  in  an  arbitrary  fashion.  Rather,  they  are  made  in  
accordance  with  rules.  Such  rules  are  only  laid  down  institutionally,  not  
logically'  (Habermas,  1976:  201).  
After  his  so-­‐called  'linguistic  turn',  however,  his  work  became  more  
open  to  rationality  in  general,  and  even  that  of  the  instrumental  kind,  
leading  some  to  link  it  with  hard  rational  choice  theory  (Bolton,  2005)—  
particular,  game  theory  (Heath,  2001).  In  this  construction,  Habermas  is  a  
'non-­‐foundational  rationalist'  explaining  'conformity  to  social  norms  as  a  
straightforward  exercise  of  rational  choice  -­‐  except  that  'rational'  is  now  to  
be  understood  in  a  noninstrumental  sense'  (Heath,  2001:  2).  It  may  be  
misleading  to  include  Jxplaining  'conformity  to  social  norms  as  a  
straightforwar  In  contrast  to  the  way  that  Gary  Becker  (and  others)  have  
staked  all  social  and  individual  action  on  the  rational  choice  approach  of  
utility  maximizing,  Habermas'  own  work  may  be  considered  a  political  
project,  an  attempt  to  understand  the  'new  social  movement'  and  provide  
strategies  for  'the  problem  of  social  order'  (Finlayson,  2005;  Heath,  2001;  
Edwards,  2004;  Habermas,  1981;  1984).  
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Nevertheless,  Habermas'  rationality  can  be  a  productive  concept,  
especially  when  one  considers  how  it  arises  contextually.  For  Habermas,  
philosophy  is  at  a  crossroads,  for  which  rationality  is  a  kind  of  solution:  
'that  philosophy  in  its  post-­‐metaphysical,  post-­‐Hegelian  currents  is  
converging  toward  the  point  of  a  theory  of  rationality'  (Habermas,  1984:  
2).  From  this  perspective,  all  action,  even  the  critique  itself,  is  
problematized,  rendering  social  theory  and  action  immobile  and  
irrelevant:  'For  Habermas,  the  problem  posed  by  "incredulity  towards  
metanarratives"  is  that  unmasking  only  makes  sense  if  we  "preserve  at  
least  one  standard  for  [the]  explanation  of  the  corruption  of  all  reasonable  
standards"'  (Habermas,  quoted  in  Rorty,  1985:  172).    
A  common  antidote,  positivism,  is  equally  problematic  for  Habermas.  
Against  the  perceived  skepticism  of  David  Hume  (whose  work  we  will  
address  shortly),  positivism  arises  out  of  the  argument  that  while  reason  
may  not  be  able  to  exist  a  priori,  it  is  through  the  cognitive  reshaping  of  
nouema  (things  in  themselves)  into  the  structure  of  reason  that  we  may  
accept  reason  as  a  concept  as  it  arises  from  the  mind.  If  truth  of  the  real  
can  never  be  known,  Kant  proposes  that  the  way  in  which  reason  shapes  it  
is  consistent  enough  to  create  valid  point  of  discussion.  This  position  is  
equally  untenable  and  rather  solipsistic  for  Habermas:  'From  this  
perspective,  the  distinction  between  appearance  and  "thing-­‐in-­‐itself"  also  
becomes  meaningless.  Experiences  and  judgments  are  now  coupled  with  a  
practice  that  copes  with  reality.  They  remain  in  contact  with  a  surprising  
reality  through  problem-­‐solving  activities  that  are  evaluated  by  their  
success'  (Habermas,  2003:  114).    
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As  a  solution,  he  proposes  communicative  action  (and  within  it,  
communicative  rationality)  which  takes  into  account  both  the  way  in  
which  rationality  is  a  part  of  human  social  life  (that  people  tend  to  see  the  
world  in  rationality's  terms),  and  is  also  constructed  by  it  in  the  speech  
act.  Here,  rationality  is  able  to  proceed  through  the  construction  of  
objective  truth  communicatively,  when  there  is  consensus,  or  'validity  
claims':  'In  speaking  we  relate  to  the  world  about  us,  to  other  subjects  to  
our  own  intentions,  feelings  and  desires.  In  each  of  these  dimensions  we  
are  constantly  making  claims,  even  if  usually  only  implicitly,  concerning  
the  validity  of  what  we  are  saying'  (Habermas,  1984:  3).  This  approach  
successfully  addresses  the  dual  problems  of  subjectivity  and  inaction:    
[I]f  we  start  from  the  communicative  employment  of  
propositional  knowledge  in  assertions,  we  make  a  prior  
decision  for  a  wider  concept  of  rationality  connected  with  
the  ancient  conceptions  of  logos.  This  concept  of  
communicative  rationality  carries  with  it  connotations  
based  ultimately  on  the  central  experience  of  the  
unconstrained,  unifying,  consensus-­‐bringing  force  of  
argumentative  speech,  in  which  different  participants  
overcome  their  merely  subjective  views,  and,  owing  to  the  
mutuality  of  rationally  motivated  conviction,  assure  
themselves  of  both  the  unity  of  the  objective  world,  and  
the  intersubjectivity  of  their  lifeworld.  (Habermas,  1984:  
10).  
  
In  this  context,  then,  rationality  is  a  form  of  shared  political  
objectivity,  as  well  as  a  way  of  obtaining  it.    
Within  this  framework,  instrumental  rationality  is  not  rejected  
outright.  'Cognitive-­‐instrumental'  action,  as  he  calls  it,  does  occur  when  
certain  conditions  are  met:  'A  judgement  can  be  objective  if  it  is  
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undertaken  on  the  basis  of  a  transsubjective  validity  claim  that  has  the  
same  meaning  for  observers  and  nonparticipants  as  it  has  for  the  acting  
subject  himself'  (Habermas,  1984:  9).  In  this  way,  the  rationality  that  
Becker  speaks  of  is  subsumed  by  the  larger  sphere  of  communicative  
rationality,  with  the  caveat  that  instrumental  rationality  is  'too  narrow,  
because  we  use  the  term  "rational"  not  only  in  connection  with  expression  
that  can  be  true  or  false,  effective  or  ineffective...the  rationality  inherent  
in  communicative  practice  extends  over  a  broad  spectrum'  (Habermas,  
from  Roderick's  translation,  Roderick,  1985:  214).  Habermas'  work  may  
provide  difficulty  in  defining  and  separating  out  'his'  form  of  rationality.  
Nevertheless,  it  is  hopefully  clear  as  to  the  way  in  which  it  is  distinguished  
from  the  more  unproblematic  RCT  school.  
Habermas  shares  with  Becker  a  desire  to  explicate  social  phenomena,  
but  differs  in  that  he  wants  to  find  a  solution  to  social  injustice  through  his  
'lifeworld'  project,  which  he  sees  in  opposition  to  the  more  typically  
proposed  'systems'.  As  a  consequence,  literature  on  one  specific  behavior  
or  another  falling  under  the  rubric  of  communicatively  rational  is  light.  The  
real-­‐world  theories  that  have  arisen  from  communicative  action  fall  
almost  exclusively  in  the  field  of  planning  (Sager,  2009;  Bolton,  2005;  
Healey,  1996a;  1996b;  McNamee  and  Gergen,  1999)—so  much  so  that,  
like  RCT,  an  abbreviation  has  arisen  (communicative  planning  theory  is  
also  known  as  CPT).  'Communicative  planning  is  an  open  and  participatory  
enterprise,  involving  a  broad  range  of  affected  groups  in  socially  oriented  
and  fairness-­‐seeking  developments  of  land,  infrastructure  or  public  
services,  guided  by  a  consensus-­‐building  process  designed  to  approach  the  
principles  of  discourse  ethics'  (Sager,  2009:  2).  
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This  approach  is  not  unlike  the  Beckerian  approach  to  crime  via  
changing  the  environment,  the  important  difference  being  the  inclusion  of  
discourse  ethics;  instead  of  crime  being  seen  as  an  instrumental  action  to  
be  diminished  or  that  is  increasing  through  manipulation  of  environments,  
the  CPT  approach  is  more  concerned  with  building  consensus  within  
groups:  'planning  that  emphasizes  widespread  public  participation,  
sharing  of  information  with  the  public,  reaching  consensus  through  public  
dialogue  rather  than  exercise  of  power,  avoiding  privileging  of  experts  and  
bureaucrats,  and  replacing  the  model  of  the  technical  expert  with  one  of  
the  reflective  planner'  (Bolton,  2005:  2).  
For  our  purposes,  Habermas  might  be  able  to  show  us  how  a  
breakdown  in  communicative  action  could  lead  to  violence  as  a  factor  of  
whether  or  not  consensus  was  built  or  even  possible.  This  perspective  may  
be  less  effective  in  the  explanation  of  our  test  cases  of  violence  and  
passivity,  which  involve  individual  decisions—the  methodological  
individualist  approach.  And  yet  Habermas,  especially  post-­‐9/11,  is  not  
silent  on  violence  or  suicide  terrorism,  and  even  incorporates  his  
perspectives  on  these  subjects  into  rationality.  He  acknowledges  the  way  
in  which  the  structural  violence  of  the  West's  imposition  of  tyranny  has  
created  a  'distortion  in  communication'  (interview,  Borradori,  2003:  35),  
which  then  leads  to  real  violence.  
Unfortunately,  this  theorization  is  fuzzy—not  deliberately  complex,  
but  unformed.  On  one  hand,  the  9/11  terrorists  have  engaged  in  some  
type  of  means/end  rationality,  however  misguided:  'In  contrast  to  this,  the  
global  terror  that  culminated  in  the  September  11  attack  bears  the  
anarchistic  traits  of  an  impotent  revolt  directed  against  an  enemy  that  
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cannot  be  defeated  in  any  pragmatic  sense.  The  only  possible  effect  it  can  
have  is  to  shock  and  alarm  the  government  and  population'  (interview,  
Borradori,  2003:  34).  Here,  the  revolt,  however  'impotent',  serves  to  
create  an  end:  namely  shock  and  alarm,  or  terror.  
On  the  other  hand,  Habermas  emphasizes  the  particular  irrationality  
of  these  acts,  which  he  refers  to  repeatedly  as  'fundamentalism':  'Such  
orthodoxy  first  veers  toward  fundamentalism  when  the  guardians  and  
representatives  of  the  true  faith  ignore  the  epistemic  situation  of  a  
pluralistic  society  and  insist—even  to  the  point  of  violence—on  the  
universally  binding  character  and  political  acceptance  of  their  doctrine'  
(interview,  Borradori,  2003:  34).  This  position  limits  what  participation  
these  actors  can  have  in  a  global  society,  or  even,  more  practically,  in  
simple  negotiations:  'This  model  explains  why  attempts  at  understanding  
have  a  chance  only  under  symmetrical  conditions  of  mutual  perspective-­‐
taking...  Without  the  structures  of  a  communicative  situation  free  from  
distortion,  the  results  are  always  under  the  suspicion  of  having  been  
forced'  (interview,  Borradori,  2003:  39).  
The  description,  which  implies  both  rational  and  irrational  traits  on  
the  part  of  the  terrorists,  is  only  one  of  the  problems  of  this  perspective.  
One  could  say  that  we  are  criticizing  Habermas  for  his  views  and  not  his  
work;  that  his  own  statements  may  be  incongruent  with  his  theory  of  
communicative  action,  and  therefore  not  necessarily  a  valid  criticism  of  it.  
But  the  fault  line  was  extant  in  his  work  before  9/11;  in  1997,  Gerald  
Delanty  pointed  out  that  Habermas'  rationality  is  especially  occidentally  
rationalized,  and  specifically:  'As  a  result  of  its  Enlightenment  bias,  
Habermas'  social  theory,  which  presupposes  a  rationalized  life-­‐world,  has  
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particular  difficulty  in  answering  new  cross-­‐cultural  challenges,  such  as  
Islamic  modernity,  the  politics  of  identity  associated  with  new  social  
movements'  (Delanty,  1997:  31).  Later  critics  have  pointed  to  Habermas'  
'methodological  atheism'  which  leads  him  to  exclude  terrorists  as  
irrational  (Bugyis,  2010).  This  is  both  a  theoretical  and  real  problem  as  it  
excludes  some  (perhaps  many)  groups  and  individuals  from  participation  
in  the  rational,  and  leaves  wide  areas  of  behavior  unexplained.  
How  does  this  affect  our  own  test  study?  Rather  than  simply  and  
non-­‐descriptively  stating  that  acts  of  violence  and  passivity  are  not  
communicatively  rational,  and  thus  not  worthy  of  further  discussion,  let  us  
briefly  and  somewhat  controversially  take  the  test  case  of  the  Rwandan  
Genocide.  Here,  the  burgomaster  of  Musambira,  Justin  Nyandwi,  recounts  
his  near  execution:    
They  told  me  a  lot  of  things:  that  I  was  against  the  
interahamwe,  that  I  had  a  cont  worthy  of  further  
discussion,  let  us  briefly  and  somewhat  controversially  take    
Nyandwi  and  his  companions  were  brought  to  a  pit  where  
the  dead  were  thrown,  the  former  burgomaster  told  me.  
He  described  a  scene  of  horriﬁc  violence  and  said  he  
expected  to  die  (Strauss,  2008:  261).  
  
Here,  the  actors  are  shown  to  the  pit  in  which  they  are  to  be  thrown.  
There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  outcome.  They  were  spared  in  this  instance,  
but  not  through  action  or  resistance  on  their  own  part,  and  many  others  
who  died  would  have  gone  through  identical  circumstances  without  
having  survived  the  experience.  This  is  especially  interesting  as  the  people  
involved  are  three  policemen  trained  in  violence  and  a  burgomaster,  the  
elected  head  of  the  province,  all  used  to  wielding  authority,  yet  suddenly  
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ready  to  relinquish  it  without  resistance.  In  Habermasian  terms,  one  
actually  could  explain  this  phenomenon  of  giving  up  control  to  the  killer  as  
building  a  consensus,  and  not  as  controversy  for  controversy's  sake.  This  is  
in  line  with  Collins'  observations  across  many  social  instances  of  violence,  
that  the  victim  and  victimizer  are  participants  (Collins,  2008,  see  next  
chapter).  In  Habermasian  terms,  both  the  murdered  and  the  murderers  
share  a  validity  claim,  in  this  case  over  the  authority,  however  nihilistic  
and  fatal,  that  the  latter  wields.  Whether  or  not  the  authority  is  valid  in  
terms  of  equal  societal  footing,  the  subjects  involved  act  as  if  it  is.  
Although  such  a  line  verges  on  victim  blaming,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  
empirical  and  historical  justification,  since  genocidal  violence  often  
requires  the  participation  of  its  victims,  even  if  only  in  their  passivity.  How  
this  participation  arises  cannot  be  ignored,  especially  as  it  is  the  case  study  
of  this  thesis.  Unfortunately,  Habermas  forbids  this  line  of  inquiry,  for  the  
reason  that  communicative  action  requires  'equals'  in  power  and  
reasoning  ability,  which  are  arguably  residual  effects  of  the  Eurocentric  
rationalism  that  he  presents.  If  Habermas  only  allows  a  very  narrow  
interpretation  of  who  can  be  rational,  we  are  forbidden  from  applying  
what  may  be  a  useful  theory  to  actual  instances  of  behavior.  
  
Elster:   Philosophy  of  Social   Science  
  
Rationality  already  has  a  history  within  the  philosophy  of  social  
science,  given  that  it  meets  the  double  requirement  of  an  analysis  of  
human  behavior,  as  well  as  offering  a  perspective  on  social  science  itself.  
Although  the  following  summation  was  written  about  the  field  in  general,  
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it  serves  as  a  near  complete  introduction  to  the  work  of  Jon  Elster  in  
particular,  which  'deals  with  such  problems  as  the  role  of  understanding  
(Verstehen)  in  apprehending  social  phenomena,  the  status  of  rational  
choice  theory,  the  role  of  experiments  in  the  social  sciences,  the  logical  
status  of  game  theory,  as  well  as  whether  there  are  genuine  laws  of  social  
phenomena  or  rather  social  mechanisms  to  be  discovered'  (Mantzavinos,  
2009:  2).    
Jon  Elster  is  an  interesting  case  in  regard  to  rationality,  beginning  as  
one  of  its  strong  proponents,  and  gradually  using  it  less  and  less  as  a  
paradigm.  In  the  new  edition  of  Nuts  and  Bolts,  he  notes  how  his  own  
views  had  changed  since  the  first  edition  of  the  book:  'I  now  believe  that  
rational-­‐choice  theory  has  less  explanatory  power  than  I  used  to  think.  Do  
real  people  act  on  the  calculations  that  make  up  many  pages  of  
mathematical  appendixes  in  leading  journals?  I  do  not  think  so'  (Elster,  
2007:  3).  
Rational  choice  in  Elster's  formulation  must  involve  at  least  two  
factors:  real-­‐world  information,  and  the  option  to  apply  whatever  theory  
has  the  greatest  explanatory  power.  Unlike  the  potentially  ex  post  facto  
reasoning  of  social  and  personal  capital,  not  all  actions  are  rational,  nor  
are  they  rational  in  the  same  way.  Rational  choice  still  retains  its  
explanatory  power,  if,  and  only  if,  these  criteria  are  met:  'An  action  is  
rational,  in  this  scheme,  if  it  meets  three  optimality  requirements:  the  
action  must  be  optimal,  given  the  beliefs;  the  beliefs  must  be  as  well  
supported  as  possible,  given  the  evidence;  and  the  evidence  must  result  
from  an  optimal  investment  in  information  gathering'  (Elster,  2007:  191).    
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From  this  perspective,  rational  choice  theory  presents  a  problem  not  
in  its  consistency  but  in  its  unwillingness  to  confront  the  simple  inherent  
contradiction:  'Rational  choice  theorists  want  to  explain  behavior  on  the  
bare  assumption  that  agents  are  rational.  This  assumption  includes  the  
hypothesis  that  agents  form  rational  beliefs,  including  beliefs  about  the  
options  available  to  them.  There  is  no  need,  therefore,  to  classify  the  
determinants  of  behavior  as  either  subjective  (desires)  or  objective  
(opportunities).  Rational-­‐choice  theory  is  subjective  through  and  through'  
(Elster,  2007:  191).  Nor  does  he  necessarily  see  much  solution  in  Jve  
through  and  through'  (Elster,  2007:  191).jective  (opportunities).  opt  Like  
Delanty's  critique,  there  is  the  sense  of  elitism:  that  the  body  of  
participants  who  can  leap  the  hurdle  for  participation  are  
'disproportionately  found  in  the  privileged  part  of  the  population'  (Elster,  
2001a:  37).  The  outcome  is  that  'the  high  ideals  of  rational  discussion  
could  create  a  self-­‐elected  elite'  (Rienstra  and  Hook,  2006:  315).  More  
importantly  for  this  thesis,  Elster  sees  a  problem  in  Habermas'  explanatory  
power:  'I  am,  in  fact,  largely  in  sympathy  with  the  fundamental  tenets  of  
the  view,  yet  fear  that  it  might  be  dismissed  as  Utopian,  both  in  the  sense  
of  ignoring  the  problem  of  getting  from  here  to  there,  and  in  the  sense  of  
neglecting  some  elementary  facts  of  human  psychology'  (Elster,  1989b:  
114).  
In  contrast  to  the  other  rationalities,  and  per  his  location  within  the  
philosophy  of  social  science,  Elster  is  Catholic  in  his  approach.  He  is  willing  
to  incorporate  a  variety  of  schemes  to  form  a  stronger  explanandum,  
including  game  theory,  bounded  rationality,  heuristics  and  biases,  filter  
models,  and  even  emotions.  We  will  discuss  each  model  as  and  if  it  relates  
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to  our  case  study  below,  but  this  approach  is  deliberately  distinct  from  the  
more  rigid  RCT,  which  tends  to  seek  the  evidence  after  the  theory  has  
been  formed  (i.e.  that  all  actors  are  rational).  Elster  eschews  total  theory:    
'Most  writers  try  to  make  do  with  rational  self-­‐interest  as  a  
sole  motivational  assumption,  while  I  have  invoked  a  
broader  range  of  motives.  Though  I  share  their  preference  
for  a  parsimonious  explanation  and  their  hesitation  to  get  
into  a  morass  of  ad  hoc  assumptions,  I  have  concluded,  
with  some  reluctance,  that  there  is  no  way  in  which  the  
programme  can  be  brought  forward  on  this  narrow  basis.  
Ultimately,  parsimony  must  take  second  place  to  realism'  
(Elster,  1989a:  248).  
  
Elster  has  written  personally  about  almost  every  behavior  under  the  
sun  (except  our  case  study,  naturally);  to  understand  this  approach,  we  
will  examine  his  take  on  suicide  terrorism,  the  theorization  of  which  draws  
from  a  variety  of  sources:  'To  make  sense  of  these  missions,  we  can  adopt  
the  usual  explanatory  machinery  of  the  social  sciences,  the  key  elements  
being  the  motivations  and  beliefs  of  the  actors,  attackers,  and  organizers,  
and  the  constraints  they  face'  (Elster,  2005:  233,  emphasis  in  original).  
Rational  motivations  are  possible  within  suicides  missions:  'In  itself,  
there  is  nothing  irrational  in  the  willingness  to  sacrifice  one’s  life  for  a  
cause,  and  even  less  in  the  willingness  to  send  others  to  their  death  for  it'  
(Elster,  2005:  252),  just  as  irrational  motives  can  be  rationally  attempted:  
'The  conspiratorial  frame  of  mind  is  irreducibly  irrational...  In  standard  
rational-­‐choice  theory,  this  would  not  make  the  suicidal  actions  irrational.  
Yet  it  would  still  be  true  (a)  that  suicide  attackers  are  irrational,  and  (b)  
that  they  would  not  have  opted  for  SMs  (suicide  missions)  had  they  been  
rational'  (Elster,  2005:  252,  emphasis  in  original).  Even  within  this  
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irrational  framing,  Elster  opens  up  the  possibility  of  an  academically  
reliable  explanandum  in  emotion,  noting  that  some  suicide  attackers  will  
not  back  down  because  of  the  increased  pressure  from  their  peers  and  
family,  and  that  the  cost  of  changing  their  minds  is  shame.  This  retains  its  
validity  as  an  explanation  because  shame  is  an  interaction-­‐based  (social)  
emotion,  which  'tend  to  be  stronger  than  comparison-­‐based  ones'  (Elster,  
1999:  143).  
As  far  as  beliefs  go,  Elster  notes,  as  per  above,  that  incomes  and  
education  levels  of  suicide  bombers  tend  to  be  higher  than  in  the  general  
population.  To  explain  this,  Elster  allows  that  it  is  not  necessarily  the  
obvious  objective  observations  (as  per  the  RCT  model)  that  are  in  play  
here.  Drawing  from  his  study  on  dissatisfaction  levels  between  Military  
Police  and  Air  Force  promotions  (Elster,  2001b:  452),  Elster  notes  the  way  
in  which  the  one  group  of  MPs  that  were  promoted  less  have  a  higher  job  
satisfaction.  This  seeming  discrepancy  is  understood  as  a  function  of  
expectation.  Since  the  Air  Force  has  more  promotions,  the  individuals  in  
that  group  have  a  higher  expectation  of  success  and  a  greater  loss  at  its  
frustration.  This  is  the  concept  of  'relative  deprivation':  proceeding  from  
the  subjective  point  of  view  of  the  actor,  it  is  not  that  they  are  
economically  poor  that  motivates  (per  an  RCT  model),  but  instead  that  
differences  exist  between  their  expectations  and  their  reality:  'A  more  
plausible  factor  than  absolute  deprivation  is  relative  deprivation,  that  is,  
the  gap  between  expectations  and  reality  experienced  by  the  many  
educated  Palestinians'  (Elster,  2005:  248).  
For  constraints,  Elster  cites  the  usual  suspects  of  heightened  security  
measures  and  even  the  invention  of  dynamite.  Moving  over  to  his  theory  
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of  blister  packs  and  suicide  (not  suicide  terrorism),  Elster  invokes  his  own  
'filter  model'  which  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  constraints  of  
choice  within  which  the  actor  must  operate.  Unlike  an  existential  actor,  
the  options  are  not  infinite.  Opportunity  forms  part  of  the  motivation  for  
suicide,  as  he  notes  the  reduction  of  suicide  rates  at  the  introduction  of  
'blister  packs',  which  make  it  slightly  harder  to  aggregate  enough  
medication  for  an  overdose:  'Why  do  suicide  rates  go  down  when  
dangerous  medications  are  sold  in  blister  packs  rather  than  bottles?  
Answer:  because  many  desires  are  so  short-­‐lived  that  by  the  time  one  has  
opened  the  blister  pack  the  suicidal  impulse  has  ended'  (Elster,  2007:  
353).  This  answer  to  suicidal  motivation  is  partial,  but  includes  an  
assessment  of  both  emotion  and  opportunity.  
If  we  take  an  Elsterian  approach  to  passivity,  we  are  required,  at  
least,  to  address  constraints  and  even  emotion,  which  would  then  apply  to  
the  experience  of  combat  and  threat  of  violence.  It  should  come  as  no  
surprise  that  fear  leads  to  impairment  of  other  cognitive  tasking  in  both  
the  experimental  realm  (Mineka  and  Sutton,  1992;  Fessler,  2001)  and  the  
real  world  of  combat  (Grossman,  2008).  If  fear  limits  cognitive  ability  
(greater  detail  on  how  this  functions  will  be  provided  in  Chapter  5),  the  
actors  would  thus  subject  to  a  'limitation  of  choice'.  As  per  the  three  
criteria  above,  Elster  is  emphatic  that  choice  is  largely  dependent  on  what  
is  available  to  the  actor,  not  only  in  the  existential  sense  of  what  they  can  
do,  but  in  the  cognitive  sense  of  what  they  think  they  can  do.  If  the  subject  
is  afraid,  the  availability  of  choice  is  limited,  and  thus  'fighting  back'  or  
'running  away'  simply  disappears  from  the  menu  of  options.  
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Yet,  why,  one  might  ask,  might  immobility  be  the  default?  As  per  
further  investigation,  Elster  is  also  willing  to  engage  the  sub-­‐field  of  
evolutionary  psychology,  that  is,  certain  behaviors  are  inherent  in  the  
individual  for  the  larger  purpose  of  the  species.  In  investigating  the  
phenomena  of  investing,  where  'people  invest  their  money  in  projects  
undertaken  by  other  agents  even  when  the  latter  are  free  to  keep  all  the  
proinvestigating  the  phenomena  of  investing,  where  'people  invest  their  
money  in  projects  undertaken  by  other  a'  (Elster,  2007:  353).  Per  the  
altruism  studies  cited  above  during  the  discussion  of  RCT,  if  'social  
commonality',  either  normative  or  evolutionary,  can  override  our  desire  
for  personal  monetary  gain,  it  could  also  override  the  need  to  survive.  
Here,  two  needs  to  cooperate  (with  the  troop/legion/commander/state  
and  with  humanity)  are  put  into  conflict,  leading  some  actors  to  fire,  
others  to  fake  it,  others  to  cooperate  with  the  firers,  and  others  to  do  
nothing.  
One  potential  conflict  with  this  perspective  is  the  way  in  which  it  
explains  one  behavior  as  it  negates  another.  If  we  are  social,  then  no  one  
will  fight.  If  we  are  rational,  then  everyone  will.  Or  vice  versa.  While  it  
provides  the  model  for  each  behavior,  it  fails  to  provide  the  model  that  
allows  us  to  determine  what  model  should  be  used.  The  choice  itself,  the  
most  crucial  element  within  the  paradigm,  remains  unexplained,  as  in  why  
one  would  be  chosen  over  the  other,  under  what  circumstances,  by  which  
individual,  and  so  on.  It  is  furthermore  presumed  (as  is  often  the  case  in  
rationality)  that  the  rational  choice  is  the  de  facto  path,  when  in  fact,  
rational  choice  itself  is  not  self-­‐explanatory.  Raymond  Boudon  exposes  
      -­‐63-­‐  
 
this  tautologic  when  he  quotes  rational  choice  theorist  Martin  Hollis  back  
to  himself:  'Rational  action  is  its  own  explanation'  (Boudon,  2003:  2).  
Yet  even  when  the  strict  rational  choice  model  is  not  applied,  the  
choice  as  to  the  application  of  models  (either  bounded,  RCT,  emotional,  
game  theoretical,  etc.)  gives  rise  to  subjectivity,  where  the  weakest  point  
is  the  theorist.  To  demonstrate  how  this  operates,  it  is  necessary  to  take  
Elster's  position  on  violence  seriously,  especially  as  it  relates  to  our  case  
study.  Similar  to  the  above  position  on  suicide  attacks,  he  states  that  
'Nobody  will  or  should  think  it  a  serious  puzzle  why  people  sometimes  
volunteer  for  war  service,  or  lie  about  their  age  and  disabilities  to  get  into  
a  situation  that  is  quite  likely  to  get  them  killed'  (Elster,  2005:  239).  This  
veers  awfully  close  to,  and  may  even  state  that,  the  idea  that  such  violent  
acts,  as  long  as  they  are  state-­‐motivated,  are  rational.  The  act  of  risking  
your  life  and  killing  for  your  country  involves  more  emotional  resistance  
and  vastly  more  pure  physical  risk  than  voting,  but  the  latter  is  seen  as  
classically  non-­‐rational  behavior:  'It  is  not  clear  why  voters  bother  to  vote  
at  all  in  national  elections,  when  it  is  morally  certain  that  a  single  vote  will  
make  no  difference'  (Elster,  2007:  22).  However,  here,  violence  is  
presented  with  less  investigatory  spirit  than  the  much  less  dangerous  act  
of  crossing  the  street  to  hit  a  few  levers.  The  question  why  one  might  give  
their  lives  for  their  country  (a  group  of  people  they  do  not  know  
personally)  is  not  the  answered  question  Elster  portrays  it  to  be.  
The  greatest  argument  against  this  Catholic  approach  is  that  it  is  
simply  difficult  to  cognate.  That  is,  from  an  individual  point  of  view,  it  
requires  Elster's  encyclopedic  knowledge  of  perspectives,  which  are  1)  still  
limited  (cognitive  psychology,  for  example,  is  not  pursued),  and  2)  
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subjectively  applied.  However  explanatory  they  may  be,  this  theoretical  
problem  has  a  real-­‐world  counterpart:  too  much  information.  At  the  end  
of  his  analysis  of  suicide  missions,  having  cited  the  above  theories  of  
rationality,  emotion,  game  theory  and  heuristics,  he  is  forced  to  conclude:  
'Although  some  are  more  plausible  than  others,  we  may  not  ever  know  
the  exact  motivational  and  cognitive  states  of  the  suicide  attackers  for  the  
simple  reason  that  (to  some  extent  at  least)  there  is  no  fact  of  the  matter'  
(Elster,  2005:  210,  emphasis  in  original).  Elster's  devotion  to  empirical  
accuracy  is  admirable,  and  to  be  emulated,  but  is  problematized  for  both  
its  potential  for  subjectivity,  and  the  fluidity  of  its  conclusions.  With  a  
seemingly  endless  field  of  interpretations,  and  without  any  defined  
method  of  determining  which  one  should  apply,  Elster's  interpretation  of  
behavior  has  finally  violated  his  core  tenet:  explanatory  value.    
  
Weber:  Sociological   
  
Max  Weber  was  an  early  proponent  of  what  we  recognize  today  as  
rationality.  His  pioneering  work  in  sociology  in  the  early  20th  century  is  
arguably  the  original  basis  for  contemporary  thinking  on  the  subject;  
Elster  initially  considered  him  one  of  the  two  main  theorists  on  rationality  
(Elster,  1979),  just  as  Habermas  uses  him—critically—as  a  starting  point  
for  his  theory  of  communicative  action,  devoting  the  first  half  of  book  one  
to  Weber's  theories  (Schecter,  2010;  Habermas,  1984).  Weber  remains  an  
inescapable  point  of  reference  for  all  the  theorists  and  theories  discussed  
previously.  
      -­‐65-­‐  
 
The  reason  for  this  centrality  is  undoubtedly  the  way  in  which  he  
applied  rationality  within  previously  irrational  spheres,  both  in  'primitive'  
religion  (Weber,  1963),  and  then  towards  the  protestant  reformation  
(Weber,  1930:  181)  in  his  attempt  to  explain  why  'occidental'  rationalism  
led  to  mass  industrial  capitalism.  'Against  19th-­‐century  French  
anthropology,  Weber  argued  that  man  did  not  acquire  his  "rationality"  
with  the  Enlightenment  and  that  individuals  in  all  previous  epochs  were  
not  incapable  of  rational  action'  (Kalberg,  1980:  1154).  Weber  situates  
religious  action  as  purposeful  in  the  material  world,  and  not  in  the  
metaphysical  one:  'religiously  or  magically  motivated  action  is  relatively  
rational  action,  especially  in  its  earliest  forms...  Rubbing  will  elicit  sparks  
from  pieces  of  wood,  and  in  like  fashion  the  mimetic  actions  of  a  
"magician"  will  evoke  rain  from  the  heavens...magical  action  or  thinking  
must  not  be  set  apart  from  the  range  of  everyday  purposive  action,  
particularly  since  the  elementary  ends  of  the  religious  and  magical  actions  
are  predominantly  economic'  (Weber,  1963:  A.1.b).  
This  view  was  not  as  positivistic  as  the  strict  RCT  theorists  would  later  
make  it.  Weber  was  a  critic  of  the  instrumentally  rational  as  a  potentially  
destructive  byproduct  of  modernist  society  (Kalberg,  1980:  2001),  where  
'[i]n  no  sphere  of  life,  according  to  Weber,  has  rationalization  
unambiguously  advanced  human  well-­‐being'  (Brubraker,  1984:  3).  For  
Weber,  the  character  of  modern  society  was  a  by-­‐product  of  puritan  
values  of  work  translated  into  capital  concerns  and  increasingly  focused  
on  means–end  rationality  at  the  expense  of  the  intangibles—the  famous  
'iron  cage'  of  modernity:  'The  Puritan  wanted  to  work  in  a  calling;  we  are  
forced  to  do  so...  This  order  is  now  bound  to  the  technical  and  economic  
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conditions  of  machine  production  which  today  determine  the  lives  of  all  
the  individuals  who  are  born  into  this  mechanism,  not  only  those  directly  
concerned  with  economic  acquisition,  with  irresistible  force'  (Weber,  
1930:  181).    
As  Weber  attempts  to  address  other  types  of  behavior  than  the  
typically  rational,  it  would  not  be  fair  to  say  that  there  was  a  single  system  
or  typology,  especially  since  his  often  referenced  work,  Economy  and  
Society,  was  incomplete  when  he  died.  Weber,  for  example,  proposed  15  
action  types,  in  'Basic  Concepts  in  Sociology'  (Weber,  1962;  Norkus,  2000),  
as  well  as  four  types  of  rationality  formal  and  substantive  (Weber,  1978)  
and  practical  and  theoretical  (Kalberg,  1980).  Rogers  Brubraker  proposes  
no  fewer  than  16  individuals  forms  of  rationality  in  Weber's  typology  
(Brubraker,  1984).  However,  because  Economy  and  Society  has  been  so  
referenced  (selected  as  the  most  important  sociological  work  of  the  20th  
century  by  the  International  Sociological  Society  (Mommsen,  2000)),  we  
will  focus  on  his  four  types  of  'social  action':    
1.  Instrumentally  rational  (zweksrational):  when  the  actor  seeks  a  
demonstrable  end  through  a  demonstrable  means.    
2.  Value  rational  (Wertzrational),  choices  made  for  the  belief  of  a  
religious,  moral,  or  other  value  'for  its  own  sake'.  
3.  Affectual:  behavior  determined  by  emotion  and  feelings.    
4.  Traditional:  'that  is,  determined  by  ingrained  habituation'  (Weber,  
1978:  24–25).  
These  action  types  open  up  the  possibility  that  what  was  previously  
seen  as  irrational  behavior  has  a  usefully  explicable  reason  behind  it.  
Furthermore,  the  individual  decisions,  explained  as  rational,  value  
rational,  and  so  on,  are  seen  as  the  building  blocks  for  the  larger  
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sociological  phenomenon  of,  to  take  Weber's  example,  the  transition  of  
Europe  from  Calvinist  austerity  to  hard  capital  modernism  and  the  pursuit  
of  the  industrial  that  accompanies  it.  In  this  way,  others  have  noted  that  
Weber's  theories  dovetail  to  classical  economic  Rational  Choice  (Norkus,  
2000;  Brubraker,  1984).  Although  influential,  it  could  be  said  that  Weber  
would  be  critical  of  this  perspective,  no  doubt  seeing  such  projects  as  bars  
of  the  iron  cage.  
Habermas  may  acknowledge  his  debt  to  Weber,  but  notes  that  
Weber  was  especially  vulnerable  to  seeing  the  zweksrational  where  it  was  
not  in  place.  Speaking  in  particular  of  Weber's  tendency  to  associate  the  
legal  systems  as  purposefully  rational,  Habermas  notes  that  'Weber  did  
not  distinguish  adequately  between  the  particular  value  contents  of  
cultural  traditions  and  those  universal  standards  of  value  under  which  the  
cognitive,  normative  and  expressive  components  of  culture  became  
autonomous  value  spheres  and  developed  complexes  of  rational  with  
their  own  logics'  (Habermas,  1984:  149).  Habermas,  naturally  enough,  
would  see  such  institutions  as  communicatively  rational  (or  not);  that  is,  
any  rationality  that  would  arise,  even  for  the  means  and  end,  would  do  so  
by  agreement,  or  intersubjectively,  and  not  through  an  objective  
rationalism.  Elster  notes  his  influence  as  one  of  the  preeminent  theorists  
of  rationality  (Elster,  1979),  but  later  gives  greater  credit  to  the  heuristics  
and  biases  school  and  Thomas  Schelling's  game  theoretic  approach  (Elster,  
2007).  Game  theory  is  the  application  of  instrumental  rationality  to  
situations  with  multiple  actors;  in  the  case  of  the  prisoner's  game,  for  
example,  two  actors  receive  a  lighter  sentence  if  they  both,  blind  to  one  
other,  forgive  the  other  (Elster,  2007;  Kreps  et  al.,  1981).  It  is  Elster's  
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criticism  that  Weber  lacks  the  perspective  of  game  theory  (Norkus,  2000),  
although  this  must,  of  course,  be  placed  in  the  historical  context  that  it  
had  not  yet  been  developed.  
How  would  such  sociological  rationality  approach  passivity?  I  would  
say  that  there  are  two  Weberian  rationalities  at  work,  the  first  taxonomic,  
as  outlined  above,  and  the  second  interpretive.  The  first  might  explain  the  
passivity  phenomenon  as  a  function  of  the  four  large  motivations  that  
Weber  describes.  It  is  fairly  easy  to  dismiss  the  zweksrational  
(instrumentally  rational)  in  the  case  of  tonic  immobility,  as  its  
contradiction  with  the  typically  rational  behavior  (actors  risking  death  for  
no  visible  reason)  is  the  reason  for  its  placement  in  this  thesis.  
Furthermore,  unlike  Becker,  Weber  does  not  offer  the  possibility  of  
human  capital  to  figure  into  a  rationality  equation.  
Instead,  he  offers  the  similar  Wertzrational  (value-­‐rational),  in  that  
the  subjects  in  question  are  risking  their  lives  for  the  higher  value  of  life  
itself.  We  have  discussed  this  aspect  human  empathic  capital  in  the  
Beckerian  section,  but  for  Weber  the  value  is  the  ends  in  and  of  itself.  This  
is  problematic  as  the  case  studies  in  question  (with  the  exception  of  one-­‐
on-­‐one  violent  crime)  are  often  social:  that  is,  people  acting  passively  in  
the  presence  of  either  their  friends  and  family  (in  the  case  of  genocide),  or  
with  their  fellow  soldiers,  which  may  be  an  even  stronger  bond  in  some  
cases  (Marshall,  1947;  Grossman,  1999).  In  both  instances,  the  strong  
social  bond  (the  value)  would  be  attached  to  the  group,  rather  than  the  
group  which  is  attempting  to  kill  them.  This  is  not  to  dismiss  the  argument  
out  of  hand;  Weber  could  argue,  for  example,  that  the  actor  values  the  
ethical  action  of  not  taking  a  life  over  lives  of  those  he  loves.  There  is,  
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unfortunately,  very  little  anecdotal  or  empirical  evidence  to  support  such  
an  ethical  stance  as  commonly  held.  What  usually  manifests  after  the  fact  
in  survivors  of  violence  is  great  shame  and  guilt  over  what  was  not  done  
(Jones,  2010;  Ullman,  2007);  shame  is  just  as  equally  experienced,  in  
seeming  contradiction,  for  those  who  do  act  violently  (Chappelle  et  al.,  
2012;  Otto  and  Webber,  2013;  Chapters  6  and  7).  
Secondly,  there  is  the  normative  aspect  of  authority,  a  subject  on  
which  Weber  has  written  extensively.  Authority  is  a  topic  that  further  
coincides  with  our  own  subject  matter,  as  Weber  famously  holds  that  
violence  is  a  monopoly  of  the  state,  and  furthermore,  and  less  often  cited,  
that  this  is  a  function  of  the  legitimacy  with  which  we  imbue  that  state  
(Weber,  1978).  There  is  a  notable  exception  to  this  'rule',  which  we  will  
address  shortly,  but  in  the  meantime,  normative  behavior,  in  particular  an  
actor's  adherence  to  authority  figures,  could  be  invoked  especially  in  the  
case  of  genocide,  an  argument  made  above  in  regard  to  Habermas.  On  the  
other  hand,  we  have  soldiers  told  and  trained  by  authority  figures  to  fight,  
but  they  don't,  at  the  risk  of  their  own  lives.  This  is  complicated  by  the  fact  
that  some  systematic  violence  is  committed  against  soldiers  (not  citizens)  
who  do  not  fight  back  (as  in  the  case  of  Nanjing),  as  well  as  by  non-­‐state  
and  non-­‐authority  figures  (as  in  the  case  of  the  Hutus  in  Rwanda).  
In  Weber's  typology,  the  actor  is  pulled  in  four  different  directions,  
with  the  instrumentally  rational  (survival)  seemingly  the  least  important.  
The  normative,  in  the  authority,  may  have  some  explanatory  power,  but  it  
is  indifferently  present  at  best.  Ethical  values  are  possible  but  dubious,  
leaving  us  with  affect  of  a  rather  inexplicable  type,  in  that  fight  or  flight  
response  of  fear  is  not  invoked.  Once  again,  and  similar  to  Becker,  we  
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have  run  against  the  limits  of  what  is  explanatory  and  what  is  descriptive.  
As  Zenonas  Norkus  puts  it:  'As  long  as  Weber's  action  theory  does  not  
include  nomological  statements,  it  can  be  seen  only  as  a  scheme  of  
classification,  not  as  explanatory  theory.  The  same  applies  for  all  later  
efforts  to  construct  a  sociological  action  theory,  from  Parsons  to  Js,  it  can  
be  seen  only  as  a  s:  174).  
There  is  no  reason  to  exhaust  the  list  of  types  which  may  or  may  not  
conform  to  this  case  study,  since  the  point  of  these  brief  outlines  is  the  
demonstration  of  different  positions  that  call  themselves  rational.  This  
varietal  version  of  rationality  is  close,  although  not  as  strictly  defined,  to  
Elster's,  in  that  it  assigns  a  classification  (or  more  than  one)  to  a  particular  
behavior.  We  turn  instead  to  Weber's  second  rationality,  one  to  which  
Weber  subscribes  but  might  not  propose  himself.  Via  the  work  of  Georg  
Simmel,  Max  Weber  held  Verstehen  (understanding)  as  an  underlying  
principle  of  the  social  sciences:  'This  ability  to  share  other  people's  minds  
is  a  special  knowledge,  distinct  from  the  kind  of  perception  gleaned  from  
tests  and  statistics.  Statistical  knowledge  without  "emphatic"  knowledge  is  
superficial  and  unintelligent'  (Abel,  1948:  212).  
This  is  especially  relevant  to  our  own  thesis,  as  Weber  proposes  
violence  under  the  larger  subject  of  Verstehen:    
'Similarly  we  understand  the  motive  of  a  person  aiming  a  
gun  if  we  know  that  he  has  been  commanded  to  shoot  as  a  
member  of  a  firing  squad,  that  he  is  fighting  against  an  
enemy,  or  that  he  is  doing  it  for  revenge.  The  last  is  
affectually  determined  and  thus  in  a  certain  sense  
irrational.  Finally,  we  have  a  motivational  understanding  of  
the  outburst  of  anger  if  we  know  that  it  has  been  provoked  
by  jealousy,  injured  pride,  or  an  insult...  In  all  the  above  
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cases,  the  particular  act  has  been  placed  in  an  
understandable  sequence  of  motivation,  the  understanding  
of  which  can  be  treated  as  an  explanation  of  the  actual  
course  of  behavior.  Thus  for  a  science  which  is  concerned  
with  the  subjective  meaning  of  action,  explanation  requires  
a  grasp  of  the  complex  of  meaning  in  which  an  actual  
course  of  understandable  action  thus  interpreted  belongs...  
This  involves  a  departure  from  ordinary  usage,  which  
speaks  of  intention  in  this  sense  only  in  the  case  of  
rationally  purposive  action'  (Weber,  1978:  8–9).    
  
Like  Elster,  Weber  offers  us  the  possibility  of  an  'affectively  
determined'  interpretation  of  behavior,  that  is  not  dismissed  as  
incomprehensible  out  of  hand,  but  further  exists  as  an  invitation  to  
greater  understanding.  Here,  emotion  exists  within  choice,  and  can  be  
linked  to  rationality  via  cause  and  effect:  'an  understandable  sequence  of  
motivation'.  Before  the  possibility  of  such  an  affective  system  is  laid  out  
(in  Chapters  4–7),  we  now  explore  the  traces  of  feeling  within  rationality,  
which  will,  in  turn,  lead  to  how  such  a  system  might  be  constructed:  
through  the  positive  feelings  of  completed  schemas.  
  
The  Persistence  of  Causality  
  
We  have  explored  four  types  of  rationality,  each  seemingly  in  
conflict,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  they  actually  critique  one  another's  
perspectives.  Yet,  what  they  share  vastly  outweighs  whatever  differences  
they  may  see  in  each  other.  In  the  act  of  invoking  rationality,  there  is  an  
unspoken  and  unexamined  commonality:  causality.  Whether  normative,  
instrumental,  value-­‐based,  bounded,  or  through  the  human  capital  of  
face,  all  rationality  demands  cause  and  effect:  When  I  do  X,  I  (want  to)  get  
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Y.  Although  the  concept  of  actions  and  consequences,  of  cause  and  effect,  
is  seemingly  natural,  it  is  in  fact  heuristic.  From  a  purely  logical  
perspective,  it  is  not  possible  to  take  causality  at  face  value.  At  the  level  of  
social  science,  rationality  depends  on  a  method  (causality)  that  cannot  be  
proven.    
Although  cause  and  effect  are  everyday  features  of  human  reasoning,  
David  Hume  has  famously  argued  against  the  process  of  induction  (using  
past  observations  to  form  a  theory  about  future  events),  presenting  a  
problem  for  philosophy  and  the  hard  sciences  from  which  it  has  never  
recovered.  Building  on  the  work  of  George  Berkeley,  Hume  proposed  that  
induction—the  process  of  cause  and  effect—can  never  be  proved  
absolutely.    
'If  we  would  satisfy  ourselves,  therefore,  concerning  the  
nature  of  that  evidence,  which  assures  us  of  matters  of  
fact,  we  must  enquire  how  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  
cause  and  effect.  I  shall  venture  to  affirm,  as  a  general  
proposition,  which  admits  of  no  exception,  that  the  
knowledge  of  this  relation  is  not,  in  any  instance,  attained  
by  reasonings  a  priori;  but  arises  entirely  from  experience...  
A  stone  or  piece  of  metal  raised  into  the  air,  and  left  
without  any  support,  immediately  falls:  but  to  consider  the  
matter  a  priori,  is  there  anything  we  discover  in  this  
situation  which  can  beget  the  idea  of  a  downward,  rather  
than  an  upward,  or  any  other  motion,  in  the  stone  or  
metal?'  (Hume,  1910:  140).  
  
In  reference  to  'matters  of  fact',  Hume  is  discussing  his  two  objects  of  
reason  or  representative  states  of  mind:  relations  of  ideas  (abstractions  of  
the  mind  that  relate  to  purely  one  another,  like  2+2=4)  or  matters  of  fact,  
which  are  beliefs  construed  by  the  mind  about  the  world  (Hume,  1910:  
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458;  Radcliffe,  1999).  For  Hume,  causality  cannot  reside  in  either  of  these  
representative  states  of  mind,  and  therefore  cannot  be  proved.  Whether  
or  not  there  are  in  fact  two  objects  of  reason  is  debatable,  but  the  
implications  of  the  floating  piece  of  metal  are  as  conspicuous  as  a  black  
swan:  one  cannot  prove  the  objective  truth  of  cause  and  effect  unless  one  
already  believes  in  cause  and  effect.  
There  have  been  many  challenges  to  Hume's  formulation.  In  the  field  
of  hard  sciences,  Karl  Popper  famously  argued  that,  in  practice,  science  
was  not  inductive,  and  that  its  purpose  was  to  'falsify,  not  verify'.  The  job  
of  the  scientific  method  is  to  propose  'risky  predictions'—the  more  radical  
better—as  long  as  they  contain  the  quality  of  falsification,  that  is,  that  
they  may  be  disproved.  According  to  the  principle  of  modus  tollens,  it  is  
the  disproof  that  advances  knowledge:  the  confirmation  of  a  theory  by  a  
causal  observation  does  not  confirm  the  theory,  but  the  refutation  of  a  
theory  by  observation  can  negate  it  (Popper,  1959).  
There  are  two  main  arguments  against  Popper.  Firstly,  that  real  
scientists,  simply  by  force  of  cognitive  habit,  employ  induction  in  their  
reasoning  and  that  this  practice  both  does  and  doesn't  lead  to  scientific  
discovery  (Evans,  2007),  sometimes  called  'confirmation  bias'  (Nickerson,  
1998;  Sloman  and  Hagmayer,  2006;  Oswald  and  Grosjean,  2004).  
Secondly,  that  modus  tollens  presumes  that  the  observation  of  all  data  
has  been  achieved.  This  the  so-­‐called  'black  swan'  problem,  that  the  
intervening  period  during  which  there  is  a  lack  of  complete  data  (as  with  
the  time  between  having  never  seen  a  black  swan),  the  absence  of  
refutation  indicates  either  that  the  theory  is  correct,  or  that  the  theory  is  
incorrect  but  the  contradicting  data  has  not  been  observed.    
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As  this  thesis  resides  within  the  philosophy  of  social  science  and  not  
the  philosophy  of  science,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  debate  over  
induction  endures  in  the  philosophical  realm  as  well.  We  have  shallowly  
discussed  Kant,  who  credits  Hume  with  waking  him  from  his  'dogmatic  
slumber'.  As  per  before,  'In  his  confrontation  with  Hume's  scepticism,  Kant  
makes  causality  a  category  of  the  understanding,  such  that  it  becomes  a  
faculty  of  the  human  mind.  This  corresponds  to  his  notion  that  objects  and  
events  are  not  simply  given  in  time  and  space.  They  must  be  thought  by  a  
stable  epistemological  subject,  in  other  words,  a  fundamental  condition  of  
rational  knowledge  is  that  objects  and  events  have  to  orient  themselves  
towards  human  understanding'  (Schecter,  2010:  87).  
Kant's  solution  is  not  unlike  instrumental  rationality  or  (despite  his  
potential  objection)  Habermas'  understanding  of  communicative  
rationality,  in  that  it  allows  for  causality  to  exist  as  long  as  it  is  understood  
as  a  process  of  reasoning.  Jon  Elster  offers  the  following  summary  of  the  
way  in  which  rationality  as  a  field  skirts  the  Humean  problem:  'As  I  have  
emphasized,  consequences  of  a  decision  cannot  explain  it.  Only  the  
mental  states  that  precede  the  decision  enable  us  to  explain  the  actions  as  
optimal  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  agent  rather  than  to  characterize  
them  as  useful  or  beneﬁcial  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  external  observer  
(or  of  the  agent  at  a  later  time)'  (Elster,  2007:  209).  Rationality  may  be  
inherently  causal,  but  as  it  remains  confined  to  the  actor's  point  of  view,  it  
is  not  subject  to  Hume's  critique.  
This  is  not  to  argue  against  a  stable  mechanical  universe  of  cause  and  
effect;  we  all  owe  our  lives  to  the  causality  of  modern  medicine.  Real-­‐
world  causality  exists,  and  situating  it  within  the  mind  as  a  cognitive  
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process  is  a  valid  logical  and  philosophical  argument.  Unfortunately,  this  
position  fails  to  address  the  second  question  that  Hume's  argument  begs:  
if  causality  cannot  be  proved  objectively,  and  yet  exists  subjectively,  
where  has  it  come  from?  In  other  words,  if  Hume  is  correct  and  we  cannot  
rely  on  causality,  how  on  earth  did  we  already  do  so,  even  before  Hume  
told  us  it  was  impossible?  
Montaigne,  who  Elster  often  invokes,  proposes  a  human  propensity  
for  causal  reasoning,  or  at  least  causality:  'I  have  observed  that  men,  in  
the  face  of  "facts",  are  more  willing  to  seek  the  reason  than  to  seek  the  
truth:  that  they  leave  the  things  behind  and  proceed  to  their  causes...  We  
begin  by  saying,  "How  is  this  so?",  when  we  should  ask,  "Is  this  so?"'  (de  
Montaigne,  1950:  III,  11,  1151,  author's  translation).  Elster  uses  
Montaigne  to  call  greater  attention  to  the  importance  of  observation  in  
understanding  behavior,  as  an  example  of  the  way  in  which  beliefs  can  
filter  choice  before  it  is  made.  He  misses  the  implications  of  the  statement  
(this  from  an  essay  entitled  'Il  faut  savoir  douter  de  ses  certitudes')  that  
asks:  what  are  the  ramifications  of  a  reasoning  for  which  default  is  
causality?  
Modern  cognitive  studies  have  noted  the  tendency  towards  default  
causal  thinking  (see  below).  As  Weber  puts  it,  'We  begin  with  the  
assumption  that  all  action  is  rational  based'  (Weber,  1978:  5).  Montaigne's  
observation  of  implicated  cause  has  a  long  human  history.  The  societal  
imagination  of  blood  in  Western  culture  indicates  the  way  in  which  it  must  
have  a  reason  or  purpose,  even  if  that  purpose  may  constantly  be  
redefined.  Blood  begins  as  a  container  for  the  human  spirit,  then  in  the  
humoral  theory,  a  combination  of  the  four  elements  of  water,  earth,  air  
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and  fire  (Longrigg,  1999),  transforming  to  a  source  of  contamination  and  
sin  in  the  European  middle  ages,  then,  through  Galen's  proposal,  as  a  
byproduct  of  the  liver's  manufacture,  and  finally  to  William  Harvey's  
theory  that  it  carries  oxygen  for  use  by  the  body  (Starr,  2000).  Whatever  
the  interpretation,  events  don't  just  happen,  they  happen  because;  
objects  don't  just  exist,  they  exist  because.  Reasoning  often  proceeds  as:  
(apprehension  of)  event  —>  (assignation  of)  cause.  The  human  
interpretation  of  blood  is  merely  one  example  of  the  many  types  of  
understanding—philosophical,  ethical,  political,  metaphysical,  scientific  or  
rational—that  depend  on  inductive  reasoning.  
Within  blood  there  are  two  causalities  at  play.  The  first,  via  Popper,  is  
one  where  science  progresses  forward  à  la  the  Enlightenment:  a  series  of  
failed  theorems,  in  the  positive  sense,  refined  as  each  'invalid'  theory  is  
rejected  by  empirical  observation.  Eventually,  though  trial  and  error,  we  
discover  better  and  better  explanations.  Rationality  offers  a  second  
position.  Contained  as  they  are  within  the  actor's  belief  system,  each  of  
these  assignations  may  vary  in  empirical  value,  but  they  are  all  cognitively  
equal.  From  the  actor's  point  of  view,  the  belief  was  rational  only  
inasmuch  as  it  causally  explained  the  phenomenon.  Its  empirical  value  was  
secondary.  The  structure  of  causality  remains  a  continual  cognitive  
function,  whether  or  not  the  beliefs  are  'true'  in  a  scientific,  occidental,  or  
religious  sense.  Causality  has  a  genealogy.  In  other  words,  the  belief  (or  
more  accurately,  faith)  in  causality  came  first,  and  only  after  thousands  
and  thousands  of  years  did  we  begin  to  see  any  scientific  verification.  It  is  
only  happenstance  that  the  universe,  through  our  slow,  sheer  and  often  
backwards  persistence,  that  we  have  seen  induction  come  to  bear  
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empirical  fruit.  Causality  may  be  crucial  to  the  scientific  model,  but  from  
the  cognitive  side,  our  faith  in  it  can  also  account  for  the  slowness  with  
which  new  explanations  are  adopted.  
But  can  rationality  explain  its  faith  in  itself?  If  we  consider  induction  
as  a  'false  belief',  we  can  situate  its  manifestation  within  a  sub-­‐field  of  
rationality  known  as  the  'sunk-­‐cost'  fallacy.  This  model,  along  with  'path  
dependence'  (David,  1985;  Arthur,  1989)  or  'groupthink'  (Janis,  1982)  has  
been  used  to  explain  such  varied  instances  as  typewriter  layouts  and  the  
Vietnam  War,  instances  where  the  actors  face  great  cost  in  the  material  
sense  in  the  continuation  of  a  behavior,  but  virtually  no  cost  to  abandon  a  
now  debunked  belief.  Jon  Elster  explains  this  behavior  as  'loss  aversion':  
'the  assumption  that  people  attach  value  to  changes  from  a  given  baseline  
rather  than  to  the  end  states  obtaining  after  the  change...  Loss  aversion  is  
the  tendency  for  people  to  attach  larger  value  (in  absolute  terms)  to  a  loss  
from  the  reference  level  than  to  a  same-­‐sized  gain'  (Elster,  2007:  221).  
False  beliefs  are  difficult  to  abandon  as  the  cost  to  do  so  multiplies  for  the  
length  for  which  we  hold  the  belief.  Unfortunately,  the  (logically)  false  
belief  of  which  we  speak  is  causality  itself,  upon  which  rationality  
depends.  We  cannot  use  a  rational  framework  to  explain  the  phenomenon  
of  the  persistence  of  causality  as  an  explandandum,  for  the  simple  fact  we  
believed  in  causality  before  it  was  rational  to  do  so.  
Feminist  critique  will  take  us  the  next  step  further  in  understanding  
causality  as  a  comprehensive  default,  as  it  positions  rationality  as  a  
contested  and  usually  male  site  of  privilege.  'Abstract  thought,  objective  
judgement  or  general  principles  are  seen  as  masculine  characteristics,  
whereas  subjectivity,  emotions  and  orientation  towards  the  concrete  are  
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understood  as  female...  This  separation  is  not  equal  but  organized  in  a  
hierarchical  relation  of  subordination'  (Ross-­‐Smith  and  Kornberger,  2004:  
283).  Throughout  this  chapter,  we  have  examined  the  concept  of  
rationality  as  observed  state,  and  even  as  a  normative  practice,  but  in  so  
doing  have  ignored  its  situation  as  a  normative  category.  From  everyday  
discourse  to  political  decision-­‐making,  the  'rational'  is  seen  as  
unproblematically  positive,  in  contrast  to  the  feminine  'irrational'.  
One  might  call  the  combined  efforts  of  our  four  theorists  (and  more  
above)  'the  rationality  project',  as  it  attempts  to  bring  the  irrational  into  
the  fold  of  the  rational—the  gradual  and  contested  incorporation  of  
traditionally  non-­‐rational  (religious,  criminal,  familial,  suicidal,  suicidal  
attacking)  behavior  into  a  rational  framework.  What  is  not  stated  is  that  
this  act  positivises  whatever  behavior  is  being  discussed.  The  non-­‐rational  
has  the  power  of  the  dismissive  insult,  and  if  we  note  the  wide  variety  in  
which  some  theorists  hold  some  behaviors  rational,  and  others  irrational,  
just  as  arbitrary.  It  seems  unwise  to  overlook  the  importance  with  which  
suicide  terrorism  has  crept  into  this  category,  not  as  a  form  of  empirical  
understanding,  but  as  a  form  of  legitimacy  (Jackson,  2005;  Ruby,  2002;  
Pape,  2003).  Richard  Jackson  notes  the  way  in  which  language  constructs  
the  war  on  terror.    
'More  than  affecting  perceptions  language  also  structures  
cognition—it  affects  the  way  we  think  and  particularly  how  
we  make  strategic  choices...the  language  we  use  at  any  
given  moment  privileges  one  view  over  others,  naturalising  
some  understandings  as  rational  and  others  as  
nonsensical...  The  language  of  the  'war  or  terrorism'  has  a  
similar  effect,  namely,  it  makes  some  strategic  options  
seem  rational  and  logical  and  others  seem  absurd,  even  
taboo'  (Jackson,  2005:  34).    
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If  they  are  rational  actors,  their  voices,  or  at  least  their  underlying  causes  
must  be  taken  seriously;  if  irrational,  they  can  be  marginalized.  The  
rational  terrorist  is  political;  the  irrational  terrorist  is  not.  
Now  we  reach  the  final  step,  because  feminist  theory  is  not  merely  a  
critique  of  power,  but  an  opening  to  understanding  hidden  motivations  
behind  the  masculine:  '[F]eminist  critique  of  reason  is  particularly  
concerned  with  rendering  problematic  the  construction  of  an  identity  
wherein  strategic  rationality  is  emphasized  at  the  cost  of  the  cultivation  of  
emotions'  (Nagl-­‐Docekal,  1999:  68).  Elster's  secondary  explanation  of  the  
'sunk  cost'  now  begins  to  have  greater  explanatory  power,  as  it  assigns  a  
value  to  the  holding  of  a  belief  itself:  'The  emotion  of  pridefulness—based  
on  the  belief  that  one  is  a  superior  kind  of  person—will  resist  the  
acknowledgment  that  one  has  made  a  mistake.  This  may  explain,  in  some  
cases  at  least,  vulnerability  to  the  sunk-­‐cost  fallacy'  (Elster,  2007:  221).  
The  persistence,  and  origin,  of  causality  is  less  about  masculinity  than  
the  way  in  which  it  is  constructed  by  emotion,  on  the  longstanding  and  
false  duality  between  the  passions  and  the  intellect.  'Human  beings  want  
to  be  rational',  says  Elster  (Elster  2007:  164),  finally  locating  this  correctly:  
in  the  realm  of  desire.  What's  missing—the  next  step—is  the  interrogation  
of  the  schema  of  that  desire.  Instead  of  becoming  entombed  in  a  debate  
about  phenomenology,  we  must  allow  Hume's  formulation  to  give  us  the  
opportunity  to  understand  causality  in  a  new  way:  not  as  a  contested  
access  point  to  what  is  true  or  real,  nor  as  an  assumed  subjective  position  
of  how  reason  functions,  but  as  a  way  to  understand  human  behavior  as  a  
function  of  the  cognition  of  emotion.    
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Elster  continues,  'We  do  not  take  pride  in  our  lapses  from  rationality.  
Rather,  we  try  to  avoid  them  or  correct  them,  unless  our  pridefulness  
prevents  us  from  recognizing  them.'  Rationality  is  a  process  that  not  only  
includes  emotion,  but  one  which  itself  is  an  intensely  affective.  The  
problem  with  Elster's  formulation  is  its  situation  within  normative  terms  
of  emotion  ('pride')  without  adequate  definition.  By  resituating  rationality  
as  a  function  of  cognate  feeling,  the  concept  is  able  to  maintain  both  its  
causal  validity,  and  more  importantly,  its  explanatory  power.  
  
The  Ends  of  the  Ends  
  
Hume,  who  has  caused  this  dilemma,  also  offers  us  a  way  out,  of  a  
sort:  'Reason  is,  and  ought  only  to  be,  the  slave  of  the  passions'  (Hume,  
1978:  II.3.3,  415).  This  is  not  an  essay  on  Hume's  theory,  but  it  is  
undeniable  the  way  in  which  his  major  conclusions  raise  questions  for  
rationality.  Ultimately,  Hume's  own  relationship  between  passion  and  
reason  may  be  too  complex  to  unpack  here,  but  the  argument  that  
emotion  is  the  sole  motivating  factor  in  choice  remains  robust.  In  his  
discussion  of  determinism  and  free  will,  Ronald  deSousa  exposes  the  
following  problem  in  what  he  calls  the  'angelic  dilemma',  so  named  for  
angels  that  must  choose  between  two  equally  valid  options:  
'Free  will  is  a  cute  trick  invented  to  evade  the  following  
inevitable  dilemma:  
Either  (1)  the  free  decision  is  determined  by  something,  or  (2)  it  
is  determined  by  absolutely  nothing.  In  case  (2)  it  is  simply  a  
form  of  irrationality.  But  in  case  (1)  then  either  (a)  it  is  
determined  by  nonrational  principles,  which  contravenes  the  
assumption  that  we  are  dealing  with  a  perfectly  rational  being,  
or  (b)  it  is  determined  by  rational  principles,  which  contravenes  
the  assumption  that  free  will  escapes  the  determination  of  
reason...  
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...the  faculty  of  emotion  is  actually  required  for  the  more  
conventional  mechanisms  of  rationality  to  function'  (de  Sousa,  
1987:  14).  
  
In  de  Sousa's  construction,  valence  cannot  be  removed  from  choice.  
When  it  comes  to  rationality,  we  are  discussing  means  and  ends;  if  we  
continue  to  trace  what  is  behind  the  ends,  we  find  that  they  are  
inescapably  emotional  in  nature.  As  sociologist  Philip  Slater  says,  there  are  
no  rational  motives  (Slater,  2011).  
To  clarify  this  construction,  we  now  confront  another  shared  
paradigm  in  our  four  rationalities:  the  instrumental/non-­‐instrumental  
split.  Each  school  of  rationality  proposes  the  existence  of  classically  
rational  behavior—the  instrumentally  rational—from  which  it  then  splits  
(Habermas  into  communicative,  Becker  into  social  capital,  and  so  on).  
Although  instrumental,  rationality  can  be  critiqued  as  unproblematically  
modernist,  or  even  normative.  What  is  not  critiqued  is  the  sense  that  it  
makes:  'Rational  action  is  its  own  explanation'.  The  incorporation  of  non-­‐
rational  into  the  rational  underlines  the  classic  dualist  assumption:  that  
which  is  rational  by  extension  makes  sense;  it  is  the  other  behavior  we  
need  to  explain.  It  other  words,  the  prejudice  against  the  irrational  is  
inherent  to  any  critique  that  uses  rationality  as  a  yardstick.  But  it  is  
impossible  to  both  assume  the  rational  and  explain  the  irrational.  What  
need  to  be  interrogated  are  not  the  exceptions,  but  the  rules.  
What  if  we  were  to  imagine,  however  improbably,  a  truly  
instrumentally  rational  action?  Everyday  examples  could  include  investing  
in  a  no-­‐risk  guaranteed  100  percent  return,  stepping  out  of  the  way  of  a  
passing  car,  and,  pertinent  to  our  thesis,  fighting  back  when  one's  life  is  
threatened.  To  be  as  strict  as  possible,  it  is  not  enough  that  the  subject  
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believe  that  what  he  or  she  is  doing  is  rational.  The  'instrumental'  aspect  
requires  (at  least)  three  things:  
1)  It  must  be  physically  represented  in  the  world  in  a  legible  way  (such  as  
money,  or  one's  life)  
2)  That  the  subject  and  an  outside  observer  agree  that  the  end  is  
demonstrably  achievable.    
3)  That  there  is  no  risk  involved;  that  that  action  always  creates  the  
intended  result.  
Obviously,  we  are  speaking  very  hypothetically,  like  a  choice  between  
two  identical  jobs,  one  with  higher  pay,  fewer  hours  and  closer  to  home.  
The  criteria  are  satisfied  in  the  sense  that  we  can  see  the  instrumentality  
in  time,  travel  and  money  (clear  to  both  subject  and  observer),  and  with  
no  risk  (if  we  limit  the  choice  between  two  jobs,  so  the  risk  of  taking  a  
permanent  vacation  is  not  allowed  as  a  factor  in  the  decision).  Even  in  this  
case,  Habermas  would  correctly  point  out  that  even  given  the  most  
obvious  circumstances,  the  ends  must  be  intersubjectively  agreed  upon.  
Something  so  seemingly  obvious  as  money  is  a  social  contract,  not  an  
absolute;  the  fact  that  economic  rationality  represents  a  contested  and  
violent  split  between  non-­‐materialist  religious  sects  and  Western  capital-­‐
based  society  means  that  this  is  not  a  mere  theoretical  issue.  
But  we  are  here  to  assume  the  impossible:  a  purely,  unquestionably,  
universally  instrumentally  rational  choice.  Using  our  case  study  as  a  
starting  point,  what  if  one  of  our  subjects  fought  back  and  managed  to  
disarm  their  attacker,  and  in  the  way  of  Hollywood  film,  harmlessly  
knocked  them  out  with  a  karate  chop,  achieving  the  ends  to  survive  at  no  
ethical  cost.  What  could  be  more  rational  than  that?  The  problem,  as  per  
Hume,  is  immediate,  why  would  one  want  to?  The  desire  to  live,  however  
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'natural'  it  has  become  normatively,  remains  a  desire.  The  highly  
scientized  medical  community  allows  for  'rational  suicide';  as  long  as  
'depression  is  not  a  factor',  the  desire  not  to  live  can  be  considered  
rational  in  the  context  of  great  pain  and  terminal  illness  (Wanzer  et  al.,  
1989;  Conwell  and  Caine,  1991;  Lucas,  2011).  Thus,  even  'to  live'  cannot  
be  seen  as  de  facto  rational.  Rationality  posits  the  possibility  that  the  ends  
may  be  emotional  and  the  means  rational,  but  this  formula  is  inescapable;  
the  ends  are  always  emotional.  When  the  ends  are  called  'rational'  (and  
what  this  may  mean  is  always  contested  in  any  case),  they  remain  desired,  
even  if  the  desire  is  'to  be  rational'.  To  prosper,  to  profit,  even  to  survive,  
at  the  heart  of  all  of  these  'rational'  ends  (in  the  instrumental  sense),  is  an  
irrational  desire.  
This  will  return  us  to  a  fundamental  flaw  in  rational  choice  theory  of  
all  stripes.  It  seeks  to  be  explanatory,  and  yet  the  ends  remain  
incompletely  described.  Without  the  feelings  associated  with  them,  the  
goals,  however  instrumental,  are  valueless.  This  is  not  to  say  that  they  are  
worthless,  but  rather  that  they  are  empty  of  content,  lacking  the  ultimate  
instrument  of  choice:  feeling.  The  instrumentally  rational  has  a  strong  
affective  component,  without  which  it  cannot  operate.  We  do  not  
rationally  want  money,  or  longer  lives,  or  to  protect  our  country  or  
children;  we  want  the  feeling  of  having  done  so,  or  the  feeling  of  having  
chosen.  It  remains  necessary  to  provide  greater  empirical,  historical  and  
logical  evidence  for  this  claim,  which  will  follow  in  the  last  four  chapters.  
What  matters  here  is  the  way  in  which  a  deeper  examination  of  ends  
affects  how  the  schools  of  rationality  struggle  as  explanatory  theories.  
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If  valid,  this  perspective  resolves  a  number  of  contradictions  in  our  
rationality  schools.  Firstly,  it  deepens  the  possibilities  in  unearthing  the  
motives  of  our  case  studies,  unsatisfactorily  explained  in  terms  of  
contemporary  rationality  theory.  Because  of  the  nature  of  violence  and  
passivity,  it  is  easy  to  focus  on  the  instrumental  aspect  of  'what  
happened'.  Did  they  fight?  Did  they  not  fight?  In  this  new  light,  the  actors  
are  not  choosing  a  manifest  outcome,  but  an  internal  feeling  outcome.  
The  instrumental  aspect  and  thus  the  action  is,  as  it  must  be,  secondary.  
This  is  true  in  cases  of  resistance  and  passivity;  although  one  is  obviously  
instrumental  and  one  apparently  not,  both  choices  derive  from  the  
feelings  and  emotions,  either  expected,  or  achieved  in  the  choice.  
Secondly,  this  perspective  could  be  used  to  explain  Hume's  problem  
of  induction.  Cause  and  effect,  per  Montaigne,  is  our  default  form  of  
reasoning;  even  if  it  means  eschewing  logic,  we  want  to  be  rational.  And  
this  is  exactly  the  point:  if  induction  cannot  be  logically  inferred,  and  if  it  
does  not  spring  from  reason,  why  not  from  desire?  The  origin  of  cause  and  
effect  lies  not  in  the  mind,  or  the  construction  of  cognition,  but  in  the  
construction  of  feeling:  the  feeling  created  by  thinking  causally.  In  this  
case,  rationality  (the  desire  to  be  rational)  is  a  feeling.  It  could  
conventionally  be  called,  ironically,  a  'fear'  of  feeling,  although  I  will  argue  
in  the  coming  chapters  such  contested  and  overdetermined  terms  suffer  
in  their  ability  to  adequately  explain.  Instead,  we  can  say  there  is  a  choice  
made  (to  be  rational)  that  relates  to  the  negative  anticipated  feeling  state  
associated  with  the  schema  of  'being  emotional'.    
There  are  two  common  objections  to  the  centrality  of  emotion  as  the  
source  of  human  choice  and  behavior.  The  first,  within  philosophy,  
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famously  originates  with  Hume's  finger:  'It  is  not  contrary  to  reason  to  
prefer  the  destruction  of  the  whole  world  to  the  scratching  of  my  finger'  
(Hume,  1978:  2.3.3).  In  Hume's  scenario,  there  is  no  stable  and  reasonable  
basis  for  ethics.  This  statement  engendered  an  immediate  response  from  
Kant,  who  proposed  the  'ought'  system  of  the  categorial  imperative  (King,  
1992:  241;  Kant,  1934)  that  the  rational  actor  should  behave  in  such  a  way  
that  he  expected  all  others  to  behave.  This  an  admittedly  gross  
simplification,  but  we  remain  between  the  poles  of  the  emotional  and  the  
rational.  Here,  '[T]he  problem  faced  by  'sentimentalist'  tradition...is  how  
to  derive  morality  from  emotions  without  putting  morality  into  emotions  
first'  (Roberts,  2010:  364).  
The  question  arises:  why  not  derive  morality  from  emotions?  In  
purely  logical  terms,  we  must  address  the  second  part  of  Hume's  passage,  
not  coincidentally  quoted  more  rarely  than  his  deadly  finger:  'It  is  not  
contrary  to  reason  for  me  to  choose  my  total  ruin,  to  prevent  the  least  
uneasiness  of  an  Indian  or  person  wholly  unknown  to  me.  It  is  as  little  
contrary  to  reason  to  prefer  even  my  own  acknowledged  lesser  good  to  
my  greater,  and  have  a  more  ardent  affection  for  the  former  than  the  
latter'  (Hume,  1978:  II.2.3,  3).  Hume  posits  an  empathic  action  which  
causes  the  destruction  of  the  actor,  just  as  disconnected  from  a  'reason'-­‐
based  choice;  yet,  the  vast  focus  in  the  debate  remains  on  the  finger  that  
destroyed  the  world.  Strangers  rescue  strangers  at  great  risk  to  
themselves.  Soldiers  die  rather  than  shoot  back,  and  even  play  football  
with  their  enemy.  Some  even  argue  that  violence  is,  despite  what  the  
Daily  Mail  says,  actually  diminishing  over  time  (Pinker:  2007,  2011;  
Rhodes,  1999;  see  next  chapter).  
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In  Hume's  formulation,  the  sway  of  emotion  will  make  us  just  as  likely  
to  be  ethical  as  to  be  unethical.  This  is  not  relativism.  If  we  are  controlled  
exclusively  by  passions,  as  human  beings  we  tend  to  act  ethically.  Martha  
Nussbaum  has  long  been  arguing  that  emotions,  as  a  part  of  human  life,  
must  be  ethical  (Nussbaum,  2001;  2004).  She  is  part  of  a  tradition  as  old  
(at  least)  as  Hume:  'that  that  moral  emotions  and  intuitions  drive  moral  
reasoning,  just  as  surely  as  a  dog  wags  its  tail'  (Haidt,  2001:  830).    
If  emotions  are  seen  as  black  boxes,  it  would  be  not  incorrect  to  see  
them  as  an  unstable  basis  for  ethical  thought.  This  manifests  in  a  way  that  
might  be  called  an  objection  to  disorder.  Let  us  consider  the  following  
from  Kant:  
'For  the  pure  conception  of  duty,  unmixed  with  any  foreign  
addition  of  empirical  attractions,  and,  in  a  word,  the  
conception  of  the  moral  law,  exercises  on  the  human  heart,  
by  way  of  reason  alone  (which  first  becomes  aware  with  
this  that  it  can  of  itself  be  practical),  an  influence  so  much  
more  powerful  than  all  other  springs  which  may  be  derived  
from  the  field  of  experience,  that,  in  the  consciousness  of  
its  worth,  it  despises  the  latter,  and  can  by  degrees  become  
their  master;  whereas  a  mixed  ethics,  compounded  partly  
of  motives  drawn  from  feelings  and  inclinations,  and  partly  
also  of  conceptions  of  reason,  must  make  the  mind  waver  
between  motives  which  cannot  be  brought  under  any  
principle,  which  lead  to  good  only  by  mere  accident  and  
very  often  also  to  evil'  (Kant,  1934:  29–30).    
  
This  vision  of  irreducible  multiplicity  is  not  dissimilar  to  Elster's  
objection  to  'emotional  choice',  which  leads  to  multiple  'action  
tendencies'  (Elster,  2010:  264).  Unfortunately,  the  same  can  be  said  for  
the  same  rational  choice,  as  in  the  availability  heuristic,  or  game  theory,  
where  one  actor  can  choose  many  paths  and  still  remain  within  a  rational  
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framework.  Reason  was  no  less  contested  in  Kant's  time.  Rationality  offers  
just  as  much  multiplicity,  rancor  and  confusion  as  passion  or  emotion,  and  
even  if  we  ignore  that  rationality  is  itself  (as  to  what  is  and  is  not  rational,  
or  even  what  is  or  isn't  rationality)  a  contested  field  spread  across  many  
disciplines  and  even  more  authors.  And  yet,  this  obvious  multiplicity  of  
reason  raises  no  objection.  Why  then  object  to  the  same  feature  of  
passion?  
If  deriving  morality  from  emotion  is  not  more  (or  less)  multiplicitous  
than  deriving  morality  from  reason,  we  can  consider  the  language  of  the  
above,  preoccupied  with  what  is  and  isn't  mixed,  and  what  is  and  isn't  
defined.  Masculinity  has  often  been  drawn  in  opposition  to  that  which  is  
undefined  to  sometimes  violent  results  (Theweleit,  1987,  see  Chapter  4).  
This  is  what  Richard  Bernstein  calls  'Cartesian  anxiety'  (Bernstein,  1983),  
over  'the  possibility  of  intellectual  and  moral  chaos'  (Bordo,  1987:  4).  The  
third  insight  that  the  incorporation  of  feeling  into  rationality  can  offer  can  
be  explained  as:  when  we  say  we  want  to  be  rational,  what  we  mean  is  
that  we  do  not  want  to  be  irrational.    
Whether  it  is  associated  with  randomness,  femininity,  nature,  lack  of  
control,  or  simply  chaos,  emotion—in  the  sense  that  both  Elster  and  Kant  
use  it  here—is  present  in  the  desire  to  be  positioned  rationally.  Even  
Hume,  the  sentimentalist,  expresses  it  to  some  degree:  we  are  slaves  of  
our  passions.  This  could  be  called  fear  of  emotion,  although  as  fear  has  
many  definitions,  it  is  more  specifically  understood  as  the  negative  
anticipation  of  a  future  schemic  break  (see  Chapter  5).  However  minor  in  
valance  it  may  seem  (and  given  the  long  history  of  dualism,  it  is  probably  
not  minor),  these  objections,  without  logical  basis,  are  expression  of  the  
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fear  of  emotion.  Although  feminist  theory  rightly  places  this  in  the  
masculinist  tendencies  of  rationality,  this  is  beside  the  point,  as  this  is  a  
question  of  tautology.  When  looking  strictly  at  the  ends  of  rational  choice,  
fear  of  emotion  is  an  emotion.  
The  second,  and  wholly  understandable,  objection  to  the  centralizing  
of  emotion  in  social  analysis  is  the  lack  of  a  cohesive  and  logical  
framework.  Jon  Elster  discusses  this  extensively  in  his  2010  essay  
'Emotional  Choice  and  Rational  Choice',  in  which  he  argues  that  'emotions  
cannot  be  rational:  1)  they  are  typically  unchosen  and  2)  rationality  can  
only  be  a  feature  of  choice...emotional  choice  will  be  minimally  rational'  
(Elster,  2010:  267–9).  This  is  fair  enough.  But  if  it  is  emotion  that  gives  the  
structure  to  causality  and  thus  rationality,  and  if,  furthermore,  rational  
choice  is  always  predicated  on  emotional  ends,  it  follows  that  feeling  and  
emotion  may  be  the  aspects  of  conscious  experience  that  have  given  rise  
to  reason.    
It  remains  then  not  to  divide  which  motivation  or  feeling  is  reason  
and  which  is  passion,  but  instead  to  concisely  map  how  thoughts  generate  
feelings.  This  occurs  through  (at  least)  two  processes,  schemas  and  
attribution.  Although  the  exact  nature  of  this  theory  will  be  the  subject  of  
the  last  four  chapters,  we  can  note  the  way  in  which  emotions  are  
themselves  constructed  schemically  within  this  debate,  that  'our  
emotional  responses  represent  the  'animal'  side  of  our  nature,  rather  than  
the  rational  side'  (Goldie,  2010:  10).  By  virtue  of  placement  in  the  wrong  
category,  the  very  idea  of  an  emotion  itself  generates  emotion  (feeling)  
within  the  individual  making  the  rational  argument.       
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Chapter  Three:  Attributions  within  Fields  of  Violence  
  
In  all  forms  of  rationality,  we  have  been  introduced  to  cognitive  
dependence,  or  at  the  very  least  to  a  schemic  attachment  to  the  'rational'.  
Acting  emotional,  despite  being  just  as  based  on  feeling  as  acting  rational,  
is  a  future  state  imagined  and  then  avoided.  'To  be  emotional'  is  a  
violative  schema,  and  demonstrates  the  first  step  of  the  
attribution/assignation  process:  what  is  this?  The  next  step—who  did  this?  
—exists  within  both  violence  and  theories  of  violence.  On  the  one  hand,  
actions  of  violence  (and  passivity)  are  motivated  by  feelings  of  agency.  The  
external  object  of  blame  is  a  target  of  violence,  just  as  the  internal  
anticipated  state  of  self-­‐blame  can  both  generate  or  restrict  violent  action.  
Additionally,  the  theories  themselves  depend,  in  some  aspects,  on  what  
institution  or  idea  is  or  is  not  held  responsible  for  violence.  When  
attributions  are  made  to  an  agent  beyond  what  has  been  observed,  it  
demonstrates  both  a  fault  in  logic  and  a  fundamental  aspect  of  feeling  
cognition.    
  
What   is   Violence?  
  
The  rational  and  irrational  aspects  of  violence  and  passivity  have,  
naturally  enough,  been  a  subject  within  the  study  of  violence.  It  might  
seem  disingenuous  to  call  this  sprawling  subject  a  field,  as  it  crosses  a  
variety  of  disciplines  from  sociology  to  tactics  to  psychology  to  genetics.  
International  Relations—somewhat  altered  in  its  current  form—was,  in  
fact,  founded  at  Aberystwyth  University  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  
peace  as  a  reaction  to  the  violence  of  World  War  I  (Schmidt,  2002).  Today,  
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there  are  available  degrees  in  Conflict  Studies  (e.g.  King's  College,  SOAS),  
Trauma  and  Violence  (NYU),  and  Peace  and  Conflict  Studies  (UC  Berkeley,  
UC  Boulder),  with  the  last  subject  connected  to  an  influential  eponymous  
journal.  There  is  a  growing  tradition  of  treating  violence  (and  its  
alternative)  as  a  subject  in  its  own  right.  The  academic  controversy  over  
interdisciplinarity  aside,  we  can  say  there  is  a  congruence  in  the  central  
question:  why  do  human  beings  hurt  each  other  to  such  an  extent,  many  
times  with  no  discernible  purpose?    
The  point  of  reviewing  the  literature  within  this  field  is  two-­‐fold.  The  
first  is  obvious:  has  this  motivation  not  to  fire  (or  to  fire  when  not  
threatened)  already  been  answered?  Although  it  will  be  argued  that,  from  
an  explanatory  point  of  view,  it  has  not,  there  is  much  insight  that  
sociological  perspectives  on  violence  have  to  offer;  they  are  one  of  the  
few  academic  disciplines  to  cover  passivity  in  any  depth.  The  second  
aspect  returns  us  to  the  field  within  which  this  thesis  operates.  The  
philosophy  of  social  science  allows  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  studies  
themselves,  and,  in  this  case,  the  seemingly  divergent  perspectives  on  
offer  provide  insight  into  concepts  of  agency,  causality  and  feeling  that  
may  motivate  violence  itself.    
Even  when  we  consider  violence  a  field  in  its  own  right,  however,  
ambiguity  arises.  As  is  so  often  the  case,  a  debate  emerges  over  
definitions—in  this  case,  over  what  we  can  define  as  violence.  Although  
there  are  many  definitions  of  violence,  and  many  disagreements,  this  
controversy  is  best  symbolized  in  Galtung's  conception  of  structural,  and  
then  cultural,  violence.  In  1969,  Johann  Galtung  published  his  influential  
paper  'Violence,  Peace,  and  Peace  Research',  in  which  he  posited  that  it  
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was  possible  to  conceptualize  violence  structurally,  and  that  it  could  be  
understood  systemically,  even  if  there  was  no  subject  or  actor:  [I]n  a  
society  where  life  expectancy  is  twice  as  high  in  the  upper  as  in  the  lower  
classes,  violence  is  exercised  even  if  there  are  no  concrete  actors  one  can  
point  to  directly  attacking  others'  (Galtung,  1969:  171).  Galtung  would  
later  refine  this  more  abstract  concept  of  violence  to  include  'cultural  
violence'—those  aspects  of  culture  that  legitimize  violence,  which  make  
'direct  and  structural  violence  look,  even  feel,  right—or  at  least  not  wrong'  
(Galtung,  1990:  292).  Religion,  for  example,  may  exist  as  a  type  of  cultural  
violence.  Galtung  argues  that  Israel  'translate[s]  chosenness,  a  vicious  type  
of  cultural  violence,  into  all  eight  types  of  direct  and  structural  violence'  
(Galtung,  1990:  297).  
The  concept  of  other  forms  of  violence  has  reached  increasing  social  
acceptance.  In  the  field  of  anthropology,  structural  violence  has  gained  
ground  as  a  paradigm  inside  a  field  that  eschews  judgmental  or  politically  
charged  explanation.  The  violence  in  places  like  Haiti  (Farmer,  2004),  drug  
users  in  San  Francisco  (Bourgois  et  al.,  2004),  and  the  deprivation  of  
hospitals  in  Columbia  (Abadia  and  Oviedo,  2009)  arise  from  the  
conditions,  sometimes  centuries  old,  that  impose  a  violence  of  this  
intangible  kind.  The  appeal  of  structural  violence  for  this  field  is  the  appeal  
of  an  explanation  that  is  'both  "sinful"  and  ostensibly  "nobody’s  fault"'  
(Farmer,  2004:  305).  In  terms  of  enacted  policy,  the  UN  publication  of  the  
United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP,  1994)  marked  an  attempt  
to  broaden  the  concept  of  security.  Whether  this  was  influenced  by  
Galtung's  conceptions,  it  reflects  the  way  in  which  the  broadening  of  
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concepts  like  violence  and  security  are  gaining  social  acceptance  and  even  
influencing  policy.    
These  definitions  are  not  without  controversy.  Human  security  
especially  is  criticized  as  an  attempt  to  politicize  events  and  situations  by  
'securitizing'  them  (Paris,  2001;  King  and  Murray,  2001).  By  redefining  
violence,  governments  prioritize  changes.  In  the  case  of  structural  
violence,  C.A.J.  Coady  specifically  critiques  the  practicality  of  Galtung's  
definition,  whose  'extended  concept  of  violence'  creates  a  requirement  of  
peace  so  broad  that  'peace  cannot  be  a  worthy  social  ideal  or  goal  of  
action  unless  it  is  the  total  ideal'  (Coady,  1986:  27).  Coady  proposes  the  
usefulness  of  'restricted'  violence—in  other  words,  physical  or  
instrumental  violence—to  clear  up  such  confusion.  This  definition  is  
opposed  to  what  Coady  calls  'wide'  (like  Galtung's)  or  'legitimate'  (defining  
the  permissibility  of  violence  according  to  whether  it  was  sanctioned  by  a  
state  or  like  authority  (Coady,  1986:  24;  Coady,  2008).  
The  definition  of  'restricted'  is  one  that  will  be  employed  for  the  
purposes  of  this  thesis.  This  is  the  most  basic  of  definitions:  the  act,  and  
more  importantly,  the  choice,  of  physically  hurting  another  or  many  other  
human  beings.  Using  the  strict  definition  is  not  a  moralistic,  rhetorical  or  
political  statement.  As  previously  argued,  it  is  the  instrumental  nature  of  
physical  violence  which  makes  the  decisions,  anticipations  and  
consequences  of  the  acts  resonate  so  well  within  the  field  of  rationality.  
Rationality  is  about  what  can  be  measured,  and  this  strict  definition  meets  
that  requirement.  Physical  violence  is  also—to  use  a  military  metaphor—
the  tip  of  the  spear.  It  is  a  moment  of  choice  for  the  individual:  to  kill  or  
not.  Thus,  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  the  emphasis  will  be  on  obvious  
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(objective)  violence,  not  for  the  ethical  implications,  but  the  cognitive  
ones.  
If  this  is  the  case,  why  address  Galtung's  or  alternative  perspectives  
on  violence?  This  is  because  all  attempts  to  recontextualize  violence  
express,  even  if  unintentionally,  an  apprehension  or  perception,  or  even  a  
feeling  of  violence.  The  controversy  over  what  violence  is,  and  the  way  in  
which  international  policy  changes  over  new  definitions,  expresses  the  
idea  that  one  can  feel  violated  (in  the  root  sense  of  the  word)  even  if  no  
physical  violence  is  present.  One  of  Galtung's  earlier  definitions—'Violence  
here  is  defined  as  the  cause  of  the  difference  between  the  potential  and  
the  actual'  Galtung,  1969:  168)—is  echoed  both  in  cognitive  models  of  
anger  (see  Chapter  7)  and  the  field  of  rationality  within  the  concept  of  
'relative  frustration'  (Elster,  2001b;  Boudon,  1986,  previous  chapter).  
Even  with  a  pure  definition,  it  will  be  increasingly  important  along  the  
signposts  of  the  argument  to  acknowledge  what  violence  feels  like  (and  
vice  versa).  Charles  Tilly  invites  us  to  consider  the  following:  'For  relation  
people,  collective  violence  amounts  to  a  kind  of  conversation,  however  
brutal  or  one-­‐sided  that  conversation  may  be'  (Tilly,  2003:  6).  Extending  
this,  it  could  be  understood  that  violence  is  spectral.  Even  within  the  
instrumental  definition,  it  could  be  considered  that  two  murders  are  
worse  than  one,  which  is  worse  than  assault  and  so  on.  The  recent  
emphasis  on  stretching  beyond  the  restricted  definition  underscores  the  
way  in  which  attacks  to  one's  wellbeing,  identity,  and  way  of  life  feel  like  
violence.    
Returning  to  methodological  individualism,  all  violence  shares  the  
singular  quality  of  having  been  experienced  by  the  individual.  It  is  
      -­‐94-­‐  
 
therefore  always  interpretive,  even  when  it  can  be  objectively  described  
as  an  event.  Although  the  case  study  of  violence  will  remain  within  the  
purely  instrumental,  the  broader  definitions  allow  the  observation  that  
violence  is  very  often  a  response  in  kind,  and  that  felt  violence  creates  a  
real  violent  response.  Given  that  the  topic  is  passivity  in  the  face  of  
violence,  it  could  be  argued  that  real  violence  may  not  feel  real  (in  the  
sense  that  it  rarely  causes  a  real  violence  response),  whereas  felt  violence  
feels  more  real—real  enough  to  provoke  actual  violence.    
  
The  600-­‐Pound  Dichotomy  in  the  Room  
  
Around  350  years  ago,  Thomas  Hobbes  proposed  the  idea  of  the  
state  as  a  useful  instrument  against  human  'brutish'  instincts.  Within  this  
concept,  violence  is  an  inherent  quality  of  human  beings,  something  that  
only  an  external  force  could  temper:  'Hereby  it  is  manifest  that,  during  the  
time  men  live  without  a  common  power  to  keep  them  all  in  awe,  they  are  
in  that  condition  which  is  called  war,  and  such  a  war  as  is  of  every  man  
against  every  man'  (Hobbes,  1969:  §7,  XIII).  Jean-­‐Jacques  Rousseau  and  
the  'noble  savage'  are  often  seen  as  the  counterpoint  to  this  perspective,  
where  the  corrupt  influence  of  society  alters  the  pure  state  of  humanity.  
Although  it  is  important  to  note  that  Rousseau  neither  conceived  the  term  
of  the  noble  savage,  nor  did  he  argue  it  too  strenuously,5  the  
                                                
4.  Interestingly,  all  the  critics  of  the  Noble  Savage  concept  (e.g.  Pinker,  LeBlanc)  cite  
Rousseau  as  the  proponent  of  the  inherent  goodness  of  'savage  man',  when,  in  fact,  it  
seems  to  have  originated  with  John  Dryden.  See  Lovejoy,  Arthur  (1923).  The  Supposed  
Primitivism  of  Rousseau's  'Discourse  on  Inequality',  Modern  Philology,  21(2),  pp.  165–
186.  
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Hobbes/Rousseau  question,  though  attributionally  incorrect,  remains  a  
feature  of  social  sciences:  'From  the  first  perspective,  society  is  the  
external  guarantor  of  order  that  pacifies  the  beast  within  us  all;  from  the  
second,  modern  society  is  responsible  for  corrupting  the  essential  
goodness  of  human  nature'  (Malešević,  2010:  3).  
There  are  many  perspectives  on  violence:  anthropological,  rationalist,  
realist,  psychological,  institutionally  sociological,  and  so  on.  Charles  Tilly,  
quoted  above,  links  collective  violence  such  as  revolution  or  revolt  to  the  
'central  political  process',  and  specifically  'claims  over  resources  and  
privileges  controlled  by  government'  (Tilly,  1973:  438).  Why  choose  this  
particular  schism,  over  Tilly's  more  materialist  claims,  or  any  other  
number?  The  first  is  purely  practical:  the  phenomenon  of  combat  passivity  
is  addressed  rarely  in  an  academic  context,  and  the  two  books  under  
discussion  happen  to  fall  across  this  particular  divide.  The  second  is  the  
way  in  which  the  theoretical  aspect  of  this  thesis  intersects  with  this  
system.  Concepts  of  internal  or  learned  behavior  inevitably  polarize  
around  blame.  It  is  the  feelings  generated  by  assignation  that  make  this  
particular  binary  of  definitions  so  pernicious.    
Unconscious  motivations  erupt,  from  both  sides,  in  a  very  specific  
way.  First,  authors  will  critique  this  dualism  as  a  primitive  appendage  of  
Enlightenment  philosophy,  followed  immediately  by  a  strong  position  on  
one  side  or  the  other.  Two  of  the  very  first  scholars  to  speak  about  
violence  in  terms  of  evolutionary  psychology,  Martin  Daly  and  Margo  
Wilson,  begin  by  calling  this  dichotomy  'an  inane  formulation  that  has  
spectacularly  impeded  progress'  (Daly  and  Wilson,  1988a:  5).  They  then  
conceptualize  spousal  abuse  as  a  function  of  'fitness',  that  the  male  is  
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inclined  to  jealousy  and  violence  as  a  function  of  maintaining  the  
evolutionary  imperative  of  his  offspring  (Daly  and  Wilson,  1988b:  522–4).  
Theorist  Sinib:  522y  and  violen  into  a  similar  trap,  first  critiquing  the  
debate:  'Although  these  two  contrasting  standpoints  have  commanded  
much  attention  for  the  past  three  centuries,  neither  provides  a  
sociologically  accurate  account  of  the  human  relationship  to  war  and  
violence').  He  then  goes  on  to  state  that  'when  we  act  in  the  image  of  
Hobbes’s  state  of  nature—as  egoistic  self-­‐preservers—we  do  that  for  very  
Rousseauian  reasons  and  nearly  always  in  Rousseauian  contexts    our  
social  embeddedness  is  the  source  of  both  our  selfishness  and  our  
altruism'  (Malešević,  2010:  3–5).    
Finally,  for  better  or  worse,  this  dualist  conception  is  still  widely  
utilized  in  violence  literature.  A  brief  scan  of  evolutionary  psychology  (Gat,  
2009;  2012;  Thayer,  2000;  2004),  anthropology  (Le  Blanc  and  Register,  
2003;  Keeley,  1996),  animal  anthropology  (Goodall  et  al.,  2013),  
neuropsychology  (Anderson  et  al.,  1999;  Scarpa  and  Raine,  2000;  2007),  
and  even  International  Relations  (Morgenthau,  1961;  Gat,  2009)  makes  
the  consistent  claim  that  it  is  society  that  keeps  human  nature  in  check.  
The  'man  as  brute'  perspective  can  be  implied:  'For  if,  as  I  suspect,  war  is  
an  archetypal  phenomenon,  only  conscious  awareness  can  save  us  from  
its  grip'  (Stevens,  2004:  24,  this  from  a  review  of  the  war  on  terror).  
Alternatively,  it  can  be  stated  outright:  'Hobbes  was  right,  and  Rousseau  
wrong,  about  the  state  of  nature'  (Azar,  2012:  1).  The  concept  of  the  
'blank  slate'  or  'noble  savage'  seems  equally  popular.  Our  historians  of  
combat,  David  Grossman  and  Gwynne  Dyer,  argue,  without  the  strongest  
evidence,  that  man  is  inherently  non-­‐violent  (Dyer,  2006;  Grossman,  1996;  
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2008).  Military  historians  Jack  Levy  and  William  Thompson  (2011)  as  well  
as  anthropologist  Raymond  Case  Kelly  (2000)  both  assume  that  it  was  
complex  state  civilization  that  introduced  war  violence,  despite  the  
growing  evidence  to  the  contrary.    
In  the  last  five  years,  two  major  works  have  been  published  that  
address  passivity  under  threat  of  violence,  both  of  which  feature  this  
seemingly  inescapable  dichotomy.  Steven  Pinker,  writing  extensively  via  
the  work  of  sociologist  Norbert  Elias  (see  below),  sees  social  influences  as  
Hobbes  might:  to  control  the  nature  of  man,  who  is  'wired  for  violence'  
(Pinker,  2011:  1410).  Even  Randall  Collins  cannot  escape  a  kind  of  
Rousseauian  aside,  where  he  states  at  one  point  that  '[h]umans  are  hard-­‐
wired  for  interactional  entrainment  and  solidarity,  and  this  is  what  makes  
violence  so  difficult'  (Collins,  2008:  26).    
One  could  say  there  is  a  quest  for  legitimacy  in  the  attraction  of  
pronouncement  as  to  the  nature  of  man,  be  it  noble  or  savage.  Using  the  
term  'wired'  carries  the  weight  of  nearly  Newtonian  weight.  It  might  be  
rhetorically  tempting  to  say  that  there  is  little  scientific  value  to  these  
pronouncements.  In  fact,  there  is  none.  Any  theories  about  what  is  or  is  
not  human  nature  will  remain  purely  conjectural,  for  the  simple  reason  
that  it  is  impossible  to  design  an  experiment  that  can  tell  us  which  is  which  
and  under  what  circumstances.  It  is  junk  science  similar  to  astrology  and  
homeopathy;  yet,  unlike  these  last  two,  remains  a  serious  subject  for  
debate.    
This  somewhat  outrageous  assertion  will  be  argued  in  greater  detail  
further  down,  but  at  this  point  it  can  be  noted  that  there  is  an  appeal  to  
making  pronouncements  on  the  nature  of  man,  just  as  there  is  an  appeal  
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to  violence.  This  split  is  inane,  but  it  is  also  telling;  the  fact  that  so  many  
deny  and  then  embrace  it  should  tell  us  that.  As  it  happens,  these  appeals  
are  the  same,  or  at  least  are  generated  by  the  same  cognitive  structure.  
We  have  a  violation  (violence),  which  is  in  turn  explained  not  only  within  a  
causal  framework,  but  within  a  causal  agent  framework.  In  each  case,  
something  can  be  understood  to  be  responsible:  the  enlightenment,  social  
networks,  man's  nature  and  so  on,  just  as  simultaneously  future  states  of  
self-­‐designated  responsibility  (shame  and  guilt)  are  avoided  by  giving  up  
blame  to  agents  outside  the  self  (Chapter  6).  It  would  be  foolish  to  
discount  the  many  insights  that  Collins,  Pinker,  and  others  present.  But  
under  the  dictum  of  a  greater  theoretical  examination  of  social  sciences,  
we  will  now  attempt  to  congruently  infer  common  aspects  of  human  
violence,  as  well  as  common  aspects  of  the  theories  that  attempt  to  
explain  them.    
As  Steven  Pinker's  work  was  published  after  Randall  Collins'  and  
contains  criticism  of  same,  it  will  be  presented  second,  allowing  us  to  
address  legitimate  concerns  with  Collins'  perspective.  Pinker's  take  is  
distinctly  more  problematic,  as  it  takes  core  observations  about  human  
behavior  and  extends  them  to  impossible  speculation.  But  as  we  learn  
more  about  the  contradictions  in  the  theories  of  violence,  so  too  do  we  
discover  violence  itself,  and  the  conflicts  that  give  rise  to  conflict.    
  
Violence  is   Hard  
  
Randall  Collins,  in  Violence:  A  Microsociological  Theory,  presents  a  
compelling  and  simple  argument  that  violence  is  hard,  or,  more  
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specifically:  'Symbolic  violence  is  easy,  real  violence  is  hard'  (Collins,  2008:  
24).  He  bolsters  this  assertion  with  a  vast  amount  of  data  on  the  subject,  
including  his  original  research  on  the  photography  of  fighting.  He  reviews  
riots,  soccer  hooliganism,  violent  crime,  spousal  abuse,  and  even  the  
amount  of  violence  that  exists  between  siblings  and  young  children,  which  
oddly  accounts  for  the  statistically  greatest  amount  of  family  violence  
(Collins,  2008:  14,  142).  Finally,  of  course,  he  addresses  soldiers'  non-­‐firing  
in  combat.6  
Randall  Collins  is  interested  in  explaining  the  phenomenon  
sociologically:  'Not  violent  individuals,  but  violent  situations—this  is  what  
a  micro-­‐sociological  theory  is  about...it  is  a  false  lead  to  look  for  types  of  
violent  individuals,  constant  across  situations'  (Collins,  2008:  11).  Collins  
proposes  what  he  calls  'emotional  entrainment',  the  interactional  
relationship  between  individuals  themselves,  as  well  as  larger  groups.  
Violent  situations  arise  out  asymmetrical  entrainment.  When  the  
aggressor  feels  dominant  and  the  victim  feels  weak,  this  produces  a  
feedback  loop  of  potentially  increasing  violence.  Here,  violence  only  
emerges  situationally:  '[t]he  apex  of  the  event  is  the  actions  of  the  violent  
few.  The  basis  of  the  emotional  energy...is  the  successive  layers  of  
helpers,  co-­‐participants,  and  spectators  around  them'  (Collins,  2008:  413).    
Collins  uses  many  examples,  and  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  
demonstrate  his  theory  with  two  of  them.  The  first,  somewhat  
controversial,  but  right  on  point  with  the  case  study  in  question,  is  that  of  
spousal  abuse,  where  Collins  notes  that  women  who  present  as  a  victim  
                                                
5.  Collins,  one  of  a  few  of  whom  it  could  be  said  have  a  'pro-­‐Marshall'  stance,  actually  
mentions  the  shortcomings  of  Marshall's  research.  
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can  incur  the  anger  of  their  abuser.  The  violence  is  relational,  and  even  
without  an  audience,  victim  cues  in  this  asymmetrical  entrainment  cause  
the  abuser  to  fill  his  role:  'Cryingl  is  a  weapon  of  the  weak  and  it  can  be  a  
dangerous  weapon  to  use'  (Collins,  2008:  142).  When  one  partner  
manifests  victim-­‐like  behavior,  the  other  steps  up  and  takes  on  the  role  of  
the  perpetrator.  Collins'  intent  is  not  so  much  victim  blaming  as  it  is  an  
attempt  to  break  this  'time-­‐process  in  which  conflict  builds  up  emotional  
entrainment.  Knowing  the  time-­‐patterns  would  be  helpful  for  practical  
measures  in  training  to  prevent  violence'  (Collins,  2008:  140).  
Collins  extends  this  entrainment  to  the  interaction  of  a  third  party:  
the  spectators  mentioned  above.  In  his  own  case  study  of  photographs  of  
riots  and  brawls,  he  first  takes  note  of  the  fighters'  inherent  disinclination  
not  to  fight  becoming  a  kind  of  dance.  One  approaches  and  blusters  as  the  
other  retreats  and  vice  versa,  each  trying  to  find  an  out.  The  crucial  factor  
for  Collins  is  the  audience,  who  he  notes  greatly  increases  the  probability  
of  violence:  'The  audience  is  crucial  in  a  staged  fight;  it  provides  the  
support  that  circumvents  confrontational  tension/feark  A  testable  
hypothesis:  a  focused  audience  lowers  fighters'  tension/fear  and  affects  
their  willingness  to  fight  at  all,  for  how  long  and  with  what  intensity'  
(Collins,  2008:  197–99).    
In  combat,  this  entrainment  plays  out  in  two  ways.  In  the  case  of  
combat  passivity,  each  individual  soldier  is  neither  presented  with  a  victim  
for  them  to  engage  as  the  perpetrator,  nor,  as  in  the  case  of  the  ranks  
spread  wide  in  the  World  War  II  theater,  are  they  given  an  audience  to  egg  
them  on.  As  such,  '[t]he  micro-­‐situational  reality  of  the  home  front  or  the  
rear  staging  areas  is  all  us,  even  as  its  talk  refer  to  the  enemy  as  a  symbolic  
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object  defining  the  outer  boundaries  of  the  group.  Coming  nearer  the  
front,  one's  attention  shifts  more  and  more  to  the  enemy  as  a  real  social  
presence'  (Collins,  2008:  80).  This  social  presence,  and  the  emotional  
entrainment  implied  between  any  human  beings,  on  whatever  side,  acts  
as  a  buffer  between  violence,  as  it  does  between  all  the  situations  
outlined  above.    
If  some  soldiers  do  not  fire  back,  some  obviously  do.  If  'violence  is  
hard',  what  are  the  conditions  under  which  violence  will  arise?  Besides  
fatalities  from  artillery,  the  greatest  number  of  deaths  occur  in  a  rout:  
when  one  side  weakens,  and  the  other  side  falls  upon  them  with  
devastating  results.  'The  greatest  number  of  deaths'  fails  to  describe  the  
rampage  quality  of  the  end  of  battle,  where  rape,  evisceration,  trophy  
taking  and  so  forth  are  common.  Collins  relates  a  story  told  by  Marshall,  
where  having  killed  all  the  enemy,  the  soldiers  'moved  into  the  barns  of  
the  French  farmhouse,  where  they  killed  the  hogs,  cows,  and  sheep.  The  
orgy  ended  when  the  last  beast  was  dead'  (Marshall,  1947:  183,  cited  in  
Collins,  2008:  95).  This  is  what  Collins  terms  'forward  panic'.  
Collins  uses  the  word  'panic'  instead  of  rage  or  shame  through  a  
process  of  'contagion  of  emotion':  'In  atrocities,  this  mechanism  is  not  the  
mood  of  the  sports  victory  or  defeat,  but  ebullient  killers  feeding  off  the  
hopeless  passivity  of  those  who  are  being  killed,  and  the  victims  caught  in  
the  helpless  shock  and  depression  by  the  emotional  dominance  of  those  
who  kill  them.  This  seems  irrational  against  all  self-­‐interest  of  the  victims.  
Nevertheless,  it  is  a  factual  pattern  that  characterizes  virtually  all  major  
atrocities'  (Collins,  2008:  108).  Although  Collins  does  not  provide  a  concise  
modeling  of  how  these  emotions  manifest,  there  seems  to  be  
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transformation  from  fear  to  shame  to  anger.  The  concept  of  forward  panic  
is  useful  as  a  observable  and  repeatable  historical  reality.  Collins'  concept  
of  a  'contagion  of  emotion'  is  not  inaccurate  but  incompletely  defined.  
After  the  theory  of  cognate  feeling  has  been  fully  laid  out  in  this  thesis,  we  
will  return  to  the  subject  of  forward  panic,  and  how  these  emotions  might  
be  broken  down  usefully  into  their  component  causal  assignations  and  
feelings.    
What  is  missing  in  Collins'  theory,  as  is  appropriate  given  its  
sociological  focus,  is  an  accurate  description  of  the  attraction  or  desire  to  
violence.  In  the  above  case  of  'emotional  contagion',  why  does  fear  lead  to  
savagery  instead  of  mutual  flight,  or  even  passivity?  But  there  is  the  larger  
problem  of  why  soldiers  are  in  the  war  in  the  first  place:  what  is  the  
attraction  of  violence?  Collins  fails  to  address  individuals  who  desire  
violence  without  the  benefit  of  a  group,  or  even  dual,  entrainment.  Serial  
killers  (to  be  discussed  in  a  proposed  volume  two,  Collins,  2008:  450)  are  
an  admittedly  rare  phenomena,  but  serial  rapists  and  child  abusers  are  
not:  these  are  people  who  both  depend  on  a  lack  of  an  audience,  and  
whose  behavior  cannot  be  attributed  to  their  entrainment  with  their  
victim.  Although  Pinker's  theories  have  problems  (see  below),  he  does  at  
least  proscribe  that  an  individual  may  have  a  motive  for  violence  (Pinker,  
2011:  Chapter  8).  
In  the  case  of  combat,  Joanna  Bourke  notes  the  savagery  of  some  
soldiers'  behavior  and  accounts:  '(killing)  was  like  "getting  screwed  the  
first  time"  and  gave  men  "an  ache  as  profound  as  the  ache  of  orgasm".  In  
the  words  of  a  black  Muslim  Marine,  "I  enjoyed  the  shooting  and  the  
killing.  I  was  literally  turned  on  when  I  saw  a  gook  get  shot."'  (Bourke,  
      -­‐103-­‐  
 
2000:  42).  Although  this  sexual  aspect  is  but  one  of  Bourke's  paradigms  of  
the  desire  for  violence  (see  Chapter  7),  there  is  a  consistent  historical  
expression  of  this  desire,  especially  in  war:    
'Take  the  glamour  out  of  war!  I  mean,  how  the  bloody  
hell  can  you  do  that?  Go  and  take  the  glamour  out  of  a  
Huey,  go  take  the  glamour  out  of  a  Sheridan...  Can  you  
take  the  glamour  out  of  a  Cobra,  or  getting  stoned  at  
China  Beach?  It's  like  taking  the  glamour  out  of  an  M-­‐
79a  Ohhhh,  war  is  good  for  you,  you  can't  take  the  
glamour  out  of  that.  It's  like  trying  to  take  the  glamour  
out  of  sex,  trying  to  take  the  glamour  out  of  the  
Rolling  Stones."  He  was  really  speechless,  working  his  
hands  up  and  down  to  emphasize  the  sheer  insanity  of  
it.  "I  mean,  you  know  that  it  just  can't  be  done!'  (Herr,  
1997:  189–190).  
  
Chris  Hedges  likens  war  to  pleasure  in  a  different  paradigm:  'The  rush  
of  battle  is  a  potent  and  often  lethal  addiction,  for  war  is  a  drug,  one  I  
ingested  for  many  years'  (Hedges,  2003:  1),  and  goes  on  to  argue  that  this  
pleasure  manifests  especially  perniciously  in  the  public  in  general,  and  its  
political  leaders  specifically.  Although  the  addiction  or  even  pleasure  
model  is  not  fully  expanded  in  this  case,  its  existence  does  contradict  
Collins'  larger  conclusion  that  violence  is  hard.  Instead,  for  some,  it  seems  
easy,  even  enjoyable,  leading  us  back  to  the  principle  of  methodological  
individualism:  how  acts  of  violence  are  interpreted  by  the  individual.    
This  is  not  to  discount  Collins'  insights,  which  are  well-­‐documented,  
and  congruently  argued.  Nor  is  it  to  say  that  he  ignores  the  possibility  of  
the  desire  of  violence,  something  that  is  seen  in  the  creation  of  the  
concept  of  forward  panic.  It  is  merely  to  say  that  the  imagination  of  
violence  (and  even  sometimes  its  execution)  isn't  so  much  easy  (as  in  
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requiring  no  friction)  as  it  is  desirable—the  difference  between  a  pull  and  
a  push.  Although  this  thesis  will  address  a  different  type  of  desire  to  
violence  than  the  sexual  or  bodily  pleasures  described  above  (see  Chapter  
7),  these  accounts  demonstrate  what  is  missing  from  Collins'  descriptions:  
desire  and  pleasure,  in  the  experience  of  the  participants.    
  
Violence  is   Natural   
  
Although  his  methodology  will  prove  to  be  flawed,  Steven  Pinker  at  
least  introduces  a  kind  of  dualism  into  the  question  of  violence.  Unlike  
Collins,  his  explandandum  includes  strong  motivations  both  for  and  
against  violence.  His  main  argument  is  that  evolutionary  pressure  
produced  two  intentional  structures  for  human  beings,  what  he  
colloquially  terms  'better  angels'  and  'inner  demons'.  Within  this  
paradigm,  both  the  social  desire  prohibiting  violence  and  the  desire  for  
violence  exist  side  by  side.  His  book,  The  Better  Angels  of  Our  Nature,  may  
not  be  strictly  academic,  but  it  has  had  a  significant  impact  in  human  
behavior  circles,  and  Pinker  is  a  highly  regarded  as  a  'global  thinker'  (Swift,  
2010).  
It  would  be  simplistic  to  characterize  Pinker  as  a  member  of  the  
'nature'  school,  or  that  he  believes  exclusively  in  an  inherent  character  of  
human  behavior.  Nevertheless,  he  situates  himself,  without  apologies,  in  
the  Hobbesian  paradigm  that  believes  it  is  the  job  of  society,  and  more  
specifically  the  state,  to  tame  the  rough  nature  of  human  instincts.  Social  
interaction  exists,  but  only  inasmuch  as  it  influences  the  inherent  natural  
process.  In  his  scenario,  'the  focus  of  the  book  is  on  transformations  that  
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are  strictly  environmental:  changes  in  historical  circumstances  that  engage  
a  fixed  human  nature  in  different  ways'  (Pinker,  2011:  20).    
These  historical  circumstances  include  the  transition  from  hunter  
gatherers  to  farmers,  the  Civilizing  Process,  the  Humanitarian  Revolution  
(the  increase  and  legitimization  of  non-­‐violence),  the  Long  Peace  (the  
theory  that  democracies  tend  not  to  fight  each  other),  the  New  Peace  (the  
post-­‐Cold  War  trending  to  less  war),  and  the  'Rights  revolution',  or  the  
increasing  recognition  of  formally  targeted  minorities.  It  would  be  a  book  
in  itself  to  discuss  these  six  processes,  which  Pinker  sees  as  the  
motivational  factors  in  reducing  violence.  The  last  four  are  controversial  in  
their  own  right,  and  have  been  criticized,  as  well  as  championed,  
elsewhere.  Instead,  a  specific  focus  on  the  Civilizing  Process  will  hopefully  
be  an  elucidating  condensation  of  Pinker's  total  argument.    
Pinker  does  not  simply  and  blindly  argue  that  human  nature  is  all  that  
determines  behavior.  In  his  third  chapter,  he  heavily  relies  on  the  social  
theories  of  Norbert  Elias,  and  what  is  known  as  the  civilizing  process.  As  
such,  Elias'  theory  bears  elaboration  here.  Elias  argued  that  the  years  
between  the  13th  and  19th  centuries  marked  the  slow  formation  of  our  
modern  civil  society,  pushed  by  the  forces  of  a  growing  interest  in  
manners,  as  well  as  a  consolidating  state  apparati  (among  other  factors).  
His  arguments  exist  by  inference.  For  example,  Elias  argued  that  a  rude  
society  could  be  understood  to  exist  according  to  the  increasing  
publication  of  manuals  on  mores  in  the  15th  and  16th  centuries.  The  
remonstrations  against  defecation,  farting,  and  even  public  masturbation  
and  sex  (Elias,  2000:  120–45)  imply  that  there  was  something  to  rail  
against.    
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Pinker  focuses  on  the  role  of  the  Hobbesian  state:  'Leviathan's  
incentives  make  commerce  more  attractive,  but  commerce  makes  the  job  
of  the  Leviathan  easier'  (Pinker,  2011:  320).  This  quotation  demonstrates  
two  things  simultaneously:  the  pre-­‐eminence  of  the  concept  of  a  state  
that  exists  to  civilize  its  subject,  and,  less  ideologically,  the  transition  from  
a  land-­‐based  to  a  monetary  economy.  In  classic  rationalist  terms,  land  is  a  
limited  resource,  making  its  use  a  zero  sum  game.  Our  actors  are  both  
rational,  acting  inside  a  monetary  economy  that  is  a  'classic  positive-­‐sum  
gamec  where  each  person  can  confer  a  large  benefit  to  another  at  a  small  
cost  to  himself  or  herself'  and  evolutionarily  justified.  'Examples  include  
primates  who  remove  ticks  from  each  other's  backs'  (Pinker,  2011:  256).    
Pinker  pays  special  attention  to  Elias'  understanding  of  violence.  In  
service  of  this,  he  reproduces  the  medieval  woodcuts  that  Elias  shows  to  
demonstrate  the  'Knight's  World'  (Elias,  2000:  513).  These  illustrations  
from  the  15th  century  depict  violence  as  a  casual  affair:  'a  peasant  
disembowels  a  horse  as  a  pig  sniffs  his  exposed  buttocks.  In  a  nearby  cave  
a  man  and  a  woman  sit  in  the  stocks.  Above  them  a  man  is  being  led  to  
the  gallows,  where  a  corpse  is  already  hanging,  and  next  to  it  is  a  man  who  
has  been  broken  on  the  wheel,  his  shattered  body  pecked  by  a  crow'  
(Pinker,  2011:  234).  It  is  important  to  note  that  Elias'  use  of  these  images  
have  elicited  much  criticism  that  a  'Knight's  World'  was  less  representative  
of  reality  than  it  was  of  how  the  knight  saw  the  world  (Schwerhoff,  1998,  
quoted  in  Ziemann,  2012;  see  also,  Malešević  and  Ryan,  2013).  This  is  not  
a  criticism  that  Pinker  addresses.  
On  the  one  hand,  it  can  be  said  that  these  criticisms  have  some  
validity,  since  Elias'  feelings  on  human  nature  may  not  have  been  so  far  
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from  Pinker's;  Sinive  some  validand  Kevin  Ryan  note  that  the  Civilizing  
Process  'is  littered  with  references  to  humans  as  essentially  animalistic  
creatures  motivated  by  biological  impulses,  which  are  presented  in  the  
form  of  "elementary  urges",  "drives",  "instinctual  tendencies",  "animalistic  
activities"  and  "animalistic  impulses"'  (Maleševic  and  Ryan,  2013:  7).  Such  
an  underlying  belief  gives  Elias  a  motivation  to  skew  data  to  his  
perspective—not  an  uncommon  phenomenon.  The  problem  with  these  
critiques  is  that,  like  S.L.A.  Marshall  before  him,  despite  Elias'  methods  
being  subject  to  valid  scrutiny,  other  data  has  proved  him  to  be  
coincidentally  correct.    
Pinker  offers  the  vast  amount  of  evidence  collected  on  levels  of  
violence  over  the  last  5,000  years.  Despite  what  we  may  read  in  the  
newspapers,  it  seems  that  there  may  have  been  a  dramatic  decline  of  
violence  in  modern  times.  This  topic  has  been  the  subject  of  a  great  deal  
of  scholarship,  in  the  last  20  years  especially.  Beginning  with  Lawrence  
Keeley's  work,  War  Before  Civilization,  and  continuing  onward  (LeBlanc  
and  Register,  2003;  Gat  2006),  research  into  the  archeological  records  has  
shown  that  small  tribes  from  over  5,000  years  ago  were  in  fact  very  
violent,  with  some  groups  having  death  rates  as  high  as  30  percent.  This  
finding  was  confirmed  anthropologically,  in  that  small  non-­‐state  societies  
have  correspondingly  high  rates  of  violence  compared  to  their  state  
counterparts.  Authors  Steven  LeBlanc  and  Catherine  Register  note  that  
the  last  place  on  earth  to  be  found  by  modern  man,  the  New  Guinea  
highlands,  was  also  the  most  warlike  (Le  Blanc  and  Register,  2003:  151).    
The  story  of  violence  is  then  a  story  of  decline  over  the  years,  
matched  in  terms  of  warfare.  As  horrible  as  20th-­‐century  war  wars  seem  
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by  sheer  scale,  in  terms  of  percentage  of  population,  they  remain  low  by  
comparison  to  nearly  any  pre-­‐20th-­‐century  society.  Forgiving  the  term  
'primitive',  Keeley's  research  is  reproduced  here:    
  
(Source:  Keeley,  1996:  89).  
Even  the  historically  traumatic  and  extreme  violence  of  World  War  II  
produced  a  death  rate  of  only  five  per  1,000  people  (Keeley,  1996:  90;  
Gat,  2012:  3).    
Likewise,  the  death  rate  from  homicide  in  European  countries  has  
actually  declined  dramatically  in  the  last  five  centuries,  'due  primarily  to  a  
decrease  in  the  number  of  fights  between  young  males,  both  among  the  
elites,  who  had  frequently  killed  each  other  in  duels,  and  among  ordinary  
people,  who  had  engaged  in  frequent  manly  confrontations  and  knife  
      -­‐109-­‐  
 
fights  in  public  places'  (Muchembled,  2012:  2).  Pieter  Spierenburg  
demonstrated  that  the  homicide  rate  in  Amsterdam  dropped  thirty-­‐fold  
from  1550  to  1800,  from  47  per  100,000  people  to  1.5  per  100,000  
(Butterfield,  1994).  Eric  Monkkonen  notes  similar  drops  in  the  US,  in  the  
even  shorter  historical  period  from  1800  to  1950  (Monkkonen,  2001;  
2002).    
Despite  the  obvious  conflict  to  his  central  thesis  of  a  decline  in  
violence,  Pinker  acknowledges  his  debt  to  Collins,  and  discusses  'forward  
panic'  (routs  in  battle)  at  length.  His  version  focuses  more  on  the  rage  
aspect  and  less  the  panic:  'A  rampage  may  be  a  primitive  adaptation  to  
seize  a  fleeting  opportunity  to  decisively  rout  a  dangerous  enemy  before  it  
can  remobilize  and  retaliate'  (Pinker,  2011:  1421).  For  Pinker,  this  is  part  
of  the  adaptive  quality  of  the  our  past  predatory  qualities.  These  are  
interactive  connections  between  the  midbrain,  forebrain  and  frontal  
cortex,7  where  the  'Fear  system'  and  'Rage  system'  are  linked:  'Mild  fear  
can  trigger  freezing  or  flight,  but  extreme  fear,  combined  with  other  
stimuli,  can  trigger  an  enraged  defensive  attack.  Forward  panic  or  
rampage  in  humans  may  involve  a  similar  handoff  from  the  Fear  system  to  
the  Rage  system  (Pinker,  2011:  1456).  A  similar  transition,  as  described  in  
Collins,  is  taking  place,  but  the  emotional  concepts  remain  vaguely  
defined.    
In  regard  to  our  case  study,  passivity  in  combat  or  in  life  or  death  
situations,  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  Pinker  is  somewhat  dismissive  at  
                                                
6.  This  is  a  vast  simplification.  The  actual  processes  are  detailed,  contradictory,  
controversial  and,  as  I  have  argued,  irrelevant.  As  George  Mandler  notes  that  we  
should  not  be  surprised  when  something  appears  on  a  brain  scan;  only  if  nothing  did.  
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least  in  terms  of  data,  calling  Marshall's  study  'dubious',  and  seemingly  
ignoring  the  other  evidence  that  I  have  cited  in  the  introductory  chapter,  
despite  having  clearly  read  Grossman  and  Collins  (Pinker,  2011:  1416).  
Nevertheless,  he  acknowledges  the  possibility  as  follows:  
'It's  true,  then,  that  when  men  confront  each  other  in  face-­‐
to-­‐face  conflict,  they  often  exercise  restraint.  But  this  
reticence  is  not  a  sign  that  humans  are  gentle  and  
compassionate.  On  the  contrary,  it's  just  what  one  would  
expect  from  the  analyses  of  violence  by  Hobbes  and  
Darwinoften  exercise  restraint.  But  this  reticence  is  not  a  
sign  that  humans  are  gentle  and  compassionate.  On  the  
contrary,  iteemingly  ignoring  the  carefully—a  reticence  
experienced  as  anxiety  or  paralysis.  Discretion  is  the  better  
part  of  valor;  compassion  has  nothing  to  do  with  it'  (Pinker,  
2011:  1416).  
  
This  is  a  seemingly  sensical  argument,  that  social  self-­‐interest  is  the  
overriding  goal;  and  yet,  this  type  of  dualist  explanation  has  its  
disadvantages.  Firstly,  it  does  not  fit  the  data  with  which  we  have  been  
presented.  If  self-­‐interest  is  the  goal,  the  soldier  in  a  Napoleonic  firefight,  
for  example,  engages  in  the  opposite  of  self-­‐interest  by  not  shooting  back.  
The  irrationality  of  this  action  is  the  starting  point  of  this  thesis.  Pinker,  
however,  may  be  arguing  that  this  evolutionary  imperative  is  manifesting  
as  a  subconscious  anxiety,  a  residual  effect  of  evolutionary  self-­‐interest.  
This  is  perhaps  even  more  problematic.  For  without  a  proper  
distinguishing  criterion,  there  is  no  way  to  assign  whether  or  not  an  
individual  is  being  demonic  or  angelic,  or  why.  It  would  therefore  be  
possible  to  argue  for  any  dataset.  If  Marshall  had  found,  for  example,  that  
100  percent  of  soldiers  had  fired  back,  this  would  be  due  to  their  
aggression,  if  0  percent,  because  they  were  protective.    
      -­‐111-­‐  
 
  
Impossible  to  Prove;   Irrelevant   if   True  
  
What  follows  relies  heavily  on  a  criticism  of  Steven  Pinker's  work,  
which  in  one  sense  is  unfair,  but  necessary  in  another.  It  is  unfair  in  that  
the  large  logical  error—that  human  beings  either  have  a  nature  or  don't—
applies  equally  to  both  sides  of  the  debate.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  
demonstrate  the  error,  and  Pinker's  work  serves  especially  well  because  
he  either  misrepresents,  mistakes,  and  possibly  lies  about  much  of  the  
research  that  he  uses.  Collins'  work,  besides  being  considerably  more  
nuanced  and  more  reliably  researched,  does  not  rely  on  a  position  that  
humans  are  inherently  one  way  or  another.  Man  as  brute  is  Pinker's  stated  
position.  The  attribution  of  human  nature  (or  a  lack  of  it)  is  a  significant  
logical  error  as  the  experimental  paradigm  to  prove  this  one  way  or  the  
other  does  not  exist;  there  is  no  human  without  biology,  or  without  
history.  The  blindness  to  this  fallacy  persists  because  the  debate  around  
violence  is  motivated,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  same  desires  that  engender  
it:  the  attempt  to  make  causal  order  through  attribution  of  blame.  
However  problematic  from  a  logical  or  empirical  point  of  view,  this  schism  
operates  because  of  the  satisfaction  (on  either  side)  of  knowing  who  is  or  
is  not  at  fault.    
To  examine  this  point,  let  us  look  at  what  seems  to  be  a  strongly  
varied  level  of  violence,  both  across  history  and  cultures.  As  previously  
stated,  There  is  a  great  deal  of  evidence  as  to  the  dramatic  drop  in  
criminal  and  even  war  violence  in  the  last  50  centuries.  However,  in  our  
age  of  increasing  statistical  obsession,  an  interesting  trend  appears:  in  the  
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1960s,  the  murder  rate  went  up  in  the  US  and  Europe,  only  to  go  back  
down  again  in  the  1990s.  Pinker  acknowledges  the  sudden  rise  in  murder  
rates  beginning  the  1960s,  what  Pinker  calls  a  'tiny  bounce  in  the  last  third  
of  the  20th  century'  (Pinker,  2011:  84).  
Pinker  explains  this  via  Cas  Wouters,  a  student  of  Norbert  Elias.  Here,  
the  civilizing  process  of  the  last  600  years  is  temporarily  reversed,  as  
observed  by  the  increasing  questioning  of  social  mores,  and  popularity  of  
Marxism  (Pinker,  2011:  343).  This  rate  then  decreases  in  the  1990s  as  a  
function  of  the  'recivilizing'  process:  
'How  can  we  explain  the  recent  crime  decline?  Many  social  
scientists  have  tried,  and  the  best  that  they  can  come  up  
with  is  that  the  decline  had  multiple  causes,  and  no  one  can  
be  certain  what  they  were,  because  too  many  things  
happened  at  once.  Nonetheless,  I  think  two  overarching  
explanations  are  plausible.  The  first  is  that  the  Leviathan  
got  bigger,  smarter,  and  more  effective.  The  second  is  that  
the  Civilizing  Process,  which  the  counterculture  had  tried  to  
reverse  in  the  1960s,  was  restored  to  its  forward  direction'  
(Pinker,  2011:  387).  
  
As  evidence  of  the  recivilizing  process,  Pinker  introduces  the  
seemingly  Hobbesian  notion  of  what  is  known  as  the  Broken  Windows  
Effect,  or  BWE.  Here,  the  relative  order  in  a  given  neighborhood  (e.g.  
graffiti,  trash,  broken  windows)  is  thought  to  be  a  contributing  factor  to  
the  amount  of  crime,  and  by  repairing  it,  one  would  see  a  commiserate  
drop  in  crime.  It  was  the  cornerstone  of  Mayor  Giuliani's  policing  program  
as  Mayor  of  New  York  (Kelling  and  Coles,  1998),  and  it  has  been  shown  to  
have  some  effect,  both  in  a  large  real-­‐world  studies  of  cities  (Harcourt  and  
Ludwig,  2006)  as  well  as  within  controlled  experiments  (Keizer  et  al.,  
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2012).  The  BWE  remains  an  especially  relevant  concept  in  regard  to  how  
human  beings  process  order,  and  how  this  order  affects  emotion  and  
choice.  
Obviously,  the  BWE  is  not  without  controversy.  The  rates  of  violence,  
when  controlled  for  hospital  care  as  we  are  about  to  do,  indicate  that  the  
drop  in  crime  may  not  be  as  straightforward  as  a  single  statistic  can  show.  
Furthermore,  what  has  been  strongly  demonstrated  is  that  the  BWE  only  
works  within  a  fixed  radius.  While  the  crime  rate  may  often  drop  in  a  
neighborhood  post-­‐makeover,  the  surrounding  areas  experience  a  jump  in  
crime  (Grabosky,  1996;  Harcourt,  2001).    
The  real  effect  of  the  BWE  and  the  recivilizing  process  on  violent  
crime  is  slowly  coming  into  view.  Firstly,  the  decline,  rise,  then  decline  of  
the  rate  of  murder  or  death  by  violence  is  by  no  means  as  objective  as  we  
might  believe.  Siniy  no  means  as  objective  as  we  might  believe.ming  
idataset  of  the  violent  past  fails  to  analyze  the  way  in  which  violence  
enacts  at  interpersonal,  intra-­‐group  and  intra-­‐polity  (micro,  mezzo  and  
macro)  levels.  Without  disputing  the  general  decline,  Males  at.ming  into  
view.erience  a  jump  in  crime  (Grabosky,  1996;  Harcourt,-­‐state  societies  is  
negligible  and  greatly  varied  (between  1232  and  1248,  homicide  rates  in  
England  were  as  high  as  30  and  as  low  as  6.8  per  100,000,  just  as  modern-­‐
day  San  Francisco  can  be  8.1  and  Washington  D.C.  rests  at  42.9  (Males  at  
42.9  (Malen  Given  the  variation  year  on  year,  the  difference  between  
medieval  violence  rates  and  current  ones  may  be  real  in  the  aggregate,  
but  are  not  as  dramatic  as  might  first  appear.    
Furthermore,  although  the  rate  of  violence  per  person  has  dropped,  
the  modern  state  permits  the  possibility  of  mass  violence  on  a  scale,  in  the  
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millions,  which  would  have  been  impossible  in  pre-­‐state  societies,  that  
'inter-­‐polity  violence  reaches  unimaginable  proportions.  Our  age  is  the  
most  belligerent  in  all  of  history'  (Maleess,  which  the  c  These  
'unimaginable  proportions'  also  apply  to  what  could  have  happened,  or  
rather  what  was  expected  to.  There  may  be  no  point  in  speaking  
hypothetically  about  all  the  various  close  calls  to  nuclear  annihilation  that  
occurred  over  the  40-­‐year  period  of  the  cold  war,  an  historical  moment  
that  we  seem  to  have  erased  from  the  lesson  books.  But  as  we  are  
speaking  of  violence  and  its  potential,  there  is  something  to  be  said  about  
the  fact  that  many  classically  rational  thinkers  considered  either  limited  or  
total  nuclear  war  a  strategic  option.8  This  conceptualization  of  violence  on  
a  previously  unimaginable  scale  would  generally  support  Male  that  many  
cla  Our  thinking  about  war  violence  has  either  remained  in  line  with  our  
ancient  counterparts,  or  it  has  increased.    
Whether  or  not  we  accept  the  last  two  tenuous  points,  we  are  now  at  
the  center  of  the  large  logical  error  of  Pinker's  argument.  Violence  rates  
are,  in  fact,  increasing,  and  have  been  since  the  1960s.  There  was  no  
bounce,  or  rather  there  was  no  fall  after  the  bounce.  What  Pinker  has  
conveniently  ignored  is  that  medical  technology  has  greatly  advanced,  due  
largely  and  not  unironically  to  the  Vietnam  War.  In  fact,  the  aggravated  
assault  rate  has  been  increasing  since  the  1960s.  Homicide  rates  have  
dropped  only  via  the  survival  rate  of  those  injured.  
                                                
7.  Blair,  Bruce  (1993).  The  Logic  of  Accidental  Nuclear  War;  The  Brookings  Institute:  
Washington,  D.C.;  Kanwisher,  Nancy  (1989)  Cognitive  Heuristics  and  American  Security  
Policy.  The  Journal  of  Conflict  Resolution,  33(4),  pp.  652–75.  
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(Source:  Dobson,  2002;  Harris  et  al.,  2002)  
  
It  could  be  said  that  Pinker  simply  did  not  know  or  consider  this,  and  
this  is  fair  enough.  But  such  data  has  the  effect  of  utterly  destroying  his  
argument.  To  simplify:  X  (the  civilizing  process)  has  an  inverse  
causal/correlative  relationship  to  Y  (the  murder  rate).  X  has  increased  over  
time  until  the  1960s,  when  it  dropped,  only  to  bounce  back  in  the  1990s.  Y  
has  done  the  opposite,  thus  proving  the  relationship.  There  is  no  issue  
with  the  idea  that  Pinker  is  arguing  for  a  quantitative  character  of  what  
can  only  be  qualitative  data;  for  example,  if  the  'civilizing  process'  
corresponds  to  the  violence  rate,  in  1960  it  was  a  '5',  and  in  1980  it  
dropped  to  a  '3'.  Qualitative  and  quantitative  must  exist  side  by  side.  
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What  we  see  in  the  dataset  leads  to  two  conclusions:  that  the  general  
theory  (civilizing  process  is  correlated  to  violence  rates)  is  wrong;  or  his  
observations  about  the  civilizing  process  itself  (that  it  was  high  then  low  
then  high)  are  wrong.  The  latter  is  the  most  likely,  as  the  idea  that  the  
Marxist/revolutionary  aura  of  the  1960s  led  to  a  rise  in  a  questioning  of  
the  social  order  is  extremely  problematic  as  a  unique  phenomenon.  Such  
cultural  revolutions  have,  and  will  remain,  common;  the  freak-­‐out,  drop-­‐
out  attitude  of  the  1960s  cannot  be  called  any  more  or  less  radical  than  
the  socialist  movement  of  the  1920s  that  led  to  an  actual  revolution  in  
Russia  and  unprecedented  labor  conflicts  in  the  US.  And  so  accumulates  
the  evidence  of  conclusions  chasing  their  data,  and  not  the  other  way  
around.    
Note  also  that  this  error  applies  to  both  sides  of  the  
Rousseauian/Hobbesian  debate  over  human  behavior.  Consider  The  Arc  of  
War,  in  which  historians  Jack  Levy  and  William  Thompson  argue  a  very  
different  graph,  and  different  theory,  of  war  violence.  Against  recent  
theory,  they  propose  that  50,000  years  ago,  there  was  little  warfare  
among  small  hunter-­‐gatherer  bands.  As  complex  social  apparati  took  hold,  
so  too  did  warfare  and  warfare  violence,  which  then  dropped  in  the  last  
200  years.  Taking  a  different  tack,  they  argue  for  'co-­‐evolutionary  theory',  
where  war  evolves  with  other  'activities',  such  as  economies,  technology  
and  political  organization,  and  when  one  transforms,  the  others  are  
affected,  and  in  turn  affect  war  (Levy  and  Thompson,  2011:  3,  28).  They  
use  the  development  of  gunpowder  as  one  example,  the  introduction  of  
which  did  not  change  warfare  per  se,  so  much  as  it  'rationalized'  warfare,  
leading  to  greater  state  centralization,  in  turn  leading  itself  to  greater  war  
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violence  (Levy  and  Thompson,  2011:  210–16).  The  arc,  as  well  as  their  
scholarship  on  a  wide  spectrum  of  wars,  demonstrates  the  supposition  
that  warfare  is  related  directly  to  cultural  changes  and  not  to  any  inherent  
nature  of  man.    
Azar  Gat,  positioned  in  the  evolutionary  school,  argues  correctly  that  
Levy  and  Thompson  have  conveniently  ignored  the  evidence  of  pre-­‐state  
warfare  (Gat,  2012:  3),  asserting  that  many  tribes  are  significantly  more  
violent  than  even  medieval  European  warring  states.  From  an  academic  
perspective,  this  is  a  valid  criticism.  But  Levy  and  Thompson's  theory  is  just  
as  valid  (or  invalid)  as  Gat's  and  Pinker's.  We  could  have  learned  violence  
from  a  single  or  multiple  event  and  passed  it  along  culturally  like  language.  
Work  on  the  epidemiology  of  war—that  outbreaks  of  war  act  in  a  similar  
fashion  to  diseases  when  mapped—would  be  ammunition  for  this  point  
(Houweling  and  Siccama,  1985).  Our  ability  to  go  on  and  on  and  
appropriate  whatever  evidence  at  hand  proves  us  right  demonstrates  the  
main  point:  both  Levy  and  Thompson's  social  and  Pinker's  evolutionary  
theories  are  absolutely  conjectural.  This  is  not  a  question  of  a  lack  of  
accurate  historical  data—that  we  cannot  be  there  50,000  years  ago,  and  
thus  cannot  know  what  happened.  No,  questions  about  the  nature  or  
nurture  of  man  cannot  be  answered  for  the  simple  fact  that  there  is  no  
way  to  test  the  hypothesis.  
Consider  the  way  in  which  one  piece  of  research  is  used  to  prove  
opposite  points.  Psychologist  James  Gilligan  (see  Chapter  5  and  7)  notes  
that  Swedish  adoption  studies  show  'no  correlation'  between  violence  in  
biological  parents  and  children  (Gilligan,  1997:  215).  Pinker,  on  the  other  
hand,  uses  the  same  studies  to  say  that:  '(when)  one  looks  at  adopted  
      -­‐118-­‐  
 
children  and  shows  that  they  act  more  like  their  adoptive  parents  than  like  
their  biological  parents,  cycles  of  violence  prove  nothing'  (Pinker,  2002:  
212).  In  the  more  recent  volume,  he  cites  the  work  of  Angela  Scarpa  and  
Adrian  Raine  to  back  this  up,  that  in  fact  damage  to  the  prefrontal  cortex  
can  have  a  significant  impact  on  future  violent  behavior  (Pinker,  2011:  
1451).  
I  did  not  have  the  opportunity  to  double  check  all  of  Steven  Pinker's  
research,  but  it  does  not  speak  well  that  four  out  of  four  fact  checks  found  
him  wanting.  It  is  true  that  Raine  and  Scarpa  discuss  the  neurological  
influence  on  violent  behavior  (Scarpa  and  Raine,  2000  and  2007;  Raine,  
2002).  What  is  not  mentioned  is  the  authors  are  proponents  of  the  
'biosocial',  that  is,  the  interaction  of  biological  and  social  factors.  In  a  
summary  paper,  Raine  discusses  the  Swedish  adoption  studies  that  
examined  petty  criminal  behavior  (Raine,  2002:  213).  Pinker  would  be  
correct  that  some  correlation  exists  between  having  birth  parents  who  
engage  in  petty  criminality  and  future  criminality,  even  by  individuals  
adopted  by  parents  that  do  not  have  a  history  of  crime.  But  this  is  far  from  
the  whole  picture.  Not  only  do  environmental  factors  have  an  effect  on  
future  criminal  behavior  (nearly  the  same  amount  as  the  biological  
correlation),  but  more  to  the  point,  when  combined,  that  is  when  children  
of  criminals  are  raised  by  criminals,  the  factors  multiply:    




What  the  above  studies,  Levy  and  Thompson's  arc  of  war  and  Pinker's  
angels  and  demons,  actually  show  is  the  untenability  of  the  natural  or  
cultural  perspective.  It  is  impossible,  through  any  empirical,  inductive  or  
deductive  argument,  to  design  a  test  for  which  affects  what,  and  to  what  
degree.  Let  us  consider  the  ideal  scientific  scenario,  conveniently  free  of  
ethics.  We  have,  say,  1,000  genetically  identical  individuals,  who  can  be  
raised  in  a  variety  of  social  environments.  Which  one  is  the  control?  Even  
raising  a  child  in  a  black  soundless  box  (as  has  been  tried,  rather  
unfortunately,  with  monkeys9)  is  a  type  of  culture.  What  are  the  effects?  
                                                
8.  Masserman,  Jules  and  Pechtel,  Curtis  (1953).  Conflict-­‐Engendered  Neurotic  and  
Psychotic  Behavior  in  Monkeys.  Journal  of  Nervous  and  Mental  Disease,  118  (5),  pp.  
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When  do  they  occur?  To  what  extent  are  biological  factors  an  influence?  
Which  biological  factors?  When?  Is  it  even  possible,  at  this  juncture  in  
medical  research,  to  individuate  a  single  biological  factor?    
The  opposite  test  is  equally  invalid,  where  genetically  different  
individuals  are  raised  identically.  Besides  the  control  question,  there  is  the  
additional  problem  of  the  complexity  of  experience.  The  concept  of  what  
exactly  is  a  determining  factor  in  an  individual's  pathology  can  be  
demonstrated  in  the  cases  of  identical  twins  and  autism.  Although  autism  
is  largely  considered  to  be  hereditary,  it  is  an  inescapable  fact  that  
identical  twins  raised  in  the  same  family  will  sometimes  diverge,  that  one  
will  develop  autism  and  one  will  not  (Szatmari,  2003).  The  same  can  be  
said  of  schizophrenia  and  bipolar  disorder  (Plomin  and  Daniels,  1987;  
Lichtenstein  et  al.,  2009).    
Pinker  is  correct:  the  classically  (and  at  this  point,  largely  heuristic)  
psychological  model—that  mommy  did  X  and  therefore  I  do/avoid  X—
does  not  apply.  There  remains,  however,  strong  evidence  of  some  yet  
unknown  experiential  element.  What  was  the  personal  experience,  
moment  or  cascade  of  moments  that  set  one  individual  into  categorical  
withdrawal  and  not  the  genetically  identical  other?  What  biological  factors  
were  activated,  and  how?  It  is,  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word,  impossible  
to  say.  When  such  specific  and  individualistic  traits  develop  under  non-­‐
biological  circumstances,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  something  like  
'violence'—vague,  socially  contingent,  and  based  on  choice—could  have  
even  a  significant  biological  component.  Pinker  himself  argues  earlier  in  
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his  career:  'As  long  as  the  heritability  of  talents  and  tastes  is  not  zero,  
none  of  us  has  any  way  of  knowing  whether  a  trait  has  been  influenced  by  
our  genes,  our  childhood  experiences,  both,  or  neither'  (Pinker,  2002:  
378).  In  the  case  of  something  as  contextual  as  violence,  heritability  will  
never  be  a  one  or  a  zero.    
This  complexity  of  this  interaction  has  profound  (annihilating,  even)  
effects  for  any  attempts  at  evolutionary  psychology.  For  example,  a  
hereditary  link  has  been  observed  between  craving  for  sweets  and  
alcoholism,  which  itself  contains  sugar  (Mennella  et  al.,  2005;  Mennella  et  
al.,  2010).  It  would  be  absurd  to  argue  that  there  is  an  evolutionary  
imperative  for  alcoholism,  but  equally  so  to  argue  that  there  is  no  
biological  component.  Neurological  and  adoption  studies  that  point  to  a  
link  between  biological  factors  and  violence,  but  like  sugar  and  alcoholism,  
there  is  no  one-­‐to-­‐one  correlation.  In  the  case  of  violence,  it  could  
manifest  due  to  a  propensity  for  anger  or  the  cognitive  processing  of  
anger,  the  feeling  of  adrenaline  that  manifests  with  acts  of  violence,  or  
even  the  shame  after  committing  them.  More  likely  the  origin  lies  in  
something,  as  in  the  example  of  the  autistic  twin,  that  is  simply  beyond  
our  human  comprehension,  either  presently  or  eternally.    
Let's  say  that  we  could  design  this  magical  experiment,  one  that  
would  finally  tell  us  that  we  are  inherently  violent  or  not.  Even  armed  with  
this  information,  it  wouldn't  matter,  as  whatever  solution  we  put  forward  
will  be  a  social  one.  The  last  ally  imaginable,  Richard  Dawkins,  states  that  
'it  is  perfectly  possible  to  hold  that  genes  exert  a  statistical  influence  on  
human  behavior  while  at  the  same  time  believing  that  this  influence  can  
be  modified,  overridden  or  reversed  by  other  influences'  (Dawkins,  quoted  
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in  Ehrenreich,  1997:  89).  Whatever  the  preference  of  the  individual,  the  
social  remains  the  arena  in  which  we  must  operate.    
In  the  case  of  war  (and  we  are  talking  about  combat  violence  and  
passivity),  whatever  biological  impulse  there  is,  the  amount  of  
organization  that  is  required  in  terms  of  material,  logistics,  uniforms,  
weapons  design,  social  acceptance  and  even  ritual,  speaks  to  a  majority  
social  event.  Whatever  the  original  behavior,  the  solution  will  be  found  in  
the  social  arenas  of  desire,  choice  and  understanding.  This  is  not  to  say  
that  Pinker  discounts  human  cultural  influence—quite  the  contrary.  The  
objection  lies  is  naming  any  behavior  as  purely  inherent  or  social.  And  if  it  
cannot  be  proved,  and  if  it  is  not  relevant,  why  discuss  it?  This  is  not  a  
rhetorical  question,  but  a  real  one:  why?    
  




The  answer  to  this  question  lies  in  what  might  be  called  
metacausality.  Social  theories  of  violence  lose  their  explanatory  value  as  
they  exceed  the  remit  of  the  evidence,  as  they  attempt  to  speculate  about  
grander  and  grander  fields  of  human  nature,  or  lack  thereof.  To  clarify  
how  this  might  operate,  we  turn  to  Sir  Karl  Popper  and  Friedrich  
Nietzsche.  This  is  not  as  a  means  of  creating  a  debate  over  what  is  
legitimate  social  science,  but  instead  an  interrogation  as  to  why  this  type  
of  sense-­‐making  is  attractive.  The  answer  serves  as  an  introduction  to  the  
second  half  of  the  thesis,  in  the  feelings,  and  the  agency  'side  effects'  
inherent  in  processing  causality.    
Popper  is  most  famous  for  his  attempt  to  address  Hume's  question  of  
induction  (see  previous  chapter),  and  laid  out  the  limited  ways  in  which  
the  scientific  method  could  be  considered  validly  applied.  But  what  is  of  
interest  here  is  his  motivation  in  so  doing,  less  a  Humean  dilemma  than  a  
general  annoyance  with  the  circular  reasoning  of  social  science:  'I  found  
that  those  of  my  friends  who  were  admirers  of  Marx,  Freud,  and  Adler,  
were  impressed  by  a  number  of  points  common  to  these  theoriess  Once  
your  eyes  were  thus  opened  you  saw  confirming  instances  everywhere:  
the  world  was  full  of  verifications  of  the  theory'  (Popper,  1963:  33).  The  
confirmation  of  theory  despite  contradictory  evidence  is  seen,  for  the  
purposes  of  this  thesis,  under  Pinker's  take  on  combat  passivity:  'It  stands  
to  reason  that  initiating  serious  aggression  in  a  symmetrical  standoff  is  
something  a  Darwinian  creature  must  consider  very,  very  carefully—a  
reticence  experienced  as  anxiety  or  paralysis'  (Pinker,  2011:  1420).  If  no  
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one  fights,  or  everyone  does,  or  somewhere  in  between,  the  theory  is  
verified.  
Popper  referred  to  this  type  of  reasoning  as  'metaphysics',  and  
although  that  term  in  this  context  may  seem  a  stretch,  it  describes  a  type  
of  global  explanation.  Helpfully,  it  would;  Pinker  defines  human  behavior  
in  terms  of  'angels'  and  'demons'.  In  this  instance,  what  are  the  origins  of  
this  metaphysical  theory,  or,  more  narrowly,  from  whence  the  desire  to  
think  metaphysically?  Nietzsche  located  this  in  what  he  called  the  will-­‐to-­‐
truth.  For  Nietzsche,  the  death  of  God  was  not  a  statement  of  atheism,  
but  an  acknowledgment  of  a  void.  One  dogma  had  disappeared,  and  
another  would—must—take  its  place.  
Some  have  argued  that  the  will-­‐to-­‐truth  moved  our  faith  in  the  
modern  state  (Foucault,  1980;  Elbe,  2003),  which  connects  with  Pinker's  
Hobbesian  perspective.  But  Nietzsche's  own  concern  was  with  the  
sciences:  'Against  positivism,'  he  writes,  'which  halts  at  phenomena—
"There  are  only  facts"—I  would  say:  No,  facts  is  precisely  what  there  is  
not,  only  interpretations.  We  cannot  establish  any  fact  "in  itself":  perhaps  
it  is  folly  to  want  to  do  such  a  thing'  (Nietzsche,  1967:  §481).  Although  
Nietzsche  would  turn,  somewhat  tautologically,  to  Christianity  for  an  
explanation  of  this  folly  (Nietzsche,  2008:  erhapsthere  was  also  a  
prescience  that  the  phenomena  of  making  sense  was  both  intrinsic  (see  
'fundamental  human  drive/Fundamentaltrieb  des  Menschen',  Nietzsche,  
1979:  §15)  and,  more  importantly,  emotional:    
'"Truth"  is  therefore  more  fateful  than  error  and  ignorance,  
because  it  cuts  off  the  forces  that  work  toward  
enlightenment  and  knowledge...it  is  more  flattering  to  
think  "I  possess  the  truth"  than  to  see  only  darkness  
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around  one-­‐above  all:  it  is  reassuring..."Peace  of  soul",  "a  
quiet  conscience":  all  inventions  made  possible  only  by  pre-­‐
supposing  that  truth  has  been  found'  (Nietzsche,  1967:  
§452).  
  
This  quote  reveals  what  I  believe  to  be  the  feeling  origins  of  these  
metaphysical  conclusions:  the  quiet  conscience  of  the  ultimate  
explanation.  The  location  of  these  nature  vs.  nurture  debates  within  a  
charged  field  helps  explain  some  familiar  social  phenomena,  including  the  
continued  controversy  over  the  teachings  of  evolution  (at  least  in  the  US).  
This  is  not  to  argue  whether  or  not  creationism  is  valid  (it  is  not),  merely  
to  say  that  this  debate  is  about  a  higher  level  of  importance  to  the  
construction  of  the  self  than  other  causal  networks  (dependent  on  the  
individual,  of  course).    
With  increased  affect,  comes  the  increased  attribution  of  agency:  
blame.  Although  we  will  return  to  this  subject  under  a  more  cognitive  
perspective  (Chapters  6  and  7),  there  is  a  logic  to  these  assignations.  As  
negative  feelings  grow,  as  they  might  in  the  case  of  these  larger  truths,  it  
follows  that  the  emotional  effect  is  the  cause,  and  from  that,  something  or  
someone  must  be  responsible.  Higher  explanations,  such  as  God,  
government  and  evolution,  do  more  than  just  provide  the  piece  of  soul,  
they  provide  the  scapegoat:  'a  theory  through  which  they  can  shift  the  
responsibility  for  their  existence,  for  their  being  thus  and  thus,  on  to  some  
sort  of  scapegoat.  This  scapegoat  can  be  God—in  Russia  there  is  no  lack  of  
such  atheists  from  ressentiment'  (Nietzsche,  1967:  §765).  
Indeed,  within  this  debate  over  higher  causes  of  violence,  blame  
agents  abound.  For  example,  some  have  argued  that  rape  is  part  of  an  
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evolutionary  paradigm  of  selection  (Thornhill  and  Palmer,  2001),  
provoking  obvious  and  justified  feminist  criticism  (Travis,  2003).  Such  
gendered  comparisons  are  often  found  in  popular  culture,  such  as  
supposed  evolutionary  advantages  of  male  promiscuity  or  female  
nurturing  traits  (Buss  and  Schmitt,  1993).  In  each  case,  the  implied  shift  of  
blame—'I  can't  help  it,  it's  biological'—makes  its  way  into  the  discussion,  
embodied  best  in  a  recent  Daily  Mail  headline:  'Born  cheater?  Why  being  
unfaithful  could  be  in  your  genes'  (Daily  Mail,  2011).  There  is  no  point  in  
entering  this  debate,  but  simply  noting  the  explicit  stake  at  play  could  be  
helpful:  blame.  If,  for  example,  the  male  is  genetically  programmed  to  
rape,  it  is  easily  arguable  that  his  responsibility  is  diminished,  even  if  
Thornhill  and  Palmer  both  deny  and  then  affirm  this  claim  at  the  same  
time  (see  Wilson  et  al.,  2003:  679).    
For  Pinker  (and  the  inverse,  possibly,  for  Collins),  this  attention  of  
blame  is  directed  towards  an  incorrect  object  and  must  be  righted.  In  the  
case  of  Hobbesians,  there  is  a  perfectly  reasonable  agenda  to  rescue  the  
state  from  its  current  status  as  a  blame  agent  in  war  violence:  'The  decline  
in  violent  mortality  under  the  leviathan  agent  in  war  violence  righted.at  
his  responsibility  is  diminished,  even  if  Thornhill  and  Palmer  bo,  2006:  
409).  For  Pinker,  this  manifests  as  an  equally  reasonable  cause,  rescuing  
the  Enlightenment:  'In  reflecting  on  (the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  
Wars),  it  was  natural  for  people  to  reason,  "After  this,  therefore  because  
of  this,"  and  for  intellectuals  on  the  right  and  the  left  to  blame  the  
Enlightenment'  (Pinker,  2011:  562).    
The  classic  motivation  posited  to  these  two  poles  of  social  debate  is  
one  of  rational  politics:  'Loosely  put  nurture  has  been  the  rallying  cry  of  
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the  scholarly  left,  because  it  seems  to  maximize  human  options,  while  
nature  has  tended  to  be  the  province  of  the  scholarly  right,  because  it  has  
been  so  often  been  deployed  to  ratify  the  status  quo'  (Ehrenreich,  1997:  
88).  Ehrenreich  acknowledges  the  less-­‐than-­‐scholarly  motives  behind  our  
inane  dichotomy,  but  winds  up  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse:  it  is  the  
beliefs  that  motivate  the  politics  and  not  the  other  way  around.  It  is  less  
about  conventionally  divisive  politics  than  blame  agents,  or  rather,  what  is  
at  the  core  of  politics  lies  in  which  blame  agents  are  designated.    
  
               §  §  §  
  
What  do  theories  of  violence  tell  us?  On  the  one  hand,  we  see  
consistent  and  explicable  phenomenon,  like  the  links  between  emotion,  
passivity  and  forward  panic.  On  the  other,  as  the  theories  become  more  
baroque,  they  explain  violence  in  a  different  way:  by  demonstration.  All  
arguments,  this  one  included,  seek  to  find  causal  order.  When  a  certain  
threshold  is  reached,  the  pleasure  of  simple  logic  is  not  enough.  The  
theories  of  violence,  in  these  and  many  cases,  are  constructed  by  the  
same  framework  that  engenders  violence:  the  attempt  to  make  a  larger  
type  of  sense,  and,  within  that,  to  find  an  agent  responsible  (or  to  shift  
responsibility).    
This  is  not  to  discount  either  Pinker's,  Collins',  or  any  other  theorists  
work  in  the  sociology  of  violence.  Pinker's  assertion  that  we  were  more  
violent  in  pre-­‐history  and  history  is  valuable  and  well-­‐supported—Collins'  
observations  on  the  group  dynamics  of  violence  equally,  if  not  more,  so.  
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Instead,  it  could  be  said  that  that  the  explanatory  value  of  such  theories  
remain  robust  inasmuch  as  they  stay  within  a  purely  causal  framework,  
and  do  not  stray  beyond  the  describable  purvey.  As  a  theory  moves  from  
causal  to  metacausal,  it  loses  its  explanatory  power.  Furthermore,  it  is  
necessary,  vital  even,  to  be  mindful  of  what  feeling  motivation  might  lie  
behind  the  statements,  even  in  such  supposedly  neutral  fields  as  
academia,  rationality,  and  even  politics.  If  the  Rousseauian/Hobbesian  
split  divides  along  conventional  liberal  conservative  politics,  this  may  not  
be  ideological,  but  a  question  of  identical  paradigms  utilizing  different  
blame  agents  and  an  attempt  at  the  satisfaction  of  future  feelings.  
This  chapter  remains  an  introduction  to  theories  of  confirmation  and  
assignation,  and  we  will  return  in  Chapters  6  and  7  to  discuss  the  case  
study  of  soldiers  who  do  not  return  fire,  as  well  as  Collins'  forward  panic,  
applying  the  theory  in  greater  depth.  What  can  be  said  here  is  that  what  is  
often  seen  as  emotionally  neutral  may  have  unseen  motives—motives  
that  engender  endless  debate  over  the  irresolvable.  The  weakness  of  both  
these  perspectives  lies  in  the  way  in  which  emotion  (rage,  panic,  shame)  is  
not  specifically  defined,  and  especially  fails  to  incorporate  their  
manifestations  into  choice.  Given  the  current  state  of  emotional  theory,  as  
we  are  about  to  see,  this  flaw  is  quite  understandable.  It  now  remains  to  
create  a  replicable  structure  of  thought  and  feeling  that  can  incorporate  
emotional  choice  within  an  explanatory  framework.       
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Chapter  4:   Are  Emotions  Rational?  
  
The  preceding  two  chapters  have,  at  the  very  least,  served  as  an  
introduction  and  critique  of  the  literatures  of  the  sociology  of  violence  and  
rationality.  Both  fields  rely  on  the  use  of  emotional  terms,  especially  when  
faced  with  behaviors  that  cannot  be  explained.  Panic,  rage  and  shame  
characterize  extreme  violence,  just  as  fear  might  invoke  immobility.  We  
take  'pride'  in  our  rationality,  or  are  at  least  ashamed  of  a  future  state  
when  we  have  behaved  irrationally.  An  attempt  at  a  new  model  of  
emotion,  one  that  breaks  specific  named  emotions  into  their  component  
parts  of  thought  and  feeling,  is  the  main  goal  of  this  thesis.  What  follows  is  
not  even  a  short  review  of  the  philosophy  of  emotions,  although  it  does  
contain  some  introductory  features  as  to  the  current  state  of  the  theory.  
And  although  there  will  be  some  critiques  mounted,  the  purpose  is  rather  
refinement:  a  distillation  of  what  features  are  relevant  to  choice.  
  
'Eureka!'   Always  Has  an  Exclamation  Mark  
  
Ronald  de  Sousa  argues  that  there  are  two  schools  of  emotions,  the  
physiological  and  the  intentional,  placing  authors  like  William  James  and  
Antonio  Damasio  in  the  former  and  Robert  Solomon  and  Martha  
Nussbaum  in  the  latter  (de  Sousa,  2010:  100).  Although  there  are  arguably  
hundreds,  or  at  least,  each  version  is  a  combination  of  these  two  
perspectives,  it  is  nevertheless  a  useful  starting  point.  In  the  shortest  of  
shorthand,  the  physiological  school  locates  the  origin  of  emotion  at  the  
site  of  the  body,  while  the  intentional  notes  the  way  in  which  emotions  
are  constructed  from  beliefs.  William  James,  one  of  the  first  to  construct  a  
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theory  of  emotion,  is  firmly  grounded  in  the  physiological.  He  holds  that  
we  feel  emotion  as  a  part  of  a  bodily  action  that  follows  an  event:  '[T]he  
more  rational  statement  is  that  we  feel  sorry  because  we  cry,  angry  
because  we  strike,  afraid  because  we  tremble,  and  not  that  we  cry,  strike,  
or  tremble,  because  we  are  sorry,  angry,  or  fearful':  James,  1884:  190).  
James  famously  uses  the  example  of  the  bear,  of  whom  we  are  not  afraid,  
so  much  as  the  fear  generates  as  a  result  of  the  bodily  aftermath:  
'Common-­‐sense  says...we  meet  a  bear,  are  frightened  and  run...  Without  
the  bodily  states  following  on  the  perception,  the  latter  would  be  purely  
cognitive  in  form,  pale,  colorless,  destitute  of  emotional  warmth.  We  
might  then  see  the  bear,  and  judge  it  best  to  run...but  we  should  not  
actually  feel  afraid'  (James,  1890:  449).  
Note  first  that  James'  is  not  the  only  perspective  in  the  physiological  
school.  In  fact,  his  somewhat  circular  argument  (I  feel  emotion  because  
my  body  feels  it)  is  used  as  a  strawman  to  dismiss  the  useful  parts  of  this  
perspective.  As  it  happens,  there  is  evidence  to  show  that  the  feelings  
generated  by  actions  cause  the  feelings  we  associate  with  emotions.  Paul  
Ekman,  for  example,  found  that  subjects  asked  to  move  the  muscles  of  the  
face  that  were  associated  with  an  emotion  (furrowed  brows  with  anger,  
for  example),  began  to  experience  that  emotion  (Ekman,  1992,  cited  in  
Damasio,  2003:  71,  see  also  Ekman,  1990).  This  would  make  James'  work  
surprisingly  prescient.    
  The  physiological  school  further  privileges  the  body  as  the  actual  site  
of  feeling.  The  works  of  Michel  Foucault  and  Maurice  Merleau-­‐Ponty,  who  
reposition  and  positivize  this  denigrated  arena  of  contention,  have  already  
attracted  writers  on  war  and  violence:  'The  body,  in  this  view,  is  "the  pivot  
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of  the  world"...  By  centring  bodies  both  in  the  fleshy  material  sense  and  in  
the  emotive  sense,  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s  work  has  important  implications  for  
the  way  in  which  we  theorise  the  humane,  Merleau-­‐Pontyriters  on  war  
and  violence:  'Thqvist,  2013:  546).  Such  a  perspective  is  not  unlike  the  goal  
of  this  thesis:  to  refocus  attention  away  from  the  rational  and  towards  the  
usually  ignored  emotional.  The  positive  aspects  of  this  perspective  are  
best  seen  as  a  struggle  against  the  false  Cartesian  dichotomy  of  the  body  
(fluid,  female,  chaos)  and  mind  (orderly,  moral,  male).  This  is  what  
Antonio  Damasio  famously  called  Descartes'  error:  'that  thinking,  and  
awareness  of  thinking,  are  the  real  substrates  of  being...the  suggestion  
that  reasoning,  and  moral  judgment,  and  the  suffering  that  comes  from  
physical  pain  or  emotional  upheaval  might  exist  separately  from  the  body'  
(Damasio,  1994:  247–50).  
The  intentional  school  would  hold  that  emotions  arise  from  
representations  of  consciousness,  instead  of  vaguely  from  the  body.  Here,  
'(e)motions  are  intentional:  that  is,  emotions  are  "about  something"'  
(Solomon,  2001:  11).  In  this  way,  it  is  the  beliefs  that  create  the  feelings,  
rather  than  the  body.  This  tradition  goes  back  as  far  as  Aristotle,  who  saw  
fear  arising  from  a  'mental  picture'  (Aristotle,  1954:  2:5:1–2).  Martha  
Nussbaum  bluntly  refers  to  them  as  'thoughts'  (Nussbaum,  2001;  Cates,  
2003)  and  Nico  Frijda  as  'interests'  or  'concerns'—'emotions  result  from  
the  encounter  of  an  event  occurring  at  some  given  moment  of  time  with  a  
disposition  that  the  subject  carried  with  him  to  that  moment  of  time'  
(Frijda,  1986:  333).  
For  philosopher  Robert  Solomon,  the  intentional  aspects  present  a  
link  with  ethics:  'We  have  noted  that  emotions  are  interestingly  similar  to  
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beliefs.  We  can  now  explain  this  similarity  by  claiming  that  emotions  are  
judgments  'We  have  noted  that  emoal  judgments'.  This  school  arguably  
extends  into  the  realm  of  cognitive  psychology,  and  appraisal,  where  
'different  types  of  appraisal  lead  to  different  emotions;  that  is,  it  is  not  the  
external  object  per  se  that  is  important,  but  my  belief  about  (appraisal  of)  
that  object'  (Power,  and  Dalgleish,  2008:  25).  Usually  seen  as  a  therapeutic  
model,  and  thus  rarely  used  within  philosophy  and  social  theory,  cognitive  
psychology  provides  a  particular  structure  to  emotion.  The  specificities  of  
this  model,  or  at  least  a  condensation  of  this  school,  will  be  laid  out  in  the  
next  chapter.    
Both  these  perspectives  unfortunately  have  crucial  flaws,  making  
their  continued  use  untenable.  Just  as  passivity  under  fire  presents  an  
impossible  contradiction  to  rationality,  there  are  many  real-­‐life  examples  
that  these  theories  of  emotion  struggle  to  explain.  The  first—the  horror  
film—may  seem  a  bit  odd.  It  has  been  theorized  at  great  length  within  
post-­‐modern,  feminist  and  post-­‐modern  feminist  theory  (Williams,  1991;  
Grixti,  1989),  but  these  are  neither  theories  of  emotion,  nor  social  
theories.  Psychologist  James  Russell  asks  if  the  Jamesian  bear  creates  'the  
same  emotion  Alice  experienced  when  she  first  saw  the  film  Aliens,  even  
though  she  knew  that  she  was  in  no  danger,  did  not  flee  the  theater,  
enjoyed  the  experience,  and  would  pay  to  see  it  again?'  (Russell:  2003,  
143).  Russell,  as  we  will  soon  see,  thinks  that  it  does  not,  that  there  are  a  
multiplicity  of  emotions  not  explicable  under  the  rubric  of  fear.  What's  
scarier,  so  to  speak,  is  that  it  may  be  the  same  emotion,  or  rather  the  
same  feeling.  In  other  words,  this  is  not  a  case  of  two  feelings  having  the  
same  name,  only  that  a  mediated  experience—a  film  of  a  bear—could  
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produce  the  same  feeling  as  seeing  a  bear.  In  any  case,  this  seemingly  
everyday  experience  presents  two  powerful  dilemmas  to  any  theory  of  
emotion,  as  we  are  presented  with  a  subject  that  1)  is  able  to  feel  fear  in  a  
dark  room  with  no  actual  threat  present,  and  2)  pays  to  do  it,  so  the  
experience  of  being  afraid  is  pleasurable  enough  to  trade  money  to  
undergo  the  experience.    
The  horror  film,  and  media  in  general,  is  difficult  to  theorize  within  
the  physiological  school.  Here,  the  Jamesian  bear  is  both  non-­‐existent  and  
pleasurable.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  bodily  action,  as  per  above.  The  
benefits  of  the  intentional  school  are  obvious,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  
we  move  out  of  the  circularity  of  experiencing  emotions  and  feelings  
bodily  (what  might  be  called  'we  feel  because  we  feel'  argument).  
Intentionality  gives  us  a  higher  explanatory  value  to  understanding  
emotion,  helping  us,  for  example,  understand  the  first  aspect  of  the  
horror  film  problem  (that  our  mind  creates  the  fear  through  the  appraisal  
of  an  image  of  someone  in  danger,  or  a  vicarious  immersion  in  a  
frightening  environment).  Unfortunately,  the  second  (that  we  would  pay  
to  feel  fear)  is  less  well  explained.  Much  of  cognitive  theory  is  either  goal-­‐  
or  path-­‐based,  that  we  are  seeking  to  achieve  or  resolve  something  
personally  (or  evolutionarily)  beneficial  with  our  emotions.  If  this  is  the  
case,  why  would  we  then  seek  out  a  deliberate  interruption  or  upset?  
Much  in  the  way  that  rationality  eschews  emotion,  emotional  schools  
eschew  theories  of  pleasure  (which  may  yet  return  us  to  the  physiological  
school).  How  is  pleasure,  or  whatever  feeling  that  causes  us  to  see  a  
horror  film,  generated?  
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A  hint  to  an  answer  appears  in  our  second  riddle,  which,  like  horror  
films,  is  an  exchange  of  rational  capital  for  feeling:  games.  How  does  one  
explain  the  pleasure  of  a  crossword,  or  of  collecting  all  the  stars  in  a  video  
game—the  pleasure  of  completion?  Let  us  call  this  the  Sudoko  problem  
(see  Chapter  7  for  a  more  complete  analysis),  as  I  am  not  speaking  of  the  
pleasures  of  violent  video  games,  which  would  only  serve  to  complicate  
and  distract  matters,  but  of  the  pleasure  of  a  game  itself.  Violent  games  
have  attracted  much  attention  from  a  research  point  of  view,  less  so  
puzzle  games,  which  are  theorized  either  as  neuropsychological  (circularly,  
that,  as  pleasure,  they  activate  pleasure  centers  of  the  brain  (Andrews,  
2007)),  or  as  tests  themselves,  of  memory,  math  ability,  dementia,  and  so  
on.  As  to  the  attraction  of  the  'solve',  the  moment  when  the  puzzle  is  
complete,  there  seems  to  be  no  interest.  This  is  especially  troubling,  as  the  
phenomenon  of  seeking  to  solve  is  universal,  ancient  and  pleasurable:  we  
don't  conceive  of  a  nonplussed  Archimedes  discovering  the  principle  of  
displacement;  'Eureka!'  always  has  an  exclamation  mark.  
The  third  point  is  less  a  riddle  that  it  is  a  struggle  of  terms:  what,  
exactly,  is  an  emotion?  This  question  is  less  semantic  than  it  first  seems.  In  
fact,  it  reveals  a  deep  contradiction  within  any  theory  of  emotion,  be  it  
cognitive,  physiological  or  even  philosophical.  There  are  (at  least)  two  
aspects  to  this  issue.  On  one  hand,  there  are  a  myriad,  possibly  infinite,  
kinds  of  one  named  emotion.  This  could  additionally  be  known  as  the  'so  
many  names'  problem,  that  anger  could  also  be  known  as,  and  be  a  form  
of,  irritation,  rage,  injustice,  indignity,  even  boredom,  just  to  name  a  few.  
This  is  hardly  a  new  question,  as  Seneca  struggled  with  the  language  of  
Latin:  'Someone  who  is  "angry"  might  not  be  "wrathful";  someone  who  is  
      -­‐135-­‐  
 
"wrathful"  might  sometimes  not  be  "angry."...we  use  the  terms  amarus  
[bitter]  and  acerbus  [harsh],  as  also  stomachosus  [testy]  and  rabiosus  
[frenzied]  and  clamosus  [ranting]  and  difficilis  [difficult]  and  asper  
[prickly],  which  are  all  different  forms  of  anger;  you  can  also  include  
among  these  morosus  [peevish],  a  hypersensitive  sort  of  wrathfulness'  
(Seneca,  2010:  18).  
Seneca's  use  of  'a  hypersensitive  sort  of  wrathfulness'  brings  up  
another  point,  that  emotions  can  be  culturally  and  historically  specific,  
further  complicating  any  hope  of  a  classification  system.  James  Russell  
finds  that  even  basic  emotions  like  anger  and  fear  are  not  universally  
defined:  'If  English  language  categories  regarding  emotion  are  not  
universal,  then  we  have  no  guarantee  that  emotion,  anger,  fear,  and  so  on  
are  labels  for  universal,  biologically  fixed  categories  of  nature.  Rather,  
they  are  hypotheses  formulated  by  our  linguistic  ancestors'  (Russell,  1991:  
444).  Even  the  very  term  'emotion'  has  no  cross-­‐cultural  definition  
(Russell,  2003:  153).  This  extends  into  the  historical  school  of  
emotionology  (Stearns  and  Stearns,  1985),  where  a  particular  culture  
influences  what  emotions  are  'appropriate'  to  express  (see  Batja  and  
Frijda,  1992,  for  a  review).  There  may  even  be  culturally  unique  emotions,  
like  amok  in  Indonesia,  where  deep  shame  can  motivation  a  blind  and  
murderous  rage  (Averill,  1982).  To  a  large  extent,  '[n]ot  only  ideas,  but  
emotions  too,  are  cultural  artifacts  in  man'  (Geertz,  quoted  in  Bourke,  
2005:  7).    
Finally,  there  is  a  flipside  to  the  attempt  to  categorize  many  emotions  
under  one  name,  which  is  that  sometimes  experiences,  choices  and  
feelings  that  mirror  one  emotion  exactly  and  should  be  considered  a  
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manifestation  of  that  emotion,  are  not.  Although  we  return  to  James  
Averill  in  Chapter  7,  we  take  a  glance  at  his  questionnaire  study  of  1983.  
Averill  found  that  anger  was  not  so  much  about  personal  injury,  or  even  a  
reaction  to  a  violation,  but  an  imputation  of  motive:  'the  major  issue  for  
the  person  in  the  street  is  not  the  specific  nature  of  the  instigating  event;  
it  is  the  perceived  justification  for  the  instigator's  behavior'  (Averill:  1983:  
1149–50).  If  true,  and  it  certainly  seems  a  useful  starting  point,  this  
formulation  adds  to  our  name  problem.  Here,  the  act  of  blaming—an  act  
upon  which  society  rests—follows  the  identical  structure  of  anger,  even  
though  we  traditionally  see  it  as  emotion-­‐free.  Under  this  understanding,  
many  aspects  of  society  and  government,  including  war,  the  justice  
system,  and  even  the  very  concept  of  mens  rea,  could  be  considered  
anger.  To  clarify:  we  use  justice  as  a  guiding  principle  of  modern  society.  
Being  that  its  constitutive  elements—assigning  blame,  feelings  of  (ethical)  
violation,  and  'teaching'  the  violator—are  essentially  identical  to  that  of  
anger,  is  it  fair  or  even  wise  to  differentiate  between  the  two?  Besides  
problematizing  any  hope  of  defining  what  emotion  is  and  is  not,  this  
furthermore  poses  the  question:  what  if  decisions  are  being  made  
following  the  structure  of  anger,  choices  and  attributions  that  may  contain  
unbeknownst,  or  more  likely,  unacknowledged,  feeling?  
The  solution  to  the  definitional  problem  is  best  characterized  by  the  
'basic  emotions  school'.  This  is  the  principle  that  there  are  a  certain  
number  of  basic  emotions,  whose  constitutive  parts  would  then  make  up  
the  vast  number  of  emotions  that  Seneca  hinted  at  above:  'this  idea  is  
manifested  in  the  belief  that  there  might  be  neurophysiological  and  
anatomical  substrates  corresponding  to  the  basic  emotions.  From  a  
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psychological  perspective,  basic  emotions  are  often  held  to  be  the  
primitive  building  blocks  of  other,  nonbasic  emotions'  (Ortony  and  Turner  
1990:  315).  This  last  quote  is  taken  from  Ortony  and  Turner's  survey  of  the  




It  should  be  clear  that  the  authors  above  take  a  somewhat  dim  view  
that  basic  emotions  could  be  so  neatly  defined.  Many  psychologists  and  
theorists  obviously  disagree,  citing  the  universality  of  facial  expressions,  
for  example  (Ekman:  1990;  1992).  Although  an  argument  can  be  made  for  
some  kind  of  universality  of  feeling,  the  strong  cultural  factors  indicated  in  
the  plethora  of  names  would  argue  that  emotional  terms  may  have  too  
many  and  divergent  associations  to  be  the  field  in  which  to  explore  that  
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option.  Ultimately,  it  may  simply  be  an  unproductive  avenue  of  inquiry  by  
virtue  of  its  ceaseless  and  expanding  debate:  'Basic  emotion  theorists  
cannot  agree  whether  there  are  3,  6,  12  or  even  more  such  building  
blocks,  nor  is  there  a  consensus  building;  emotion  theories  are  still  
procreating  like  rabbits'  (Mandler,  2002:  103).  
  
Cognito  ergo  sentio  
  
'Emotions  are  a  neglected  topic,  and  the  neglect  of  
economists  is  second  to  none.  I  find  this  surprising.  I  take  it  
that  economics  is  concerned  with  the  best  ways  of  
promoting  human  satisfaction  in  a  world  of  scarce  
resources.  With  one  exception,  all  human  satisfaction  
comes  in  the  form  of  emotional  experiences.  The  exception  
is  the  hedonic  satisfaction  produced  by  the  senses,  such  as  
the  taste  of  sweetness  on  the  tongue  or  the  feeling  of  wind  
on  your  face  after  a  long  climb'  (Elster,  1996:  1386).  
  
Jon  Elster  presents  us  with  two  interesting  conflicts  here,  both  of  
which  I  hope  we  can  now  resolve.  Firstly,  the  ultimate  end  of  any  rational  
goal  is  the  feeling  it  generates;  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  rational  motive.  
And  yet  there  is  no  need  to  reject  the  structure  of  rational  choice  out  of  
hand.  We  can  say  that  human  beings  still  choose  optimally,  not  according  
to  what  they  will  obtain,  but  instead  according  to  how  they  think  they  will  
feel.  The  mechanics  of  this  process  are  the  subject  of  the  next  four  
chapters.  As  per  this  quote  and  this  chapter,  there  can  be  a  useful  
distinction  made  between  feeling  and  emotion.    
At  this  point,  we  can  at  least  understand  why  emotions  are  often  
considered  a  black  box,  for  even  the  theories  seem  to  have  the  
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impenetrable  quality  of  the  emotions  they  seek  to  explain.  The  path  that  I  
suggest  is  not  to  theorize  emotion  at  all.  It  is  here  we  return  to  the  second  
aspect  of  Jon  Elster's  quote:  feeling.  Elster  describes  the  way  in  which  the  
wind  feels  on  your  face  after  a  long  climb,  or  sweetness  on  the  tongue.  
We  could  consider  this  yet  another  problem  for  the  emotional  school,  at  
least  in  terms  of  choice:  how  do  these  bodily  feelings  compare  with  being  
angry,  or  happy?  What  they  describe  are  present-­‐time  body  experiences,  
and  this  leads  us  to  the  next  step  in  constructing  how  people  choose.  
Feelings  and  emotions  are  often  used  interchangeably;  yet  in  a  
variety  of  fields,  a  clear  distinction  is  made.  As  simply  put  as  possible:  
feelings  are  the  present-­‐time  feeling  states—'the  primordial  
phenomenological  characteristic  of  self-­‐experiencing  life'  (Strasser,  quoted  
in  Ratcliffe,  2010)—while  emotions  can  be  thought  of  as  the  cognitive,  or  
bodily,  processes  that  may  have  led  to  them.  In  other  words,  emotions  are  
complex,  and  largely  cognitive;  feelings  are  simple  and  bodily.  For  
example,  panic  attacks  can  manifest  in  symptoms  identical  in  every  way  to  
heart  attacks,  including  arm  pain  (Clark,  1986;  APA,  2009).  Here  the  
feelings  of  the  events  of  the  mind  mimic  exactly  the  feelings  created  by  
the  body  in  a  crisis  incident.  The  feeling  (sweating,  fear,  shortness  of  
breath)  is  experienced  as  an  'in  the  moment'  state.  An  actual  heart  attack  
can  produce  identical  symptoms,  causing  many  problems  during  hospital  
admissions.  With  these  two  distinct  events,  the  present-­‐time  bodily  state  
(the  feeling)  is  the  same  with  a  bodily  and  cognitive  cause,  we  can  see  
how  a  feeling  might  be  considered  distinct  from  the  emotion  that  gave  
rise  to  it.    
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This  distinction,  under  different  names,  has  been  proposed  in  a  
variety  of  schools.  In  the  neurobiological  (the  physiological  according  to  de  
Sousa),  Antonio  Damasio  proposes  that  'Feeling,  in  the  pure  and  narrow  
sense  of  the  word,  was  the  idea  of  the  body  being  in  a  certain  way'  
(Damasio,  2003:  84).  Solomon,  from  the  philosophical  side,  argues  the  
inverse,  that  emotions  cannot  be  feelings  because  of  their  intentionality:  
'emotions  are  not  feelings  and  not  occurrences,  we  have  argued,  but  
rather  judgments'  (Solomon,  2001:  11).  Further  from  philosophy,  William  
Lyons  notes  that  it  is  the  quality  of  irreducibility  that  separates  the  two.  
Using  the  work  of  James  Bedford,  he  states  that  'while  emotions  can  be  
said  to  be  unreasonable,  unjustified,  or  inappropriate,  feelings  cannot,  
therefore  emotions  are  not  feelings'  (Lyons,  1980:  8;  Bedford,  1957).    
James  Russell,  from  the  psychological  side,  eschews  the  very  
definition  of  emotion,  and  uses  the  term  'core  affect'  to  create  a  better  
way  to  discuss  the  entire  field.  Linda  Barrett  builds  on  this  concept  with  
the  term  'affective  feeling'.  For  both  Barrett  and  Russell,  emotions  are  a  
'folk'  concept,  an  ex  post  facto  construction  to  describe  the  bare  feelings,  
and  not  an  accurate  representation  of  the  experience  (Barrett,  2006;  
Barrett  et  al.,  2007;  Russell,  2003).  In  other  words,  emotions  arise,  to  a  
certain  extent,  as  a  way  to  understand  feelings  after  they  have  been  
experienced,  rather  than  a  specific  set  of  preordained  categories  to  be  
triggered.    
As  with  emotion,  feeling  can  be  described  in  the  traditional  dual  axis  
of  valence  and  arousal.  'Valence'  and  'arousal'  are  terms  in  a  variety  of  
emotional  schools  that  refer  to  the  negative  and  positive  aspects  of  a  
feeling  or  emotion,  and  the  low  or  high  affect  or  intensity  of  the  feeling  or  
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emotion,  respectively  (see  Introduction).  Russell  inexplicably  renames  
these  as  'displeasure/pleasure'  and  'activation/deactivation'  (Russell,  
2003:  149),  just  as  he  has  renamed  feeling  to  core  affect.  The  concepts  of  
valence  and  arousal  have  been  used  in  rational  choice:  'the  only  relevant  
aspect  of  the  emotions  is  their  valence'  (Elster,  1998:  64;  see  also  Smith  
and  Ellsworth,  1985;  Johnson  and  Tversky,  1983),  with  yet  another  issue  
arising  from  ill-­‐defined  emotions—how  to  compare  emotions  of  a  
different  valence  with  the  same  arousal,  or  vice  versa  and  so  on.  One  
critique  sees  this  as  a  fundamental  flaw:  'Implicit  in  this  strategy  is  the  
idea  that  emotions  of  the  same  valence  should  sometimes  influence  
judgement  in  opposite  ways'  (Lerner  and  Keltner  2000:  478).  
By  posing  it  as  feeling,  however,  this  contradiction  is  eased.  The  
valance  and  arousal  model  allows  feelings  to  be  compared,  even  those  of  
an  extremely  low  affect  or  arousal.  Valence  is  only  necessary  when  we  
have  emotional  'containers'  to  define  certain  experiences,  either  before  or  
after  the  fact.  On  the  one  hand,  the  dual  axis  model  is  too  simple;  in  terms  
of  choice,  for  example,  a  feeling  that  is  more  easily  comprehended  would  
be  more  optimal  than  one  that  has  a  higher  valence,  but  is  harder  to  
imagine.  On  the  other,  it  may  be  too  complex,  for  what  matters  in  making  
choice  is  the  comparison  of  only  two  feeling  states.  As  such,  it  wouldn't  
matter  what  'rating'  a  feeling  had,  or  even  that  one  was  negative  and  the  
other  positive,  simply  that  it  was  possible  to  compare  the  two  and  choose  
one  over  the  other.    
Before  addressing  how  this  might  affect  choice,  three  major  
dilemmas  have  been  solved  by  placing  emotions  to  the  side  in  favor  of  
feeling.  The  first  is  the  semantic  problem.  By  focusing  on  feelings  instead  
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of  emotions,  it  clarifies  the  way  in  which  one  emotion  may  be  associated  
with  both  positive  and  negative  sensations.  The  imagination  of  anger  is  
both  unpleasant  in  its  steaming/hot/'I  can't  believe  you  did  that'  quality.  
On  the  other  hand,  when  we  imagine  a  revenge  scenario,  also  an  act  of  
anger,  we  might  categorize  that  as  positive:  'attended  by  a  certain  
pleasure  because  the  thoughts  dwell  upon  the  act  of  vengeance,  and  the  
images  then  called  up  cause  pleasure,  like  the  images  called  up  in  dreams'  
(Aristotle,  1954:  2:2:1).  What  matters  isn't  whether  or  not  it  is  anger,  but  
what  precipitated  the  two  (or  more)  feelings  that  we  may  call  anger.  The  
feeling  may  be  pleasant.  It  may  be  unpleasant.  It  may  be  mild,  it  may  be  
strong,  but  in  naming  it  (anger),  we  bring  it  into  the  realm  of  
misunderstanding.  What  can  be  usefully  and  consistently  described  is  1)  
the  structure  of  the  thought  (assigning  blame,  fairness,  breaks  in  
expectations,  and  so  on)  and  the  accompanying  feeling  (positive/negative,  
mild/strong)  that  is  usually  attached  to  the  assignation.  By  avoiding  the  
folk  concepts  which  link  these  two  events  as  a  single  emotion,  a  clearer  
and  less  contested  picture  of  human  experience  and  choice  emerges.  
The  second  advantage  is  a  merging  of  the  seemingly  diametric  
cognitive  school  and  physiological  school.  That  is  to  say,  both  the  body  
and  a  conclusion  can  lead  to  a  feeling,  upon  which  one  could  then  make  a  
choice.  For  example,  one  might  be  hungry  for  a  cake  (feeling  1),  but  
anticipating  a  sense  of  pride  upon  succeeding  a  diet  (feeling  2).  As  
situations  change  (e.g.  exhaustion,  the  memory  of  a  particular  cake,  the  
image  of  someone  in  a  bathing  suit),  feeling  1  starts  to  look  better  than  
feeling  2,  and  we  break  (or  continue)  the  diet.  This  is  not  a  rational  choice,  
as  Elster  attempts  to  frame  it  as  'using  our  future  selves  as  allies'  (Elster,  
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2007:  233).  Instead,  it  is  a  choice  that  flows  and  changes  according  to,  and  
within,  the  individual  feeling  and  bodily  states.  Furthermore,  it  is  an  
optimal  choice  in  each  case:  the  mind  believes  the  feeling  chosen  will  be  
better  than  the  one  avoided,  even  if  that  it  turns  out  not  to  be  the  case  
(i.e.  the  cake  was  not  that  good,  or  the  diet  didn't  matter  that  much).    
This  union  extends  into  feelings  that  are  both  bodily  and  cognitive—
which  is  to  say,  all  of  them.  Elster  discusses  the  taste  of  sweetness  on  the  
tongue,  but  what  of  the  individual's  history  of  food  (or  of  diabetes  for  that  
matter).  Seemingly  basic  impulses  like  food,  sex  and  even  emotion  always  
carry  a  tiny  bit  of  cultural,  historical  and  experiential  color.  There  is  no  
reason  to  extend  this  into  another  nature/nurture  debate,  just  to  
acknowledge  that  it  is  the  memory  of  experience  (cognition)  that  
influences  us  to  choose,  and  the  body  that  experiences  the  feelings  that  
create  the  end  of  that  choice.  Just  as  an  expensive  slice  of  chocolate  cake  
might  cause  us  to  break  our  diet  while  a  twinkie  would  not,  all  the  
vegetarians  I  have  known  go  off  the  wagon  with  the  worst  possible  meat  
imaginable  (e.g.  a  trip  to  McDonald's).  Feeling  is  best  seen  as  a  continuum  
between  the  body  and  the  imagination  of  it.  Antonio  Damasio  famously  
said,  'The  mind  is  embodied...not  just  embrained',  firmly  placing  him  in  
the  physiological  school.  But  consider  what  proceeded  that  quote:    
'What  the  brain  must  do  to  operate  in  this  fashion  is  come  
into  the  world  with  considerable  "innate  knowledge"  about  
how  to  regulate  itself  and  the  rest  of  the  body.  As  the  brain  
incorporates  dispositional  representations  of  interactions  
with  entities  and  scenes  relevant  for  innate  regulation,  it  
increases  the  chances  of  including  entities  and  scenes  that  
may  or  may  not  be  directly  relevant  to  survival.  And  as  this  
happens,  our  growing  sense  of  whatever  the  world  outside  
may  be,  is  apprehended  as  a  modification  in  the  neural  
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space  in  which  body  and  brain  interact'  (Damasio,  1994:  
117–18).    
  
Here,  the  focus  on  feeling  allows  cognitive  and  bodily  impulses  and  
sensations  to  fall  along  a  spectrum,  rather  than  confusedly  being  either  
physiological  or  intentional.  'Feelings...arise  from  any  set  of  homeostatic  
reactions,  not  just  from  emotions  proper'  (Damasio,  2003:  84).  They  are,  
and  will  remain,  an  appropriately  messy  combination  of  both.    
Our  third  advantage  of  a  focus  on  feeling  provides  the  answer  to  our  
second  riddle:  things  that  are  not  called  emotions,  but  probably  are.  It  is  
plausible  enough  that  many  times  our  appraisals  lead  to  emotions;  when  
we  are  angry,  it  is  always  'at'  something,  even  if  that  something  is  an  
object,  a  deity,  or  ourselves.  Yet,  often,  beliefs  produce  feelings  for  which  
we  have  no  name,  but  which  follow  the  structure  of  these  appraised  
emotions  exactly:  belief  ➙  confirmation/denial  ➙  feeling.  As  with  
'Eureka!'  above,  Jon  Elster  proposes  that  we  want  to  be  rational  (see  
Chapter  2).  Here,  a  thought  gives  rise  to  a  feeling,  presumably  positive.  
Without  that  positive  feeling,  there  is  no  reason  to  make  the  choice  
(myself  in  the  future  having  made  the  rational  decision).  The  simplest  way  
to  put  it  is  this:  we  are  always  feeling.  'The  ecology  of  emotional  life  is  not  
one  of  long  periods  of  nonemotional  "normal"  life  punctuated  by  the  
occasional  prototypical  emotional  episode.  A  frugal  ontology  may  be  all  
that  is  needed:  Emotional  life  consists  of  the  continuous  fluctuations  in  
core  affect'  (Russell,  2003:  151).  
The  desire  to  be  rational,  the  great  discovery,  the  completion  of  a  
puzzle,  the  denial  of  emotion,  the  sense  of  justice—these  are  the  
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unnamed  emotions.  They  are  emotions  in  the  sense  that  they  follow  the  
same  structure  as  the  conventional  'intentional'  emotions  like  anger,  
shame  and  even  fear:  a  thought  that  generates  a  feeling.  So  when  I  began  
this  section  with  the  phrase  'cognito  ergo  sentio'  ('I  think  therefore  I  feel'),  
the  word  'therefore'  is  not  used  in  the  grand  sense  of  all-­‐encompassing  
meaning  of  life,  but  in  the  sense  'and  then'.  Every  thought  leads  to  a  
feeling—many  slight,  but  always  present,  despite  our  pointless  denial.  It  
would  be  possible  to  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  feelings  are  not  mere  
byproducts  of  thoughts,  but  are  the  guides;  thoughts  are  the  means,  and  
feelings  the  end.  But  such  grandness,  while  potentially  true  in  many  cases,  
is  not  necessary.  It  is  only  necessary  to  observe  that  thoughts  lead  to  
feelings.  With  this  structure,  it  is  possible  to  supersede  the  common  
process  of  attempting  to  name  which  type  or  combination  of  emotion(s)  
an  individual  has  experienced.  Instead,  it  is  broken  down  simply:  what  is  
the  thought;  what  is  the  feeling?  
Emotions  present  irresolvable  conflicts  theory-­‐wise,  but  there  is  
much  to  be  mined  from  the  cognitive  model  of  emotion,  which  the  next  
chapter  will  introduce.  Here,  emotions  and  feelings  arise  from  breaks  in  
order.  The  concept  of  schema—briefly  outlined  above  as  appraisal  ➙  
feeling—is  able  to  explain  many  instances  of  affect,  including  those  that  
are  not  usually  considered  emotions,  such  as  fear-­‐seeking,  or  the  pleasure  
in  games,  or  greed,  or,  finally,  the  attraction  of  violence.  The  cognitive  
path/schema/goal  model  (the  so-­‐called  intentional  school)  will  not  answer  
all  the  questions  we  have  in  relation  to  emotion,  but  it  does  provide  a  
structure  for  many  feelings  and  folk  emotions,  especially  the  ones  relevant  
to  passive  and  active  individuals  under  threat  of  violence  and  thus  
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relevant  to  choice.  In  retaining  the  cognitive  model,  we  can  effectively  talk  
about  how  feelings  are  generated,  ways  that  are  typically  called  fear,  
shame,  anger  or  disgust,  as  long  as  we  resist  the  urge  to  name  them.    
This  brief  chapter  has  argued  that  the  division  of  feeling  and  emotion  
allows  for  both  a  better  definition  of  cognate  feelings  that  are  already  
named  emotions,  and  those  that  might  not  be.  The  physiological  and  
intentional  perspectives  on  emotion  may  be  more  intermingled  than  can  
be  reasonably  addressed  in  this  thesis.  Since  bodies  are  the  site  of  all  
feeling,  it  is  necessary  to  concede  that  there  are  abstract  features  of  
choice,  such  as  mood  or  wellness,  that  will  not  be  modeled  here.  The  
focus  will  be  on  the  cognitive  aspect  of  feeling,  for  the  simple  reason  that  
it  can  be  imagined  in  the  future,  and  therefore  as  a  factor  of  decision.  
Robert  Solomon  has  argued  that  'emotions  are  rational',  but  this  is  not  
enough.  He  continues,  'This  is  not  only  to  say  that  they  fit  into  one's  
overall  behavior  in  a  significant  way,  that  they  follow  a  regular  
pattern...that  they  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  a  coherent  set  of  causes'  
(Solomon,  2001:  16).  It  now  remains  to  outline  that  serial,  causal  structure  
in  the  most  concise  way  possible.       
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Chapter  5:   What   is    it?  The  Process  and  the  Importance  of  
Appraisal   
  
Having  eschewed  terms  of  emotions  as  overdetermined,  subjective  
and  culturally  specific,  I  will  nevertheless  retain  two  cognitive  models  of  
emotion,  the  first  of  which—schemas—this  chapter  will  outline  and  then  
apply  to  the  case  study  of  violence  and  passivity.  It  could  be  said  that  
Chapter  2  (on  the  subject  of  rationality)  was  an  introduction  to  the  idea  of  
schemas  (also  conceived  of  as  'goals',  'plans',  'expectations',  'frames',  and  
so  on).  In  the  case  of  the  reason/passion  divide,  it  could  be  said  that  the  
schools  of  both  rationality  and  emotion  are  less  a  semi-­‐scientific  attempt  
to  create  a  workable  model  than  a  feeling-­‐based  drive  to  distinguish  what  
is  and  what  is  not  acceptable  in  certain  areas  of  discourse.  Although  there  
are  still  useful  ways  to  define  and  explain  'irrational'  behavior,  it  remains  
that  we  also  have  a  feeling  reaction  to  it.  Like  the  soldier  who  does  not  fire  
back,  emotions  are  best  understood  as  to  where  they  do  and  do  not  
belong.    
  
Where  Dirt   Comes  From  
  
It  is  not  enough,  unfortunately,  to  pare  down  the  sprawling  field  of  
emotion  to  a  more  concise  description  of  feeling.  It  is  necessary  to  define,  
or  at  least  describe,  the  way  in  which  feeling  arises  through  the  process  of  
causal  reasoning.  The  first  step,  appraisal,  is  an  act  of  taxonomy:  whether  
an  object,  person,  group  or  ourselves  fit  into  a  category  (or  does  not).  This  
fit,  or  lack  thereof,  generates  a  feeling.  We  constantly  choose  between  
two  feelings  generated  by  these  quick  apprehensions.  This  is  a  process  
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that  happens  every  fifth  of  a  second  or  so,12  but  it  is  a  stark  one.  It  is  not  
the  subtle  practice  of  considering  many  nuances  and  options  (which  
occurs  over  a  longer  period  of  a  few  seconds),  but  a  difference  engine,  no  
doubt  a  major  influence  on  the  use  of  this  paradigm  within  computing.  
This  is  our  corollary  of  Occam's  Razor:  not  that  the  simpler  theory  must  be  
the  correct  one,  but  that  the  simpler  theory  will  be  more  descriptive  of  
the  simple  activity  of  present-­‐time  consciousness.  
The  crude  and  nearly  binary  aspect  of  this  process  is  largely  a  
function  of  the  very  small  capacity  of  the  so-­‐called  'working  memory'.  It  
would  be  foolish  to  describe  the  entirety  of  cognition  as  small,  if  for  no  
other  reason  than  the  vast  and  contradictory  amount  of  writing  on  the  
subject.  However,  we  are  discussing  choice,  which  takes  place  in  the  
moment,  something  which,  by  definition,  limits  its  timeframe,  and  thus  its  
scale.  Although  the  mind  moves  quickly  from  subject  to  subject,  giving  the  
illusion  of  a  larger  and  more  complex  function,  the  mind  can  only  hold  so  
many  bits  of  information  at  one  time.  Initially,  this  was  thought  to  be  as  
many  as  nine  (otherwise  known  as  the  rule  of  seven  plus  or  minus  two  
(see  Miller,  1956)),  but  it  has  been  revised  down  to  three  or  four:  'simple  
mathematical  arguments  predict  that  only  configurations  of  1,  2  or  3  
objects  can  be  recognized.  The  special  case  of  4  might  also  be  handled  
since  it  might  be  coded  with  only  two  canonical  configurations'  (Dehaene,  
                                                
10.  Dehaene,  1997:  125.  See  also  RSVP,  or  Rapid  Serial  Visual  Processing,  where  
images,  numbers  and  words  are  shown  to  subjects  on  cards  to  see  if  they  are  retained  
in  working  memory.  For  example,  words  in  sentence  order  can  be  understood  at  
twelve  words  a  second:  when  randomized,  at  five.  See  Potter,  Mary,  Nieuwenstei,  
Mark  and  Strohminger,  Nina  (2008).  'Whole  report  versus  partial  report  in  RSVP  
sentences'.  Journal  of  memory  and  language,  58(4),  pp.  907–15.  
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1992:  15).  Dehaene  notes  how  groups  in  A  can  be  held  in  immediate  
memory,  less  so  for  groups  B  and  C:  
  
Such  a  small  working  memory  may  seem  far-­‐fetched  at  first,  but  this  
merely  underlines  the  vital  importance  of  abstraction.  If  you  close  your  
eyes  and  imagine  three  or  four  objects,  and  then  increase  the  number,  
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you  will  notice  the  way  in  which  the  objects  begin  to  group;  instead  of  
visualizing  six,  you  might  see  two  groups  of  three  and  so  on.  This  is  called  
'subitizing'  (Dahaene,  1993:  12).  As  numbers  grow  larger,  we  use  
increasing  amounts  abstraction  to  count,  even  as  we  lack  the  capacity  to  
know  what  a  million  is,  ten  thousand,  or  even  ten.    
Long-­‐term  memory  is  not  small,  as  those  working  in  the  field  will  tell  
you  (Brady  et  al.,  2008).  However,  the  modest  capacity  of  present-­‐time  
conscious  limits—and,  more  importantly,  shapes—the  way  we  access  
memory,  making  the  latter  large,  but  stark.  The  intersection  between  
limited  present-­‐time  consciousness  and  nearly  infinite  memory  
necessitates  binaries,  a  productive  function  of  choice.  'Imagine  
consciousness  as  a  parallel  machine  that  permits  everything  currently  
relevant  (or  unconsciously  active)  to  come  to  consciousness  all  at  once.  
You  would  be  overwhelmed  by  thoughts,  potential  choices,  feelings,  
attitudes,  etc.  of  comparable  "strength"  and  relevance'  (Mandler,  1997:  
488).  We  are  confronted  with  information:  a  shape,  a  color,  a  noise  and  so  
on.  This  could  be,  for  example,  one  of  the  words  you  are  reading  right  
now,  which  is  a  familiar,  but  nevertheless  learned,  combination  of  light  
and  dark  scratches  on  paper,  or  dots  on  a  screen.  The  present-­‐time  
consciousness  compares  this  to  a  vast  long-­‐term  memory  bank,  and,  being  
small,  simply  asks:  is  this  X?    
The  realm  of  different  layers—memory  access,  numeracy,  rapid  serial  
visual  processing  and  so  on—is  hardly  within  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  Yet,  
it  offers  one  possible  explanation  of  how  a  large  memory  and  a  small  
present-­‐time  thinking  capacity  gave  rise  to  a  particular  type  of  cognition,  
referred  to  from  this  point  on  as  a  schema.  This  is  a  term  proposed  by  
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Mardi  Horowitz  under  his  work  for  post-­‐traumatic  stress  disorder  
(Horowitz,  1986;  1998),  a  field  that  will  offer  addition  insights  into  war  
violence  and  its  psychological  effects.  What  is  a  schema?  Horowitz  rather  
unfortunately  defines  it  as:  'an  organized  composite  of  multiple  features  
that  persists  unconsciously  to  organize  mental  processes  and  perhaps  
produce  derivatives  for  conscious  representation'  (Horowitz,  1990:  303).  
For  the  purposes  of  this  argument,  the  term  will  be  used  more  widely  and  
definitively,  that  is  a  category  into  which  a  cognitive  appraisal  either  fits  or  
does  not.    
Similar  paradigms  have  been  proposed  in  the  same  field  of  cognitive  
emotional  psychology  under  the  names  'goals'  (Oatley  and  Johnson-­‐Laird,  
1987;  Power  and  Dagliesh,  2008),  'concerns'  (Frijda,  1986;  1988),  and  
'plans'  (Mandler,  1982;  Pibram  and  Melges,  1969).  Obviously,  there  are  
differences  between  each  of  these  and  other  formulations,  evident  from  
their  names  alone.  Nevertheless,  it  could  be  said  that  there  is  some  
agreement  here.  Consider,  for  example,  the  division  into  stages  presented  
in  Michael  Power  and  Tim  Dagliesh's  SPAARS  model  (Schematic,  
Propositional,  Analogical,  and  Associative  Representation  Systems).  Here,  
the  event  moves  through  one  or  more  of  these  (propositional,  analogical  
and  so  on)  systems  to  reach  an  emotion,  from  event,  to  analog  (how  it  is  
interpreted),  to  associative  (what  it  is  related  to),  to  'output  systems'—
that  is  the  psychological  or  interpretive  reaction  (Power  and  Dagliesh:  
2008,  152–56).    
Rational  theorists  Timothy  Wilson  and  Daniel  Gilbert  likewise  present  
the  AREA  (AREA:  attend,  react,  explain  and  adapt)  model  to  explain  
affective  adaptation:  that  is,  why  we  initially  react  strongly  to  bad  news,  
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and  then  acclimate  to  it.  As  such,  the  event  is  quickly  appraised  as  either  
'explained  and/or  self-­‐relevant'  or  'unexplained  self-­‐relevant',  which  in  
turn  causes  a  'strong  affective  reaction'  (Wilson  and  Gilbert:  2008,  370–
71).  
Appropriately,  this  goal-­‐based  (self-­‐interested)  model  has  further  
been  proposed  as  a  motivator  in  combat:    
'1.  "What  is  it  all  about?"  That  is,  is  the  perceived  situation  
sufficiently  clear  that  it  can  be  understood  and  thus  acted  
on?  
2.  "Does  this  concern  me?"  That  is,  even  if  I  understand,  do  
I  consider  this  relevant  for  me  at  this  point  in  time?  
3.  "Can  I  do  something  about  it?"  That  is,  even  if  I  
understand  and  consider  it  relevant,  do  I  have  the  potential  
to  cope  with  ita  'strong  affective  rea'  (Shalit,  1988:  6).  
  
There  is  a  strong  danger  in  these  models  where  emotions  are  often  
imprisoned,  ironically  by  their  own  rationality.  With  the  use  of  the  terms  
'goal'  or  'plan',  there  is  a  tendency  to  focus  on  the  way  the  feeling  is  
generated  according  to  how  it  affects  the  individuals.  For  example,  Power  
and  Dagliesh  note  that:  'In  SPAARS,  emotions  are  primarily  appraisal  based  
and  appraisals  are  a  function  of  goals;  thus,  within  SPAARS,  emotions  are  
explicitly  functional'  (Power  and  Dagliesh:  2008,  167).  When  confronted  
with  so-­‐called  'aesthetic  emotion',  feelings  toward  beautiful  objects,  they  
pull  a  bit  of  a  theoretical  sleight  of  hand:  'These  examples  illustrate  that  
any  theory  of  emotion  is  necessarily  complex  and  that  there  is,  as  yet,  no  
completely  adequate  theory'  (Power  and  Dagliesh:  2008,  176).  In  other  
words,  the  theory  works,  except  when  we  need  it  to  the  most:  to  explain  
feeling  generated  by  things  and  people  that  do  not  affect  us  in  any  
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substantive  way.  Given  the  subject  of  this  thesis,  if  the  effect  on  the  
(physical)  self  was  a  paramount  factor,  the  soldier  would  always  fire  back.  
He  or  she  does  not.    
To  resolve  this,  it  is  simply  a  matter  of  jettisoning  the  ego,  so  to  
speak.  The  focus  on  the  self,  its  motives,  desires,  and  survival  is  a  perfectly  
understandable  and  appropriate  perspective  from  a  psychologically  
therapeutic  environment—it  is  the  subject  of  the  subject,  so  to  speak.  
Instead  of  thinking  of  the  self  (usually  male)  as  a  discrete  individual,  it  
behooves  us  to  imagine  the  self  as  the  blurry  boundary  between  
consciousness  and  the  world.  In  other  words,  if  the  self  is  the  way  the  
world  we  imagine  sees  us  back,  the  schema—how  the  world  is  
constructed  into  comprehensible  discrete  categories—defines  not  just  the  
world,  but  who  and  where  we  are.  There  are  no  objectively  real  threats—
e.g.  a  black  man  drinking  from  a  water  fountain  labeled  'white',  or  gay  
marriage—but  both  examples  invoke  schemic  breaks  which  threaten  the  
defined  self.  Reading  a  newspaper  produces  a  similar  effect:  anger  over  
the  injustice  of  an  event  that  has  no  relation  to  the  person  reading  it,  and  
over  which  that  person  has  no  power.  As  such,  we  jettison  the  dual  
question:  'what  is  it?'  and  'how  does  it  affect  me?',  and  replace  it  with  the  
simpler:  'is  it  safe?'.    
As  such,  and  to  obtain  a  more  concise  and  complete  version  of  what  
a  schema  is,  it  is  vital  to  look  beyond  just  one  discipline.  Support  for  
schemas—the  impact  categorical  conceptions  have  on  people's  emotional  
and  social  lives—can  be  found  in  anthropology,  rationality,  international  
relations,  abnormal  psychology,  philosophy,  and  even  the  physiological  
school  of  emotions.  First,  from  anthropology,  the  term  'safe'  (above)  
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recalls  one  of  the  clearest  descriptions  of  what  a  schema  might  be,  from  
Mary  Douglas'  book  Purity  and  Danger:  dirt  is  matter  out  of  place.  Here,  a  
feeling  is  generated  through  the  belief  in  a  system  of  categorization,  and  
then  a  reaction  when  something  does,  or  does  not  fit.  What  is  especially  
relevant  to  Douglas'  observation  is  the  way  it  reaches  across  cultures  and  
individuals.  Although  what  specifically  qualifies  as  dirty  is  never  universal,  
there  is  dirt,  and  we  will  have  a  markedly  similar  feeling  reaction  to  it  
('There  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  dirt'  (Douglas,  1984:  2)).  This  concept  
of  schema  can  apply  to  oneself,  one's  group,  to  others,  to  other  groups,  to  
events,  even  to  emotions,  as  seen  with  the  break  between  good  rational  
motivations  and  bad  emotional  ones.    
The  concept  of  schema  further  mirrors  the  'representativeness  
heuristic',  from  the  bounded  rationality,  or  the  heuristics  and  biases  
school  of  rationality.  Although  touched  on  briefly  in  Chapter  2,  this  
describes  the  act  of  choosing  not  according  to  optimal  outcome,  but  
according  to  a  particular  bias  or  heuristic,  such  as  why  people  might  
believe  in  a  run  of  luck,  betting  on  red  after  six  reds:  'In  answering  such  
questions,  people  typically  rely  on  the  representativeness  heuristic,  in  
which  probabilities  are  evaluated  by  the  degree  to  which  A  is  
representative  of  B...when  A  is  highly  representative  of  B,  the  probability  
that  A  originates  from  B  is  judged  to  be  high'  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  
1974:1124).  What's  interesting  about  this  particular  heuristic  is  the  
specificity  with  which  they  describe  the  importance  of  categorization  (i.e.  
'representative  of')  in  the  act  of  choice.    
From  social  psychology  is  the  concept  of  the  'cognitive  miser',  which  
was  specifically  designed  to  explain  racial  prejudice  (Taylor,  1981;  Fiske,  
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2000;  Fiske  and  Taylor,  2013).  Based  on  the  work  of  Gordon  Allport  
(Allport,  1954),  Susan  Fiske  proposes  that  prejudice  arises  not  out  of  bad  
Freudian  experience  (that  the  subject  in  question  was  taught  to  hate),  but  
as  a  manifestation  of  cognitive  shortcutting:  'That  is,  people  oversimplify  
their  experience  by  selectively  attending  to  certain  features  of  the  
information  within  the  environment  and  by  forming  categories,  concepts,  
and  generalizations  to  deal  with  vast  quantities  of  available  data'  (Taylor  
et  al.,  1978:  778).  Although  Fiske  has  since  backpedalled  from  this  
position,13  the  concept  remains  another  instance  in  which  a  schema  
manifests  as  an  individual  cognition  attempts  manage,  so  to  speak,  the  
social  world.  We  will  return  to  the  concept  of  the  cognitive  miser  and  how  
it  might  apply  to  the  experience  of  combat  exhaustion  further  down.    
Further  linking  up  the  experience  of  schemic  violations  with  violence  
is  the  work  of  Benedict  Anderson.  To  a  certain  degree,  this  is  the  subject  
of  Benedict  Anderson's  analysis  of  ethnic  and  nationalistic  violence,  what  
he  calls  'imagined  communities'.  Anderson's  theory  is  problematic  as  he  
sees  nationalism  arise  from  'dynastic  realms'  (the  religious  and  sovereign  
authorities  of  the  earlier  historical  period),  without  explaining  how  these  
themselves  arose.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  strong  categorical  component:  
'It  is  imagined  because  the  members  of  even  the  smallest  nation  will  never  
know  most  of  their  fellow-­‐members,  meet  them,  or  even  hear  of  them,  
                                                
11.'Nor,  ultimately,  can  we  blame  unethical  behavior  on  faulty  but  morally  neutral  
programming  of  the  human  information-­‐processor'  (Fiske:  2004:  118).  Even  at  the  
explanatory  level,  there  is  the  utterly  subjective  use  of  the  word  'blame',  which  is  what  
many  of  the  social  analysis  revolves  around:  apportionment  and  assignation  of  
individual  responsibility  as  ethical  process.  Fiske  is  correct  that  prejudice  is  not  
'neutral';  it  is  merely  a  question  of  how  such  categorizations  occur  under  pressure  of  
affect,  a  process  to  be  outlined  in  the  next  two  chapters.  
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yet  in  the  minds  of  each  lives  the  image  of  their  communion'  (emphasis  
added,  Anderson,  2006:  6;  see  also  Girard,  below).  If  we  combine  this  
perspective  with  Douglas'  concept,  the  term  'ethnic  cleansing'  is  doubly  
troubling,  since  it  both  implies  something  like  a  territory  may  be  
categorized  according  to  the  dirty  presence  of  a  certain  group,  and  further  
brings  terms  that  are  inherently  charged  into  political  decision  making:  
'Dying  for  the  revolution  also  draws  its  grandeur  from  the  degree  to  which  
it  is  felt  to  be  something  fundamentally  pure'  (Anderson,  2006:  144).  
From  the  physiological  perspective,  schemas  are  very  similar  to  
Damasio's  formulation  'dispositional  representations',  which  'exist  in  
potential  state,  subject  to  activation,  like  the  town  of  Brigadoon...  
Dispositional  representations  constitute  our  full  repository  of  knowledge,  
encompassing  both  innate  knowledge  and  knowledge  acquired  by  
experience'  (Damasio,  1994:  104).  Again,  the  advantage  of  Damasio's  
formulation  is  the  inclusion  of  bodily  and  cognitive  models.  For  Damasio,  
this  tendency  towards  categorization  is  imagistic,  as  it  arises  out  of  a  
model  generated  by  the  body,  namely  'neural  representations',  'which  
consist  of  biological  modifications  created  by  learning  in  a  neuron  circuit,  
become  images  in  our  minds'  (Damasio,  1994:  100).  This  is  not  unlike  one  
of  Damasio's  predecessors,  Fritz  Heider,  who  noted  the  way  in  which  
visual,  and  thus  cognitive,  processing  constructs:  'a  stable  phenomenal  
world  for  the  person  who  is  bombarded  by  unstable  patterns  of  sensory  
stimulation.  As  one  circles  an  egg,  the  size  and  shape  of  the  retinal  images  
are  constantly  changing,  yet  one  perceives  the  egg's  shape  as  invariant'  
(Gilbert,  1998:  95).  
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PTSD  is  the  origin  point  of  this  use  of  the  term  schema,  and  although  
the  experience  of  guilt  and  trauma  in  violence  will  be  explored  further,  it  
is  useful  to  touch  on  how  this  field  imagines  a  schema.  Mardi  Horowitz's  
take  is  that  it  wasn't  so  much  fear  or  death  that  manifested  stress,  but  the  
'central  idea  is  that  traumatic  events  shatter  people’s  basic  beliefs  and  
assumptions'  (Brewin  and  Holmes,  2003:  344).  This  is  able  to  explain  why  
any  of  number  of  events  can  cause  a  later  stress  reaction:  not  just  fear  of  
death,  but  experience  of  others'  deaths;  not  just  experience  of  others'  
deaths  but  one's  own  participation,  and  so  on.  Thus,  not  only  are  drone  
pilots  subject  to  PTSD  (Chappelle  et  al.,  2012),  but  are  now  found  to  have  
an  even  higher  incidence  of  mental  health  problems  than  their  active  
flying  counterparts  (Otto  and  Webber,  2013)—pilots  in  actual  physical  
danger,  versus  those  who  experience  none.14  Outside  of  moral  
implications  (or  perhaps  generative  of  them),  The  Intact  Body  represents  a  
kind  of  schema  that  violence  violates:    
'One  moment,  they  would  be  laughing  and  joking  with  him  
with  a  twinkle  in  their  eyes  about  what  they  would  do  
when  they  left  Vietnam.  The  next  moment,  they  would  be  
dead,  lying  in  the  grass  or  mud  with  a  poncho  covering  
them  until  they  were  picked  up  by  a  chopper  and  taken  to  
"Graves  Registration."...  He  was  now  burdened  with  
unfinished  business.  Every  night,  the  faces  of  his  dead  
buddies  visited  him  in  his  dreams.  He  saw  their  gray,  cold  
faces,  eyes  open,  staring  out  into  space'  (the  experience  of  
'Joe',  quoted  in  Paulson  and  Krippner,  2007:  89).    
  
                                                
12.  See  Chapter  6  for  a  more  complete  discussion  of  violence  trauma  and  unmanned  
aircraft.  
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As  such,  we  are  not  so  much  talking  about  a  'rational'  view  that  
violence  is  bad  or  wrong,  or  that  disgust  at  violence  is  natural,  but  the  
simple  idea  that  bodies  and  people  should  be  one  way,  and  war  violence  
renders  them  another.  The  following  is  written  from  the  therapeutic  point  
of  view,  but  applies  here:  'For  example,  a  person  expects  a  limb,  an  eye,  or  
a  body  organ  to  always  be  present,  both  functionally  and  as  a  part  of  his  
or  her  self-­‐image.  If  the  person  loses  a  body  part  or  undergoes  an  
amputation,  a  safe  world  can  become  a  zone  of  terror'  (Horowitz,  2003:  
4).  
In  keeping  with  the  perspective  of  methodological  individualism,  it  is  
important  to  remember  that  schemas  can  be  experienced  with  the  exact  
opposite  result.  Also  from  Paulson  and  Krippner's  book,  a  different  post-­‐
war  guilt  is  experienced,  this  time  by  the  author:  'One  major  area  of  guilt  
for  me  was  that  I  had  tried  to  kill  21  NVAs  as  a  personal  birthday  present  
to  myself  for  my  twenty-­‐first  birthday;  having  killed  only  20  1/2,  I  was  
extremely  upset.  Someone  else  had  finished  off  the  twenty-­‐first  NVA  for  
me,  and  I  was  credited  with  only  one-­‐half  a  body  count  for  that  one'  
(Paulson  and  Krippner,  2007:  102).  As  with  the  expectation  that  bodies  
should  be  whole  and  living,  other,  contrary,  expectations  are  built.  These  
schemas  function  in  the  same  way:  interruption  causes  upset.  
Interestingly,  this  guilt  would  later  transform  for  the  author  into  moral  
guilt  over  having  killed:  a  dilemma  where  two  categorical  representations  
were  in  conflict.  
These  may  be  two  useful  ways  of  seeing  how  schemas  manifest  in  
combat,  yet  guilt  and  pleasure  in  completion  are  more  subjects  of  agency,  
how  completions  or  breaks  relate  to  what  intentions  were  present—a  
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topic  that  is  the  subject  of  Chapters  6  and  7.  What  matters  here  is  the  way  
in  which  schemas  describes  the  universe,  its  stability,  and  our  relationship  
with  it.  As  we  approach  our  case  study  and  how  we  introduce  the  subject  
is  via  the  experience  of  what  happens  when  a  schema  cannot  be  found.  If  
this  is  a  process  described  by  appraisal  leading  to  feeling,  an  appraisal  
must  be  made.  In  the  instant  before  we  find  dirt  or  purity,  justice  or  
violation,  us  or  them,  we  must  first  find  a  category  for  our  experiential  
impressions.  Sometimes,  there  is  no  schema  to  describe  an  event,  
experience  or  sensation.  This  feeling  of  not  knowing  is  a  powerfully  
negative  one,  and  can  now,  finally,  begin  to  explain  the  contradictory  




The  fundamental  nature  of  categorization  cannot  be  
overemphasized;  we  very  literally  are  unable  to  function  without  it.  
Schizophrenia  is  a  rare  but  extreme  pathology,  one  in  which  the  affected  
individuals  are  unable  to  perform  even  basic  social  or  individual  self-­‐
maintenance  functions.  Its  manifestation  is  theorized  by  some  as  an  
inability  to  parse.  This  is  the  sense  of  being  overwhelmed  by  information,  
the  feelings,  images  and  sensations  that  most  people  easily  process  under  
the  constant  flow  of  cognition:  'Difficulties  with  metaphor  processing  in  
schizophrenia  are  thought  to  reflect  degradation  of  the  semantic  system  
so  that  it  fails  to  represent  the  figurative  relationships  upon  which  
metaphoric  interpretation  depends'  (Humprey  et  al.,  2010:  290).  In  their  
influential  study  of  schizophrenia,  this  is  what  McGhie  and  Chapman  
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called  'the  loss  in  the  selective  function  of  attention':  'Everything  is  in  bits.  
You  put  the  picture  up  bit  by  bit  into  your  head.  It's  like  a  photograph  
that's  torn  in  bits  and  put  together  again...  If  you  move,  it's  frightening'  
(McGhie  and  Chapman,  1961:  106).  The  experience  of  schizophrenics  can  
be  seen  on  a  scale:  the  fear  (for  our  purposes,  the  strong  negative  feeling)  
of  being  situationally  unplaced.  This  ranges  from  schizophrenia  to  the  
anxiety  of  dementia  patients  to  the  mundane  forgetting  of  a  close  friend's  
name:  'Am  I  losing  my  mind?'.  
Joanna  Bourke  opens  her  article  on  fear  in  combat  with  a  poem  from  
World  War  I  poet  Shawn  O'Leary:    
'–  And  I  
I  mow  and  gibber  like  an  ape  
But  what  can  I  say,  what  do?  
There  is  no  saying  or  no  doing.'  
  
She  adds  that  'as  historians  we  cannot  leave  it  at  that'  (Bourke,  2001:  
315).  In  an  attempt  to  rise  to  this  challenge,  this  sensical  anarchy  should  
be  seen  as  a  perfect  encapsulation  of  how  feeling  is  generated  by  
cognitive  processes  in  the  schemic  theory  outlined  above.  If  we  as  
individuals  are  constantly  parsing  data  and  applying  to  what  we  know  for  
a  'fit',  it  follows  that  not  being  able  to  do  so  would  generate  a  negative  
feeling;  that  uncertainty,  best  understood  as  a  schemic  break,  is  a  major  
factor  in  producing  negative  feelings,  feelings  we  sometimes  call  fear.  This  
is  best  understood  when  we  compare  it  to  a  fear  of  death,  which  is  the  
commonsense  understanding  of  fear  in  battle.  This  can  now  be  
understood,  not  as  separate  from  these  uncertainties,  but  as  incorporated  
in  them.  Being  under  fire  or  even  under  threat  is  not  just  the  fear  of  the  
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physical  danger,  but  the  prolonged  experience  of  not  being  able  to  
categorize.    
We  may  be  tempted  to  call  this  feeling  terror,  but  we  should  be  
careful.  Fear  in  combat  could  be  considered  at  field  in  itself  (Bourke,  2001;  
2005;  Dollard,  1943;  Grossman,  1996;  2008;  Grossman  et  al.,  2000;  
Holmes,  2003;  Marshall,  1947;  Shaffer,  1947;  Stouffer  et  al.,  194715).  It  is  
easily  the  most  studied  emotion  in  combat,  and  perhaps  the  most  studied  
topic,  at  least  in  terms  of  individual  soldiers.  For  example,  many  soldiers  
interviewed  reported  consistently  high  fears  of  'being  seen  a  coward'  
(Shaffer,  1947;  Dollard,  1943;  Bourke,  2001),  or  'of  letting  your  buddies  
down'  (Marshall,  1947;  Shalit,  1988).  Many  times,  these  fears  were  
reported  higher  than  fear  of  death,  a  challenge  to  rationality  on  its  own.  
Unfortunately,  given  the  semantic  problem  outlined  above,  what  fear  
are  we  talking  about?  The  fear  of  being  considered  a  coward  is  a  complex  
cognitive  event.  In  terms  of  this  thesis,  it  might  be  called  negative  
apprehensions  of  a  future  feeling  state  of  self-­‐assignated  causality,  
'shame',  or  rather,  the  anticipation  of  shame,  which  is  a  different  state  
entirely.  How  does  this  compare  to  the  'gibbering'  of  which  O'Leary  
speaks?  They  are  both  called  fear,  but  they  are  as  different  as  can  be;  their  
only  commonality  is  our  displeasure  in  experiencing  them.  Self-­‐assignated  
causality  is  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter.  This  chapter  is  a  very  narrow  
introduction  to  the  schemic  theory  using  its  first  stage:  not  knowing.  This  
uncertainty  could  be  seen  as  the  first  part  of  the  process  of  cognitive  
feeling  states;  before  we  can  even  create  a  category,  we  experience  the  
                                                
13.  This  is  by  way  of  demonstration,  this  is  not  even  a  complete  list  of  sources  on  this  
topic  for  this  chapter.  
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'what  is  it?'  moment,  which  usually  lasts  a  microsecond  (or  so),  after  
which  we  then  fit  the  perception  into  one  of  our  categories.  In  dangerous  
situations,  the  unfamiliarly  of  the  situation  makes  this  categorical  
scrambling  a  sustained  experience.  In  this  theory's  explication,  I  will  
attempt  to  demonstrate  two  things:  the  first  is  that  many  feelings  that  we  
name  fear,  even  the  fear  of  death,  are  largely  cognitive  in  nature,  even  in  
combat—especially  in  combat,  one  might  say.  Secondly,  and  specifying  
this  cognitive  process  further,  not  knowing,  as  represented  by  a  schemic  
break,  is  a  major  factor  in  producing  negative  feelings:  feelings  we  
sometimes  call  fear.    
To  demonstrate  the  schemic  nature  of  the  feeling  of  not  knowing,  
consider  Laurance  Shaffer's  study  of  veterans  of  bomber  missions,  which,  
during  World  War  II  was  statistically  one  of  the  most  dangerous  forms  of  
combat,  with  only  26.8  percent  of  veterans  surviving  25  missions  (Sherry,  
1987:  205).  Like  Dollard,  Shaffer  had  similar  findings  in  regard  to  fear  of  
death,  with  first-­‐time  flyers  reporting  fear  of  being  a  failure  (40  percent)  
or  a  coward  (22  percent)  over  death  (18  percent).  And,  if  we  can  look  at  
'factors  to  increase  fear  in  combat',  what  we  find  is  a  clear  indication  of  
the  strong  negative  feelings  associated  with  not  knowing.  The  second  of  
these  (and  we  will  address  the  others  shortly)  was  '[s]omeone  reporting  
an  enemy  plane  that  you  can't  see',  at  80  percent.  The  specificity  of  this  is  
extremely  telling,  indicating  that  it  was  not  so  much  the  threat  the  plane  
represented,  but  not  knowing  its  location  and  not  being  able  to  place  it.  
One  of  Dollard's  interviewees  specifically  reported  that  the  fear  of  their  
first  battle  was  due  to  '"not  knowing  what  to  expect"'  (Dollard,  1943:  17).  
This  lack  of  fit,  as  opposed  to  the  perception  of  physical  danger,  is  best  
      -­‐163-­‐  
 
expressed  in  one  soldier's  first  utterly  non-­‐ironic  impression  of  battle:  
'They  must  be  mad.  Don't  they  know  it's  very  unsafe  shooting  things  at  
other  people?'  (David  Tinker,  killed  in  the  South  Pacific,  quoted  in  Holmes,  
2003:  146).  
The  emotional  power  of  a  lack  of  contextual  'fit'  in  combat  is  further  
supported  by  the  idea  of  stress  inoculation  (Grossman,  2008:  104;  Holmes,  
2003:  53),  practiced  in  its  primitive  form  during  World  War  II  as  live  fire  
exercises.  The  idea,  at  its  heart,  is  that  combat  is  something  that  an  
individual  can  acclimate  to,  and  that  explosions,  bullets  whizzing  overhead  
and  so  on  can  be  habituated—familiar  even.  Whether  or  not  this  
inoculation  actually  works,  it  is  true  that  soldiers  report  a  reduction  in  fear  
from  their  first  time  in  combat  to  later,  implying  that  one  could  become  
accustomed  to  certain  aspects  of  combat  (Dollard,  1943:  13).  This  
supports  the  folk  belief  that  the  veteran  will  feel  less  fear  than  the  'green'  
soldier.  In  regard  to  the  trenches  of  World  War  I:  'Gradually,  they  
habituated  to  the  frightening  sights  and  sounds  of  the  front  and  
developed  what  Franz  Schauwecker,  an  ex-­‐front  officer  turned  amateur  
psychologist,  termed  Dickfhlligkeit  ("thick-­‐skinnedness")'  (Watson,  2006:  
251).    
An  interesting  exception  to  the  idea  that  fear  decreases  over  
exposure  to  combat  is  the  AAF  flyers,  many  of  whom  reported  an  increase  
in  fear  as  they  continued  to  fly  missions  (Shaffer,  1947:  140;  see  also  
'Combat  fatigue',  below).  Given  the  actual  risk  is  significantly  higher  than  
their  battlefield  counterparts,  this  is  perfectly  understandable.  However,  
we  must  consider  another  factor.  As  Shaffer  found  that  a  percentage  (29  
percent  to  20  percent)  of  the  flyers'  fears  decreased  over  time,  he  
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concluded  that  it  was  '[t]he  uncontrolled  factor  of  variation  in  the  
difficulty  of  missions  probably  affected  these  figures'.  What  remains  when  
all  other  experiential  data  is  removed  is  the  uncertainty  of  the  event.    
To  further  stress  the  importance  of  uncertainty  as  feeling,  we  then  
examine  the  first  and  third  factors  to  increase  fears  in  combat,  which  were  
'[b]eing  fired  on  when  you  have  no  chance  to  shoot  back',  at  85  percent,  
and  '[s]eeing  enemy  tracers'  at  74  percent.  The  experience  of  being  out  of  
control  in  a  dangerous  situation  is  a  familiar  one,  one  which  has  led  to  the  
model  of  'learned  helplessness'.  The  famed  study  that  originated  this  
concept  was  broken  down  into  two  groups:  the  'naive'  dog  and  the  
control.  The  former  would  be  placed  in  an  area  with  a  shock  floor,  and  
barrier  that  allowed  escape.  After  a  few  seconds  of  running  around,  the  
dog  would  discover  how  to  jump  the  barrier,  and  when  placed  in  the  same  
area  again,  would  quickly  leap  again  until  it  was  so  fast,  it  wasn't  shocked  
at  all.  The  second  group  was  subjected  to  shocks  of  random  duration  and  
intensity,  and  then  put  into  the  escapable  room.  Like  the  first  dog,  'he  
runs  around  frantically  for  about  30  sec.,  but  then  stops  moving,  lies  
down,  and  quietly  whines.  After  1  min.  of  this,  shock  terminates  
automatically.  The  dog  fails  to  cross  the  barrier  and  escape  from  shock...  
On  the  next  trial,  the  dog  again  fails  to  escape.  At  first,  he  struggles  a  bit  
and  then,  after  a  few  seconds,  seems  to  give  up  and  passively  accept  the  
shock'  (Meier  and  Seligman,  1976:  4;  see  also  Seligman  et  al.,  1968).  Given  
the  named  theory  of  the  study—'learned  helplessness'—it  is  arguable  and  
perfectly  understandable  that  it  is  the  soldier's  lack  of  ability  to  respond,  
his  or  her  powerlessness  is  the  major  factor  in  creating  this  feeling,  and  
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not  the  one  of  uncertainty  or  a  lack  of  fit  into  a  particular  structure  of  
beliefs  as  proposed.    
There  are  two  reasons  why  powerlessness  may  not  be  the  crucial  
factor,  and  why  instead  this  feeling  may  be  generated  out  of  the  
perception  of  disorder.  The  first  is  Seligman's  study  itself.  He  notes  that  
the  shocks  given  to  the  dogs  were  random  (Maier  and  Seligman,  1976:  7);  
this  would  have  been  crucial  for  his  work  in  particular.  Why?  That  year  
(actually  1968,  when  the  original  study  had  been  conducted),  he  had  
conducted  a  similar,  although  less  famous,  study  with  rats.  In  this  
experiment,  he  sought  to  understand  the  difference  between  random  and  
regular  shocks,  and  found  that  the  rats  that  received  random  shocks  
developed  stomach  ulcers  and  finally  stopped  eating,  while  the  rats  who  
received  regular  shocks—in  the  same  amount—did  not,  and  continued  
eating.  He  concluded  that  '[t]his  prediction  of  safety  may  be  at  least  as  
important  for  an  organism  as  the  prediction  of  danger'  (Seligman,  1968:  
405).  Military  historian  Richard  Holmes  has  already  noted  the  implications  
of  these  types  of  studies  for  combat,  noting  that  'knowledge  about  when  
to  expect  the  punishment  served  to  reduce  the  threat'  (Holmes,  2003:  
233).    
The  second  reason  that  helplessness  or  powerlessness  may  not,  in  
and  of  itself,  be  the  major  factor  in  the  feeling  that  we  commonly  
attribute  to  'fear'  is  the  structure  of  the  army  itself,  namely  authority.  
Although  the  feeling  operation  of  authority  is  a  subject  for  Chapters  6  and  
7,  what  we  can  discuss  here  is  that  lacking  power  is  described  as  both  
increasing  and  decreasing  the  sense  of  fear,  where  'Having  confidence  in  
your  equipment'  (93  percent),  'Having  confidence  in  your  crew'  (92  
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percent)  and  'Having  confidence  in  the  technical  ability  of  your  immediate  
superior  or  commanding  officer'  (88  percent)  were  the  top  three  factors  in  
decreasing  fear  in  combat  (Shaffer,  1947:  142).  Each  of  these  does  not  
represent  one's  own  ability,  the  classic  and  individuated  rational  subject,  
but  one  in  which  giving  up  one's  own  control  reduces  fear.  Furthermore,  
each  of  these  represents  a  type  of  ordered  schemic  belief:  equipment  that  
works,  buddies  and  a  commander  that  will  act  bravely.  In  other  words,  if  
we  seek  'powerlessness'  as  the  only  common  factor  of  fear,  or  even  as  a  
consistent  negative  feeling,  it  sometimes  is,  and  sometimes  is  not.  On  the  
other  hand,  the  way  matter  out  of  place  increases  fear,  just  as  matter  in  
its  place  decreases  it,  seems  to  argue  for  a  kind  of  schemic  mismatch  as  a  
common  factor.    
The  other  advantage  to  a  schemic  argument  (as  opposed  to  a  
sociological  model,  for  example)  is  the  way  in  which  it  can  explain  a  
variety  of  behavior.  If  we  return  briefly  to  Dehaene's  concept  of  limited  
present-­‐time  consciousness,  it  becomes  easy  to  turn  statistics  into  
absolutes.  For  example,  if  a  majority  of  soldiers  acclimate  to  battle,  it  
presents  as  an  interesting  puzzle:  why  do  soldiers  acclimate  to  battle?  
Instead,  some  soldiers  do,  some  do  not,  and  there  are  even  some  that  
report  never  having  had  any  fear  of  battle  (Dollard,  1943;  Shaffer,  1947;  
Stouffer,  et  al.,  1947).  This  too,  could  be  understood  under  a  schemic  
approach,  that  fear  of  death  is  but  one  of  many  fears  which  might  or  
might  not  be  experienced,  and  not  an  absolute.    
With  suicide  bombers,  passivity  and  even  the  choice  of  combat  itself,  
people  are  willing  to  die  in  ways  that  rationality  cannot  explain.  One  of  the  
ways  which  this  might  be  understood  is  seeing  one's  own  physical  body  as  
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but  one  of  the  schemic  categories  we  process.  This  is  not  such  a  stretch,  
since  the  body,  its  health,  its  safety  and  its  future  exists  in  some  fashion  
within  our  imagination.  Ideally,  it  would  be  high  on  the  list  of  priorities,  
but  if  we  consider  the  greatest  fear  in  combat  (being  a  coward,  where  the  
projected  behavior  doesn't  fit  with  the  belief  of  being  brave,  and  more  
importantly,  being  seen  by  others  this  way),  we  know  this  schema  is  more  
important  than  the  maintenance  of  one's  physical  body.  Although  other  
anticipated  feelings  are  in  play,  what  could  be  said  is  that  there  is  negative  
feeling  attached  to  uncertainty,  and  death  is  defined  under  this  feeling—
as  itself  a  kind  of  uncertainty—rather  than  the  other  way  around.    
The  powerful  negative  feelings  generated  by  uncertainty  or  lack  of  fit  
can  even  lead  to  a  choice  where  death  is  preferable  to  not  knowing.  A  
contemporary  societal  example  of  this  are  the  families  whose  members  
are  missing,  whose  status  is  unknown.  This  is  what  psychologist  Pauline  
Boss  called  'ambiguous  loss'  (Boss,  1999);  in  the  case  of  those  with  family  
members  with  dementia  (Boss'  area  of  research)  or  missing  children,  it  is  
the  not  just  the  loss,  but  the  not  knowing,  which  interrupts  the  grieving  
process:  'The  stumbling  block  for  families  of  missing  people  is  that  often  
there  is  no  explanation,  so  the  progression  to  being  able  to  "emotionally  
accept  the  loss"  is  virtually  an  impossibility'  (Glassock,  2009:  45).  The  work  
in  this  area,  for  obvious  ethical  reasons,  is  more  therapeutic  than  
research-­‐based;  it  would  be  useful,  but  academically  impossible,  to  
conduct  aggregate  interviews  with  families  of  missing  children,  using  
families  with  dead  children  as  a  baseline.  Nevertheless,  this  phenomenon  
provides  useful  qualitative  information,  as  many  families  report  the  same  
experience  over  and  over,  that  knowledge  of  death  is  better  than  the  
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persistent  uncertainty:  "It's  tough,  but  it's  better  than  not  knowing  where  
they  are"  (Benjamin,  2005);  "The  not  knowing  that  kills  you"  (Walsh,  
quoted  in  Gray,  2012);  "That  has  got  to  be  the  worst  thing  that  can  
happen  to  a  parent,  even  worse  than  knowing  they  died"  (Frankel,  2013).  
Here,  the  negative  outcome  (that  the  family  member  is  dead)  is  preferable  
to  the  uncertain  one.  In  contemporary  Kashmir,  this  ambiguity  manifests  
as  the  'half-­‐widow':  
  
  
(Photo  credit:  BBC  News,  12  December  2013)    
Here  the  priority  is  clear:  we  just  want  to  know.  
This  leads,  tangentially,  to  the  fourth  greatest  factor  to  increase  fear  
in  combat:  'Feeling  that  you  have  been  in  so  long  that  the  law  of  averages  
is  bound  to  catch  up  with  you'  (Shaffer,  1947:  140).  This  is  what  is  
commonly  known  as  the  gambler's  fallacy,  which  is  seen  as  part  of  the  
'representativeness  heuristic'  in  the  bounded  rationality  school,  as  
discussed  above.  Put  simply,  the  roll  of  the  dice  (or  chances  of  being  shot  
down)  are  always  the  same  each  time,  but  we  attribute  these  chances  
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differently:  'After  observing  a  long  run  of  red  on  the  roulette  wheel,  for  
example,  most  people  erroneously  believe  that  black  is  now  due,  
presumably  because  the  occurrence  of  black  will  result  in  a  more  
representative  sequence  than  the  occurrence  of  an  additional  red  as  
comprehensible'  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974:  1125).  
The  above  is  a  perfectly  reasonably,  and  even  consistent,  
explanation.  However,  as  per  the  earlier  critique  of  Chapter  2,  this  
rationalist  perspective  still  suffers  from  being  descriptive  rather  than  
explanatory;  it  names  a  phenomenon,  but  not  the  structures,  choices  or  
beliefs  that  lay  behind  it.  This  time,  the  failure  is  compounded  by  the  fact  
that  it  does  not  explain  the  variety  of  behavior  experienced  by  the  those  
in  combat.  For  example,  historian  Alex  Watson  found  the  converse  
phenomenon  in  soldiers  from  World  War  I,  and  that  besides  this  kind  of  
fatalism  discussed  in  Shaffer,  on  the  part  of  some  soldiers,  there  was  'an  
inner  conviction  that  they  themselves  will  not  be  killed'  (Watson,  2006:  
256).  Furthermore,  'Often,  fatalism  was  skewed.  Plaut  referred  to  the  
"elation  of  being  able  to  die  in  the  middle  of  wanting  to  live"  and  Captain  
H.W.  Yoxall  similarly  found  that  in  the  trenches  "while  life  becomes  more  
desirable  death  seems  less  terrible"'  (Watson,  2006:  252).  Against  the  
representativeness  heuristic,  which  requires  that  the  subject  create  a  
paradigm  based  on  a  uniform  pattern,  not  only  could  the  same  subject  
experience  both  the  belief  in  a  positive  and  negative  outcome,  but  this  
could  occur  at  almost  at  the  same  time.  
A  greater  explanatory  value  may  lay  in  a  deeper  examination  of  
Tversky  and  Kahneman's  formulation:  'The  heart  of  the  gambler's  fallacy  is  
a  misconception  of  the  fairness  of  the  laws  of  chance'  (emphasis  added,  
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Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1971:  106).  Additionally,  'Chance  is  commonly  
viewed  as  a  self-­‐correcting  process  in  which  a  deviation  in  the  opposite  
direction  to  restore  the  equilibrium'  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974:  1125).  
What  is  happening  here,  as  well  as  with  relatives  of  the  missing,  is  a  kind  
of  cognitive  conversion,  a  fast  and  dirty  version  of  what  Ian  Hacking  calls  
the  taming  of  chance.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  the  numerical  risks,  
which  are  random  and  ultimately  incomprehensible,  a  fact  made  clearer  
and  clearer  by  the  length  of  the  tour  of  duty.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  
the  schema  of  the  fairness—of  what  is  supposed  to,  or  will,  happen.  This  is  
not  fairness  in  the  larger  sense  of  justice,  but  in  the  sense  of  balance.  
Thus,  it  is  not  representative  of  one  particular  side  or  another,  as  long  as  
some  sense  of  order  emerges.  Taken  together,  this  indicates  that  both  a  
negative  certainty  (I  am  doomed)  and  a  positive  certainty  (I  am  invincible)  
trumps  an  uncertainty,  underlining  the  vital  importance  of  making  
schemic  order,  even  if  it  creates  the  expectation  of  death.  
  
How  Uncertainty  Affects  Passivity  
  
How  would  this  narrow  application  of  schemic  theory—the  
experience  of  pre-­‐schemic  uncertainty—apply  to  our  case  study?  Given  
that  passivity  does  not  occur  in  every  person  (some  shoot,  some  do  not,  
some  run,  etc.),  it  is  probable  that  the  subjects  who  do  not  shoot  are  
themselves  imbued  with  a  variety  of  motives,  and,  as  such,  a  single  action  
may  have  more  than  one  explanation.  For  example,  some  have  argued  
that  phenomenon  is  due  to  the  'taboo'  of  taking  a  life  (Grossman,  1996;  
Collins,  2010).  Given  the  nature  of  taboo  in  relation  to  schema,  we  will  
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discuss  that  in  greater  length  in  the  next  chapter.  The  subject  of  this  
chapter  is  the  feelings  generated  during  the  experience  of  uncertainty.  
How  might  this  be  a  factor  in  the  act  of  not  shooting  back?  
It  might  be  enough  to  say  that  not  shooting  back  would  be  the  
natural  (sic)  result  of  'freezing':  when  we  are  afraid,  we  can't  move.  This  is  
not  fight  or  flight,  but  what  is  known  in  ethological  circles  as  'tonic  
immobility'  (Archer,  1979;  for  a  review,  see  Volchan  et  al.,  2011).  This  
term  adds  a  third  option  to  fight  or  flight,  the  more  academic  version  of  'I  
just  froze'.  Archer  argues  that  it  is  adaptive:  for  example,  a  song  thrush,  by  
freezing,  escapes  his  cat,  the  'would-­‐be  predator  startled  by  the  bird's  
sudden  resurrection'  (Archer,  1979:  67).  One  could  dismiss  this  conclusion  
based  on  the  fact  that  this  is  an  individual  observation,  but  from  an  
empirical  point  of  view,  the  argument  that  tonic  immobility  is  adaptive  is  
quite  possibly  where  the  utter  fatuousness  of  the  'evolutionary'  argument  
of  behavior  reaches  its  nadir—that  freezing  and  being  leaving  oneself  to  
be  killed  by  a  predator  is  adaptive.    
Instead,  and  given  that  animals  (and  humans)  can  also  think,16  the  
cognitive  model,  especially  the  schemic  one,  is  a  better  explanation.  The  
subject,  whether  animal  or  human,  is  overwhelmed  by  an  inability  to  
know  how  to  fit  what's  going  on  into  a  familiar  category.  What  are  
headlights  to  us  would  appear  utterly  baffling  (like  twin  lights  of  the  sun  
moving  quickly?)  to  a  deer,  and  hence  the  expression.  For  soldiers,  we  
observe  similar  freezing,  but  also  other  strong,  non-­‐adaptive  reactions,  
                                                
14.  See  Paul,  Elizabeth,  Harding,  Emma  and  Mendl,  Michael  (2005).  Measuring  
emotional  processes  in  animals:  the  utility  of  a  cognitive  approach.  Neuroscience  and  
Biobehavioral  Reviews  29  (3),  pp.  469–91.  
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including  running  into  fire:  'He  stands  up  in  a  firefight  because  his  
judgment  is  clouded  and  he  cannot  understand  the  likely  consequences  of  
his  behavior.  He  loses  his  ability  to  move  and  seems  paralyzed'  (MCRP,  
2000:  15).  
Combat,  for  some  individuals  (but  not  all)  represents  a  problem  'too  
difficult  for  the  typical  human  mind  to  solve'  (Gilovich  and  Griffin,  2002:  
4),  an  extension  of  what  has  been  proposed  under  the  'cognitive  miser'  
model,  as  discussed  above.  Cognitive  miser  is  not  used  here  in  its  intended  
sense,  but  as  a  model  to  understand  limits:  that  there  is  only  so  much  
cognition  to  go  around.  Many  studies,  and  common  sense,  show  that  
stress  (Sarason,  1984;  Eysenck  and  Calvo,  1992;  Milburn  and  Watman,  
1981)  and  anxiety  (Eysenck,  1992)  reduce  an  individual's  ability  to  perform  
simple  cognitive  tasks.  This  is  known  as  'attentional  control  theory',  or  
'processing  efficiency  theory'.  As  with  Dehaene's  work,  and  the  
'peritraumatic  dissociation'  discussed  in  the  first  chapter,  it  follows  that  
many  people  struggle  to  process  the  noises,  violence,  and  inexplicable  
experience  of  live  fire,  and  thus  experience  a  kind  of  cognitive  shutdown.    
Even  without  the  existing  research  on  the  subject,  it  is  possible  to  say  
that  the  brain  has  limits,  and  that  there  are  physiological  manifestations  
when  those  limits  are  reached.  A  different  way  to  understand  this  is  not  
that  one  system  (emotion)  negatively  impacts  the  other  (thinking),  the  old  
mind/body  rearing  its  ugly  schism  yet  again.  Instead,  '[o]ne  effect  involves  
cognitive  interference  by  preempting  the  processing  and  temporary  
storage  capacity  of  working  memory.  The  worrisome  thoughts  consume  
the  limited  attentional  resources  of  working  memory,  which  are  therefore  
less  available  for  concurrent  task  processing'  (Eysenck  et  al.,  2007:  336).  
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So,  as  part  of  the  same  system,  stress,  fear,  or  any  emotion,  reduces  
cognitive  problem  solving  because  the  feeling  itself  is  a  form  of  cognitive  
problem  solving.  If  we  have  limits,  one  form  of  cognition  or  attention  or  
attribution  reduces  another.    
To  demonstrate  the  idea  of  cognitive  resource  management,  there  is  
further  the  phenomenon  of  involuntary  defecation,  especially  in  initial  
combat.  This  has  been  reported  in  wars  as  far  back  as  the  Punic  
campaigns,  where  the  changing  color  of  the  uniforms  were  the  subject  of  
Aristophanes'  plays,  redefining  war  as  'the  terrible  one,  the  tough  one,  the  
one  upon  the  legs'  (Aristophanes,  quoted  in  Hanson,  2009:  104).  Richard  
Holmes  estimated  involuntary  urination  and  defecation  between  five  
percent  and  21  percent,  and  six  percent  and  10  percent,  respectively  
(Holmes,  2003:  205),  just  as  Dollard  quantified  in  his  study  involuntary  
defecation  at  five  percent  and  urination  at  six  percent  (Dollard,  1943:  19)  
Like  many  symptoms  of  fear  (pounding  heart,  sweat,  trembling),  this  is  
considered  to  be  a  bodily  reaction,  reinforced  by  the  way  in  which  animals  
might  do  the  same  thing  (Gray,  1987:  35–9;  Hall,  1934).  
From  a  cognitive  perspective,  however,  the  control  of  one's  bowels  is  
not  autonomic,  like  heartbeat  and  breathing.  For  humans  (and  even  rats),  
this  is  something  that  is  learned.  Although  this  thesis  has  attempted  to  
eschew  neurological  explanations,  an  image  of  that  model  could  be  
helpful  here.  Bowel  control  is  thought  to  be  part  of  midbrain,  more  
specifically  the  periaqueductal  gray  (PAG)  (Yaguchi  et  al.,  2004),  while  
choice  and  conscious  thought  is  found  in  the  fore  brain,  more  specifically  
the  frontal  lobe.  If  the  brain  was  being  taxed,  one  can  imagine  a  kind  of  
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resource  management  strategy,  using  parts  of  the  brain  to  process  is  not  
usually  brought  into  play.    
This  idea  may  be  more  conjecture  than  hypothesis,  and  upon  
learning  that  involuntary  urination  and  defecation  can  also  be  found  in  
rats,  this  seemed  to  be  even  more  of  a  dead  end.  That  is,  until  a  closer  
examination  of  the  individual  case  studies  were  made.  First  of  all,  rats,  like  
humans,  learn  to  control  their  bowels,  in  that  they  do  not  fowl  their  nests  
or  homes.  Secondly,  and  most  interestingly,  the  link  between  involuntary  
urination  and  fear  was  found  in  what  was  called  The  Open  Field  Test,  first  
described  by  Calvin  Hall  (Hall,  1934).  Here,  the  animal  is  taken  from  its  
usually  enclosed  environment  to  a  large,  open  and  illuminated  space  
(hence  the  name  of  the  test),  where  it  often  urinates,  and,  as  with  tonic  
immobility  above,  freezes.    
Given  what  the  animal  is  experiencing  is  utterly  unique,  is  it  the  same  
sensation  that  we  might  call  in  the  fear  in  the  recognized  predator?  
Instead,  it  is  the  feeling  generated  from  the  perception  of  the  undefined  
and  undefinable,  following  the  'normal'  experience  of  the  understood  and  
mapped  structure  of  the  cage.  With  the  later  addition  to  the  test  of  
alternating  lights  and  noises  (Hofer,  1970,  cited  in  Walsh  and  Cummins,  
1987),  the  experience  is  not  so  different  from  the  extremes  of  combat,  at  
least  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  rat.  Although  the  physiology  of  what  
happens  to  the  brain  under  overload  remains  unresolved,  at  the  very  
least,  this  demonstrates  some  strong  cognitive  element  to  what  first  
appears  to  be  natural  or  physiological.  Furthermore,  it  is  in  keeping  with  
what  seems  to  be  a  consistent  finding:  that  one  strong  cognitive  activity  
(as  with  peritraumatic  disassociation  and  stress)  limits  another.    
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If  we  return  to  the  Gettysburg  rifles  from  Chapter  1,  we  imagine  
many  soldiers,  under  fire,  reloading  their  weapons,  over  and  over,  some  
as  many  as  37  times.  As  this  was  before  the  psychological  work  carried  out  
during  World  War  II,  we  can  see  this  as  an  unconscious  form  of  fear  
management.  The  interviewees  of  Shaffer's  (and  Dollard's)  studies  agreed  
that  the  focus  on  tasks  was  an  important  way  to  fight  fear  (Shaffer,  1947:  
142).  Like  the  act  of  counting  to  ten,  concentration  (e.g.  checking  their  
gear  or  counting  their  ammunition)  fought  the  chaos  around  them  and  
made  that  feeling  less  accessible  to  present  time  consciousness.  In  other  
words,  the  narrow  specificity  of  the  action  is  a  preferential  tonic  to  the  
wide  uncertainty  of  the  combat  environment.  Purely  unconsciously,  this  
may  be  why  the  soldiers  at  Gettysburg  reloaded  their  rifles  over  and  over  
and  over.  The  simple  task  was  all  that  was  left  available  within  the  
cognitive  processing  headroom.  Unintentionally,  the  men  who  designed  
this  classic  form  of  drill  training  gave  the  soldiers  a  task  of  many  steps  to  
focus  on.  Without  realizing  that  the  men  may  not  want  to  fire  (we  will  
come  to  the  taboo  against  violence  in  the  next  chapter),  the  complexity  of  
this  sequence  meant  that  the  removal  of  one  step  (firing  the  weapon)  was  
incidental.    
Over  a  longer  time  frame,  another  demonstration  of  cognitive  limits  
under  combat  is  the  consistent  manifestation  of  'shell  shock',  'combat  
fatigue',  or  'combat  stress  reaction',  i.e.  psychiatric  causalities  of  war.  
Having  covered  various  reactions  to  the  initial  exposure  to  combat,  what  is  
of  interest  here  is  Swank  and  Marchand's  finding  of  prolonged  combat,  
the  so-­‐called  '60-­‐day  rule'.  In  the  unprecedented  theatre  of  World  War  II,  
'under  conditions  of  continuous  long  and  severe  stress  which  (were)  
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infrequently,  if  ever,  obtained  before'  (Swank  and  Marchand,  1946:  236),  
soldiers  were  called  upon  to  fight  in  actual  combat  for  extended  periods  of  
time,  rather  than  the  more  common  fight  and  wait  around  system  found  
in  armies  up  to  and  after  that  point.  This  is  what  differentiates  the  
experience  from  the  stress  inoculation  discussed  above:  unceasing  
fighting.  They  found  the  initial  breakdown  phase  as  above,  but  also  found  




There  are  two  things  of  importance  to  the  thesis  here  of  cognitive  
overwhelm.  The  first  is  the  consistency  (and  the  small  exception):  'One  
thing  alone  seems  certain:  practically  all  infantry  soldiers  suffer  from  a  
neurotic  reaction  eventually  if  they  are  subjected  to  the  stress  of  modern  
combat  continuously  and  long  enough'  (Swank  and  Marchand,  1946:  243).  
The  exception  was  how  they  referred  to  the  psychotic  man,  'No  
personality  type  dominates  this  small,  "abnormal,"  group,  but  it  is  
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interesting  that  aggressive  psychopathic  personalities,  who  were  poorly  
disciplined  before  combat,  stand  out',  following  with  this  interesting  
footnote:  'This  seemed  true  when  this  paper  was  written,  in  November  
1944.  Since  then  we  have  concluded  that  all  normal  men  eventually  suffer  
combat  exhaustion  in  prolonged  continuous  and  severe  combat.  The  
exceptions  to  this  rule  are  psychotic  soldiers,  and  a  number  of  examples  of  
this  have  been  observed'  (Swank  and  Marchand,  1946:  243).  For  a  very  
small  group,  there  is  nothing,  or  at  least  not  enough,  disruptive  about  
combat  to  cause  a  reaction.17    
The  second  aspect  relevant  to  cognitive  headroom  are  the  
symptoms,  which  bear  repeating  in  full  here:  
'(By  Day  45):  The  soldier  was  slow  witted;  he  was  slow  to  
comprehend  simple  orders,  directions  and  technics,  and  he  
failed  to  perform  even  life-­‐saving  measures,  such  as  digging  
in  quickly.  Memory  defects  became  so  extreme  that  he  
could  not  be  counted  on  to  relay  a  verbal  order.  There  was  
also  present  a  definite  lack  of  concentration  on  whatever  
task  was  at  hand,  and  the  man  remained  preoccupied  for  
the  most  part  with  thoughts  of  home,  the  absolute  
hopelessness  of  the  situation  and  death.  This  constant  
dwelling  on  death  did  not  indicate  a  state  of  fear  but,  
rather,  a  certainty  that  it  would  occur'  (Swank  and  
Marchand,  1946:  241).  
  
From  another  study  involving  Vietnam,  'One  response  frequently  
associated  with  this  form  of  combat  stress  is  that  the  afflicted  soldier  
often  falls  asleep  amidst  heavy  battle  conditions  without  being  aware  of  it'  
(Oei  et  al.,  1990:  357).  These  symptoms  present,  within  this  context,  as  
                                                
15.  See  Chapter  7  for  conjectural  thoughts  about  why  this  personality  type  might  have  
such  a  reaction  to  combat.  
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processing  malfunction.  As  the  brain  tries  to  make  sense  of  the  situation,  
initially  it  functions  (hence  the  increase  in  efficiency  around  day  10).  Over  
time,  the  conclusions  drawn  (such  as  digging  in,  and  hiding  under  fire)  
don't  seem  to  work;  they  neither  end  the  situation,  nor  the  randomness  
with  which  their  buddies  are  killed.  As  the  continuation  to  make  sense  
fails  (with  the  exception  of  the  'psychotic',  to  whom  constant  fire  is  
possibly  a  normal  environment),  the  other  parts  of  the  cognitive  function  
shut  down.    
Why  take  a  schemic  approach  to  this  case  study?  That  is,  how  can  it  
be  said  that  this  is  a  demonstration  of  the  long  combat  veteran  not  being  
able  to  categorize  his  events  and  experiences?  The  disadvantage  of  
combat  stress  is  the  lack  of  therapeutic  environment,  not  just  for  the  
soldier  afflicted,  but  for  the  purposes  of  research.  Learning  what  is  
experienced  or  felt  is  not  only  impractical,  but  may  be  impossible  given  
the  lack  of  cognitive  function  described  above—the  individual  cannot  
account  for  anything.  PTSD,  on  the  other  hand—as  it  occurs  in  civilian  
environment—can  not  only  be  treated,  but  described  by  the  individuals.  
What  many  researchers  have  found  is  the  link  between  PTSD  and  CSR  
(combat  stress  reaction).  For  example,  in  the  1982  Lebanon  War:  59  
percent  of  those  who  experienced  combat  stress  in  combat  later  
developed  PTSD,  as  opposed  to  those  who  did  not,  who  only  developed  
PTSD  16  percent  of  the  time  (Solomon  et  al.,  1987).  
In  Vietnam,  the  picture  is  less  clear,  as  there  was  less  reported  
combat  stress  as  there  was  in  World  War  II  and  the  Lebanon  War,  whose  
'psychiatrists  were  prepared  for  battlefield  CSR’s  and  were  aware  of  their  
possible  antecedent  status  in  the  development  of  PTSD'  (Oei  et  al.,  1990:  
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361).  In  Vietnam,  there  was  a  conscious  attempt  to  avoid  underreport  
combat  stress  as  'administrative  disciplinary  infractions'  (Bowman,  quoted  
in  Oei  et  al.,  1990:  361).  What  did  exist  was  a  strong  correlation  between  
high  combat  environments  and  PTSD  (Card,  1987).  In  other  words,  the  
intensity  of  the  combat,  which  was  a  factor  in  the  speed  at  which  the  
individual  reached  breakdown  (see  Swank  and  Marchand,  1946:  237,  240),  
was  a  factor  in  later  development  of  PTSD,  which  itself  argues  for  a  
cognitive  limits  model.    
In  other  words,  PTSD  seems  to  be  a  manifestation  of  a  break  in  the  
life  schemas  of  the  individual—the  variety  of  situations,  as  well  as  the  
consistent  qualitative  descriptions  of  those  affected,  indicate  that  this  is  a  
good  model.  There  is  a  strong  link  between  combat  stress  and  later  PTSD  
manifestations.  That  fact,  combined  with  the  ways  in  which  combat  stress  
manifests,  as  detailed  above,  point  to  the  important  of  the  categorization  
function,  and  the  powerful  effects  when  the  individual  is  not  able  to  meet  
them.    
  
How  Schemas  Affect  Violence  
  
If  schemas  and  their  definition  have  an  influence  on  combat  stress  
reaction  and  a  possible  lack  of  fighting,  what  about  their  effect  on  violence  
itself?  Attempting  to  define  violence  as  purely  physical  in  Chapter  3,  the  
work  of  Johann  Galtung  proposed  that  the  difference  between  the  
potential  and  the  actual  was  a  legitimate  definition  of  structural  violence.  
What  can  be  said  within  the  context  of  attempting  to  apprehend  schemas  
is  that  this  is  a  legitimate  experience  of  violence.  The  experience  of  
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uncertainty,  of  the  mixed,  and  of  the  uncategorizable  invokes  strong  
negative  feelings  on  the  battlefield;  within  a  social  context,  the  experience  
is  the  same,  although  the  reaction  different,  as  the  field  is  more  abstract.  
Violence  is  hard;  symbolic  violence  is  easy.  From  a  purely  sequential  
perspective,  violence  is  consistently  preceded  by  a  strong  violative  
interruption.  This  pattern  can  be  found  in  Collins'  subjects'  attempts  to  
balance  emotional  entrainment,  and  in  Pinker's  use  of  the  broken  
windows  effect;  both  cases  of  individuals  presented  with  what  could  be  
called  an  upset,  which  is  often  followed  by  violent  behavior.  
There  are  numerous  other  examples,  across  a  variety  of  fields.  In  
Male  Fantasies,  Klaus  Theweleit  wrote  in  great  detail  on  the  literature  of  
the  Freikorps,  the  proto-­‐fascist  movement  in  early  1930s'  Germany.  He  
discovered  some  very  interesting  commonalities  of  his  own:  themes  which  
united  this  group's  fear  of  Jews,  women  and  even  communists.  This  was  
the  apprehension  (in  both  senses  of  the  word)  of  the  'flood',  the  sense  of  
the  amorphous,  the  fear  of  being  overwhelmed,  by  'hoards'  usually  
depicted  in  metaphors  of  being  overwhelmed:  'Nothing  is  to  be  permitted  
to  flow,  least  of  all  "Red  floods."  If  anything  is  to  move,  it  should  be  the  
movement  (i.e.,  oneself)—but  as  one  man;  information;  on  command  as  a  
line,  a  column,  a  block;  as  a  wedge,  a  tight  unit.  Death  to  all  that  flows'  
(Theweleit,  1987:  232).    
Theweleit  went  on  to  link  these  fears  with  early  toilet  training  and  
Freudian  ds."  If  esires  (Theweleit,  1987:  259–61),  which  may  be  slightly  
more  problematic  (see  'nurture',  Chapter  3).  But  the  theme  of  masses,  
containment  and  violence  continues  in  a  growing  body  of  literature  
making  the  connection  of  order  and  violence  (Kalyvas  et  al.,  2008;  see  also  
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North  et  al.,  2007).  Kalyvas,  in  his  own  contribution  to  and  not  unlike  
Collins,  examines  the  'microdynamics  of  civil  war'.  He  finds,  not  unlike  
Theweleit,  that  it  is  the  areas  of  dispute  in  civil  wars  that  are  the  most  
violent.  That  is,  areas  that  are  fully  controlled  by  the  established  
government  or  by  the  opposition  experience  low  levels  of  violence,  while  
those  that  are  contested,  mixed  and  tentative  have  more  instances  of  
violence  acts:  'The  likelihood  of  violence  is  a  function  of  control'  (Kalyvas,  
2010:  407).  Kalyvas  sees  this  as  a  product  of  rationality:  'On  the  one  hand,  
political  actors  do  not  want  to  use  violence  where  they  already  enjoy  high  
levels  of  control  (because  they  do  not  need  it)  and  where  they  have  no  
control  whatsoever  (because  it  is  counterproductive,  since  they  are  not  
likely  to  have  access  to  the  information  necessary  to  make  it  selective).  
Instead,  they  want  to  use  violence  in  intermediate  areas,  where  they  have  
incomplete  control'  (Kalyvas,  2010:  407).    
In  the  same  volume,  Scott  Strauss  writes  about  the  genocide  in  20th-­‐
century  Rwanda,  beginning  with  the  turmoil  after  of  the  death  of  
President  Habyarimana,  and  subsequent  effects  it  had  on  each  section  or  
'commune'  of  the  country.  He  notes  that  this  genocide  was  in  no  way  
monolithic;  some  communes  had  a  great  amount  of  slaughter,  and  some  
had  nearly  none:  
'[The  perpetrators]  produced  a  climate  of  crisis,  confusion,  
and  fear—and  in  turn  created  a  "space  of  opportunity"  at  
the  local  level...  Order  had  been  ruptured,  and  power  was  
indeterminately  held.  As  such,  an  opportunity  existed  for  
influential  actors  at  the  local  level  to  take  charge,  to  
establish  control  in  a  period  of  wartime  disorder...  This  
dynamic  of  order  and  disorder  helps  explain  the  onset  
variation  at  the  local  level'  (Strauss,  2008:  318).  
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Although  Rss,  2008:  318).and  disorder  helps  explain  the  onset  
variation  at  the  local  levelisted  for  influential  actors  at  the  local  level  to  
take  charge,  to  establish  con  Violence  constructs  group  order,  forming  the  
societal  identity,  in  this  case,  through  the  human  sacrifice:  'The  
community  affirms  its  unity  in  the  sacrifice,  a  unity  that  emerges  from  the  
moment  when  the  division  is  most  intense,  when  the  community  enacts  
its  dissolution  in  the  mimetic  crisis  and  the  abandonment  to  the  endless  
cycle  of  vengeance.  But  suddenly  the  opposition  of  everyone  against  
everyone  else  is  replaced  by  the  opposition  of  all  against  one.  Where  
previously  there  had  been  a  chaotic  ensemble  of  particular  conflicts,  there  
is  now  the  simplicity  of  a  single  conflict'  (Girard,  1987:  24).    
In  the  social  and  political  realm  (as  opposed  to  the  individual  one  in  
combat),  disorder  (perceived)  precedes  violence,  on  both  the  micro  and  
macro  level.  Charles  Tilly,  echoing  Hegel,  famously  remarked  that  war  
makes  states  (Tilly,  1975).  Whether  or  not  Tilly  or  Hegel  are  correct,  the  
association  between  war  and  order—as  well  as  the  implication  that  
disorder  calls  for  violence—continues  throughout  seemingly  every  point  
of  view  of  the  debate.  Although  greater  elaboration  is  due  in  the  next  two  
chapters  on  exactly  how  this  process  functions,  there  is  a  kind  of  historical  
consistency  here,  that  violence  fills  a  disorder  vacuum  with  imagined  
order.  In  terms  of  cognitive  staging,  this  the  first  interpretation—what  is  
this?—is  followed  by  the  impulse  to  make  sense  of  it,  sometimes  by  the  
aberrant's  destruction.    
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Limits  to  the  Limits  
  
There  are  many  valid  criticisms  of  the  schemic  perspective.  For  
example,  in  the  case  of  performance  under  stress,  some  individuals  
perform  better  (Byrne  and  Eysenck,  1995),  as  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  
peritraumatic  disassociation;  under  fire,  the  narrowing  of  vision  and  'time  
slowing'  effects  actually  allow  for  better  accuracy  and  decision  making  
(Klinger  and  Brunson,  2009;  Schade  et  al.,  1989).  It  might  be  possible  to  
explain  this  under  individual  characteristic  schemas,  that  each  person's  
world  view  allows  for  some  experiences  to  be  unfamiliar  (fearful)  and  
others  sensical  (navigable).  But  there  are  problems  with  the  very  idea  of  
schemas,  at  least  within  PTSD  research.  Although  Horowitz's  take  on  PTSD  
and  grieving  is  very  well  established,  the  idea  of  schema  is  only  one  of  
many  takes  (see  Brewin  and  Holmes,  2003  for  an  overview),  and  
furthermore,  seems  to  struggle,  by  Horowitz's  own  admission,  with  the  
treatment  of  combat  veterans  (Horowitz,  2003:  99).  That  being  said,  the  
application  here  is  within  the  explanatory  context  of  social  theory.  As  
categories  and  their  strong  feeling  associations  seem  to  emerge  in  a  
variety  of  disciplines,  as  outlined  above,  this  thesis  serves  as  an  attempt  to  
unite  them  under  a  single  model,  rather  than  a  narrowly  defined  
therapeutic  or  neurological  theory.  
More  important  than  criticisms  of  theories  on  which  this  one  is  
based,  criticisms  could  be  leveled  from  within  the  concept's  own  internal  
logic.  As  we  have  seen,  not  all  fear  is  an  interruption  in  a  schema,  and  one  
could  even  say  that  not  all  interruptions  are  negative.  As  with  the  horror  
film,  how  do  we  explain  combat  addiction,  or  that  some  uncertainty  can  
be  pleasurable?  Mary  Douglas  notes  the  interesting  thing  about  the  
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concept  of  purity  and  dirt  was  that  the  emotional  reaction  was  varied.  Like  
our  combat  addicted  soldiers:  'it  is  not  always  an  unpleasant  experience  to  
confront  ambiguity...  The  experience  can  be  stimulating'  (Douglas,  1984:  
24).  As  with  sex,  the  keeping  and  the  violation  of  the  taboo  both  bring  us  
pleasure.  This  makes  historical  sense,  especially  from  an  anthropological  
perspective,  since  otherwise  culture  would  never  evolve.  
However,  this  state  does  not  last:  'There  are  several  ways  of  treating  
anomalies.  Negatively,  we  can  ignore,  just  not  perceive  them,  or  
perceiving  we  can  condemn.  Positively,  we  can  deliberately  confront  the  
anomaly  and  try  to  create  a  new  pattern  of  reality  in  which  it  has  a  place'  
(Douglas,  1984:  34)  It's  not  so  much  that  one  man's  chaos  is  another  
man's  order,  but  that  one  man's  order  is  dependent  on  a  particular  form  
of  chaos.  As  with  the  man  who  was  haunted  by  the  fact  that  he  only  was  
able  to  kill  20  and  a  half  men  on  his  21st  birthday,  the  desire  for  war  and  
for  violence  takes  an  especially  schemic  turn:  'I  wanted  to  go  to  war.  It  
was  a  test  I  wanted  to  pass'  (Holmes,  2003:  56),  or,  even  more  tellingly:  'I  
adore  war.  It  is  like  a  big  picnic  without  the  objectlessness  of  a  picnic.  I’ve  
never  been  so  well  or  so  happy'  (Hynes,  quoted  in  Jones,  2006:  233,  
emphasis  added).  In  other  words,  a  break  in  one  schema  (noise,  blood,  
safety,  etc.)  defines  the  other  (the  heroic  man)  which  for  some,  like  
danger  junkies,  is  the  more  important  of  the  two,  obviously  superseding  
the  importance  of  the  cognitive  representation  of  the  physical  body.  The  
concept  of  positive  internal  agency,  and  the  way  in  which  it  motivates  
violent  action  is  the  subject  for  the  seventh  chapter,  but  what  can  be  said  
now  is  that  this  is  the  taming  of  chance,  literally.  These  are  schemas  that  
can  only  be  defined  by  the  seeking,  then  mastery,  of  chaos.  The  mastery  
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here  is  strongly  linked  to  agency;  this  is  not  the  passive  voice  ('it  was  
tamed'),  but  the  active  one  that  is  the  very  heart  of  subjectivity:  'I  tamed  
it'.    
  
               §  §  §  
Not  all  negative  feelings  in  combat,  or  anywhere  else,  are  generated  
by  a  lack  of  schemic  fit.  Getting  shot,  for  example,  is  a  physical  
experience—it  is  not  psychosomatic.  Nevertheless,  many  feelings  and  
emotions  generically  associated  with  other  concepts,  like  death,  authority  
and  control,  may  have  their  origin  in  a  lack  of  a  schemata,  in  the  feeling  of  
not  being  able  to  categorize.  These  feelings  are  powerfully,  sometimes  
overwhelmingly,  negative,  with  the  implicit  admission  that  there  may  be  
some  possible  positive  associations  in  a  future  of  resolution.  For  this  is  the  
feeling  most  associated  with  uncertainty:  the  sense  of  anticipation.  As  
when  we  hear  a  suspended  ninth  at  the  end  of  a  symphony,  we  wait  for  it  
to  resolve  to  its  dominant  major.  In  the  state  of  unknowing,  we  will  
resolve,  even  if  it  means  self-­‐deception,  internal  pain,  or  both.  The  next  
chapter  concerns  internal  assignations  of  agency,  or  shame,  blame,  and  
guilt.  The  impulse  to  resolution  is  so  powerful  that  even  the  sense  made  
from  negative  feelings  of  reproach  are  preferable.       
      -­‐186-­‐  
 
Chapter  6:   Anticipated  Self-­‐Agent  Causal ity  and  Obeisance  
  
Faced  with  the  choice  between  changing  one's  mind  and  
proving  that  there  is  no  need  to  do  so,  almost  everyone  
gets  busy  on  the  proof  (John  Kenneth  Galbraith).19    
  
In  the  1940s,  the  corpus  callosotomy  was  introduced  as  a  surgical  
option  in  treating  severe  epileptic  seizures.  This  procedure  involves  the  
complete  severance  of  the  corpus  callousum,  the  veil  that  connects  the  
right  and  left  halves  of  the  brain.  When  the  procedure  was  finally  
successful  (in  1962),  the  neurological  arm  of  psychology  went  into  
overdrive.  It  had  long  been  theorized  that  the  two  halves  of  the  brain  
served  different  functions—the  left,  intuitive:  the  right,  logical—and  here  
was  a  chance  to  test  this  theory  on  an  actual  living  individuals.    
Although  many  interesting  findings  were  made  in  regard  to  the  
separate  tendencies  of  the  left  and  right  hemispheres,  a  new  and  
unexpected  phenomenon  arose  from  the  studies:  that  of  confabulation.  In  
neuropsychology,  this  is  the  act  of  making  sense  in  the  very  literal  lack  of  
data.  As  the  right  brain  is  unable  to  communicate  with  the  left,  the  
subjects  are  shown  a  card:  'go  to  the  other  side  of  the  room'.  When  they  
go  there,  another  card  is  shown:  'why  did  you  get  up?'.  Instead  of  the  
correct  answer  ('I  have  no  idea'),  the  subject  would  inevitably  invent  an  
answer  on  the  spot:  'I  wanted  to  go  get  a  Coke'  (Gazzaniga,  2005:  148).  
This  has  been  confirmed  in  attractiveness  studies,  in  which  individuals  
initially  rank  photos  according  to  whom  they  find  attractive.  When  the  
order  of  photos  is  switched  and  shown  to  the  other  side  of  the  brain,  the  
                                                
16.  Galbraith,  John  Kenneth  (1971).  A  contemporary  guide  to  economics,  peace,  and  
laughter.  Andrea  Williams  (ed.)  Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  p.  50.  
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subjects  give  elaborate  reasons  for  a  choice  they  didn't  make  (Johansson  
et  al.  2005).  One  extreme  example  is  the  manifestation  of  reduplicative  
paramnesia:  'One  such  patient  believed  the  New  York  hospital  where  she  
was  being  treated  was  actually  her  home  in  Maine.  When  her  doctor  
asked  how  this  could  be  her  home  if  there  were  elevators  in  the  hallway,  
she  said,  "Doctor,  do  you  know  how  much  it  cost  me  to  have  those  put  
in?"'  (Gazzaniga,  2005:  150).  
This  may  seem  a  strange  place  to  begin  a  theory  of  agentic  causality,  
but  the  phenomenon  of  confabulation  solves,  to  a  limited  degree,  Hume's  
question  of  induction  (that  we  cannot  prove  cause  and  effect  unless  we  
already  believe  in  it).  As  it  happens,  we  already  do.  Thousands  of  years  
before  the  strict  application  of  the  scientific  method,  human  beings  were  
creating  identical  causal  structures  in  the  form  of  taboos  and  rituals.  It  can  
be  said  that  cause  and  effect,  in  its  corresponding  existence  found  in  
natural  events,  was  a  lucky  guess.  Whether  biological,  experiential  or,  
more  likely,  the  addition  of  both,  human  beings  process  inductively;  the  
parts  of  the  brain  indicated  in  these  confabulation  tests  are  those  involved  
specifically  in  causal  reasoning—'the  singular  capacity  of  the  brain  to  
make  causal  inferences'  (Gazzaniga,  1989:  947).    
This  could  amount  to  a  tautology  that  we  reason  causally  because  we  
do,  but  it  is  more  to  say  that  we  reason  causally  because  it  feels  good,  or,  
sometimes,  that  not  to  do  so  feels  bad.  As  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  
there  is  a  strong  emotional  price  to  pay  for  uncertainty,  as  manifests  in  
the  experience  of  schizophrenia  or  in  the  soldier  in  the  constant  chaos  of  
battle.  Conversely,  there  is  the  pleasure  in  the  completion  of  a  puzzle—
the  unnamed  feeling  of  the  solve—which  might  help  us  understand  how  
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causal  inferences  are  made:  it  feels  good  to  know.  When  John  Kenneth  
Galbraith  (and  Montaigne  in  Chapter  2)  notes  the  ease  in  which  we  put  
the  conclusion  before  the  data,  feeling  is  the  motivation.  It  is  no  small  
irony  that  Hume's  positivization  of  emotion  would  solve  his  own  puzzle:  it  
is  feeling  that  gave  us  cause  and  effect,  even  before  cause  and  effect  
could  be  demonstrably  proven.    
The  induction  problem  is  ultimately  secondary  to  choice,  as  what  
matters  for  this  section  of  the  thesis  is  attribution—that  the  cause  has  an  
agent.  For  a  Popperian  application  of  the  scientific  method,  cause  
precedes  effect.  For  choice,  blame  precedes  cause.  We  can  therefore  
break  (perceived)  causal  events  into  two  admittedly  conflated  categories:  
mechanical  and  intentional.  A  rock  falls.  This  is  gravity  working  on  objects,  
an  instrumental  event,  with  a  mechanical  cause.  A  rock  falls  on  my  foot.  
This  is  a  painful  feeling,  which  I  do  not  like,  suddenly  I  ask:  who  did  that?  
An  event  occurs,  we  assign  a  cause.  An  event  occurs  which  affects  our  
feeling  states,  we  assign  an  agent.  As  the  effect  is  felt,  it  is  logical  to  
assume  that  there  was  a  like  intent.  Just  as  the  event  had  a  mechanical  
cause,  the  feeling  had  an  intentional  one.  It  is  not  a  strict  division,  with  
overlaps  and  shades  of  each  in  the  other,  but  this  could  be  called  
causality,  and  agent  causality.    
This  chapter  explores  several  examples  of  self-­‐assignated  causality,  
specifically  in  relation  to  our  case  study  of  violence  and  passivity.  The  act  
of  assigning  cause  or  even  intent  to  oneself  could  be  called  shame,  guilt,  
remorse,  and  so  on.  We  have  previously  discussed  the  problems  of  using  
emotional  terms  as  reference  points,  and  the  way  in  which  their  ill-­‐defined  
nature  can  bring  in  unproductive  associations.  This  is  especially  true  of  
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shame  and  guilt  and  remorse,  which  have  a  different  semantic  problem  in  
that  there  is  great  deal  of  energy  devoted  in  the  literature  to  
distinguishing  what  are  essentially  identical  experiences.  In  one  
formulation,  guilt  is  a  form  of  shame  related  specifically  to  action:  'shame  
as  a  result  of  evaluating  one’s  past  performance  as  morally  wrong'  
(Johnson-­‐Laird  and  Oatley,  1989:  114).  In  another,  shame  is  concerned  
with  'self-­‐image':  for  example,  while  guilt  is  a  moral  emotion,  and  one  that  
allows  positive  change.  'In  fact,  a  great  deal  of  theory  and  research  in  
psychology  views  guilt  as  the  proill-­‐defined  nature  can  bring  in  
unproductive  associations.onand  Leach,  2011:  476).    
Their  core—negative  self-­‐designated  causality  for  a  perceived  
event—is  identical.  Michael  Lewis  calls  these  'self-­‐conscious  emotions'.21  
Lewis  follows  the  same  schemic  pattern  as  this  thesis,  noting  that  these  
feelings  arise  according  to  'a  set  of  standards,  rules,  or  goals  (SRGs)'  
(Lewes,  2008:  743)  and  'the  evaluation  of  success  or  failure  of  one’s  action  
in  regard  to  these'  (Lewes,  2008:  748).  What's  interesting  about  the  
attempt  at  distinction  between  shame  and  guilt  is  the  way  it  intersects  
with  the  reason/passion  divide  once  again:  guilt  is  productive;  shame  is  
not.  Guilt  functions  as  societally  beneficial,  shame  is  selfish,  while  the  
attribution  of  the  emotion  itself  contains  an  attribution.    
For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  terms  like  guilt,  shame  and  remorse  
are  interchangeable  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  like  above,  they  describe  the  
same  experience  of  self-­‐blame  for  a  violated  schema.  Secondly,  and  more  
importantly,  choice  is  made  according  to  future  states,  which  means  
                                                
17.  Notably,  he  goes  on,  like  his  counterparts,  to  distinguish  them  via  various  
attributes,  like  global-­‐self  versus  specific-­‐self  attributions.  p.  743.  
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future  scenarios.  Whatever  it  is  called,  the  scenario  in  the  future  is  a  
negative  designation  of  self-­‐causality,  which  is  to  be  avoided.  This  is  
especially  true  when  reframing  the  process  of  non-­‐firing  out  of  the  
sociological  and  into  anticipated  feelings,  where  the  individual  must  
choose  between  two  usually  avoidable  states  of  self-­‐designated  causality.  
One  outcome  makes  them  a  murderer,  and  the  other  a  failure,  each  a  
state  of  blame.  Authority,  then,  operates  not  as  a  system  of  ideology  or  
coercion,  but  by  offering  the  individual  an  out  in  terms  of  feeling—a  state  
of  non-­‐blame,  a  restructuring  of  agentic  causality.  The  chapter  continues  
with  a  brief  application  of  the  theory  to  passive  citizens,  and  how  feelings,  
both  cognated  and  bodily,  contribute  to  resignation  and  abdication,  even  
in  the  face  of  certain  death.  It  concludes  with  an  analysis  of  how  meta-­‐
decisions  to  violence  made  by  leaders  revolve  specifically  around  attempts  
to  manage  self-­‐directed  causal  feeling.    
  
The  Act  of  Ki l l ing  
  
Confabulation  demonstrates  the  way  that  we  make  sense,  even  if  it  
means  contradicting  what  we  are  seeing.  From  a  rationalist  view,  it  is  
impossible  to  have  elevators  in  a  single-­‐storey  home,  and  easy  to  conclude  
that  such  an  observation  is  absurd.  Many  everyday  assignations  of  self-­‐
blame  are  equally  absurd  and  yet  are  seen  as  normal  within  a  cultural  
context.  We  touched  on  the  grief  of  the  missing  in  the  previous  chapter  
transforming  an  uncertainty  into  a  negative  certainty  (death).  In  this  
situation,  if  a  parent  were  to  express  guilt  over  failing  to  have  held  their  
child  one  moment  longer  to  save  them,  this  feeling  would  be  
comprehensible,  even  though  actual  intent,  or  the  ability  to  intervene,  
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was  missing.  One  of  the  near  universal  conclusions  of  survivors  of  suicide  
is  self-­‐blame,  even  though  it  was  the  act  of  another:  'You  tend  to  say  "I  
have  three  children.  Two  are  very  successful;  they  did  it  all  themselves.  I  
have  one  child  who  killed  himself;  that  was  my  fault"'  (Colt,  2006:  491).  
These  events  make  cultural  sense  to  us;  if  we  were  in  the  same  
situation,  we  imagine  feeling  the  same  way.  And  yet  there  is  no  logical  
component.  The  individuals  involved  do  nothing  actively  or  passively  to  
harm  their  loved  ones.  Freud  or  a  Freudian  might  argue  there  was  
subconscious  intent  towards  a  family  member:  'And  after  death  has  
occurred,  it  is  against  this  unconscious  wish  that  the  reproaches  are  a  
reaction.  In  almost  every  case  where  there  is  an  intense  emotional  
attachment  to  a  particular  person  we  find  that  behind  the  tender  love  
there  is  a  concealed  hostility  in  the  unconscious'  (Freud,  1950:  129).  These  
desires  may  or  may  not  be  present,  but  from  an  evaluative  point  of  view,  
this  is  beside  the  point.  None  of  the  survivors  in  question  were  
omniscient,  a  necessary  constituent  of  responsibility—that  you  knew  an  
event  was  to  occur,  and  did  nothing—'(w)hat  grief  counselors  call  the  
"what  ifs"  and  the  "if  onlys"'  (Colt,  2006:  491).    
To  understand  the  preference  of  a  known  negative  (self-­‐assignated  
causality)  over  feelings  generated  by  uncertainty,  there  is  the  example  of  
the  Iraq  veteran  'Michael'  suffering  from  severe  PSTD  over  the  death  of  a  
child:  'a  part  of  me  died  with  that  little  girl  that  night'  (Wizelman,  2011:  
44).  That  little  girl  was  part  of  a  family  that  his  platoon  accidentally  fired  at  
while  an  armed  group  attempted  to  force  their  way  through  a  checkpoint.  
What  is  interesting  in  this  case  is  that  besides  being  unintentional,  
Michael,  without  the  benefit  of  forensic  evidence,  could  not  know  
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whether  his  bullets  killed  that  particular  girl,  or  anyone,  given  that  the  
entire  outfit  fired.  He  chose  one  victim,  and  became  overwhelmed  with  
severe  guilt,  with  the  alternative  being  not  knowing.  Not  unlike  the  
confabulist's  reworking  of  causality,  in  this  case  the  experience  of  the  past  
is  rewritten  as  if  it  was  known.  The  impossible  alternative  appears  not  
only  plausible,  but  ordinary,  even  if  it  means  that  the  individual  suffers  
great  psychological  pain.  Such  impossible  assignations  should  disturb  us,  if  
for  no  other  reason  that  they  remain  commonplace  and  unexamined.    
Feelings  of  responsibility  for  events  not  within  the  individuals  purvey  
might  be  located  in  the  psychological.  As  a  child  learns  basic  motor  skills  
and  object  manipulation,  he  or  she  begins  to  link  intent  and  action,  cause  
and  effect.  Piaget  makes  such  a  distinction  as  developmental,  that  
children's  causal  relationships  progress  from  the  first  stage  'psychological,  
phenomenistic,  finalistic  and  magical'  to  'Artificialist,  animistic,  dynamic'  
and  finally,  and  appropriately  for  this  thesis,  the  'more  rational  forms'  
(Piaget,  1930:  267).  The  first  two  are  characterized  by  what  he  calls  'pre-­‐
causality',  where  'Up  to  the  age  of  4–5  he  thinks  that  he  is  "forcing"  or  
compelling  the  moon  to  move...from  4  to  5  he  is  more  compelled  to  think  
that  the  moon  is  following  him'  (Piaget,  1930:  260).  In  the  case  of  
assignating  impossible  causes,  it  is  noteworthy  that  children  of  this  early  
stage  have  difficulty  distinguishing  between  the  omniscient  powers  of  God  
and  their  own  (Gimtnez-­‐Dasí  et  al.,  2005).  Given  the  way  in  which  fantastic  
guilt  manifests,  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  there  was  a  carryover  of  some  
kind  of  this  childlike  perception:  that  we  experience  consciousness  as  the  
center  of  the  universe;  therefore,  on  some  level,  we  reason  causally  as  if  
we  are.    
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The  above  examples  demonstrate  the  commonplace  division  in  guilt:  
that  it  is  either  real  or  fantastic;  that  '[i]n  guilt  emotion,  one  believes  one  
is  to  blame  even  when  knowing  that  this  is  not  actually  the  case'  (Frijda  
and  Mesquita,  2000:  54).  The  child  who  touches  the  stove  learns  a  real  
lesson  in  causality,  just  as  the  same  child  believes  it  may  be  the  moon  that  
made  the  stove  hot.  This  schism  is  echoed  beyond  the  developmentally  
psychological,  in  moral,  legal  and  scientific  realms:  creationism  is  fantastic  
attributive  causality,  evolution  real,  and  so  on.  And  yet,  this  seemingly  
stable  ontology  of  false  and  real  ignores  the  crucial  question:  how  does  it  
feel  to  know?  This  goes  beyond  the  ordinary  normative  critique,  which  
sees  such  divisions  as  constructed,  and  instead  asks:  what  are  the  basic  
feeling  mechanics  of  cognition?  In  this  specific  case,  self-­‐designated  
causality  generates  or  avoids  certain  feelings  associated  with  perceptions  
of  causal  action.  On  one  hand,  it  may  feel  bad  to  blame  oneself  for  
something  that  was  not  in  one's  control;  on  the  other,  such  an  attribution  
may  feel  better  than  the  alternative,  which  is  the  feeling  of  uncertainty  
encountered  in  the  previous  chapter.  Both  real  and  fantastic  attributions  
of  self-­‐designated  causality  engender  strong  feelings  in  the  individual,  and  
these  feelings  unite,  or  rather  blur,  such  distinctions  as  to  who  or  who  is  
not  really  guilty.  
This  ambiguity  of  real  and  fantastic  blame  is  ably  demonstrated  in  the  
case  of  the  soldier  who  kills.  From  an  instrumental  point  of  view,  there  is  
no  one  else  responsible;  the  soldier  is  the  one  who  pulled  the  trigger.  Yet  
society  holds  the  soldier  blameless,  a  fact  made  even  stranger  for  the  way  
the  same  view  is  held  by  the  society  whose  people  the  soldier  killed.  The  
concept  that  the  soldier  is  not  a  killer  is  ethically,  societally,  militarily,  and  
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politically  sanctified  in  the  'just  war'  concept,  that  the  morality  of  going  to  
war  (jus  ad  bellum)  cleanses  the  morality  of  actions  in  war  (jus  in  bello).  
What  matters  most  here  is  not  so  much  an  international  relations  
doctrine,  but  how  feelings  might  be  the  cause  of  such  an  elaborate  system  
of  absolution.  Jeff  McMahan,  who  argues  that  this  is  not  the  case,  i.e.  that  
an  unjust  war  means  soldiers  could  be  held  responsible  for  their  action,  
nevertheless  states:  'It  would  be  intolerable  to  suppose  that  all  soldiers  
who  are  commanded  to  fight  in  an  unjust  war,  or  who  fight  in  such  a  war  
without  knowing  that  it  lacks  a  just  cause,  are  for  that  reason  criminals  or  
even  murderers'  (McMahan,  2005:  4).  Even  in  this  extreme  polemic,  it  is  
an  appeal  to  feeling:  the  'intolerable'.  
In  contrast  to  the  longstanding  norms  and  any  legal,  ethical  and  
political  justifications,  there  are  the  perceptions  of  the  soldiers  
themselves.  The  first  chapter  introduced  the  possibility  that  many  soldiers  
feel  guilt  over  killing,  with  a  nod  towards  the  vociferous  controversy  over  
S.L.A.  Marshall's  (and  others')  contention  that  so  few  soldiers  in  combat  
fire  back.  From  this,  we  must  ask,  is  there  guilt?  Or  are  there  at  least  
negative  feelings  associated  with  killing?  We  know  that  many  soldiers  
experience  strong  post-­‐traumatic  stress  disorder,  but  this  could  easily  be  a  
byproduct  of  the  risk  of  death,  or,  along  the  lines  of  this  thesis,  the  strong  
cognitive  uncertainty  experience  detailed  in  the  previous  chapter.  
David  Grossman  (among  many  others)22  has  argued  that  much  of  this  
stress  is  due  to  the  psychic  cost  of  killing.  Grossman  cites  as  evidence  the  
                                                
18.  See  Gywnne  Dyer,  Lonnie  Athens,  Rachel  McNair,  S.L.A.  Marshall.  Even  Joanna  
Bourke,  who  is  most  famous  for  exploring  the  ways  in  which  soldiers  enjoy  killing,  
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way  in  which  prison  guards  during  wartime,  and  under  threat  of  being  
bombed,  were  subject  to  mental  stress  and  breakdown,  while  their  
prisoners,  equally  in  danger,  were  not  (Grossman  1996:  58).  Similar  effects  
were  found  in  medics,  sailors  and  recon  patrol—personnel  at  high  risk  of  
death,  but  little  risk  of  killing  (Grossman,  1996:  62).  Likewise,  sociologist  
Randall  Collins  has  noted  the  numerous  ways  in  which  'violence  is  hard':  
from  the  public  displays  of  blustering  in  public  fights  that  are  ways  of  
avoiding  violence  (Collins,  2008:  198)  to  soldiers  ordered  to  kill  civilians  
who  miss  at  point-­‐blank  range  (Collins,  2008:  78).    
These  examples,  while  telling,  remain  conjectural.  What  has  emerged  
in  recent  years  may  qualify  as  true  empiricism  evidence.  As  briefly  
mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  last  decade  has  seen  a  new  form  
of  combat,  namely  piloting  RPAs.23  The  amount  of  scholarship  on  the  case  
study  of  RPA  pilots  is  immense:  legal,  ethical  and  biomechanical  issues  are  
brought  to  the  fore.  We  will  focus  on  a  very  narrow  slice,  namely  the  
psychological  impact  on  the  pilots  themselves.  We  take  as  our  control  (in  
the  experimental  sense)  bomber  pilots,  who  are  at  risk  of  dying.  When  
compared  with  RPA  pilots,  who  have  none,  it  is  found  that  RPA  pilots  
experience  greater  psychological  stress  and  breakdown  than  their  real-­‐life  
counterparts  (MA  or  'Manned  Aircraft')  by  a  significant  amount:  'Rates  of  
clinical  distress  and  PTSD  were  higher  among  RPA  operators  (20  percent  
and  five  percent,  respectively)  in  comparison  to  non-­‐RPA  airmen  (11  
percent  and  two  percent,  respectively)'  (Chappelle  et  al.,  2012:  1).    
                                                                                                                                          
notes  that  'combatants  themselves  constantly  raised  issues  of  personal  responsibility.  
Indeed,  they  insisted  upon  it'  (Bourke,  1999:  207).  
19.  Remote  Piloted  Aircraft,  known  colloquially  as  'drones';  as  an  attempt  to  avoid  
semantic  associations,  I  will  use  the  Army's  nomenclature.  
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Another  similar  study  found  that  'The  unadjusted  incidence  rates  of  
all  MH  ('Mental  Health')  outcomes  among  RPA  pilots  (n=709)  and  MA  
pilots  (n=5,256)  were  25.0  per  1,000  person-­‐years  and  15.9  per  1,000  
person-­‐years,  respectively'  (Otto  and  Webber,  2013:  3),  concluding  that  
'remote  combat  does  not  increase  the  risk  of  MH  outcomes  beyond  that  
seen  in  traditional  combat'  (Otto  and  Webber,  2013:  7).  Given  the  
numbers,  this  conclusion  of  not  increasing  mental  health  risk  may  seen  as  
self-­‐interested,  but  a  closer  look  at  the  findings  indicates  that  the  MA  
('manned  aircraft')  group  includes  combat  aircraft,  which  holds  a  higher  
incidence  of  mental  health  issues  (at  41  per  1,000  person  years)  and  a  
lower  incidence  with  supply  aircraft  (at  11  per  1,000  person  years).    
These  studies  noted  that  'combat  stressors'  were  a  factor  beyond  the  
general  working  conditions,  a  fact  confirmed  in  a  recent  regression  
analysis  of  American  US–Iraq  war  veterans,  concluding  '[k]illing  in  combat  
was  a  significant  predictor  of  PTSD  symptoms  and  alcohol  abuse,  even  
after  controlling  for  combat  exposure,  suggesting  that  taking  a  life  in  
combat  is  a  potent  ingredient  in  the  development  of  mental  health  
difficulties',  with  positive  correlations  between  22  percent  for  PTSD  and  
32  percent  for  depression  (Maguen  et  al.,  2010:  90  and  87,  respectively).  A  
similar  study  conducted  among  Vietnam  veterans  found  not  only  that  
killing  contributed  to  PTSD,  but  the  act  of  killing  increased  the  chances  of  
the  soldier  committing  atrocities  (Fontana  and  Rosenheck,  1999).  
Furthermore,  when  atrocities  were  controlled  for  the  act  of  killing,  
'atrocities,  aside  from  killing  others,  do  not  play  a  substantial  role  in  the  
development  of  PTSD  once  other  stressors  have  been  taken  into  account'  
(Fontana  and  Rosenheck,  1999:  124).  A  review  of  the  National  Vietnam  
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Veterans  Readjustment  Study  found  similar  results,  comparing  those  who  
saw  killing,  and  those  who  actively  participated  (MacNair,  2002a;  2002b).    
In  short,  we  can  answer  the  question  (does  killing  invoke  strong  
negative  feelings?)  with  an  equally  strong  yes.  From  a  feeling  perspective,  
this  question  is  inane;  guilt  could  be  felt  over  a  stolen  parking  space.  One  
could,  and  possibly  should,  focus  on  why  this  debate  continues,  and  why  
studies  that  focus  on  the  most  crucial  aspect  of  war—killing—are  only  
now  coming  to  the  fore.  While  certainly  interesting  from  a  political  and  
normative  point  of  view,  this  is  a  thesis  about  choice,  and  this  chapter  is  
about  how  future  anticipations  are  felt.  Killing  is  a  predictor  for  PSTD  and  
mental  health  problems,  experienced  as  'guilt'  or  'shame'  or  'depression',  
or  any  of  the  other  member  spectrum  of  contested  and  cultural  defined  
emotions.  Reorienting  this  experience  within  the  cognate  feeling  
paradigm,  the  individual  attributes  responsibility  to  him  or  herself:  
'"During  combat  operations  did  you  kill  others  in  combat  (or  have  reason  
to  believe  that  others  were  killed  as  a  result  of  your  actions)?"'  (Maguen  
et  al.,  2010:  88).  A  causal  conclusion  is  made,  despite  the  legal  and  ethical  
exemptions  put  forth  by  society,  and  a  feeling  state  results.    
Within  this  representative  scenario,  there  is  a  violation:  the  'dirt'  
spoken  of  in  the  previous  chapter.  On  one  hand,  it  may  be  a  break  in  the  
schema  of  the  whole  intact  body,  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  
prohibition  against  killing  can  also  be  framed  as  a  moral  question,  
although,  comprehensively  speaking,  ethics  are  themselves  a  schema,  
with  violations  crucially  being  contextual  to  situation.  Soldiers  seem  
especially  vulnerable  to  the  killing  of  civilians,  whether  accidental  (see  
case  study  above)  or  under  orders.  Historian  Christopher  Browning  
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famously  notes  the  way  in  which  many  of  those  in  Police  Battalion  101  
were  literally  unable  to  execute  civilians:    
'The  shooting  of  the  men  was  so  repugnant  to  me  that  I  
missed  the  fourth  man.  It  was  simply  no  longer  possible  for  
me  to  aim  accurately.  I  suddenly  felt  nauseous  and  ran  
away  from  the  shooting  site.  I  have  expressed  myself  
incorrectly  just  now.  It  was  not  that  I  could  no  longer  aim  
accurately,  rather  that  the  fourth  time  I  intentionally  
missed.  I  then  ran  into  the  woods,  vomited,  and  sat  down  
against  a  tree…  Today  I  can  say  that  my  nerves  were  totally  
finished.  I  think  that  I  remained  alone  in  the  woods  for  
some  two  to  three  hours'  (Browning,  2008:  66–7,  interview  
with  August  Zorn).  
  
In  regard  to  schema,  civilians  belong  in  one  category,  soldiers  in  
another.  Yet,  even  the  enemy  must  undergo  a  categorical  transformation:  
'The  basic  aim  of  a  nation  at  war  in  establishing  an  image  of  the  enemy  is  
to  distinguish  as  sharply  as  possible  the  act  of  killing  from  the  act  of  
murder  by  making  the  former  into  one  deserving  of  all  honor  and  praise'  
(Gray,  1998:  131–2).  Although  stated  as  a  representative  of  'cognitive  
dissonance'24  (the  act  of  turning  people  into  objects  so  that  they  are  easier  
to  be  killed),  it  is  noteworthy  in  this  context  that  the  shift  in  one  category  
(individual  to  soldier)  necessitates  two  others  (murder  to  killing;  person  to  
enemy),  further  underlining  the  way  in  which  the  act  of  killing  can  be  
understood  as  a  schemic  process.    
Yet,  there  is  incidence  of  PTSD  among  veterans  who  have  killed  other  
soldiers,  indicating  that  even  this  shift  (from  human  to  combatant)  cannot  
                                                
20.  See  the  next  chapter  for  correct  definition  and  discussion  of  this  term.  
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be  made  completely.  Note  now  the  way  in  which  the  experience  of  killing  
is  often  reported,  in  this  instance  from  a  veteran  of  the  Second  Boer  War:  
'I  killed  a  man  at  Graspan;    
I  watched  him  squirmin'  till    
He  raised  his  eyes,  an'  they  met  with  mine;    
An'  there  they're  starin'  still.    
Cut  of  my  brother  Tom,  he  looked,    
...  
Harder  to  dodge  than  my  bullet  is    
The  look  that  his  dead  eyes  cast.    
If  the  Empire  asks  for  me  later  on    
It'll  ask  for  me  in  vain,    
Before  I  reach  to  my  bandolier    
To  fire  on  a  man  again'.25    
  
As  with  the  incidence  of  the  recollection  of  dead  eyes  staring  back  in  
the  last  chapter,  the  eyes  of  the  dead  loom  large  in  the  memory,  or  
consciousness  of  the  perpetrator,  even  in  non-­‐violent  incidents:  'Eye-­‐to-­‐
eye  confrontations,  however  truncated,  between  holdup  man  and  victim,  
appear  to  be  unbearable  for  the  gunman  to  sustain'  (Collins,  2008:  80).  For  
Dave  Grossman,  face-­‐to-­‐face  contact  is  the  pinnacle  of  the  aversion  to  kill:    
'Willis  came  abreast  of  him,  his  M-­‐16  pointed  at  the  man’s  
chest.  They  stood  not  five  feet  apart.  The  soldier’s  AK  47  
was  pointed  straight  at  Willis.  
The  captain  vigorously  shook  his  head.  
The  NVA  soldier  shook  his  head  just  as  vigorously.  
It  was  a  truce,  cease-­‐fire,  gentleman’s  agreement  or  a  deal-­‐
fire,  gentlemans  vigorously.erman  of  the  aversion  to  kill:  t  
inc'  (Grossman,  1996:  137).  
                                                
21.  Grover,  M.  (1904).  I  Killed  a  Man  at  Graspan,  from  The  Coo-­‐Ee  Reciter  By  
Australian,  British,  And  American  Authors.  Humorous.  Pathetic,  Dramatic,  Dialect,  
Recitations  &  Readings,  William  Thomas  Pyke  (ed.),  London:  Ward,  Lock  &  Co.,  pp.  7–9.  
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For  Randall  Collins,  the  eyes  are  the  core  embodiment  of  emotional  
entrainment;  this  is  'why  eyes  are  so  important  in  violent  confrontations.  
Soldiers  paralyzed  in  terror  avert  their  eyes,  just  as  they  make  childish-­‐
magical  gestures  to  avoid  being  seen'  (Collins,  2008:  84).  They  are  the  
origin  and  reflection  of  emotion,  imbuing  Clausewitz's  fog  of  war  with  an  
emotional  facet:  'The  fog  of  combat  is  a  metaphor  for  confrontational  
tension.  That  tension  encompasses  the  various  kinds  of  fear,  which  have  
real  objects  that  the  fighters  can  pay  attention  to:  the  safety  of  their  own  
bodies;  the  enemy  whom  one  doesn't  want  to  see,  or  doesn't  want  to  see  
killed'  (Collins,  2008:  86).    
Without  disputing  Collins'  conclusions,  there  remains  a  vagueness  to  
the  construction  of  emotions.  When  he  speaks  of  'fear',  we  confront  the  
problem  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter:  that  fear,  like  many  emotions,  
has  a  multiplicity  of  definitions,  some  related,  others  not.  By  refocusing  
the  emphasis  on  feeling,  and  the  way  in  which  they  are  generated  by  
causal  conclusions,  the  victim's  eye  is  less  an  aspect  of  the  soul,  a  concept  
of  humanity,  or  a  undefined  generator  of  emotion,  as  they  are  accusatory,  
a  powerful  assignation  of  causality.  Returning  briefly  to  the  studies  in  the  
last  chapter,  Bourke  specifies  that  it  was  not  so  much  being  a  coward  that  
was  a  source  of  fear,  but  being  seen  as  a  coward:  'the  fear  of  being  seen  
to  be  afraid  was  the  only  fear  a  man  felt  when  going  into  battle'  (Bourke,  
quoting  Shaw,  2001:  323).    
The  eyes,  as  manifestations  of  another's  view  of  you,  so  to  speak,  go  
beyond  the  emotional  and  into  the  realm  of  the  ontological.  In  the  natural  
sciences,  this  is  embodied  in  the  idea  of  consensus,  that  one's  own  
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observation  is  not  enough  to  determine  a  scientific  truth.  Even  with  the  
principle  of  falsification,  it  is  the  confirmation  of  others  that  allows  for  the  
stability  of  theories:  'Not  every  consensus  is  a  sign  of  truth;  but  it  is  
presumed  that  the  truth  of  a  statement  necessarily  draws  a  consensus'  
(Lyotard,  1979:  24).  Although  Lyotard  is  highly  critical  of  this  process  'that  
scientific  rationality  has  as  its  criterion  of  truth  the  consensus  of  its  peers  
and  no  more  than  that'  (Rutgers,  1999:  30),  Ian  Hacking  notes  that  this  is  
simply  an  inescapable  facet  of  the  scientific  process.  In  'dynamic  
nominalism',  even  socially  dependent  paths  can  lead  to  legitimate  science  
'(the  Second  Law  of  Thermodynamics)  is  a  fact  about  the  universe  that  we  
have  discovered.  The  history  of  its  discovery  makes  no  jot  of  difference  to  
what  it  is,  was,  and  always  will  be'  (Hacking,  1999:  32).    
This  is  not  an  attempt  to  reopen  the  debate  over  the  social  
construction  of  science.  Instead,  we  must  note  that  even  within  this  
seemingly  objective  realm,  truth  is  social,  defined  by  others.  In  the  case  of  
emotion,  the  usual  focus  lies,  as  it  does  with  Collins,  on  the  social  nature  
of  feelings.  While  descriptive  to  a  point,  there  is  a  quality  of  'truthiness'  
that  affects  the  emotion.  The  appropriation  of  Stephen  Colbert's  gag  here  
redefines  truth  not  as  an  either/or,  but  as  a  spectrum,  or  threshold.  
Feelings  are  generated  not  by  the  undefined  qualities  of  sociality  and  
culture,  but  specifically,  by  the  way  in  which  the  truth  is  constructed.  This  
truth  is  not  theory  of  gravity,  linked  to  observation,  mathematics  and  so  
on,  but  a  designation  of  agency,  which  is  explicitly  found  in  another's  gaze.  
The  sequence  might  be  understood  as  follows:  feelings  arise  from  causal  
conclusions,  usually  attributions  of  agency  (blame).  As  a  kind  of  truth,  they  
are  strengthened  by  the  perception  (the  eyes)  of  others,  which  affects  the  
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intensity  of  the  feeling,  e.g.  that  there  is  lower  affect  as  a  coward  by  
oneself  than  in  the  presence  of  others.  Intensity  of  feeling  is  dependent  on  
how  true,  so  to  speak,  a  conclusion  is,  and  choice,  in  turn,  depends  on  that  
feeling.    
  
Eyes  from  the  Other  Direction  
  
Future  self-­‐designated  causal  agency  accounts  for  many  violence-­‐
avoidance  behaviors;  we  will  now  turn  to  the  way  in  which  an  identical  
structure  can  account  for  how  violence  may  be  instigated.  Given  the  
reality  of  war,  many  soldiers  do  fire,  and  even  more  surprisingly,  give  their  
lives  with  little  reward  to  themselves.  This  begs  the  longstanding  question:  
why  obey?  From  Marxist  theories  of  ideology,  to  Weberian  descriptions  of  
legitimate  violence,  to  Foucauldian  concepts  of  disciplined  bodies,  
documenting  the  myriad  of  theories  of  authority  would  require  an  entirely  
new  chapter,  if  not  a  lifetime  of  work.  What  we  are  able  to  do  in  this  
instance  is  discuss  the  individual  cognates  and  feelings  generated  by  the  
imaginations  of  authority  which  are  specifically  related  to  self-­‐designated  
causality.  As  this  operates  on  the  micro  level,  such  ruminations  do  not  
necessarily  contradict  these  grander  theories.  In  fact,  an  understanding  of  
the  feeling  operation  of  authority  may  help  fill  the  gaps  in  these  more  
sociologically  directed  paradigms.    
To  take  a  single  example,  Jon  Elster  has  critiqued  Marxism's  concept  
of  ideology  as  tautological,  or  functionalist,  with  the  view  that  because  the  
ruling  class  benefits  from  a  working  class  ideology  of  submission,  ideology  
must  have  been  engineered  to  benefit  the  ruling  class,  that  'the  beneficial  
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effects  of  mobility  also  explain  it'  (Elster,  1982:  458).  This  is  not  to  single  
out  one  particular  theoretic  school  or  model  (or  sub-­‐model)  for  critique,  
merely  to  note  that  the  attempt  to  see  questions  of  obeisance  under  an  
instrumental  or  rational  terms  misses  the  most  crucial  component:  how  it  
feels  to  obey.  Elster's  solution  of  a  game  theoretic  model  is  equally  
unsatisfactory;  as  far  as  explanatory  power  goes,  we  still  fail  to  
understand  the  actual  motivations  of  the  actors  in  question.    
Understanding  authority  as  a  function  of  future  causal  assignation  is  
best  described  through  the  process  of  how  soldiers  actually  learn  to  kill:  
through  their  training.  Theories  of  military  socialization  come  in  a  variety  
of  forms,  from  feminist  critiques  to  simple  practical  advice:  how  to  build  a  
better  soldier  through  a  refinement  of  methods.  The  purpose  here  is  less  
to  critique  these  theories  than  to  utilize  them—to  go  one  level  deeper  and  
provide  a  more  mechanical  explanation  of  the  behavior  on  an  individual  
level:  how  the  decisions  are  schemically  cognated  and  felt,  and  most  
importantly,  how  training  reframes  the  way  in  which  the  individual  assigns  
responsibility.  The  focus  is  less  on  perspectives  than  on  two  'historical'  
periods  in  army  training,  which  might  be  called  abusive  and  post-­‐abusive.  
Here  the  stricter  definition  of  violence  in  Chapter  2,  as  physical  only,  
clarifies  the  way  in  which  self-­‐designated  causality  manifests.  
It  is  not  fair  to  say  that  physical  abuse  is  a  consistent  technique  of  all  
drill  instructors  (DI)  in  the  United  States,  even  as  far  back  is  as  the  turn  of  
the  century.  Regulations  were  tightened  after  an  incident  in  1956  where  
six  recruits  drowned  during  basic  training  (Eckholm,  2005),  and  finally  
even  physical  touching  was  outlawed  in  1985.  Nevertheless,  it  was  a  
common  enough  practice,  so  much  so  that  DIs  would  continue  to  kick  and  
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punch  even  after  the  regulation  that  could  lead  to  their  court  martial  (AP,  
2005;  Eckholm,  2005,  below).  This  abuse  could  take  very  extreme  forms,  
as  one  case  from  the  Vietnam  era  makes  clear:    
'One  night  three  men  who  had  been  censured  for  
ineffectiveness  in  their  assigned  tasks  were  called  forward  
in  front  of  the  assembled  platoon,  ordered  to  insert  their  
penises  into  the  breeches  of  their  weapons,  close  the  bolt,  
and  run  the  length  of  the  squad  by  singing  the  Marine  
Corps  Hymn.  This  violent  ritual  ended  as  the  drill  instructor  
left  and  the  three  men  sank  to  the  floor,  penises  still  
clamped  to  their  weapons'  (Eisenhart,  1975:  16).  
  
Although  one  could  cite  any  number  of  such  examples  of  physical  
abuse—throughout  the  millennia—there  are  two  reasons  that  this  
example  is  illustrative  of  causal  agent  linkage,  i.e.  the  creation  of  a  self-­‐
blame  agent.  The  first  is  the  way  in  which  physical  punishment  is  linked  
with  individual  action,  that  being  'censured  for  their  ineffectiveness'  
meant  that  it  was  assumed  that  the  result  (penises  locked  into  their  rifles,  
and  consequent  humiliation)  was  'caused'  by  the  individual's  action.  A  
recruit  is  punched  in  the  stomach  and  thrown  on  the  floor  for  an  
infraction,26  and  like  a  struck  child,  the  consequence  (violence)  is  swiftly  
and  causally  linked:  you  do  X,  you  get  Y.  The  action  of  the  violence  
instigator  (the  DI)  is  not  part  of  the  causal  chain.    
The  second  aspect  of  the  example  cited  here  is  the  way  in  which  
masculinity  is  used  to  create  discipline.  Critiques  of  the  basic  training  
process  note  the  way  in  which  conformity  to  masculine  norms  are  'the  
                                                
22.  As  indicative  of  the  US  Army's  transition  to  non-­‐violent  training  methods,  this  
example  occurred  in  2003,  and  led  to  the  court-­‐martial  of  the  DI  responsible  (Eckholm,  
2005).  
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major  emphasis  of  basic  training'  (Arkin  and  Dobrofsky,  1978:  157);  this  
emphasis  on  reinforcing  masculine  traits  is  something  which  even  its  
proponents  note  (Faris,  1975).  The  obvious  manifestation  of  a  recruit's  
failure  to  measure  up,  so  to  speak,  is  linked  by  insults  of  'ladies',  'faggots',  
and  so  on.  These  critiques  see  masculinity  and  war  as  self-­‐reinforcing  
concepts;  on  one  hand,  to  be  a  soldier  is  the  most  desirable  type  of  
masculinity:  'All  questions,  all  ambiguities,  all  contradictions  in  what  it  
means  to  be  a  man  or  a  citizen  are  banished  in  the  creation  of  the  warrior'  
(Braudy,  2003:  7)  Just  as,  circularly,  the  masculine  ideal  may  itself  be  a  
causal  factor  in  the  perpetuation  of  war:  'Warfare  and  aggressive  
masculinity  have  been,  in  other  words,  mutually  reinforcing  cultural  
enterprises'  (Ehrenreich,  1997:  127;  see  also  Goldstein,  2003).    
The  feminist  analysis  remains  valid,  to  a  point.  One  of  feminism's  
greatest  triumphs  was  the  separation  of  sex  from  gender,  that  
masculinity,  besides  being  constructed,  not  only  changed  over  time  in  
regard  to  fighting  (Braudy,  2003),  but  also  within  armed  forces  at  the  
same  time  (Barrett,  1996),  that  'being  a  man'  was  always  a  contingent  
definition.  Like  the  Marxist  version  of  authority;  however,  it  begs  the  
question:  what  is  the  motivation  for  being  masculine?  The  new  
regulations,  besides  reducing  the  incidents  of  physical  abuse,  has  
furthermore  changed  the  way  in  which  DIs  speak:  'drill  sergeants  may  
address  recruits  only  as  "soldier"  or  "private,"  or  by  surname'  (Eckholm,  
2005).  Whether  or  not  this  is  practiced  consistently,  it  indicates  the  way  in  
which  this  means  that  the  armed  forces  are  still  able  to  instill  discipline  
without  the  reliance  on  reinforcing  (specifically)  masculine  norms.  Even  as  
far  back  in  the  1970s,  consider  this  verbal  abuse  for  the  Air  Force  pre-­‐
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flight:  '"nothing",  "nobody",  spastic,  slovenly,  gross,  and,  worst  of  all,  
"casual"'  (Wamsley,  1972:  406).    
Masculinity,  while  powerful,  remains  a  schema—a  set  of  mobile  and  
situational  definitions  against  which  one  must  measure.  As  a  schema,  it  
remains  one  of  many  for  the  individual.  Insults  and  humiliation  revolving  
around  masculinity,  while  extent  even  to  this  day,  are  not  necessary  to  
humiliate  and  insult  a  recruit.  What  does  remain  universal  is  the  sense  of  
schemic  violation.  The  cadets,  whether  sexually,  according  to  manhood,  
decency,  or  even  just  motivationally  (being  that  'casual'  was  the  worst  
insult  you  could  dole  out),  were  out  of  place  in  the  Douglasian  sense,  and  
had  to  find  a  way  back.  Whatever  the  technique,  the  blame  agent  is  
maintained  with  the  same  structure  in  a  both  non-­‐violent  and  non-­‐
masculinized  environment.    
This  'casual'  schema—that  an  individual  lacks  intent,  desire,  or  
commitment  and  therefore  is  lacking—has  become  more  and  more  
incorporated  into  basic  training  as  the  US  Armed  Forces  transitions  to  a  
volunteer  force.  Here  'washing  out'  is  an  option  given  back  to  the  recruit.  
'You  can't  hack  it  little  girl!'  (Eisenhart,  1975)  is  replaced  by  the  more  
concise  and  gender  universal  'You  can't  hack  it'.  The  visible  rituals  around  
failure  have  always  been  a  part  of  the  higher  levels  of  training;  during  Hell  
Week  for  the  Navy  SEALs,  the  washouts  ring  a  bell  to  indicate,  very  
audibly,  that  they  have  failed  (Couch,  2009),  leaving  their  helmets  as  a  
visual  reminder  of  the  shame  of  what  might  happen  to  those  who  remain.  
Without  the  obvious  motivation  of  violence  or  intimidation,  self-­‐initiated  
elimination  (SIE)  (Wamsley,  1972)  operates  on  the  same  principle  as  the  
immediate  cause/effect  of  the  physical  kick  or  punch.  In  the  volunteer  
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army,  physical  abuse  allows  the  recruit  to  assign  blame  to  the  perpetrator  
('the  DI  is  an  abusive  jerk',  or  possibly  stronger  language)  and  exit  without  
any  assignations  of  blame  on  him  or  herself.  In  a  non-­‐abusive  
environment,  the  blame  is  shifted  back  to  the  self.  The  anticipated  state  to  
avoid  is  not  being  hit  or  being  abused,  but  the  state  of  having  failed.    
Another  accusatory  schema  in  basic  training  lies  in  the  building  of  
small  group  cohesion.  This  is  what  Faris  euphemistically  calls  'collective  
evaluation'.  'For  example,  an  entire  platoon  may  have  passes  withheld  
because  the  floor  under  one  bunk—the  responsibility  of  one  individual—
was  inadequately  swept'  (Faris,  1975:  118).  The  intensity  of  this  future  
shame  state  is  increased  as  the  group  participates;  one's  'fault'  is  no  
longer  the  assignation  of  the  DI,  or  even  the  self,  but  the  entire  group.  
This  can  be  combined  with  the  instrumental  nature  of  violence  for  even  
greater  effect:  
'It  was  obvious  that  those  who  had  quit  were  scared  
senseless  as  they  lay  on  the  floor  in  the  position  of  
attention,  all  lined  up  close  to  each  other.  Then  Gunny  
ripped  off  one  of  the  racks  and  covered  the  quitters.  Then  
he  ordered  the  rest  of  the  platoon  to  file  by  "the  dead"  as  
he  referred  to  them,  and  kick  them  as  we  passed,  calling  
them  "quitters."...  The  men  knew  exactly  what  the  new  
rules  would  be.  If  we  had  to  pay,  then  they  had  to  pay.  No  
one  had  better  fall  out  of  another  run'  (Dark,  2009:  39-­‐40).    
  
As  with  the  eyes  of  the  dead,  the  eyes  of  your  fellow  recruits  now  reflect  
the  blame,  in  a  way  that  is  clearly  and  powerfully  comprehensible,  so  that  
it  may  be  understood  as  a  future  scenario.  The  consistent  throughline  
here  is  not  masculinity  or  even  behavioral  technique  but  causal  re-­‐
assignation,  with  a  negative  intensity  that  one  avoids  at  all  costs.    
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How  Authority  Operates:   Availabi l ity  and  Abdication  
  
The  focus  has  been  exclusively  on  negative  aspects  of  self-­‐designated  
causality,  which  would  leave  an  incomplete  picture.  Obviously,  when  
someone  succeeds  and  is  then  credited,  this  is  a  future  state  that  is  
desirable.  Basic  training  does  not  just  create  a  negative  outcome  to  avoid,  
but  a  positive  one  to  embrace.  'As  they  mastered  the  physical  training  
room  arrangement  and  drill,  their  confidence  and  self-­‐esteem  rose.  That  
so  much  indignity  and  abuse  had  been  suffered  to  reach  these  bits  of  
status  only  enhanced  their  value'  (Wamsley,  1972:  407).  The  implication  
for  agent  causality  are  clear.  Fail,  and  you  will  be  punished  or  shamed;  
succeed,  and  even  the  'bits'  of  status  are  desirable.  As  with  most  writers  
on  the  subject  of  basic  training,  Wamsley  sees  it,  not  incorrectly,  as  a  
function  of  group  dynamics  and  social  conditioning:  'Thus,  the  first  
increases  in  status  were  within  the  subculture'  (Wamsley,  op.  cit.)  
Likewise,  Gwynne  Dyer  asserts  that  '[b]asic  training,  whatever  its  
hardships,  is  a  quick  way  to  become  a  man  among  men  with  an  
undeniable  status'  (Dyer,  2006:  42).    
What's  especially  interesting  in  Dyer's  analysis  is  that  this  increase  is  
less  by  accomplishment  than  by  design.  He  notes  the  way  in  which  tasks  
like  running  and  climbing  rope  are  not  in  themselves  actually  difficult:  
'One  of  the  most  striking  achievements  of  the  drill  instructors  is  to  create  
and  maintain  the  illusion  that  basic  training  is  an  extraordinary  challenge,  
one  that  will  set  those  who  graduate  apart  from  others,  when  in  fact  
almost  everyone  can  succeed'  (Dyer,  2006:  44).  While  it's  true  that  the  
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process  is  constructed  within  a  social  environment,  what  matters  for  this  
thesis  is  the  way  in  which  the  individual  experiences  it  as  a  shift  in  casual  
agency.  Failure  and  success  is  redefined  not  as  a  random  act,  or  even  an  
act  controlled  by  an  external  agent,  but  outcomes  predicated  on  the  
individual.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that  these  assignations  are  largely  
cognitive,  that  they  are  ultimately  more  a  function  of  confabulation,  
contextual  reframing,  or  both.  In  each  case,  this  affects  future  choice  for  
the  agent:  to  avoid  the  strong  negative  feelings  associated  with  failure,  
and  to  pursue  the  less  powerful,  but  still  very  tangible,  positive  feelings  
associated  with  success.    
The  introduction  of  positive  causal  assignation  here  does  not  
discount  the  effects  of  group  sociology,  but  does  better  explain  the  
mechanics  on  the  individual  level.  Dyer's  example  indicates  the  way  in  
which  agent  causality  ('blame'  or  'pride')  is  constructed.  The  first  two  
weeks  of  boot  camp  are  often  spoken  about  as  the  stripping  of  identity—
clothes  are  taken,  heads  shaved  and  so  on.  But  this  is  less  relevant  than  
the  way  in  which  agency  is  transformed.  Everything  the  cadet  does,  from  
walking,  standing,  eating,  sleeping,  the  way  they  look,  is  to  be  corrected,  
shamed  or  credited.  This  is  the  unifying  principle  of  the  abusive  and  non-­‐
abusive  forms  of  coercion:  to  create  a  shift  in  agency.  Whether  conscious  
or  not,  the  emphasis  on  causality  serves  the  motivational  function.    
The  final  piece  of  the  redefinition  of  causal  agency  is  the  creation  of  
an  external  blame  agent,  one  which  allows  the  individual  to  avoid  any  
future  blame  states.  After  creating  an  environment  that  assigns  and  
relieves  agent  causality  (blame  and  credit),  the  Armed  Forces  now  offers  
the  out:    
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'I  was  amazed  how  many  American  civilian  soldiers  
appeared  to  put  great  weight  on  taking  the  oath  of  the  
soldier.  Frequently,  I  heard  the  remark:  "When  I  raised  my  
right  hand  and  took  that  oath,  I  freed  myself  of  the  
consequences  of  what  I  do.  I'll  do  what  they  tell  me  and  
nobody  can  blame  me"'  (Gray,  1998:  181).  
  
After  all  the  investigation  into  self-­‐blame  states,  this  statement  is  no  
coincidence.  In  terms  of  feeling  states,  the  crucial  operation  of  the  act  of  
obedience  is  not  the  instrumental  one  (that  one  does  what  the  leader  
says),  but  the  feeling  it  generates  through  the  abdication  of  causal  blame.  
This  is  no  trifle;  it  is  the  freedom,  so  to  speak,  from  any  future  negative  
feelings  of  self-­‐designated  causality.  
This  feeling  may  count  as  yet  another  one  of  our  unnamed  emotions.  
Blaming  others  is  often  the  domain  of  anger,  and  there  may  be  some  
connection  to  that  larger  emotion  contained  in  the  combination  of  
resentment  and  respect  that  often  accompanies  our  feelings  towards  
authority,  government,  and  power.  But  the  shifting  of  blame,  in  this  case,  
is  more  likely  an  unnamed,  though  not  insignificant,  emotion.  It's  less  
anger  than  relief,  even  if  it  means  killing,  as  per  the  quote  above,  or  giving  
up  your  life.  For  the  citizen,  this  surrender  of  agency  is  a  kind  of  contract,  
with  potentially  dangerous  results  in  the  case  of  highly  violent  states.  
'When  I  asked  Guatemalans  why  they  hadn't  fled  when  the  army  
requisitioned  the  local  church  and  began  to  use  it  as  a  torture  chamber,  
many  adults  told  me,  "We  were  doing  nothing  wrong  so  we  believed  that  
nothing  would  happen  to  us"'  (Zur,  1994:  16).  In  this  case,  there  is  the  
specificity  contained  in  the  idea  of  'doing  nothing  wrong'.  As  there  was  no  
assignation  of  self-­‐blame,  there  could  be  no  corresponding  negative  
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consequences  from  the  authority.  It  didn't  make  sense  to  the  point  that,  
from  a  comprehension  perspective,  it  was  not  happening.    
We  will  return  to  civilian  victims  of  mortal  violence  shortly.  Instead,  
we  may  now  begin  to  answer  the  question  posed  by  this  thesis:  'Why  
don't  soldiers  in  imminent  danger  of  death  always  fire  back?'  Without  the  
rationalist  bias,  this  might  be  now  rephrased  as  'What  internal  feeling  
states  lead  some  to  inaction,  and  others  to  violence?'.  As  an  expression  of  
two  behaviors,  this  has  been  seen  as  a  kind  of  tension,  the  concept  of  
'riding  herd',  as  noted  in  several  instances  in  the  introductory  chapter  and  
in  the  chapter  covering  violence.  This  allows  proximation  to  authority  to  
increase  the  chances  of  firing  (Grossman,  1996;  Collins,  2007;  Marshall,  
1947,  du  Picq,  1880).  One  can  imagine  a  kind  of  fulcrum,  that  as  the  
soldier  moves  closer  to  the  kills,  they  become  hesitant;  closer  to  either  
their  fellows  or  superiors,  and  more  like  to  kill.  If  this  is  a  worst  of  two  
evils  scenario,  it  implies  tension  within  the  individual.  Otherwise,  the  
choice  would  be  simple  and  quick.  For  Grossman,  this  tension  is  an  
inversion  of  the  Hobbesian  perspective  put  forth  by  Steven  Pinker:  
'[inside]  the  mammalian  brain  of  most  healthy  human  beings  is  this  
powerful  resistance  to  killing  your  own  kind'  (Grossman,  2004).  Collins  
introduces  the  more  sociological  'non-­‐solidarity  entrainment'  perspective:  
'the  deepest  emotion  is  the  tension  of  conflict  itself...it  comes  from  trying  
to  act  against  another  person,  and  thus  against  one's  own  propensities  to  
fall  into  solidarity  with  that  person'  (Collins,  2008:  81–2,  see  Chapter  2).  
Both  these  observations  have  a  kind  of  descriptive  value  (per  
Boudon),  but  it  is  imperative  to  go  deeper.  The  use  of  a  tension  implies  
two  dynamic  forces,  and  yet  only  one  (that  'violence  is  hard')  has  been  
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explained,  or  even  described.  What  is  the  attraction  of  violence,  authority  
or  both?  In  order  to  better  understand  this  as  a  tension,  I  propose  that  the  
individual  is  choosing  between  two  essentially  identical  negative  feeling  
states,  identical  because  each  choice  implies  a  future  state  of  causal  
assignation  (blame).  'I  killed'  and  'I  disobeyed/let  my  buddies  down'  are  
future  scenarios  where  the  individual  has  violated  a  schema.  This  is  a  
damned  if  you  do  scenario,  whose  understanding  as  identical  causal  states  
('I  will  be  at  fault')  explains  the  tension  more  clearly.  As  future  states,  it  is  
only  proximation  (to  the  victim,  to  the  authority)  that  causes  one  version  
to  be  overridden  by  the  simple  virtue  of  being  more  comprehensible  to  
the  chooser.    
In  this  paradigm,  feelings  arise  from  thoughts,  more  specifically  
causal  conclusions.  We  have  examined  the  ways  in  which  many  people  
experience  negative  feelings,  specifically  related  to  their  perceived  
responsibility  in  another's  death  (or  the  loss  of  a  child,  or  an  act  of  
cowardice,  and  so  on).  This  feeling,  sometimes  caused  guilt  or  shame,  
arises  only  in  combination  of  an  event  and  an  causal  assignation  of  guilt.  In  
making  sense,  especially  about  results  that  invoke  strong  feelings,  we  
assign  an  actor,  even  if  that  actor  is  ourselves.    
However,  these  feelings  exist  via  a  past  event,  as  in  the  PTSD  
experienced  by  the  veterans  discussed  above.  In  terms  of  choice,  the  
feeling  must  be  anticipated  as  a  future  situation.  This  has  been  
colloquially,  but  imprecisely,  referred  to  a  'fear'  ('I  was  afraid  of  being  seen  
as  a  coward').  One  could  argue  that  the  anticipation  of  a  feeling  is  a  
feeling,  perhaps  future  pluperfect  guilt  ('will  have  had  done').  In  other  
words,  the  imagination  of  the  future  event  of  self-­‐designated  causal  
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agency  (guilt)  itself  creates  a  present-­‐time  feeling.  Although  interesting,  
and  possibly  a  factor  in  choice  (that  strong  feelings  invoked  may  have  add-­‐
on  cognitive  effects  as  we  saw  with  the  uncertainty  experienced  by  
individuals  in  Chapter  5),  this  discussion  must  be  saved  for  another  day.  
What  matters  here  is  not  so  much  the  feeling,  but  that  the  future  
experience  can  be  replicated  cognitively—it  arises  from  a  particular  set  of  
circumstances  that  can  be  comprehended  or  scenarized.  There  is  a  
schemic  outcome  (violation  of  role,  death,  completion  of  goal,  etc.),  each  
of  which  has  an  actor  assigned.  In  terms  of  choice  (and  thus  anticipation),  
it's  less  important  that  we  would  feel  'guilt'  or  'shame'  over  killing  than  it  
is  that  we  can  anticipate  that  we  would.    
Rational  choice  theory  operates  on  the  principle  of  instrumentality.  
The  idea  that  one  choice  is  less  optimal  than  the  other  relies  not  only  on  
the  idea  that  one  choice  is  instrumentally  superior  (say,  more  money),  but  
that  this  outcome  can  be  understood  by  the  chooser.  When  dealing  with  
complex  probabilistic  outcomes,  critiques  within  the  field  have  arisen  over  
whether  the  individuals  were  choosing  sub-­‐optimally,  or  simply  weren't  
able  to  do  the  mathematics  required  to  answer  the  question.  For  example,  
a  sample  of  female  veterans  found  that  only  16  percent  could  answer  
three  simple  probabilistic  questions,  converting  a  percentage  to  a  
proportion  (one  percent  to  10  in  1000),  a  proportion  into  a  percentage  
(100  in  1,000  to  10  percent),  and  to  estimate  how  many  out  of  1,000  coin  
tosses  would  come  up  heads  (Schwartz  et  al.  1997:  967).  Even  in  a  sample  
screened  for  higher  education,  only  80  percent  of  respondents  answered  
'Which  represents  the  larger  risk:  one  percent,  five  percent,  or  10  
percent?'  correctly.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  subjects  didn't  know  that  
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one  was  less  than  10,  merely  that  the  question  could  be  interpreted  as  
inversion  of  risk.  Such  findings  obviously  call  into  question  many  studies  of  
optimality  within  rational  choice,  that  bias  may  simply  be  confusion.  
Jon  Elster  has  defined  an  action  to  be  rational  as  follows:  'An  action  is  
rational,  in  this  scheme,  if  it  meets  three  optimality  requirements:  the  
action  must  be  optimal,  given  the  beliefs;  the  beliefs  must  be  as  well  
supported  as  possible,  given  the  evidence;  and  the  evidence  must  result  
from  an  optimal  investment  in  information  gathering'  (Elster,  2007:  191,  
see  Chapter  2).  In  this  case,  beliefs  must  take  comprehensibility  into  
account:  the  choice  or  outcome  is  understood.  This  facet  goes  beyond  the  
question  of  subjectivity  that  Elster  is  attempting  to  address.  This  is  why  
the  schemic  approach  has  been  integrated  into  the  anticipated  feeling  
state  theory  within  this  thesis.  The  point  of  schema,  both  theoretically  and  
for  the  individual,  is  the  ease  in  which  it  is  understood.  It  is  a  binary:  
something  is  either  in  or  out  of  place,  which  in  turn  is  able  to  define  
someone  or  something  the  agent  of  blame  or  cause.  Returning  to  the  
effect  of  distance  of  authority  and  killing,  each  scenario  (killer/coward)  
presents  more  clearly  as  the  moment  of  choice  approaches.  As  the  
situation  increases  in  comprehensibility,  so  too  the  feeling,  which  finally  
motivates  the  choice  in  the  moment.    
As  stated  in  the  opening  chapter,  the  strongest  evidence  for  S.L.A.  
Marshall's  assertion  that  soldiers  did  not  commonly  fire  during  combat  in  
World  War  II  are  examples  from  other  academic  and  historical  fields.  One  
such  example  can  be  found  in  rape  resistance  studies.  For  a  preamble,  it  
must  be  understood  that  the  majority  of  rapes  occur  in  instances  where  
the  victim  knows  their  attacker—78  percent  by  a  non-­‐stranger,  38  percent  
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by  a  friend  or  acquaintance  (USDOJ,  2005).  In  this  instance,  'women  who  
were  less  concerned  about  the  offender’s  judgment,  engaged  in  less  self-­‐
blame,  and  had  greater  resentment  were  more  likely  to  use  more  
resistance'  (Nurius  et  al.,  2004  quoted  in  Ullman,  2007:  421).  Within  the  
context  of  agent  causality,  each  of  these  three  factors  are  assignations  of  
blame,  where  positive  self-­‐assignation  was  a  factor  in  resistance,  while  
negative  designation  ('self-­‐blame',  'offender's  judgment')  produced  the  
opposite.    
Rape  is  both  a  risky  and  perfect  subject  for  the  attribution  of  blame,  
since  blame  is  itself  a  topic  within  rape  studies,  that  it  is  a  crime  unique  for  
the  way  in  which  society  and  the  judicial  system  focuses  on  the  mistakes  
the  victim  made  (Krah  the  evider  the  former;  Feild,  1978  for  the  latter,  see  
Grubb  and  Harrower,  2008  for  an  overview).  Although  over  30  years  old,  
Feild's  study  even  found  'No  differences...between  the  police  and  rapists  
on  behalf  of  the  attitudinal  dimensions'  (Field,  1978:  156),  including  
'victim  precipitation'.  The  idea  that  the  actual  perpetrator  and  the  justice  
system  can  hold  the  victim  responsible  has  further  implications  for  the  
arbitrary  yet  powerful  way  in  which  agency  can  be  assigned.    
Likewise,  with  the  victims  of  any  genocide,  it  is  taboo  to  even  discuss  
the  idea  of  physical  resistance.  This  is  known  in  popular  parlance  as  
'blaming  the  victim',  which  one  could  argue  I  am  in  fact  doing.  However,  
the  subject  is  the  cognitive  nature  of  blame  itself,  making  both  the  taboo  
and  its  violation  an  artifact  of  causal  agent  reasoning.  That  is  to  say,  there  
is  a  strong  difference  between  finding  actual  responsibility  (or  more  
neutrally,  implementable  methods  to  reduce  violence  of  any  kind)  and  the  
feeling  we  get  when  we  assign  blame,  either  to  ourselves  or  to  someone  
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else:  feelings  that  in  many  instances,  rule  our  decision-­‐making  processes.  
In  fact,  it  could  be  said  that  our  avoidance  of  blaming  the  victim  has  
prevented  the  closer  scrutiny  of  the  operation  of  blame  in  the  furtherance  
of  violence.  The  idea  is  that  soldiers  can  both  kill  and  be  blameless,  just  as  
rape  victims  can  be  perceived  as  guilty,  would  indicate,  at  the  very  least,  
some  type  of  causal  misperception  at  work.  Such  debates  are  closed  when  
we  blame  the  blamer,  instead  of  attempting  to  address  the  feelings  
involved  in  these  events,  and  their  understanding  in  the  aftermath.    
From  a  purely  practical  perspective,  there  is  a  second  problem  in  
victim  blaming  in  that  non-­‐victim  categories,  like  police  and  soldiers,  can  
easily  fall  into  the  same  passive  behaviors.  Randall  Collins  uses  the  
example  of  the  hitman,  who  encounters  little  resistance  when  killing  his  
counterpart:    
'The  rival  hitman,  who  presumably  has  some  of  the  same  
techniques,  recognizes  what  is  being  done,  but  is  unable  to  
do  anything  about  it.  He  proceeds  to  give  in  emotionally,  
falling  for  the  tactics  of  being  calmed  down  by  a  deception  
that  neither  hitman  really  believes  in;  he  shows  unwanted  
moments  of  fear,  as  he  bargains  and  pleads  for  his  life;  
having  lost  emotional  control,  he  even  shits  in  his  pants—
like  many  policemen  and  soldiers  under  fire'  (Collins,  2008:  
459).  
  
Collins'  assertions  are  confirmed  by  other  examples:  'Soviet  POWs,  
young  militarymen  with  organization,  and  leadership,  and  initial  vigor,  
died  passively  in  German  camps'  (Jones,  2010:  248).  The  massacre  on  
Nanjing,  the  annihilation  of  Carthage,  and  of  course,  the  case  study  of  this  
thesis—the  passive  soldier—all  provide  further  evidence  that  'victims'  can  
exist  both  inside  and  outside  authority  structures.  Although,  notably,  
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soldiers  were  at  the  core  of  some  instances  of  resistance  (at  Sobibor,  
Czechoslovakia,  etc.),  there  is  no  one-­‐to-­‐one  correlation  between  military  
or  violence  training,  and  resistance.  
For  Collins,  this  is  an  example  of  the  sociological  nature  of  violence,  
that  training  or  personality  is  not  as  important  as  the  situation,  which  
produces  a  victim  and  a  perpetrator,  and  each  takes  on  the  role.  Collins  
describes  this  as  an  exchange  of  emotional  energy,  which  while  
descriptive,  fails  at  the  analytical  level  (i.e.  'what  is  an  emotion?').  What  
exactly  is  going  on  in  the  conclusions  and  feeling  states  of  the  individuals?  
There  are  many  feeling  factors  here,  each  with  an  influence,  and  while  the  
analysis  offered  is  neither  simple  nor  complete,  it  is  consistent:  choice,  
sense-­‐making  and  feeling  follow  a  set  of  rules.  Put  most  generally,  
uncertainty  is  less  desirable  than  self-­‐assignation  is  less  desirable  than  
other-­‐assignation,  with  sense  being  made  by  schemas.  
Taking  the  case  studies  above,  the  powerful  unfamiliarity  of  battle  
detailed  in  the  previous  chapter  could  be  extended  to  any  crime  or  
political  arrest  or  genocide:  like  the  first  time  in  battle,  the  experience  is  
so  new  and  so  uncertain  that  it  leads  to  basic  immobility.  Furthermore,  
and  in  keeping  with  anticipated  feeling  states,  immobility  and  submission  
on  the  part  of  a  victim  of  deadly  violence  goes  beyond  simple  future  
causal  assignation  ('I  don't  want  to  take  another  life'),  but  combines  with  a  
very  specific  and  immediate  bodily  feeling  (he's  (sic)  got  a  gun  on  me,  
which  could  shoot,  which  would  hurt).  It  is  a  question  of  proximity  and  
comprehensibility.  The  immediate  fear  of  violence  (being  hurt  or  shot)  
combined  with  the  future  blame  state  forms  a  kind  of  procrastination,  
until  the  moment  when  it  is  too  late,  when  the  death  blow  comes.  
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The  passivity  exhibited  in  the  case  of  violence  victims  is  not  a  literal  
freezing,  but  a  compliance.  As  the  people  make  sense,  either  in  the  
moment  or  afterwards,  there  is  an  assessment  of  causal  agency:  either  of  
the  self,  in  the  case  of  victims,  or  in  passing  it  along  to  an  authority  figure,  
as  in  the  case  of  many  perpetrators  of  violence.  In  considering  the  hitman  
in  Collins'  example,  the  two  individuals  share  many  traits:  both  killers,  and  
both  familiar  with  what's  going  to  happen.  The  important  difference  isn't  
the  vague  assignment  of  'roles',  but  the  presence  of  authority.  Simply  put,  
one  has  orders,  the  other  does  not.  One  has  the  ability  to  abdicate  
responsibility,  the  other  does  not.  With  the  inclusion  of  the  hitman,  the  
soldier  and  the  citizen,  the  common  factor  is  the  presence  (or  absence)  of  




Let  us  say  that  there  is  a  feeling  of  relief  when  the  soldier  takes  the  
oath,  or  follows  the  order,  knowing  that  a  future  blame  state  has  been  
avoided.  Even  though  the  individual  actually  experiences  blame,  in  the  
form  of  extreme  guilt  and  psychic  symptoms  of  PTSD,  the  choice  is  based  
on  an  anticipated  feeling  state,  rather  than  an  actual  feeling  outcome.  If  
the  soldier  can  both  attempt  to  avoid,  and  then  experience  blame  over  
killing,  it  is  now  imperative  to  ask:  how  do  those  giving  orders  manage  or  
experience  their  cognitive  feeling  states?  Though  we  would  be  right  to  be  
suspicious  of  'personality  types',  a  brief,  and  possibly  polemic,  
examination  of  sociopathy  in  leadership  may  reveal  how  the  cycle  of  
abdication  operates.    
      -­‐219-­‐  
 
Given  the  recent  economic  pattern  of  overinvestment  and  
inflationary  collapse,  it  should  be  no  surprise  that  those  ostensibly  
responsible  are  singled  out  for  study.  One  such  paper  found  that  business  
leaders  have  a  higher  incidence  of  sociopathy  than  the  general  population,  
with  future  business  leaders  rating  four  times  higher  in  psychopathic  traits  
(Babiak  et  al.,  2010).  Likewise,  a  study  of  604  participants  in  Australia  
found  such  traits  an  advantage  in  entrepreneurship:  'even  when  the  
experimental  conditions  changed  from  rewarding  to  punishing,  
participants  who  were  high  in  either  psychopathic  tendencies  or  
entrepreneurial  intentions  continued  to  behave  as  if  still  rewarded'  (Palin,  
2013).  Entrepreneurs  were  also  subject  to  another  classification:  
narcissism.  Steve  Jobs  or  Bill  Gates  are  'productive  narcissists',  where  their  
ego  both  drives  them  and  allows  them  to  ignore  the  feelings  of  others  
(Maccoby,  2003).    
There  is  a  certain  absurdity  to  this  claims,  the  imagination  of  'snakes  
in  suits'.  Even  if  true,  those  in  prison  rate  25  times  higher  on  the  Hare  PCL-­‐
R  checklist  than  the  general  population  (or  six  times  higher  than  business  
leaders),  the  tool  used  above  to  rate  sociopathy.  Furthermore,  this  form  
of  cognitive  appraisal  conveniently  ignores  a  version  of  the  ideological  
question  posed  above:  if  they're  all  psychopaths,  why  would  we  do  what  
they  say?  There  are  additional  legitimacy  concerns:  as  with  many  
instances  of  social  science,  the  second  study  has  not  yet  been  peer  
reviewed,  although  it  has  been  heavily  quoted  in  the  media.  However,  
there  is  a  larger  truth  to  be  had  in  these  assertions  of  mental  disorder  in  
positions  of  power.  If  we  forgo  the  naming  characteristics  of  terms  like  
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sociopath,  psychopath27  and  narcissist,  we  can  instead  focus,  very  
narrowly,  on  the  causal  conclusions  of  what  occurs  in  these  types  of  
decisions.  That  is,  instead  of  investigating  the  quantitative  aspects  of  how  
many,  of  what  type  and  in  what  environment  psychopaths  may  or  may  not  
be  prevalent,  we  can  think  qualitatively:  how  particular  traits  associated  
with  these  personality  types  function  within  an  authority  structure.  
These  personalities  depend  on  a  peculiar  sense  of  self-­‐designated  
agent  causality.  Martha  Stout  describes  sociopathy  as  follows:  'Imagine  no  
struggles  with  shame,  not  a  single  one  in  your  whole  lifec  and  pretend  
that  the  concept  of  responsibility  is  unknown  to  you'  (Stout,  2005:  1).  On  
the  less  florid  side  of  the  spectrum,  the  originator  of  the  modern  
conception  of  psychopathy,  Hervey  Cleckley,  describes  'him'  as  follows:  
'Whether  judged  in  the  light  of  his  conduct,  of  his  attitude,  or  of  material  
elicited  in  psychiatric  examination,  he  shows  almost  no  sense  of  shame'  
(Cleckley,  1988:  343).  Psychopathic  subjects  further  show  'poor  judgment  
and  failure  to  learn  by  experience',  another  criterion  included  in  the  Hare  
PCL-­‐R,  above  (Skilling  et  al.,  2002:  35).  Both  perspectives  outline  a  very  
specific  trait:  a  lack  of  causal  assignation  to  the  self,  and  sometimes  failure  
to  even  make  causal  conclusions  at  all.  This  can  be  seen  not  as  a  moral  or  
even  a  conventionally  psychological  question,  but  a  cognitive  one:  the  
instance  of  being  unable  to  make  a  particular  type  of  agent  causality  
(blame).  
This  is  not  a  statement  that  all  leaders  are  psychopaths  (or  extreme  
antisocial/psychopathic  types,  as  named  in  the  current  DSM-­‐V).  Although  
                                                
23.  These  terms  are  technically  interchangeable  at  this  time,  as  the  recent  DSM-­‐V  has  
reclassified  this  disorder  under  the  'antisocial/psychopathic  type'.  
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it  is  likely  that  those  in  positions  of  authority  exhibit  these  traits  in  larger  
numbers  than  the  general  population,  the  common  lack  of  basic  cognitive  
function  of  a  true  sociopath  precludes  this.  In  fact,  the  proponent  of  this  
theory  even  notes  that  actual  psychopathology  is,  in  the  long  term,  
damaging  to  the  companies  involved:  'employees  high  on  psychopathic  
traits  will  exhibit  few  behaviors  that  facilitate  organizational  functioning  
and  many  behaviors  that  harm  the  organization  and  its  members'  
(Mathieu  et  al.,  2013:  301).    
If  the  focus  is  on  the  traits,  and  not  the  individuals,  one  is  able  to  
explain  why  there  might  be  a  higher  preponderance  of  this  behavior  
within  higher  ranks  of  authority.  Here,  the  leader  has  a  very  specific  
cognitive  function  within  the  group.  If  the  larger  element  of  the  group  is  
attempting  to  avoid  the  negative  feelings  of  self-­‐attributed  causality  (as  
seen  with  the  soldiers  raising  their  hands  to  the  oath),  the  missing  puzzle  
piece  would  be  those  individuals,  situations  or  combinations  that  allow  
the  head  of  the  hierarchal  order  not  to  cognate  the  scenario  that  leads  to  
that  feeling.    
This  is  not  a  matter  of  blame  ('all  leaders  are  sociopaths!'),  but  a  
question  of  cognitive  resource  management.  Though  his  ethical  argument  
retains  this  blaming  problem,  note  the  way  in  which  Hebert  Kelman  
constructs  his  case  against  'transcendent  missions'  in  central  authority:    
'What  is  important  to  note  is  that,  according  to  this  view,  
the  freedom  from  all  restraints  devolves  on  the  central  
decision  maker  from  a  higher  authority,  the  state,  of  which  
he  is  merely  the  servant...  This  whole  doctrine  is,  of  course,  
extremely  dangerous  because  of  its  total  circularity...  In  
effect,  this  doctrine  authorizes  central  decision  makers  to  
use  their  power  without  restraint  by  invoking  a  
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transcendent  mission  that  is  not  subject  to  principles  of  
personal  morality'  (Kelman,  1973:  45–6).    
  
When  examined,  narrowly,  from  the  point  of  feeling,  this  is  an  attempt  to  
avoid  feelings  of  responsibility  from  every  level  of  society.    
  President  Harry  Truman  is  famous  for  at  least  two  things:  the  
decision  to  drop  the  atomic  bombs  at  Nagasaki  and  Hiroshima,  and  a  
plaque  on  his  desk  that  read  the  'the  buck  stops  here',  possibly  inspired  by  
that  same-­‐self  decision.  Reading  through  his  diaries  and  letters  during  July  
and  August  1945,  there  are  two  moments  of  note.  On  25  July  1945,  the  
decision  had  been  made  to  drop  the  bombs,  but  'military  objectives  and  
soldiers  and  sailors  are  the  target  and  not  women  and  children'  (Ferrell,  
1980:  55).  By  August  11th,  obviously,  the  decision  had  changed,  motivated  
by  a  kind  of  vengeance,  the  'murder  of  our  prisoners  of  war'  and,  six  years  
after  the  fact,  the  bombing  of  Pearl  Harbor  (Truman,  1945).29      
In  the  end,  there  is  no  stated  self-­‐recrimination:  'I  have  no  regrets,  
and,  under  the  same  circumstances,  I  would  do  it  again—and  this  letter  is  
not  confidential'  (Truman,  1963).  Leaving  aside  all  the  moral,  tactical  and  
political  second-­‐guessing  that  has  gone  on  in  the  years  since,  what  
matters  here  is  not  so  much  the  'regret',  but  the  way  in  which  the  field  
was  constructed  to  allow  a  decision.  'It  was  done  to  save  125,000  
youngsters  on  the  American  side'  (Truman,  1963).  Whether  or  not  this  
was  true  historically,  and  whether  or  not  it  is  true  that  Truman  personally  
didn't  feel  regret  over  the  decision,  it  serves  as  a  way  to  understand  how  
                                                
24.  For  the  structure  of  vengeance,  see  next  chapter.  
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future  states  of  responsibility  construct  a  matrix  in  which  authority  
decisions  are  made  and  then  followed.    
Truman  is  responsible  for  the  soldiers'  lives,  and  would  anticipate  his  
negative  feelings  if  he  did  not  drop  the  bomb.  He  gives  orders  to  the  
soldiers  who  drop  it,  who  are  absolved  of  blame  via  their  taking  of  the  
orders  from  someone  who  has  been  absolved  of  blame  by  their  existence.  
Leaving  aside  Kelman's  ethical  concerns,  the  problem  from  a  functionalist  
point  of  view  (the  actual  achievement  of  a  defined  instrumental  goal  
through  a  law  or  institution)  is  that  in  this  environment,  no  one  is  
responsible.  This  is  less  about  whether  or  not  there  are  'snakes  in  suits'  
than  to  reframe  the  debate  of  how  social  authority  operates:  according  to  
shifting  states  of  causal  attribution.  The  citizen  follows  the  rules  of  the  
state,  just  as  the  state  takes  its  mandate  from  its  citizenry.  The  buck  stops  
nowhere.    
               §  §  §  
This  is  a  gross  simplification  that  no  one  is  responsible.  Obviously,  
other  feelings  and  thoughts  can  override  our  potential  anticipations  of  
responsibility,  leading  to  a  variety  of  actions  and  choices.  Actions  that  lead  
to  self-­‐recrimination  are  nothing  if  not  educational,  even  if  it  is  a  child  
touching  a  hot  stove,  and  are  the  functionalist  definitions  of  guilt  versus  
shame.  Yet,  there  is  a  strong  reality  to  this  circular  dynamic:  that  the  
follower  abdicates  to  the  leader  via  orders,  the  leader  via  mandate.  The  
positive  associations  of  relieving  oneself  of  future  blame  states  are  not  
rational  in  the  conventional  sense,  but  they  operate  under  the  same  
principle  of  optimality—the  best  future  state  is  chosen.  The  problem  is  
one  of  schema,  that  the  safety  of  the  individual's  physical  self  is  only  one  
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of  many  'self-­‐schemas'  (masculine  self,  obedient  self,  familial  self,  heroic  
self  and  so  on),  and  under  many  circumstances,  even  in  the  everyday  
experience  of  driving  automobiles,  the  physical  self  schema  is  
deprioritized.    
This  chapter  has  focused  on  states  of  internal  causal  assignation.  On  
one  hand,  'blame'  is  preferable  to  the  chaos  of  unknowing;  on  the  other,  
its  future  experience  is  something  we  can  both  cognate  and  attempt  to  
choose  against.  For  some  individuals,  this  can  mean  passivity  in  avoiding  
the  future  state  perceived  in  the  violation  of  killing;  for  others,  the  future  
state  of  having  failed  an  authority  figure  is  equally  to  be  avoided.  Another  
method  to  escape  these  anticipated  states  is  via  de-­‐cognition;  the  self-­‐
delusion  that  Elster  speaks  of  is  in  fact  a  choice  to  avoid  feeling.  If  feelings  
are  the  end,  their  influence  on  the  structure  of  authority—on  both  sides—
is  powerful  indeed.    
Yet,  future  states  of  negative  self  agency  only  partially  explain  
violence;  indeed,  the  cycle  of  abdication  discussed  above  is  largely  only  
the  sphere  in  which  it  operates.  Future  blame  states  are  passed  along  
endlessly  until  no  one  is  to  blame,  but  there  must  be  a  motive  to  act  in  
order  to  begin  this  process  in  the  first  place.  One  impulse—anger—is  
nearly  undeniable  as  a  motive  for  violence.  Although  ostensibly  the  
subject  of  the  next  chapter,  it  is  the  cognitive  sense  that  anger  promises  
within  choice  that  is  the  real  motivation.  The  cycle  of  violence  is  
paradoxically  marked  by  the  feeling  of  order  it  anticipates,  followed  by  the  
reality  of  chaos  it  engenders.    
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Chapter  7:   Working  through  Anger:  Three  Facets  of  Cognitive  
Feeling  Resolution    
  
'The  paranoid  mentality  is  far  more  coherent  than  the  real  
world,  since  it  leaves  no  room  for  mistakes,  failures,  or  
ambiguities.  It  is,  if  not  wholly  rational,  at  least  intensely  
rationalistic;  it  believes  it  is  up  against  an  enemy  who  is  as  
infallibly  rational  as  he  is  totally  evil'  Richard  Hofstadter.30  
  
In  one  sense,  this  is  a  chapter  on  anger,  a  seriously  studied  emotion,  
especially  in  regard  to  violence.  But  a  better  way  to  understand  this  might  
be  to  say  that  the  topic  at  hand  is  actually  the  particular  structure  of  
anger,  and  the  way  in  which  it  seeks  completion.  This  manifests  in  the  way  
in  which  anger  is  first  experienced:  not  by  a  perceived  violation,  but  as  the  
motive  to  that  violation.  A  crime  is  not  a  crime  without  intent,  even  if  that  
intent  is  formed  after  the  fact.  The  second  manifestation  is  more  obvious,  
although  just  as  insidious;  the  commonality  with  which  we  expect  a  
resolution  to  injustice  in  the  form  of  vengeance.  What  is  peculiar  is  the  
way  in  which  the  impugned  external  agent  is  less  the  object  of  action  than  
their  motives,  which  must  be  constructed,  reconstructed.  If  the  body  of  
the  offender  is  destroyed,  this  is  merely  one  way  to  redirect  or  erase  the  
aberrant  motive.    
It  would  not  be  fair  to  say  that  all  or  even  most  violence  exists  within  
this  particular  motive-­‐transformative  aspect.  In  keeping  with  experiences  
that  are  not  called  emotions,  but  probably  are,  war  is  often  fought,  and  
certainly  planned,  in  low  affect  resolution.  Like  a  game  or  film,  there  is  a  
                                                
25.  Hofstadter,  Richard  (1967).  The  paranoid  style  in  American  politics.  New  York:  
Random  House,  p.  36.  
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transgression,  and  a  mechanical  way  to  right  it.  At  least  some  of  the  
pleasure  of  violence  can  be  understood  within  this  paradigm,  a  goal  set,  
then  achieved.  These  three  facets—of  assigning  motives,  of  imagined  
completion  through  vengeance,  and  finally  of  resolution  as  a  confirmation  
of  agency  as  seen  in  both  media  and  violence—each  share  the  pattern  of  a  
broken  schema  and  the  imagination  of  that  feelings  will  resolve.  
The  fifth,  sixth  and  seventh  chapters  of  this  thesis  are  an  attempt  to  
explicate  how  feelings  might  be  understood  in  relation  to  causal  thoughts.  
Each  chapter  can  be  used  to  describe  a  stage  in  the  process.  The  fifth  
chapter  dealt  with  the  strong  negative  feelings  arising  from  perceptions  of  
uncertainty,  what  might  be  called  pre-­‐schemic.  Until  we  know  what  it  is,  
we  are  out  of  sorts,  in  both  the  feeling  and  cognitive  senses  of  the  phrase.  
This  feeling  is  to  be  avoided  by  making  sense,  even  if  that  sense  is  
arbitrary  or  contradictory.  In  many  cases,  avoiding  this  state  by  knowing  
comes  with  a  vestigial  association:  the  assignation  of  causality  to  an  agent.  
The  assignations  are  very  often  equally  arbitrary,  and  many  times  direct  
towards  ourselves,  as  seen  in  Chapter  6.  Self-­‐designated  causality  (blame)  
is  a  state  to  be  avoided,  although  not  as  much  as  the  state  of  not  knowing.  
Remembering  that  an  event  can  be  perceived  as  quickly  as  a  fifth  of  a  
second,  this  could  be  understood  simply,  but  not  inaccurately,  in  three  
stages:  
What  is  it?    
Who  did  it?    
What  were  they  thinking?    
  
As  we  reach  the  end  of  this  theory,  as  well  as  the  final  step  in  the  
cognitive  feeling  process,  imagine  a  scenario  to  address  each  stage  in  turn.  
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A  man  dreams  about  his  dead  father.  No  event,  in  the  instrumental  sense,  
has  occurred,  but  the  schemic  fit  (father=alive)  generates  a  feeling  
(happiness,  frustration,  depending  on  which  schema  the  father  fits,  or  
modulation,  as  the  subject  fits  the  father=alive  input  into  a  variety  of  
schemas/memories).  This  is  merely  to  demonstrate  that  when  talking  
about  choice  and  cognitive  feeling  generation,  we  are  not  talking  about  
discrete  events,  but  assessments,  what  have  also  been  known  as  
appraisals.  Whatever  ontology  of  choice  there  might  be  remains  internal,  
not  instrumental,  or  rather,  an  appraisal  model  explains  both  instrumental  
and  internal  based-­‐choice,  whereas  conventional  rationality  can  only  
explain  the  former.    
The  man  awakens,  and  for  the  sake  of  moving  procedurally  to  the  
next  step,  has  forgotten  his  dream.  The  house  is  there,  his  clock  is  there.  
Everything  is  as  it  should  be:  a  schemic  fit.  Not  a  strong  positive  feeling,  
but  certainly  not  a  negative  one.  As  he  walks  downstairs,  a  break.  The  
door  to  the  study  is  closed.  The  first  appraisal:  no  appraisal.  I  don't  know  
why,  or  what,  or  who,  and  fear  (strong  sense  of  schemic  uncertainty).  
Then  he  remembers,  my  mother  is  staying  overnight.  Relief  (schemic  fit:  I  
know),  and  after  the  relief,  embarrassment  (how  silly  of  me).  As  with  the  
dream,  this  cognitive  assessment  was  of  the  subject's  own  feeling—not  an  
event  or  an  appraisal  of  an  event,  but  an  internal  reaction  to  an  appraisal.  
In  this  case,  the  negative  self-­‐designated  causality  (how  silly  of  me)  arises  
from  an  internal  feeling  state,  or  the  appraisal  that  led  to  it,  or  both  (I  was  
afraid,  but  for  no  reason:  subject=stupid).    
The  man  walks  into  the  living  room,  to  find  the  television  and  stereo  
gone,  and  the  back  door  open.  After  an  initial  reaction  of  uncertainty  
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(what  is  this?),  he  realizes  that  he  has  been  burgled.  He  feels  a  sense  of  
violation,  disbelief  or  fear,  followed  by  a  sense  of  anger.  Let's  assume  that  
our  man  is  in  the  30  percent  of  men  (women  report  a  higher  sense  of  
violation,  for  example)  who  recall  feeling  angry  when  discovering  a  
burglary  (Maguire,  1980:  263).  Breaking  down  anger  into  its  cognitive  
parts,  instead  of  'anger',  there  is  a  schemic  break,  an  assessment  of  
causality  (an  external  agent),  and  finally,  an  imagination  of  intent:  who  
would  do  this?  And  then,  why?    
It  could  be  said  that  we  will  be  working  through  anger  (so  to  speak),  
with  the  important  admonition  that  many  feelings  discussed  are  not  
traditionally  linked  with  this  named  emotion.  Other  designated  causality,  
then,  has  (at  least)  two  stages:  attribution  and  resolution.  The  first,  and  
first  section,  resides  in  manufacturing  intent,  that  when  there  is  upset  
attributed  to  an  external  agent,  this  attribution  requires  a  motive.  
Sometimes,  this  motive  corresponds  to  the  other's  actual  intent,  
sometimes  it  does  not,  but  as  with  self-­‐designated  causality,  this  is  besides  
the  point.  It  is  always  manufactured  as  it  must  originate  from  within  the  
injured  subject.  The  second  section  deals  with  the  distinct  solution  offered  
by  other  designated  causality.  Unlike  self-­‐designated  causality,  you  can  
erase  intent.  This  is  the  'teaching'  element  of  injustice,  the  'I'll  show  
you/them',  the  'only  way  they'll  learn'  that  often  precedes  the  use  of  
violence.  Violence  tricks  us;  since  it  has  been  defined  here  as  concrete,  the  
physical  act  as  opposed  to  the  social,  and  so  our  focus  remains  on  the  
instrumental.  Yet  this  is  a  kind  of  blindness,  as  the  contested  areas  are  less  
feelings,  or  even  concrete  actions,  but  states  of  knowledge.  When  it  
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comes  to  violence,  what  matters  is  that  the  intent  has  been  redirected  or  
altered.  Erasing  the  person  is  merely  one  of  the  ways  to  do  this.  
Yet,  it  would  be  simply  inaccurate  to  say  that  war  is  fought  in  anger;  
this  is  rarely  the  case,  especially  for  those  actually  fighting.  Nor  are  most  
decisions  to  go  to  war  made  (entirely)  under  this  anticipated  feeling  of  
completion  (what  might  be  called  vengeance).  The  avoidance  of  loaded  
terms  like  anger  will  again  pay  dividends  as  other  designated  causality  
leads  to  instrumental  solutions  in  war,  the  feeling  of  completion.  Like  the  
Sudoku  puzzle,  war  lends  itself  to  resolution  through  self-­‐agency  
confirmation,  sometimes  with  very  low  affect—as  with  the  planning  of  
war—sometimes  with  very  high,  as  with  the  killing  that  war  necessitates.  
This  is  the  arena  of  territories,  populations,  PowerPoint  presentations,  
firing  rates,  war  games,  numbers,  troop  carriers  and  so  on.  Logistics  offer  
feeling  solutions  not  because  of  our  violent  natures,  or  inexplicable  
feelings,  but  because  of  their  near  numerical  clarity.  Violence,  in  the  form  
of  killing,  offers  the  ultimate  feeling  solution,  the  binary  switch  from  a  one  
to  a  zero,  and  more  importantly,  the  clear  confirmation  of  our  own  agency  
in  doing  so,  as  well  as  the  very  concept  of  agency  itself.  The  cycle  of  
violence,  so  often  lamented,  could  be  seen  as  a  reciprocal  relation  
between  the  simplicity  of  the  cognitive  feeling  state,  and  the  reality  of  the  
complex  interconnected  social  world,  where  death  is  anything  but  the  








This  last  aspect,  the  intent,  may  seem  incidental  at  first,  but  it  is  in  
fact  the  most  crucial  aspect  to  other  assignated  causality:  what  were  they  
thinking?  This  can  be  expressed  legally  in  the  way  in  which  crime  is  
prosecuted  through  mens  rea.  A  man  spills  a  drink,  causing  another  to  fall  
to  his  death.  Without  intent,  there  is  no  crime.  He  pours  the  drink,  and  
there  is.  The  action  is  the  same;  the  intent  determines  the  crime.  As  
previously  mentioned,  James  Averill's  study  of  anger  found  an  identical  
centrality  to  the  concept  of  intent.  It  was  his  stated  goal  to  contradict  'the  
presumed  link  between  anger  and  hatred'  (Averill,  1983:  1149),  and  as  
such,  focused  on  the  causes  of  anger,  as  reported  by  the  individuals  
experiencing  it.  Not  surprisingly,  Averill  found  that  'the  typical  instigation  
to  anger  is  a  value  judgment.  More  than  anything  else,  anger  is  an  
attribution  of  blame'  (Averill,  1983:  1150).  More  significantly  was  the  final  
shared  element:  'But  the  major  issue  for  the  person  in  the  street  is  not  the  
specific  nature  of  the  instigating  event;  it  is  the  perceived  justification  for  
the  instigator's  behavior.  Anger,  for  the  person  in  the  street,  is  an  
accusation'  (Averill,  1983:  1149).  
Cognitive  and  appraisal  psychology  has  made  impugned  intent  a  
crucial  component  of  anger.  It  may  even  be  possible  to  credit  Averill's  
research  with  this,  as  the  focus  arises  around  this  time,  in  the  early  1980s,  
and  it  continues  to  be  referenced  in  works  of  cognitive  psychology  even  by  
those  who  ignore  his  central  thesis  (Power  and  Dalgleish,  2008).  Bernard  
Weiner  uses  'controllability'  as  a  major  aspect  of  anger:  'an  ascription  of  a  
negative,  self-­‐related  outcome  or  event  to  factors  controllable  by  others'  
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(Weiner,  1985:  562),  with  factors  of  attribution  including  locus,  stability  
and  controllability.  Given  Averill's  work,  this  distinction  may  be  semantic:  
'Intent  and  control  generally  covary  highly...  Individuals  intend  to  do  what  
is  controllable,  and  can  control  what  is  intended'  (Weiner,  1983:  554;  see  
also  Weiner,  1986).    
For  Kelly  Shaver,  blameworthiness  is  the  central  motive,  with  the  five  
variables  being  causality,  intentionality,  coercion,  appreciation,  and  
foreknowledge  (Shaver,  1985).  Blameworthiness  can  even  be  a  factor  in  
blame,  as  odd  as  that  may  initially  sound.  One  survey  found  that  people  
were  between  twice  and  four  times  less  likely  to  attribute  blame  if  an  
automobile  accident  was  caused  by  a  neutral  act  (hiding  an  anniversary  
present),  or  an  immoral  one  (hiding  cocaine);  as  such,  'the  degree  of  
culpability  in  an  act  can  influence  perceptions  of  causation'  (Alicke,  1992:  
376).  
This  is  not  a  thesis  on  cognitive  psychology,  and,  much  like  basic  
emotions,  there  is  a  tendency  to  follow  the  rabbit  down  its  hole  over  
which  factors  cover  what  aspect  and  so  on;  although  the  subject  is  'trait'  
anger31;  see  Wilkowski  and  Robinson  (2008)  for  a  summary  of  attribution  
and  anger.  As  an  attempt  to  incorporate  feeling  into  rational  choice,  
however,  what  we  can  distill  from  these  theories  and  case  studies  is  the  
consistent  sense  that  the  object  of  anger  is  assigned  a  motive.  It  could  be  
said  that  we  manufacture  the  intent  of  the  object  of  anger  no  matter  
what;  as  an  internal  appraisal,  even  if  someone  explains  that  their  intent  
was  identical  to  the  one  that  we  assign,  we  still  must  credit  them.  But  the  
                                                
26.  State  versus  trait  refers  to  a  transitory  feeling  in  the  former,  and  a  tendency  in  the  
latter.  Obviously,  each  affects  the  other.  
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assignation  of  intent  goes  far  beyond  this  kind  of  Berkeleyian  sophistry,  in  
that  in  many  cases  the  intent  assigned  is  separate  from  the  object's.  For  
example,  as  Averill  attempted  to  disconnect  anger  from  hatred,  he  noted  
the  way  in  which  the  blame  agent  (or  anger  object)  was  well  known  to  the  
subject,  a  child,  or  spouse,  suggesting  the  intent  is  a  deviation  from  the  
established  relationship.  
More  significantly  is  the  way  in  which  inanimate  objects  were  easily  
imbued  with  intent:  'In  9  episodes  there  was  a  strong  tendency  to  
personify  the  target  and  imbue  it  with  human  characteristics'  (Averill,  
1983:  1149).  You  swing  a  hammer  and  accidentally  strike  your  thumb.  You  
didn't  intend  to  hit  your  thumb,  therefore  the  hammer  did.  Given  the  
pain,  it  is  a  reasonable  one-­‐to-­‐one  conclusion.  Likewise,  we  have  the  
capacity  to  imbue  a  non-­‐present  object,  i.e.  God,  with  intent  and  even  
existence,  with  one  study  finding  that  nonaffiliates  (including  atheists,  
agnostics,  and  those  reporting  "none"  for  religion)  reported  greater  anger  
toward  God  in  terms  of  lifetime  frequency'  than  believers  (Exline  et  al.,  
2011:  144).  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  study  found  that,  in  general,  
that  people  experience  more  positive  feelings  towards  God  than  
negative,32  but  the  negative  feelings  still  exist.  
At  the  beginning  of  the  violation,  one  can  see  the  near  instantaneous  
process  of  cognition  at  work  here,  what  is  sometimes  called  cognitive  
                                                
27.  Although  relations  of  cognitive  emotions  and  God  are  not  the  subject  of  the  
current  discussion,  these  positive  feelings  could  be  akin  to  the  abdication  of  self-­‐
designated  causality  found  in  the  earlier  discussions  of  authority,  as  when  fighter  pilots  
found  comfort  in  trusting  external  sources  like  their  plane,  crew  or  leaders.  The  
purpose  here  is  simply  to  establish  that  external  blame  agents  need  not  be  physically  
there  for  the  existence  of  anger.  
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dissonance.  Cognitive  dissonance  is  the  state,  occurring  'when  people  
believe  that  two  of  their  psychological  representations  are  inconsistent  
with  each  other'  (Cooper,  2007:  6).  Like  the  unsure  and  undefined  
experience  of  combat,  this  is  a  state  that  is  unpleasant  and  requires  
resolution.  The  concept  was  put  forth  over  50  years  ago  when  Leon  
Festinger  observed  a  doomsday  cult  on  the  day  after  their  predicted  
Armageddon.  As  people  who  believed  with  certainty  that  the  world  was  to  
end  on  December  21,  1955,  Festinger  predicted  that  they  would  find  a  
way  to  rewrite  their  beliefs  if  the  earth  survived.  It  did,  and  they  did  
(Cooper,  2007:  3).  For  Festinger,  the  need  to  resolve  inconsistency  was  
not  a  mere  impulse  or  desire,  but  a  drive:  'Just  as  hunger  impels  a  person  
to  eat,  so  does  dissonance  impel  a  person  to  change  his  opinions  or  his  
behavior'  (Festinger,  1962:  93).  
The  concept  of  cognitive  dissonance  confirms  the  previous  
theorization  of  pre-­‐schemic  feelings  as  strongly  negative,  that  uncertainty  
is  an  unpleasant  experience  that  leads  to  a  cognitive  resolution.  The  
concept  is  introduced  in  this  chapter  as  it  has  a  particular  history  with  
violence.  Within  genocide  studies,  the  cognitive  dissonance  is  seen  after  
the  fact,  as  part  of  the  denial  process:  'over  time  perpetrators  of  mass  
violence  further  devalue  their  victims  as  a  means  to  maintain  their  sense  
of  a  just  world  and  to  avoid  cognitive  dissonance'  (Woolf  and  Hulsizer,  
2005:  110;  see  also  'denialist'  stance,  Jones,  2010:  518).  In  this  framing,  
cognitive  dissonance  is  the  feeling,  and  dehumanization  is  the  means  to  
eliminate  it.  This  has  been  captured  evocatively  in  the  2013  film  The  Act  of  
Killing,  where  perpetrators  of  the  mass  killings  in  Indonesia  re-­‐enact  their  
murders  as  genre  plays.    
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But  given  the  function  of  anger,  it  makes  more  sense  to  see  it  the  
other  way  around.  That  is,  the  dissonance  occurs  before  the  acts  of  
violence,  in  the  form  of  schemic  interruption,  and  the  action  solution  
follows  through  causal  assignations  of  blame.  The  focus  on  cognitive  
dissonance  in  violence  is  much  like  PTSD,  seen—legitimately—as  a  
manifestation  of  psychic  reconciliation  between  an  ethical  self,  and  one  
who  has  killed.  Unfortunately,  within  this  context,  the  origin  of  genocide  
remains  a  kind  of  rational  black  box.  When  Alexander  Hinton  argues  for  
'psychosocial  dissonance'  in  the  case  of  Cambodia,  the  motives  for  the  
génocidaires  are  a  given,  almost  Machiavellian:  'the  Khmer  Rouge  
instituted  a  number  of  social  and  ideological  reforms  that  served  to  
facilitate  genocide  by  altering  the  environment  in  which  agents  of  death  
perpetrated  their  deeds'  (Hinton,  1996:  824).  For  Hinton,  the  attempt  to  
eliminate  a  threatening  other  group  is  an  uncomplicated  expression  of  the  
instrumental  goal  of  one's  own  group  to  survive,  despite  the  obvious  
strong  emotions  involved.    
Like  many  behaviors  that  have  been  examined  herein,  genocide  has  
been  categorized  along  the  pole  of  rational/irrational,  with  Hinton's  
examination  falling  on  the  former.  Arguably,  rational  choice  is  increasingly  
becoming  the  'most  popular'  approach,  in  opposition  to  the  'social-­‐
psychological'  (Kaufmann,  2006:  46–7).  The  dilemma  that  genocide  
presents—that  elites  benefit  while  those  under  their  authority  do  not—is  
explained  by  the  dual  strategic  action  of  personal  gain,  such  as  'looting,  
land  grabs,  and  personal  revenge'  or  the  possibility  'to  raise  their  in-­‐group  
status'  (Fearon  and  Laitin,  2000:  874.  For  a  more  comprehensive  overview  
and  critique  of  rationalist  perspectives  on  genocide,  see  Kaufmann,  2006).  
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Yet,  these  models  still  rely  on  emotion  to  function,  revenge  in  the  above  
case,  and  in  the  case  of  Slobodan  Milo  still  rely  ged  manipulation  of  Balkan  
hatreds:  'In  our  model,  cold  calculations  based  on  fear  induce  the  pivot  to  
side  with  Milotion  falling  on  the  former.  strong  emotions  involved.  of  
death  perpetrated  their  deeds'  (Hint'  (de  Figueiredo  Jr.  and  Weingast,  
1997:  265).  Fear  over  what?  What  type  of  fear?  How  manipulated?  
We  can  see  these  views  of  a  kind  of  reproduced  version  of  the  sense  
making  that  they  are  attempting  to  describe.  Returning  now  to  the  
literature  of  the  'sociopath'  in  leadership  positions,  the  act  of  calling  
someone  a  psychopath,  or  evil,  or  of  a  type,  carries  with  it  a  bit  of  
pleasure,  captured  so  well  in  Jon  Ronson's  rather  purple  prose:  'Why  is  the  
world  so  unfair?  Why  all  that  savage  economic  injustice,  those  brutal  
wars,  the  everyday  corporate  cruelty?  The  answer:  psychopaths.  We  
aren’t  all  good  people  just  trying  to  do  good.  Some  of  us  are  psychopaths.  
And  psychopaths  are  to  blame  for  this  brutal,  misshapen  society'  (Ronson,  
2011:  99).  We  categorize  another  person  as  a  type  an  act  that  is,  
historically  at  least,  one  of  the  stages  that  occurs  before  an  act  of  
violence.  This  type  of  categorization  exists  within  a  series  of  causal  
negotiations  as  to  who  or  who  is  not  at  fault,  a  discourse  that  seems  to  be  
at  the  very  heart  of  societal  negotiations.  It  is  not  a  question  as  to  
whether  or  not  blame  should  be  assigned,  or  if  it  is  a  useful  concept,  or  
that  is  largely  a  byproduct  of  cognitive  feeling  completion.  Instead,  we  are  
certain  that  someone  or  something  must  be  at  fault,  and  society  must  
organize  to  find  that  someone  or  something  and  transform  it.    
Within  the  schools  of  dehumanization  and  objectification,  the  act  of  
categorization  precedes  violence.  For  example,  it  has  long  been  noted  that  
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verbal  abuse  is  a  precursor  to  domestic  violence  and  even  murder,  so  
much  that  can  be  quantifiably  correlated  (Murphy  and  O'Leary,  1989;  
Schumacher  and  Leonard,  2005).  In  the  case  of  serial  killing  and  genocide,  
this  falls  into  the  category  of  'dehumanization':  'Dehumanization  is  a  
process  of  ridding  the  other  of  the  benefit  of  his  humanity.  The  process  
extends  along  a  continuum,  leading  to  the  ultimate  step  of  removing  the  
other  person’s  opportunity  to  live'  (Charny,  quoted  in  Hickey,  2010:  92.  
For  genocide,  see  Haslam,  2006:  253;  Kelmar,  1973;  'Devaluation'  in  Staub,  
1989).    
Not  surprisingly,  such  instances  occur  during  and  not  after  genocides:  
'Tt  surprisingly,  such  instances  occur  during  and  not  after  genocides:  
removing  the  other  personehumanizat  He  said  something  to  the  effect  
that  for  him  first  came  pigs,  then  nothing  at  all,  and  only  then,  far  down  
the  list,  came  Jews'  (Rhodes,  2002:  222).  The  category  of  the  'Jew'  is  not  
even  enough  to  deserve  a  category.  But  even  in  warfare,  supposedly  
rendered  neutral  via  its  political  ends,  dehumanization  plays  a  part.  It  
would  be  pointlessly  ugly,  and  perhaps  impossible,  to  list  all  the  degrading  
terms  for  enemies  used  over  the  years,  but  consider  the  way  reporter  
Robert  Fisk  finds  this  type  of  language,  after  only  three  weeks,  and  during  
a  press  conference  about  a  bombing  run  during  the  First  Gulf  War:  '"It  was  
like  turning  on  the  kitchen  light  late  at  night  and  the  cockroaches  started  
scurrying,"  [Marine  Lieutenant  Colonel  Dick  White]  said.  "We  finally  got  
them  out  where  we  could  find  them  and  kill  them."'  (Fisk,  2007:  623).    
Yet  even  though  re-­‐categorization  of  another  human  being  precedes  
violence,  this  is  still  seen  within  the  rationalist  or  self-­‐interested  paradigm.  
In  other  words,  offenders  or  génocidaires  want  to  commit  violence,  and  
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turn  their  enemies  into  objects  to  do  so.  Neutralization  theory,  a  common  
perspective  in  treating  violent  criminal  offenders,  allows  for  justifications,  
or  'defenses  to  crimes'  to  come  before  the  act  itself:  'justifications  for  
deviance  that  are  seen  as  valid  by  the  delinquent  but  not  by  the  legal  
system  or  society  at  large...precede  deviant  behavior  and  make  deviant  
behavior  possible'  (Sykes  and  Matza,  1957:  666).  The  problem  being  that  
these  are,  rather  subjectively,  seen  as  cognitive  errors.  They  fail  to  explain,  
or  even  be  interested  in,  the  original  motivation:  'Some  work  in  the  
cognitive  distortion  tradition  suggests  that  all  offender  accounts  are  
created  equal:  essentially  any  explanation  is  a  bad  explanation'  (Maruna  
and  Mann,  2006:  170).    
The  issue  at  hand  is  the  limitation  of  these  perspectives,  a  limitation  
we  have  seen  in  the  many  behaviors  described  within  this  thesis;  the  
rational  offers  a  more  explanatory  model  with  significant  gaps  over  how  to  
define  irrational  behavior,  still  relying  on  a  generalist  definition  of  
emotions.  Ultimately,  the  real  missing  piece  is  the  motive  and  how  it  is  
experienced  by  the  individual.  Given  the  manifest  horrors  about  which  we  
have  all  read,  feeling  and  emotion  are  a  factor,  both  the  most  important  
and  most  ignored.  This  perspective  does  not  preclude  rational  or  social-­‐
psychological  schools,  but  seeks  to  further  their  explanation.  In  the  case  of  
cognitive  causal  sense  making,  this  begins  with  the  act  of  naming.  
Cognitive  Assonance  
  
The  problem  with  the  theories  of  cognitive  dissonance,  or  
neutralization  theory,  or  dehumanization  isn't  their  accuracy,  but  the  lack  
of  completion  (so  to  speak).  What's  missing  is  how,  in  the  experience  of  
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dissonance,  assonance  might  be  formed,  in  this  case  the  enemy  as  other.  
To  expiate  how  this  might  occur,  we  will  now  consider  another  commonly  
observed  belief  of  violent  actors,  that  of  the  shifting  of  blame.  Within  
Neutralization  Theory  (and  many  others),  there  is  the  strong  sense  that  
the  individual  responsible  credits  everyone  but  themselves  with  the  act:  
the  'disavowal  of  a  sense  of  personal  agency  by  diffusion  or  displacement  
of  responsibility'  (Bandura,  1999:  193;  see  also,  cycles  of  attribution  in  
authority,  previous  chapter).  This  goes  so  far  as  to  actually  invert  the  
process  of  blame,  in  what  is  called  the  Condemnation  of  the  Condemners  
'The  delinquent  shifts  the  focus  of  attention  from  his  own  deviant  acts  to  
the  motives  and  behavior  of  those  who  disapprove  of  his  violations'  (Sykes  
and  Matza,  1957:  668).  
Therefore,  we  have  (at  least)  two  strong  co-­‐factors  of  violence:  
'diffusion  of  responsibility  and  dehumanization  of  victims'  (Bandura  et  al.,  
1975:  253).  This  is  usually  as  seen  as  justification  either  before  or  after  the  
event.  A  man  wants  to  hit  his  wife,  or  a  group  wants  to  commit  genocide,  
and  in  the  above  explanations,  the  dehumanization  and  blame  shifting  
either  allows  it  to  take  place,  justifies  it  post  facto,  or  both.  Bandura  
argues  that  this  is  a  moral  disengagement,  that  it  does  not  so  much  
explain  violence  as  pave  the  way  for  it:  it  is  'disinhibition'.  Unfortunately,  
this  leaves  violence  to  the  vague  self-­‐interested  or  even  rational  origins  
we  have  seen  before.  But  what  if  the  objectification  and  causal  assignation  
are  part  of  the  same  process  that  motivates  violence  itself?    
To  understand  how  this  might  occur,  we  turn  to  another  study  of  
anger:  Jack  Katz's  of  Los  Angeles  drivers.  Katz  followed  a  similar  
methodology  to  Averill's  (interview  subjects),  albeit  with  a  more  
      -­‐239-­‐  
 
philosophical  bent  than  Averill's.  This  theorization  of  anger  was  more  in  
line  with  the  android  synthesis  proposed  by  Donna  Harraway,  merging  the  
driver/car  as  a  single  social  object  whose  cut-­‐off  becomes  a  bodily  
amputation  (Katz,  1999:  47).  This  highly  abstract  bent  was  especially  
strange  because  previously  Katz  had  noted  the  way  in  which  murder  was  
perceived  by  the  offender  as  a  moral  act:  'One  feature  of  the  typical  
homicide,  then,  is  its  character  as  a  self-­‐righteous  act  undertaken  within  
the  form  of  defending  communal  values'  (Katz,  1990:  20).  Like  Gilligan,  
violence  was  for  Katz  an  act  of  seeking  justice.    
Nevertheless,  the  case  studies  themselves  reveal  an  interesting  
pattern  of  transformation:  'Acting  as  folk  sociologists,  drivers  
(use)...'unobtrusive  measures'  to  infer  subjective  realities,  in  particular  to  
characterize  others  as  self-­‐absorbed  (diet-­‐coke  and  cell-­‐phone)'  (Katz,  
1999:  23).  The  interviews  published  are  very  telling  for  attributed  motives,  
and  the  way  in  which  they  can  be  constructed  after  the  fact.    
'Sometimes  angry  drivers  create  novel  character  types  by  
mixing  features  of  the  other’ometimes  angry  driv  
Patrick…imputes  a  “mputes  a’s  complex”  complex  angry  
drivers  create  novel  character  types  by  mixing  features  of  
the  otherch  they  can  be  constructed  after  the  fact.l-­‐phone)'  
(Katz,  1999:  23).l  homicide,  then,  is  its  character  as  a  self-­‐
righteous  act  undertaken  within  the  forl.  He  thought  for  a  
second  and  with  some  hesitation  he  claimed  it  would  have  
not  made  a  difference.  He  said  that  he  would  have  reacted  
just  the  same'  (Katz,  1999:  pp.  53–4).    
  
Sartre  famously  stated  that  emotions  were  the  magical  
transformation  of  the  world,  but  it  is  important  to  note  here  how  he  saw  
that  process  unfold:    
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'Emotion  is  a  phenomenon  of  belief.  Consciousness  does  
not  restrict  itself  to  the  projection  of  resonant  signs  onto  
the  world  that  surrounds  it;  it  lives  in  the  new  world  that  it  
has  just  created.  It  lives  it  unmediated;  it  is  interested  in  it;  
it  suffers  the  elements  that  its  directions  have  outlined.  
This  means,  since  all  paths  are  blocked,  consciousness  
flows  into  the  magical  world  of  emotion,  and  flows  entirely  
by  diminishing  itself;  this  is  a  new  consciousness  facing  a  
new  world,  and  it  constructs  itself  with  that  which  it  is  most  
intimate,  its  own  presence,  which  holds  no  distance  
between  itself  and  its  point  of  view  unto  the  world'  (Sartre,  
1965:  98–9,  author's  translation).    
    
It  could  be  said  that  within  Sartre's  formulation  that  process  is  reflexive,  
that  as  the  world  is  magically  transformed,  we  then  proceed  to  live  in  it,  
allowing  for  further  transformation—an  observation  that  is  not  out  of  
place  here.  If  we  replace  the  overdetermined  concept  of  'emotion'  with  
the  concept  of  schemic  order,  the  transformative  power  of  sense  making  
completes  our  picture  of  how  cognitive  assonance  is  formed.    
Here  we  return  to  the  concept  of  blameworthiness  as  proposed  by  
Shaver,  although  this  will  operate  just  as  well  with  any  theory  of  motive-­‐
based  anger.  The  individual  is  trying  to  make  sense  of  a  perceived  
violation.33  The  object  of  our  anger  is  de  facto  blameworthy.  It  follows  that  
the  slight,  if  other  designated,  was  like  motivated,  that  the  violation  was  
the  intention.  When  then  faced  with  an  ordinary  person  as  the  blame  
agent,  the  act  of  transformation  into  a  category  creates  the  
blameworthiness  necessary  to  complete  the  causal  assignation.  The  object  
of  our  anger  cannot  be  human  because  it  lacks  (comprehensibly)  human  
                                                
28.  Consider  the  reason  often  given:  a  woman  or  ethnic  minority  who  'doesn't  know  
their  place',  a  literalization  of  the  schemic  concept  of  dirt.  
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motivation.  The  path  of  least  resistance  is  quite  logical,  or  rather,  has  a  
clear  logic.  What  kind  of  person,  asks  the  subject,  would  do  that?  The  
blame  agent  must  be  a  named  category  (bitch,  gook,  queer,  etc.),  because  
only  a  non-­‐person  could  have  that  violative  motivation.  In  making  sense,  
rather  than  change  the  perspective,  the  external  blame  agent  is  
transformed  through  the  act  of  categorization,  through  the  act  of  naming,  
is  an  intermediate  process  between  assignation  and  resolution.    
This  is  not  to  say,  obviously,  that  perpetrators  of  violence  are  not  
using  post  facto  justifications;  they  may  be  (although  obviously,  after  the  
fact).  However,  there  are  two  distinct  advantages  to  using  this  model  over  
moral  disengagement,  neutralization  theory  or  cognitive  dissonance.  The  
first  is  a  more  complete  understanding  of  the  contradictory  nature  of  the  
excuse  itself.  Justifications  are  absurd  to  the  other  party:  either  the  justice  
system,  or  to  any  victim  of  violence,  state  or  non-­‐state.  As  such,  there  can  
be  no  rational  expectation  of  a  quid  pro  quo.  The  arrestee  cannot  expect  
the  police  officer  to  be  freed  upon  hearing  '"I  didn't  mean  it."  "I  didn't  
really  hurt  anybody."  "They  had  it  coming  to  them."  "Everybody's  picking  
on  me."  "  I  didn't  do  it  for  myself."'  (Sykes  and  Matza,  1957:  669),  and  still  
he  or  she  makes  exactly  this  justification.    
According  to  the  current  string  of  social  theories,  the  subject  is  
attempting  to  address  his  or  her  cognitive  dissonance,  which  is  motivated  
by  a  sense  of  social,  the  alignment  of  the  actual  self  with  the  ideal,  and  the  
'ought'  self  (Topalli,  2005:  799;  see  also  Higgins,  1989).  If  this  is  the  case,  
there  would  be  no  reason  to  act  to  create  those  negative  feelings  in  the  
first  place,  i.e.  to  act  violently.  If  this  is  a  case  of  'role  conflict'  (Sykes  and  
Matza,  1957:  669),  from  whence  came  the  criminal  role,  or  for  that  
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matter,  the  normative  societal  one?  Again,  these  theories  are  not  so  much  
inaccurate  as  incomplete.  A  causal  agent  model  expands  for  
dehumanization,  blame  shifting  and  the  motives  of  violence,  that  
generate,  and  are  generated  by,  them.    
With  this  in  mind,  we  approach  those  who  engage  in  criminal  
violence  via  the  modalities  in  which  they  engage  it:  causal  agent  
assignation  and  naming.  For  the  inherent  contradiction  in  this  practice,  
consider  the  batterer  paradox:    
The  batterer  paradox,  namely  that  we  have  sympathy  for  
the  male  child  exposed  to  inter  parental  aggression  and  
recognize  the  fact  that  a  significant  consequence  of  such  
exposure  is  an  increased  risk  of  becoming  a  batterer  when  
he  matures,  yet  once  that  prophecy  is  fulfilled,  the  
empathy  and  understanding  is  shifted  from  him  to  his  
victim  and  children  (Rosenbaum  and  Leisring,  2003:  17).    
  
Both  individuals  have  experienced  violence.  How  could  one  deserve  our  
sympathy,  and  not  the  other?  This  seems  obvious:  the  child  is  innocent  
and  the  adult,  being  able  to  form  intent,  is  guilty.  And  once  again,  the  
blameworthiness  is  tied  to  ability  to  comprehend  intent,  not  whether  or  
not  that  intent  was  actually  formed.  In  the  traditional  model,  the  adult  
was  inexplicably,  or  selfishly  motivated  to  hurt,  and  simply  formed  a  
convenient  excuse  afterwards,  while  the  child  must  be  innocent  of  all  
action  due  exclusively  due  to  his  or  her  presumed  lack  of  cognitive  
capacity.  The  facileness  of  this  argument  is  demonstrated  by  the  constant  
fudging  of  adult  age  crime  limits.  Is  the  10-­‐year-­‐old  guilty  of  a  serious  
crime?  The  nine-­‐year-­‐old?  On  which  day  does  this  occur?  
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What  is  missing  from  this  conception  isn't  a  deeper  understanding  of  
empathy,  or  even  an  awareness  of  the  irrationality  regarding  circularity  of  
crime,  justice  and  violence.  What  is  missing  is  an  acknowledgement  of  
feeling:  that  it  feels  good  to  name.  Calling  someone  a  'bitch'  or  a  'wife  
beater'  may  have  extremely  different  implications  and  manifest  effects,  
but  they  feel  the  same,  or  rather  arise  from  the  same  structure  of  
violation,  assignation  and  intent  creation.  The  seeming  satisfaction  in  the  
term  'psychopath'  is  useful  to  consider  here,  just  as  the  phrase  'put  in  
their  place'  can  be  seen  as  literal,  in  the  sense  that  the  place  in  question  is  
a  social  category  that  exists  within  the  individual's  conception  of  self  and  
world  schema.  
  How  would  this  generate  positive  feelings?  In  Chapter  5,  we  were  
introduced  to  the  concept  of  the  schemic  break,  that  feeling  could  be  
generated  by  violations  of  expectations  in  the  expected  world,  just  as  in  
Chapters  3  and  5,  Galtung's  concept  of  structural  violence  as  a  break  
between  the  expected  and  actual.  Although  it  can  be  argued  that  
stereotyping  can  be  a  factor  in  cognitive  headroom  ('cognitive  miser',  
Chapter  4),  the  act  of  categorization,  especially  when  linked  to  a  schemic  
violation,  embodies  the  end  of  the  tension.  At  last,  we  know.  Order  is  
restored.  In  terms  of  choice  over  anticipated  feeling  states,  we  scenarize  
the  future  state  of  'having  named'.  If  thoughts  are  the  means,  and  feelings  
the  end,  adjustments  can  be  made,  magically,  if  you  will.    
In  the  case  of  the  driver,  minor  transformations  are  made  over  
physical  characteristics.  We  turn  to  our  right  as  we  pass  the  one  who  cut  
us  off,  appraise  the  person  as  a  category  and  exclaim  'I  knew  it',  even  
though  we  knew  no  such  thing.  In  the  case  of  state  making  and  war,  the  
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ramifications  are  more  significant.  Consider,  for  example,  the  well-­‐known  
'security  dilemma'  in  International  Relations.  Put  simply,  one  state  
increases  its  armament  stockpile,  causing  another  state  to  feel  
threatened,  increase  their  stockpile,  and  so  on.  As  both  sides  attempt  to  
become  more  secure,  they  create  an  atmosphere  that  is  more  likely  to  
create  war  (see  Herz,  1950;  Jervis,  1976:  58–113).  There  are  a  vast  number  
of  theories  as  to  how  this  happens  within  a  rational  state.  But  what  about  
a  feeling  state,  or  rather,  a  state  composed  of  decision  makers  that  choose  
according  to  feeling.  When  there  is  a  violation  (in  the  form  of  a  potential  
threat),  we  impugn  a  motive.  In  the  case  of  military  security,  the  enemy's  
motive  can  only  be  the  state's  destruction,  which,  naturally  enough,  can  
only  be  manifested  by  a  blameworthy  agent,  a  named  object.  It  is  no  
insight  to  say  that  the  security  dilemma  revolves  around  the  inability  to  
see  the  other  person's  true  motivation  or  perspective,  but  in  the  case  of  
anticipated  feeling  (and  cognitive)  states,  that  inability  is  built  into  causal  
agent  reasoning.  
  
Violence  as   Information  Management  
  
In  the  case  of  casual  driving  or  spousal  arguments,  or  workplace  
flare-­‐ups,  naming  is  usually  enough.  We  have  faced  a  violation,  and  we  
have  found  the  responsible  party  and  annihilated  their  aberrant  
motivation  by  transforming  them  into  an  object  that  makes  their  
motivation  congruent.  Disorder  has  become  order,  the  break  has  been  
healed,  having  originated,  and  then  been  repaired,  entirely  within  the  
subject's  schemic  field.  It  should  not  surprise  us  that  naming  is  not  always  
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enough.  Randall  Collins  has  noted  the  dance  up  to  the  act  of  violence,  and  
this  type  of  dehumanization  is  part  of  that  dance.  Sometimes  it  ends  with  
no  action  taken;  other  times,  it  does  not.  Collins,  unfortunately,  fails  to  
provide  the  motive  for  violence,  which  we  will  now  attempt  to  address.    
It  would  be  easy  to  ask:  under  what  conditions  do  individuals  choose  
violence?  Obviously,  the  answer  is  multiplitious,  for  as  we  have  already  
seen,  soldiers  may  choose  violence  to  avoid  future  shame  states,  just  as  
some  may  kill  with  the  desire  for  agency  confirmation  (see  below).  It  is  
fairly  certain  violence  can  manifest  through  anger,  and  what  differentiates  
our  common  conception  of  anger  from  shame  and  fear  is  that  it  has  a  
positive  anticipated  state  built  within  it,  the  'certain  pleasure'  that  
Aristotle  spoke  about.  From  the  rationalist  viewpoint,  exchange  theory  
names  this  'sweet  revenge',  'that  it  is  rewarding  to  inflict  costs  on  
someone  who  has  hurt  you'  (Gelles,  2007:  411).  Not  unlike  Aristotle,  how  
this  might  be  pleasurable  is  not  explained.    
When  discussing  self-­‐designated  causal  attributions  and  schemic  
breaks,  it  is  possible  to  imagine  how  these  are  states  to  be  avoided.  The  
transformation  of  shame  into  an  actual  to  a  positive  state,  in  the  case  of  
PTSD,  is  part  of  a  long  therapeutic  process  of  understanding  and  
dismantling  self-­‐schema  (Horowitz,  2003:  54).  In  the  case  of  other  
designated  causal  attribution  (anger),  the  satisfaction  is  an  expected  part  
of  the  process.  As  with  any  anticipated  feeling  state,  whether  or  not  this  
satisfaction  will  be  achieved  is  irrelevant  to  its  factor  as  a  choice.34  In  fact,  
one  such  study  by  heuristic  and  bias  specialist  Daniel  Gilbert  found  that  
                                                
29.  'Revenge,  at  first  though  sweet,  Bitter  ere  long  back  on  itself  recoils',  Milton,  
Paradise  Lost  IX,  171,  quoted  in  Carlsmith,  Wilson  and  Gilbert.  
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subjects  'believe  that  punishing  an  offender  will  improve  their  mood  and  
bring  about  psychological  closure,  but  in  fact  punishment  will  increase  
rumination  about  the  offender  and  lead  to  a  continuation  of  negative  
affect'  (Carlsmith,  Wilson  and  Gilbert,  2008:  1316).  In  this  case,  even  the  
feeling  result  is  not  achieved,  even  if  the  choice  is  made  according  to  an  
anticipation  of  feeling.    
In  order  to  understand  how  this  satisfaction  process  'completes'  
anger,  we  examine  the  specificities  of  the  physical  manifestations  of  
violence.  In  other  words,  it  follows,  to  some  extent,  that  what  anger  does  
might  tell  us  what  anger  wants.  In  a  recent  interview  study,  it  was  found  
that  the  knowledge  state  of  the  object  of  anger  was  a  crucial  aspect  in  
satisfaction:  'In  one  condition,  the  partner  understood  that  taking  tickets  
would  be  a  punishment  for  his  prior  unfair  behavior.  In  another  condition,  
the  partner  stated  that  he  would  not  understand  that  tickets  were  
deducted  from  him.  Participants  experienced  less  anger,  more  
satisfaction,  and  more  deservingness  in  the  former  condition'  (Gollwitzer  
et  al.,  2011:  370).  That  is  to  say,  it  matters  that  the  offenders  know  that  
they  were  punished.  
Many  forms  of  violence,  including  organized  genocides  and  rape,  
carry  with  them  an  attempt  to  shame,  which  must  be  understood  through  
agent  causality  and  assignation.  If  anger  arises  out  of  a  schemic  break  and  
an  attempt  to  restore  order  according  to  the  motive,  it  follows  that  the  
target  is  not  the  blame  agent,  but  their  intent.  The  transformations  here  
are  not  attempts  to  shame,  so  much  as  they  are  to  force  the  blame  agent  
into  an  awareness  of  their  own  guilt.  This  is  why  shaming  the  enemy,  an  
unnecessary  aspect  of  violence  were  it  rational,  consistently  arises.  The  
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violative  object  is  not  the  enemy,  but  their  knowledge  state  is.  The  
transformations  of  war,  torture,  abuse,  and  even  street  crime  are  about  
information;  the  target  is  the  motive,  and  secondarily,  its  proponent.  The  
violence,  however  horrible,  is  incidental.    
Professor  deMause  has  proposed  an  approach  to  history  that  
acknowledges  psychological  motives—reasonable  enough,  and  hardly  
revolutionary  (Norbert  Elias,  70  years  ago,  proposed  the  same).  
Unfortunately,  his  insistence  on  seeing  child  abuse  as  the  singular  cause  of  
war,  crime  and  violence  has  relegated  his  work  to  the  dustbin  of  
academia.  In  a  recent  speech,  he  made  clear:  '"Aw,  deMause,  come  on—
that’s  too  simplistic!  Just  love  your  children  and  you’ll  eliminate  wars?  You  
expect  me  to  believe  this?"  Yes,  I  do,  I  always  answer'  (deMause,  2005).  
The  fact  that  he  calls  his  field  'Psychohistory'  does  not  help  matters.  
Nevertheless,  he  makes  a  compelling  argument  that  might  be  useful  in  
understanding  the  nature  of  agentic  correction  in  a  more  substantive  way.    
deMause  has  studied  at  great  length  the  history  of  childhood,  and  
makes  an  argument  about  the  Holocaust  that  I  find  especially  resonant.  
The  torments  visited  upon  the  victims  of  the  camps  find  a  nearly  one-­‐to-­‐
one  correlation  with  what  German  children  experienced.  Note  that  this  
behavior  was  specific  to  Germany  (and,  to  some  degree,  Austria),  where  
children  were  seen  as  inconvenient  appendages,  meriting  the  terms:  'little  
eater'  and  'little  shitter'—phrases  still  in  use.  Concentration  camp  
prisoners  were  just  as  specifically  made  to  endure  'an  excremental  
assault',  in  which  'they  were  forced  to  defecate  and  urinate  upon  each  
other,  were  often  thrown  into  the  cesspool  if  they  were  too  slow,  lived  in  
barracks  "awash  with  urine  and  feces,"  walked  about  "knee-­‐deep  in  
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excrement…  Later  toilet  training  of  German  children  was  also  restaged,  
often  in  precise  detail,  as  by  having  the  ghetto-­‐latrine  supervised  by  a  
guard  with  a  big  clock,  whom  the  Germans  dressed  comically  as  a  rabbi  
and  called  the  "shit-­‐master"'  (deMause,  2002:  182).  Most  disturbing  of  all,  
Germany  from  the  1900s  to  the  1920s  not  only  had  a  high  infanticide  rate,  
but  'specific  methodspervised  by  a  guard  with  a  big  clock,  whom  the  
Germans  dressed  comically  as  a  rabbi  and  called  the  "shit-­‐mMause,  2002:  
184),  acts  that  were  used  on  the  children  in  the  camps.    
deMause's  observations  merit  further  study,  yet  it  is  hard  to  credit  an  
unhappy  childhood  as  the  cause  of  the  Holocaust.  Nevertheless,  he  
describes  the  specificities  in  which  violence  is  enacted  on  victims,  and  the  
importance  of  the  act  of  shaming.  This  figures  in  countless  genocides,  
forward  panics  and  collective  rage  killings.  We  can  find  similar  abuses  
from  Mao's  cultural  revolution,  where  teachers,  targets  via  their  being  
intellectuals,  are  subject  to  the  exact  punishment  they  might  inflict  on  
their  students:    
'...black  ink  poured  over  their  heads  and  faces  so  that  they  
were  now  in  reality  a  eblack  gang.”lack  gang.oured  over  
their  heads  and  faces  so  that  they  were  now  in  reality  a  ets  
via  their  being  intellectuals,  are  subject  to  the  exact  
punishment  thels  filled  with  rocks...  All  were  barefoot,  
hitting  broken  gongs  or  pots  as  they  walked  around  the  
field  crying  out:  "I  am  black  gangster  so-­‐and-­‐so."'  (Jones,  
2010:  315).  
  
Yet,  beyond  the  standard  childhood  re-­‐enactments,  there  is  an  
informational  shift.  Like  the  Christian  torture  inflicted  during  the  
Inquisition,  the  object  is  the  confession:  the  subject  must  name  his  or  her  
own  agency.  
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It  is  therefore  necessary  to  go  beyond  the  one-­‐to-­‐one  psychological  
relationship  of  childhood  experience  and  adult  action.  What  is  this  
behavior,  beyond  the  simple  and  ugly  transformation  of  dehumanization?  
Jones  argues  specifically  that  it  was  the  felt  humiliation  of  the  
perpetrators  that  motivated  their  violence:  'Humiliation  thus  figures  
prominently  in  the  most  extreme  manifestations  of  human  aggression:  
murder,  war,  genocide.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  historical  or  
contemporary  case  of  genocide  in  which  humiliation  is  not  a  key  
motivating  force'  (Jones,  2010:  394–5).  While  certainly  evident,  there  is  
also  the  reflection  of  this  humiliation  found  in  the  acts  of  violence  itself.  
Although  this  following  example  from  the  Nanjing  Massacre  of  1937  is  
considerably  more  violent,  it  is  to  be  considered  within  the  context  of  
created  a  shift  of  agency:    
'Chinese  men  were  often  sodomized  or  forced  to  perform  a  
variety  of  repulsive  sexual  acts  in  front  of  laughing  
Japanese  soldiers.  At  least  one  Chinese  man  was  murdered  
because  he  refused  to  commit  necrophilia  with  the  corpse  
of  a  woman  in  the  snow...  Fathers  were  forced  to  rape  their  
daughters,  and  sons  their  mothers,  as  other  family  
members  watched'  (Chang,  1997:  128  and  208).    
  
The  character  of  shame  is  tied  to  the  subject,  with  forced  sex  with  
family  members,  and  the  'forcing  of  celibate  men  to  have  intercourse'  
(Wood,  2008:  326).  Looking  past  the  horror,  or  perhaps  focusing  on  it,  this  
is  an  attempt  to  cause  the  victims  to  participate  in  their  own  suffering,  
one  which  underlines  an  attempt  to  shift  causal  attribution.    
Going  beyond  the  semantically  loaded  terms  of  emotion,  humiliation  
could  be  understood  as  a  forced  self-­‐blame.  As  with  survivors  of  rape  or  
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abuse,  there  is  a  misattribution  of  self-­‐assignated  agency  (see  Chapter  5).  
The  perpetrator  of  violence  is  the  actor,  yet  attributes  responsibility  to  the  
victim,  just  as  the  victim  accepts  it.  James  Gilligan  talks  about  the  attempt  
of  violent  offenders,  even  rapists,  to  right  a  perceived  injustice.  Ross  L.  
was  a  19-­‐year-­‐old  man  who  had  raped  and  then  stabbed  a  woman  in  her  
genitals  and  eyes  (for  'eyes',  see  Chapters  5  and  6).  In  this  case,  his  'moral  
system'  was  'a  defense  against  the  threat  of  being  seen  as  a  weakling,  not  
"a  real  man"'  (Gilligan,  1997:  63).    
Gilligan  extends  this  reflected  gaze  to  genocidal  violence  as  well.  He  
notes  that  the  word  in  German  for  evil  eye,  Judenblick,  is  translated  as  
'Jew's  glance'.  As  with  the  victims  of  violence  after  the  fact  and  dead  
comrades,  the  eyes  reflect  back  a  reality,  this  time  an  accusation  that  
serves  as  a  precursor  to  violence.  For  Gilligan,  the  solution  to  the  shame  
problem  is  violence;  by  killing  the  source  of  shame,  you  kill  shame.  As  Erik  
Erikson  posits:  'he  who  is  ashamed...would  like  to  destroy  the  eyes  of  the  
world'  (Erikson,  quoted  in  Gilligan,  1997:  64).  This  completes  the  sense  of  
'truth'  engendered  by  another's  gaze.  Seen  previously  as  a  confirmation  of  
action  (fear  of  being  'seen'  a  coward')  or  in  the  silent  accusation  of  the  
dead,  this  is  a  truth  that  must  be  extinguished:  'the  mutilation  served  as  a  
magical  means  of  accomplishing  something  that  even  killing  one's  victim  
could  cannot  do,  namely  that  of  destroying  the  feeling  of  shame  itself'  
(Gilligan,  1997:  85).    
Once  again,  we  are  mired  in  loaded  terms  of  emotion.  Instead,  we  
can  say  that  the  violent  offender's  intent  is  not  violence,  per  se,  but  
instead  an  attempt  to  demonstrate—not  just  to  shift  agency,  but  to  cause  
the  victim  to  feel  or  think  that  way  as  well.  Rape  is  far  too  complex  a  
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subject  to  address  in  a  single  paragraph,  but  what  the  extreme  example  
from  Nanjing  and  the  destruction  above  points  to  is  a  raw  attempt  to  shift  
agency  to  the  target,  to  make  them  participate  in  their  own  torment.  The  
viciousness  of  the  rage  is  a  transfer  of  shame  to  anger,  manifesting  not  in  
violence,  which  is  also  incidental,  but  in  education,  in  the  act  of  showing  
the  enemy  'how  you  made  me  feel'.  This  is  referred  to  the  educational  
aspect  of  retribution  (Schmid,  2005),  that  the  punishment  is  a  function  of  
the  guilty  actor  'knowing'  what  he/she  did.  If  violence  is,  as  Charles  Tilly  
said,  a  form  of  communication,  this  is  the  message:  'the  only  language  
they  seem  to  understand'  (Truman,  1945).  This  furthermore  explains  the  
cycle  of  violence  not  as  a  pat  statement,  or  even  retribution  following  
retribution,  but  as  a  cognitive  attempt  to  change  current  or  future  feeling  
states  via  a  shift  of  causal  attribution.  Humiliation  begets  humiliation,  to  
be  sure,  but  only  inasmuch  as  agency  is  assigned.  
We  return  now  to  Randall  Collins'  conception  of  asymmetric  
entrainment  as  a  precursor  to  violence—again,  not  with  a  critique  but  
with  an  elaboration.  Collins  proposes  that  it  is  the  role,  not  just  of  the  
victim  and  aggressor,  but  of  the  audience,  that  contributes  to  violence:  
'The  woman  is  playing  the  victim  role  all  too  well,  and  this  is  part  of  the  
micro-­‐interactional  feedback  that  keeps  the  dominator  entrained  in  his  
aggression'  (Collins,  2008:  145,  see  Chapter  3).  What,  then,  are  the  stakes  
of  this  micro-­‐interactional  feedback?  Given  the  above  observations  
regarding  domestic  abuse  and  blaming  the  victims,  dehumanization,  and  
attributions,  I  would  argue  that  the  intentional  object  is  fault  itself.    
Anger  has  an  intention,  even  if  this  may  seem  incomprehensible  to  
an  outsider—or  even  the  one  experiencing  the  anger  later  on,  as  with  ex  
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post  facto  justifications.  The  aggressor  feels  violated  by  a  schemic  break,  
their  partner's  'jealousy,  poor  anger  control,  emotional  instability,  un-­‐
willingness  to  compromise,  and  relationship  insecurity'  (Henning  et  al.,  
2005:  137).  The  victim  confirms  this,  and  the  abuse  results  in  a  physical  
attribution  of  agency.  In  other  words,  as  one  individual  or  group  assigns  
agent  causality  to  another,  violence  occurs  via  a  threshold  of  assigned  
agency  when  both  sides  'agree'  that  one  is  to  blame.  As  Collins  notes,  this  
is  but  one  way  that  domestic  violence  in  particular  can  manifest.  If  the  
victim  does  not  take  the  victim  role,  this  can  lead  to  stalking  or  other  
violent  behaviors.  In  either  case,  however,  the  pole  around  which  this  
revolves  is  causal  agency,  violation  followed  by  restoration  of  order.  
  
The  Justice  Motive  
  
The  idea  that  the  assignation  of  causal  agency  is  the  motivation  
behind  domestic  and  genocidal  violence  may  be  controversial.  The  
concept  of  restorative  order,  however,  is  inescapably  clear  in  the  practice  
and  theory  of  justice  and  retribution.  Justice,  whether  individual,  political  
or  legal,  depends  on  its  scales:  after  imbalance,  can  balance  be  achieved?  
This  statement  is  hardly  radical.  Instead,  we  introduce  the  same  concept  
of  the  reapportionment  of  causal  agency  seen  in  abuse  and  genocide  as  
found  in  the  punishments,  and  even  reforms,  of  legal  or  state  justice.  Like  
the  humiliations  experienced  by  victims  of  violence,  the  real  focus  is  
directing  the  offender  to  recognize  their  own  agency.    
Continued  replication  of  this  model  exists  on  the  individual  level  in  
both  senses  of  the  word.  That  is  to  say,  that  collective  violence  and  
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individual  violence  often  share  a  common  feeling:  injustice.  Beginning  
with  the  individual,  a  sense  of  feeling  'wronged'  may  be  the  greatest  
motivator  for  violence  in  general.  As  James  Black  noted:  'There  is  a  sense  
in  which  conduct  regarded  as  criminal  is  often  quite  the  opposite.  Far  
from  being  an  intentional  violation  of  a  prohibition,  much  crime  is  
moralistic  and  involves  the  pursuit  of  justice'  (Black,  1983:  35).  Black's  
thesis  relies  on  a  concept  of  'murder  as  self-­‐help',  a  rationalist  sense  of  an  
underclass  attempting  to  regulate  in  a  non-­‐state  environment  (see  also  
Katz,  1990).    
What  are  they  experiencing?  Tiptoeing  around  moral  qualifications  
for  or  against  criminality,  injustice  is  a  kind  of  violated  expectation,  an  
imbalance  that  must  be  set  right.  James  Gilligan's  own  work  on  violence  
and  injustice  (see  above)  consists  of  a  series  of  interviews  with  over  200  
offenders,  avoiding  the  classical  rational  actor  thesis.  It  focuses  instead  on  
the  emotional  elements  of  felt  slights,  where  'all  violence  is  an  attempt  to  
achieve  justice'  (Gilligan,  1997:  11).  Gilligan's  work  is  especially  important  
as  it  largely  concentrates  on  how  feelings  operate  in  these  circumstances,  
and  how  the  punitive  legal  system  is  not  tied  to  any  social  function,  but  to  
the  feeling  of  injustice.  To  wit,  that  we've  had  3,000  years  to  test  the  
punishment  theory  of  preventing  violence,  and  that  '3000  years  is  enough  
to  test  any  theory'  (Gilligan,  1997:  94).    
The  feeling  of  injustice  as  interruption  of  expected  order  has  been  
further  linked  to  the  large-­‐scale  violent  behavior  of  war.  Scholar  David  
Welch  surveys  five  wars  (the  Crimean  War,  the  Franco-­‐Prussian  War  of  the  
19th  century,  World  War  I,  World  War  II  and  the  Falklands/Malvinas  War)  
and  found  what  he  calls  the  'justice  motive'  the  key  motivation  is  all  but  
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one  (World  War  II,  and  this  is  only  with  some  qualification).  The  justice  
motive  is  defined  'as  the  drive  to  correct  a  perceived  discrepancy  between  
entitlements  and  benefits',  which  gets  us  very  close  to  Galtung's  
expectation  thesis.  For  our  purposes,  he  adds  that  '[t]he  word  'perceived'  
is  crucial'  (Welch,  1993:  19).  Welch  is  considerably  less  critical  of  
institutions  than  Gilligan,  and  calls  for  a  moral  agreement  as  what  consists  
of  justice  and  what  does  not  (Welch,  1993:  197–203).  Less  forgiving  is  
Frederick  Manning,  who  may  be  taking  a  swipe  at  our  natural  school  as  
well:  'War  is  waged  by  men;  not  by  beasts,  or  by  gods.  It  is  a  peculiarly  
human  activity.  To  call  it  a  crime  against  humanity  is  to  miss  at  least  half  
its  significance;  it  is  also  the  punishment  of  a  crime.  That  raises  a  moral  
question,  the  kind  of  problem  with  which  the  present  age  is  disinclined  to  
deal'  (Manning,  quoted  in  Coady,  2008:  42).  
My  own  work  on  the  Bush  White  House's  war  on  terror  unites  the  
themes  of  justice  and  creation  of  order  through  violence  (King,  2010).  
Sparked  by  the  single  event  of  the  attacks  of  September  11  2001,  the  
messy  chaos  of  terrorism,  which  can  strike  at  any  time  and  for  no  reason,  
was  pressed  into  the  order  of  war  (see  Chapter  5,  violent  reaction  to  
schemic  breaks).  This  was  crystallized  by  Dick  Cheney's  famous  comment,  
blissfully  free  of  logic  but  not  of  causal  thinking:  'If  there's  a  one  percent  
chance  that  Pakistani  scientists  are  helping  AQ  build  or  develop  a  nuclear  
weapon,  we  have  to  treat  it  as  a  certainty  in  terms  of  our  response'  
(Suskind,  2006:  54).  The  Bush  White  House  was  consumed  with  notions  of  
justice  and  the  sense  of  balancing  the  imbalance:  'when  we  find  out  who  
did  this,  they're  not  going  to  like  me  as  president.  Somebody  is  going  to  
pay'  (Woodward,  2002,  75).  Attempts  to  restore  order  in  the  justice  
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motive  were  also  found  on  the  part  of  Al  Qaeda,  who,  not  unlike  the  US,  
pursued  formula  of  retribution.    
There  is  an  imbalance  of  response  in  these  actions—what  
Cambodians  call  a  'head  for  an  eye'  type  of  revenge  (Jones,  2010:  287)—as  
well  as  the  breakdown  of  classical  means/end  state  making.  These  
phenomena  demonstrate  neither  rational  actors  nor  moral  actors  seeking  
an  objective  and  clearly  defined  form  of  justice,  but  individuals  acting  
according  to  the  maintenance  of  cognitive  emotional  order.  The  Stoic  
Seneca  observed  the  contradiction  of  injustice  years  previous,  when  he  
said  that  'a  wrong  not  exceeded  is  not  revenged'  (Seneca,  1917,  Thyestes,  
176).  36    
Although  ostensibly  a  rational  realm,  politics  has  a  long,  and  
surprisingly  unabashed  history  with  anger,  where  'one  can  define  anger  as  
the  essential  political  emotion'  (Lyman,  quoted  in  Holmes,  2004).  This  
tradition  goes  back  as  far  as  Aristotle:  'any  one  can  get  angry—that  is  easy  
get  angryck  as  far  as  Aristotlehas  a  long,  and  surprisingly  unabashed  
history  with  anger,  where  'one  can  define  angevery  one,  nor  is  it  easy'  
(Aristotle,  1999:  37).  In  this  view,  anger  is  actually  appropriate,  necessary  
even:  'those  who  do  not  get  angry  at  things  at  which  it  is  right  to  be  angry  
are  considered  foolish,  and  so  are  those  who  do  not  get  angry  in  the  right  
manner,  at  the  a  right  time,  and  with  the  right  people'  (Aristotle,  1934:  
4ven:).  Anger  remains  a  'moral'  emotion.  It  merely  behooves  us  to  
                                                
30.  As  it  happens,  this  concise  observation  was  made  by  a  character  from  one  of  his  
plays;  in  his  philosophical  writing,  he  was  not  far  from  the  intentional  school  of  
emotion:  'though  anger  is  reason’s  enemy,  it  comes  into  being  only  where  reason  
resides'  (Seneca,  2010:  17).  
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distinguish  between  'good'  anger  and  'bad'  anger,  an  action  whose  main  
obstacle  for  Aristotle  was  akrasia  (weakness  of  will).    
Given  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  anger  manifests,  and  the  ways  in  
which  each  side  in  any  war  believes  in  its  own  righteousness,  it  would  be  
easy  to  argue  that  this  is  a  false  dichotomy.  It  may  be  wiser  instead  to  
argue  that  it  is  an  irrelevant  one,  and  that  attention  must  be  redirected  
towards  the  feeling  which  is  generated  by  the  causal  conclusions  and  
assignations  built  within  anger.  What  both  'good'  and  'bad'  anger  contain  
is  pleasure,  at  least  the  pleasure  of  an  anticipated  outcome.  This  becomes  
clearer  as  we  look  at  the  way  which  conventional  political  justice  
manifests  in  the  same  form  that  genocide  and  abuse  do:  the  pursuit  of  an  
alteration  of  the  blame  object's  motives.    
There  is  a  longstanding  divide  within  the  justice  community  over  
retributive  vs.  restorative  justice.  The  former  is  classic  punishment,  where  
'transgressions  disturb  the  moral  balancetice.sts  in  the  same  forlevelled  
before  justice  is  truly  achieved,  restoring  moral  proportionality  to  the  
situation'  (Okimoto  et  al.,  2012:  255).  Alternatively,  restorative  justice  
seeks  to  rehabilitate  the  offender  'a  utilitarian,  deterrence  perspective,  in  
which  the  focus  is  on  preventing  future  harms  against  society'  (Carlsmith,  
Darley  and  Robinson,  2002:  284;  see  Wenzel  et  al.,  2008  for  a  review  of  
the  perspectives).  To  introduce  a  historical  and  political  pole,  Michel  
Foucault  has  famously  argued  for  the  'sovereign'  and  'disciplinary';  where  
the  former  is  absolute,  violent  and  public,  the  latter  is  insidious  and  
written  upon  the  body  of  its  subject  (Foucault,  1991;  2008).  Although  
Foucault's  concern  was  very  much  about  the  concept  of  power,  his  thesis  
originates  within  the  field  of  justice—the  transition  from  the  brutal  public  
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execution  of  Damiens  the  regicide  in  1757,  to  (80  years  later)  the  
implementation  of  exact  places  to  be,  and  actions  to  take  upon  the  
prisoner,  from  'torture  to  the  time-­‐table'  (Foucault,  1975:  13).  
Each  of  these  seemingly  unrelated  justice  'systems'  has  the  intention  
of  their  blame  agent  at  their  core.  For  the  disciplinary  practice  and  reform,  
this  is  more  evident,  since  the  intentions  of  the  docile  subject  is  the  stated  
object  of  change.  In  the  case  of  restorative  justice,  neutralization  theory,  
touched  upon  above,  puts  the  offender's  ability  to  assign  blame  at  the  
center  of  its  practical  application:  'The  term  "cognitive  
distortions"...describes  various  thoughts,  perceptions,  beliefs  and  ideas  
that  are  understood  to  present  obstacles  to  the  offender  taking  
responsibility  for  his  crimes,  and  that  taking  responsibility  is  understood  to  
be  essential  to  effective  treatment'  (Marshall  et  al.,  2011:  118).  The  
therapeutic  target  is  very  much  to  get  the  subject  to  acknowledge  their  
part  in  the  crime,  even  if  this  has  been  shown  to  have  negligible  effect  
(Hood  et  al.,  2002;  see  Maruna  and  Mann,  2006  for  an  analysis  of  the  
efficacy  of  this  perspective).    
The  blame  agent's  intentions  are  just  as  much  at  the  fore  in  
Foucault's  conception  of  the  sovereign.  As  he  details  Damiens  agonizing  
suffering,  there  is  constant  mention,  as  there  would  be  in  any  historical  
document  during  the  period,  of  the  'confesseurs',  (Foucault,  1975:  11–3).  
Although  Foucault  is  detailing  what  is  visited  upon  the  body  of  this  man;  
the  fact  that  he  is  able  to  can  only  be  due  to  the  presence  of  these  men.  
Their  purpose,  as  one  might  assume  from  the  name,  was  not  to  be  
historians,  but  to  hear,  in  detail,  what  the  man  said  in  relation  to  his  own  
sin.  In  other  words,  their  presence  is  required  only  according  to  the  
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offender's  motive,  and  what  the  offender  believes  about  it.  If  the  point  
was  physical  pain,  or  even  dismemberment  of  a  body,  they  would  not  be  
necessary.    
To  complete  the  picture  of  how  the  process  of  schemic  cognition  and  
feeling  might  motivate  choice  and  action,  we  return  to  complete  an  
examination  of  forward  panic  seen  in  Chapter  3.  To  review,  this  is  the  
point  in  a  pitched  battle,  where  one  side  runs,  and  the  other  falls  upon  
them,  almost  always  with  terrible  violence.  Collins  summarizes  it  as  
follows:    
'[A]  period  of  prolonged  tension/fear,  with  a  hidden  enemy  
and  strong  suspicions  that  the  normal  surroundings  and  
civilian  population  are  a  cover  for  sudden  attacks;  forward-­‐
advancing  operations  in  this  danger  zone,  building  up  
frustration  and  anticipation  at  finally  catching  the  enemy,  
and  triggering  moments  when  the  enemy  seems  to  have  
been  caught;  a  frenzied  rush  of  destruction'  (Collins,  2008:  
88).    
  
Eschewing  terms  like  'tensions',  'frenzy'  and  'frustration',  this  can  be  seen,  
in  terms  of  schemic  agent  causality,  in  three  phases:  unknowing,  
attribution,  and  restoration.  The  fear  that  Collins  speaks  of  is,  naturally  
enough,  the  bare  and  raw  uncertainty  of  not  knowing,  as  seen  in  Chapter  
5.  This  goes  beyond  living  or  dying,  but  alludes  to  the  profound  chaos,  
noise,  mud  and  smoke  of  battle.  On  a  second-­‐by-­‐second  basis,  nothing  is  
known.  
To  Collins,  and  as  per  the  abuse  discussion  above,  by  running,  one  
side  takes  the  'role'  of  the  victim.  This  means  that  to  the  (now)  aggressor,  
the  chaos  has  order  and  a  transgressive  agent.  This  is  amplified  by  the  
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audience  that  Collins  speaks  about:  'the  stance  of  the  audience  has  an  
overwhelming  effect  on  whether  and  how  much  violence  is  carried  out'  
(Collins,  2008:  9).  For  Collins,  this  is  a  question  of  emotional  energy  'that  
the  audience  also  provides  the  social  energy  and  solidarity  to  overcome  
tension/fear  and  make  fighting  possible  at  all'  (Collins,  2008:  199).  
Additionally,  this  is  a  question  of  what  is  known.  Truth,  as  noted  in  
Chapter  5,  is  social  in  nature,  where  even  scientific  theorems  are  subject  
to  a  collective  agreement.  Here,  the  attribution  of  blame  is  confirmed  as  
absolute  en  masse:  who  is  at  fault,  who  deserves  it.  
Finally,  the  violence,  especially  in  this  form,  has  the  caste  of  blame  
shifting:  it  is  about  more  than  simply  killing.  Keeping  in  mind  that  this  is  
not  the  murder  of  civilians,  but  the  violence  that  follows  a  pitched  battle,  
here  is  one  of  the  oldest  examples.  After  years  of  uncertainty  and  
frustration  (according  to  a  schemic  perspective),  the  Roman  army  
breeched  the  city  walls  of  Carthage:    
'To  keep  the  streets  open  for  their  attacks,  Roman  Soldiers  
threw  the  dead  and  the  living  together  into  holes  in  the  
ground,  sweeping  them  along  like  sticks  and  stones  or  
turning  them  over  with  their  iron  tools,  and  a  man  was  
used  for  filling  up  a  ditch.  Some  were  thrown  in  head  
foremost,  while  their  legs,  sticking  out  of  the  ground,  
writhed  a  long  time  (Appian,  quoted  in  Kiernan,  2007:  50).  
  
As  the  victims  are  made  to  suffer,  the  consequent  humiliation  is  best  
understood  as  an  apprehension  and  then  reassignment  of  causal  agency.  
When  one  side,  for  whatever  reason,  breaks  off  and  runs,  this  confirms  
their  role  as  a  victim,  but  only  inasmuch  as  it  does  their  agency.  But,  as  
with  the  model  of  anger,  it  is  not  enough  to  know  the  blame  agent.  The  
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real  target  is  the  transgressive  motive  ('you  were  trying  to  kill  me!'),  and  
violence  results  from  this  restoration  of  order.    
If  humiliation  is  a  factor  in  genocide,  justice  and  forward  panic,  using  
the  structure  of  basic  emotions  makes  little  sense,  that  we  would  say,  
tautologically,  that  anger  leads  to  shame.  However,  a  structural  
understanding,  that  anger  is  generated  by  the  assignation  of  a  violative  
motive  to  a  blame  agent,  begins  to  reveal  a  logical  balance.  The  balance  to  
other  designated  causality  isn't  'revenge',  but  attempts,  however  magical,  
to  transform  the  blame  agent's  own  beliefs  about  their  responsibility.  In  
other  words,  revenge,  and  whatever  resolution  it  anticipates,  is  in  the  
inversion  of  the  violation.  It  is  necessary  to  force  the  blame  agent  to  
acknowledge  its  agency  in  the  violative  action.  It  takes  the  form  of  shame  
only  because  shame  is  self-­‐designated  causality.    
  
Affect  Resolution  via  Confirmation  of  Agency  
  
Although  many  casualties  in  matched  battles  do  occur  via  forward  
panic  (what  might  be  called  forward  assignation),  killing  in  war,  and  
certainly  planning  for  it,  does  not  (always)  occur  with  such  extreme  
violence  or  passion.  Modern  warfare,  in  fact,  is  characterized  by  distant  
killing  such  as  bombing,  or  artillery,  which  accounts  for  45  percent  to  58  
percent  of  causalities  in  WWI,  50–75  percent  in  WWII,  60  percent  in  Korea  
and  so  on  (Bailey,  2004:  xvii).  The  planning  process  itself,  which  leads  to  
the  orders  that  cause  these  deaths,  can  be  almost  excruciatingly  rational,  
from  the  sand  tables  and  icons  used  by  the  Roman  Empire,  to  the  1960s'  
statistical  analysis  and  body  count  used  by  Robert  McNamera,  to  the  
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PowerPoint  presentations  in  warfare's  more  contemporary  incarnations  
(Perla,  1990;  Anderson,  2005:  51;  Franks,  2004:  336;  Bumiller,  2010).  
It  would  therefore  be  extremely  reductive  to  credit  this  type  of  
violence  to  the  higher  affect  causal  reassignation  system  outlined  above  
(i.e.  anger/retribution).  And  yet,  obviously,  these  acts  do  occur,  and  many  
times,  as  in  the  case  of  both  Vietnam  and  the  US–Iraq  War  of  2003,  and  
even  World  Wars  II  and  I,  do  not  lead  to  instrumentally  rational  outcomes,  
a  knowable  advantage  for  the  instigating  player.  However,  although  
traditional  forms  of  emotion  like  anger  and  shame  are  not  at  play  in  these  
decisions,  feeling  is;  more  importantly,  it  is  feeling  that  manifests  
according  to  causal  assignation.  In  this  case,  we  are  speaking  of  the  
pleasure  of  confirming  one's  own  agency  in  an  instrumental  act;  these  
positive  effects  were  briefly  touched  on  in  the  previous  chapter,  where  
the  relative  ease  of  basic  training  allows  for  feelings  of  accomplishment.  It  
is  the  job  of  this  section  to  outline  how  this  feeling  manifests.  
To  begin  to  understand  this  process,  we  will  first  examine  how  
pleasure  presents  in  killing.  This  is  not  a  traditional  emotion,  but  there  is  
strong  evidence  that  it  is  experienced  by  many  soldiers.  Joanna  Bourke  
has  examined  at  length  the  emotions  and  feelings  experienced  by  those  in  
combat  (see  'fear'  in  Chapter  4).  She  is  arguably  most  well  known  for  her  
analysis  of  the  pleasure  that  soldiers  take  in  killing.  Bourke  notes  at  least  
three  forms  of  pleasure  in  this  environment,  including  sexual  pleasure  
linked  with  killing,  but  we  will  turn  to  a  form  that  most  closely  ties  in  with  
this  thesis,  instrumentality  and  agency:  'Major  William  Avery  Bishop  
thought  it  "great  fun"  to  train  his  machine  gun  on  Germans  because  he  
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"loved"  to  watch  them  running  away  "like  so  many  rats"'  (Bourke,  2000:  
20).    
In  the  above  quote,  we  can  note  the  dehumanization,  but  there  is  a  
further  sense  of  'fun',  which  Bourke  links  with  the  enjoyment  of  sport  or  
films.  William  Broyles  'likened  the  happiness  generated  by  the  sport  of  
war  to  the  innocent  pleasures  of  children  playing  cowboys  and  Indians,  
chanting  the  refrain,  'bang  bang,  you're  dead!'.  This  creates  a  type  of  
pleasure  feedback  loop,  where  films  provide  the  context  for  war  and  vice  
versa:  'Films,  then,  provided  both  pleasurable,  and  deathly,  scripts'  
(Bourke,  2000:  17).  In  modern  times,  this  continues  in  new  media:  video  
games,  which  are  referenced  here  by  two  separate  pilots  in  the  US-­‐Iraq  of  
1990:  'It  was  fun,  like  a  video  game  in  real  life.  It  was  awesome.  I  was  the  
right  guy  at  the  right  time.  I  was  scared.  It  was  like  a  great  video  game  and  
I  had  the  keys  to  the  car'  (Barrett,  1996:  134–5).  
There  is  a  long  history  of  relating  media  to  violence;  TV  shows,  
movies  and  video  games  create  or  at  least  encourage  it  (USDHHS,  2001;  
Cline  et  al.,  1973;  Anderson  et  al.,  2003).  These  studies  are  problematic  for  
many  reasons.  Not  unlike  the  nature/nurture  question  of  violence,  it  is  
difficult  to  tease  out  whether  or  not  desire  for  violence  in  media  creates  
or  is  created  by  violence  in  practice.  Furthermore,  even  when  some  
causality  is  demonstrated,  it  is  surprisingly  slight  (Anderson  et  al.,  2003).  
But  what  is  of  larger  concern  is  the  way  in  which  these  types  of  studies  
serve  as  a  distraction  from  the  real  question:  what  motivates  the  desire  
for  violence  in  the  first  place?  People  would  not  purchase  or  participate  in  
violent  video  games  or  TV  shows  unless  there  was  some  appeal  to  begin  
with.  The  link  between  media  and  violence  is  correlative  but  not  causal  (in  
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either  direction).  That  is,  both  violence  and  media  are  telling  the  same  
story  and  creating  the  same  feeling  within  the  individual:  satisfaction  in  
self  agency.  
To  improve  understanding  of  how  violence  might  satisfy  in  a  
confirmation  context,  it  is  necessary  to  explore  another  schism  that  falls  
along  the  lines  of  the  liberal  political  project,  between  'autonomous  man'  
and  communitarianism.  Liberal  politics  holds  the  individual  as  the  ultimate  
unit:  'The  first  premise  of  liberal  political  theory  is  that  only  individuals  
count.  Individuals  formulate  projects.  Individuals  conceive  values.  When  
values  and  projects  come  to  fruition,  individuals  experience  the  joy  of  
their  attainment;  when  they  fail,  individuals  feel  the  frustration  that  
results'  (Johnston,  1994:  191).  This  perspective  is  also  known,  critically,  as  
'atomism'  (Taylor,  1985:  187–199)  or  'individualism'  (Sandel,  1998).    
Additional  critiques  have  emerged  of  this  view  from  feminism,  which  
sees  them  as  'political  traditions  that  historically  have  been  hostile  to  
women's  interests  and  freedom'  (MacKensie  and  Stoljar,  2000:  2).  Often  
directed  at  liberalism  primacies  of  the  self,  this  is  a  critique  of  masculinist  
norms,  of  a  rational  and  wholly  separate  individual  that  controls  his  
destiny:  'the  myth  that  humans  are  independent,  separate  beings.  While  
there  may  be  times  in  our  lives  when  humans  are  independent  and  
autonomous,  there  are  other  times  in  our  lives  in  which  we  are  not  
independent...  We  do  not  view  these  relationships  as  a  set  of  
interconnected  political  relations,  nor  do  we  view  them  as  defining  who  
we  are  as  humans'  (Tronto,  1996:  147–8).  
As  with  war,  there  is  a  fundamental  awareness  of  sociality,  that  our  
choices  and  the  effects  of  our  choices  only  matter  inasmuch  other  people  
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choose  themselves  to  allow  them  to  matter,  and  further  how  their  
subsequent  choices  and  actions  in  turn  affect  ourselves  and  others.  This  
presents  yet  another  dilemma  for  rationality,  that  one  would  even  be  able  
to  choose  outside  of  a  web  of  social  interaction,  instead  of,  as  traditionally  
posited,  as  an  agent  that  controls  their  own  outcome.  Rational  choice  
depends  on  an  individuated  actor  whose  choices  and  outcomes  have  a  
one-­‐to-­‐one  relationship.  This  is  true  even  in  game  theory,  where  
expanding  choice  to  a  second  actor  changes  the  potential  outcomes,  but  
not  the  underlying  assumption  of  agency.  The  underlying  assumption  that  
a  choice  can  lead  to  an  outcome,  is  strongly  contradicted,  in  most  real-­‐life  
situations,  on  a  series  of  social  connections.    
The  reason  this  myth  continues  is  not  for  politics  or  power,  or  even  
rationality,  but  for  its  cognitive  vitality.  It  could  be  said  that  
methodological  individualism  itself  holds  such  an  autonomous  view,  
although  it  is  hoped  that  the  thesis  is  attempting  some  reflexivity:  not  that  
we  are  individuated,  but  many  times  this  is  how  we  cognitively  process  
our  own  agency,  as  distinct  subjects.  Causality,  as  we  have  seen  time  and  
time  again,  is  assigned  an  agent,  which  depends  on  the  belief,  naturally,  
that  agency  is  possible.  In  complex  social  interdependency,  we  can  really  
only  vaguely  affect  the  outcome,  even  if  in  apprehension,  we  believe  that  
we  determine  it.  This  belief  in  agent  causality  is  the  cornerstone  of  feeling,  
both  positive  and  negative,  and  we  make  the  world  according  to  it.    
Communal  interconnectivity  could  be  no  more  evident  than  in  war,  
which  is,  naturally  enough,  mass  fighting.  The  leader's  commands  must  be  
followed  by  the  sub-­‐leaders,  those  below  them,  and  so  on.  But  beyond  the  
concept  of,  and  possible  breaks  in  authority  lies  the  fog  of  war;  the  
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complexity  of  mass  fighting  is  simply  beyond  our  comprehension  to  
understand.  Charles  Carrington  on  the  battle  of  Ypres:  'What  surprises  me  
is  that  historians  have  elevated  it  into  a  tactical  masterpiece  like  Messines.  
It  was  just  all  in  wrestling  in  the  mud'  (Holmes,  2003:  155).  On  one  hand,  
we  know  that  war  is  chaotic,  unformed,  and  inexplicable.  On  the  other  are  
timetables,  material,  and  PowerPoint  presentations.  It  would  be  easy  and  
fair  to  say  that  this  is  a  component  of  everyday  cognitive  parsing,  taking  
the  complex  into  the  knowable.    
What  this  misses,  naturally  enough,  is  how  it  feels,  specifically  in  
regard  to  the  subject's  own  agency.  We  have  seen  the  effects  of  chaotic  
input  on  the  soldiers  that  fight  it,  but  this  applies  as  well  to  those  who  
plan  it.  If  autonomy  is  a  contradiction  when  it  comes  to  social  systems,  
why  pursue  it?  Whatever  political  or  feminist  issues  are  at  stake,  what  
matters  here  is  the  way  in  which  it  feels  to  be  autonomous.  In  terms  of  
anticipated  feeling  states,  the  individual  imagines  a  positive  scenario  in  
which  1)  the  world  has  been  numerically  transformed  (in  terms  of  advance  
in  rank,  money,  death,  territory  and  so  on),  and  2)  the  individual  was  or  
could  be  the  instrument  of  that  change,  even  if  social  interconnectedness  
makes  such  a  one-­‐to-­‐one  relationship  impossible.  In  other  words,  the  
instrumental  world  is  built  not  only  to  cognitively  simplify  our  
overwhelming  flow  of  input,  but  to  create  a  field  in  which  agency  can  
manifest.    
If  there  is  a  link  between  war,  video  games  and  narrative,  it  is  this.  
From  a  recent  'bible'  on  video  game  design:  'The  player  does  an  action  
(hitting,  shooting),  sees  the  immediate  result  (enemy  is  killed  by  attack),  
which  grants  a  reward  (experience,  money,  power-­‐up).  This  elegant  
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feedback  loop  allows  for  quick  and  frequent  player-­‐to-­‐world  interaction.  
It's  Freud's  pleasure  principle  in  practice.  Ring  the  bell,  a  reward  is  gained.  
Why  stop  ringing  the  bell?'  (Rogers,  2014:  214).  Although  possibly  not  the  
most  cogent  interpretation  of  Freud,  these  similarities  of  agent  causality  
and  warfare  demonstrate  a  stronger  link  between  media  and  violence  
than  the  standard  exposure/action  model  currently  in  favor.  'As  the  
button  is  pressed,  the  action  should  happen'  (Rogers,  2014:  116).    
Film  narrative  has  a  similar  dependence,  seen  in  the  reliance  on  the  
protagonist.  From  Robert  McKee's  famous  book  on  screenwriting:    
  'A  story  cannot  be  told  about  a  protagonist  who  doesn’t  
want  anything,  who  cannot  make  decisions,  whose  actions  
effect  no  change  at  any  level...  Rather,  the  protagonist’s  
will  impels  a  known  desire.  The  protagonist  has  a  need  or  
goal,  an  object  of  desire,  and  knows  it.  If  you  could  pull  
your  protagonist  aside,  whisper  in  his  ear,  "What  do  you  
want?"  he  would  have  an  answer:  "I’d  like  X  today,  Y  next  
week,  but  in  the  end  I  want  Z."'  (McKee,  1997:  138).  
  
What's  striking  here  is  the  near  rationalist  language  of  variables  ('X',  'Y').  
It's  true  that  war  and  stories  feed  off  each  other,  but  only  inasmuch  as  
they  demonstrate  the  desire  for  instrumental  and  individually  demarcated  
agency.    
Once  recognized,  this  desire  for  proof  of  agency  manifests  in  warfare  
in  compelling  ways.  Throughout  the  procedures  of  fighting,  there  has  been  
a  long  history  of  trophy  taking.  From  a  practical  point  of  view,  this  serves  
no  purpose;  an  enemy  counterpart  is  killed,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  go  
beyond  that.  Initially,  this  seemed  indicative  of  the  humiliation  seen  
before,  and  while  there  is  an  element  of  that,  the  more  I  read,  the  more  a  
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strongly  practical  element  struck  me.  Ears—the  most  common  trophy  in  
Vietnam  and  Iraq—keep  their  shape  over  time.  In  World  War  II,  '[t]eeth  
and  skulls  were  the  most  commonly  taken  "trophies"'  (Harrison,  2006:  
246).  One  soldier  in  Vietnam  took  this  preservation  element  a  step  
further:  'I  was  also  introduced  to  his  ear  collection  of  four  to  six  ears.  Each  
ear  was  in  a  small  clear  glass  jar  and  preserved  in  formaldehyde  or  
alcohol.  Yes,  I  received  instruction  on  how  to  correctly  remove  a  trophy  
ear  from  your  freshly  killed  opponent'  (Roach,  2011:  12).    
Souvenirs,  then,  are  less  a  manifestation  of  dehumanization—though  
they  are  that  as  well,  as  some  would  take  breasts,  penises,  and  even  
vaginas  (Jones,  2010:  115),  then  a  demonstration:  'We  used  to  cut  their  
ears  off.  We  had  a  trophy.  If  a  guy  would  have  a  necklace  of  ears,  he  was  a  
good  killer,  a  good  trooper...  The  officers  expected  you  to  do  it  or  
something  was  wrong  with  you.  It  was  generally  regarded  as  a  sign  of  
combat  effectiveness'  (Bourke,  2000:  30,  emphasis  mine).  Although  
indicative  of  the  masculinity  and  the  myth  of  the  subject,  from  a  cognitive  
feeling  perspective,  this  seemingly  gruesome  act  is  a  totem  against  the  
true  chaos  of  combat:  I  have  agency.    
The  attempt  to  create  agency  extends  naturally  enough  to  state  
actors  who  must  manage  the  impossible  complexity  of  intra-­‐  and  inter-­‐
institutional  interaction  and  attempt  control.  It  is  imperative  to  consider  
the  planning  of  war  from  the  perspective  of  satisfying  the  desire  for  low  
affect  instrumental  agency.  Gen.  Tommy  Franks  'solution'  to  Iraq,  as  put  
forward  to  President  George  Bush  Jr.  in  Dec.  2001,  is  a  grid  of  lines  and  
slices:    
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'The  starbursts  at  the  intersections  of  Lines  and  Slices  
represented  points  of  focus  we  would  use  to  develop  the  
specifics  of  a  detailed  plan.  For  example,  the  starburst  at  
the  intersection  of  "Operational  Fires"  and  "Leadership"  
meant  we  would  attack  leadership  targets  using  bombs  and  
missiles.  Simply  stated,  the  starbursts  helped  the  
Component  Commanders  and  staff  match  specific  military  
tools  to  specific  targets,  resulting  in  better  synergy  among  
traditionally  independent  arms  and  services'  (Franks,  2004:  
340).    
  
This  is  not  to  say  that  war  or  state  action  can't  be  planned,  only  to  be  
mindful  of  the  way  in  which  we  may  be  under  the  sway  of  beliefs  
generated  by  the  desire  for  the  feeling  of  a  future  state  of  completion  and  
agency.  General  H.R.  McMaster:  'It's  dangerous  because  it  can  create  the  
illusion  of  understanding  and  the  illusion  of  control.  Some  problems  in  the  
world  are  not  bullet-­‐izable'  (Bumiller,  2010).  
  
What   is   Bulletizable?  
  
The  use  of  Iraq  presents  an  additional  dimension  on  the  political  
level,  especially  given  recent  events.  This  statement  from  former  UK  Prime  
Minister  Tony  Blair  on  the  2014  Sunni  insurgency  underlines,  with  virtually  
every  sentence,  the  centrality  of  agent  causality  in  political  war  thinking.    
'"Don't  believe  washing  our  hands  of  it  and  walking  away  
will  solve  the  problem"  
Writing  on  his  website,  the  former  prime  minister  warned  
that  every  time  the  UK  puts  off  action,  "the  action  we  will  
be  forced  to  take  will  be  ultimately  greater".  
He  said  the  current  violence  in  Iraq  was  the  "predictable  
and  malign  effect"  of  inaction  in  Syria.  
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"We  have  to  liberate  ourselves  from  the  notion  that  'we'  
have  caused  this,"  he  wrote.  "We  haven't."  
"Where  the  extremists  are  fighting,  they  have  to  be  
countered  hard,  with  force"'  (BBC,  2014,  article  entitled  
'We  didn't  cause  Iraq  Crisis').  
  
Besides  the  attempts  to  shift  agency,  and  presentation  of  future  
states  of  self-­‐blame  if  nothing  is  done,  action  is  seen  as  a  solution  by  
virtue  of  its  being  an  action.  In  this  case,  action  and  choice  arise  not  out  of  
genuine  causal  relationships,  but  out  of  vestigial  manifestations  of  causal  
thinking.  Instead  of  the  real  effects  of  what  violence  has  rent,  
demonstrated  in  Iraq  (at  least)  twice,  choice  is  based  on  agency;  historical  
causes  and  effects  are  ignored.  In  the  above  instance,  Mr.  Blair  seems  so  
preoccupied  with  blame  (and  avoidance  of  same),  that  the  ineffectiveness  
of  the  previous  military  solution  in  Iraq,  or  whatever  facets  of  the  military  
intervention  might  have  been  effective,  cannot  even  be  addressed.    
James  Scott,  and  others  from  the  Science  and  Technology  Studies  
school,  has  detailed  the  many  disasters  that  occur  when  'seeing  like  a  
state',  and  when  complex  social  interactions  are  conceived  as  solvable  
through  simple  instrumental  changes,  there  is  an  'assumption  that  spatial  
order  (in  architecture)  is  the  same/will  create  social  order'  (Scott,  1998:  
133;  see  Chapter  2).  In  addition  to  Scott's  work,  we  add  the  concept  of  
agency,  that  it  is  not  a  mere  question  of  countability,  instrumentality  or  
numeracy,  but  the  way  in  which  action  pleasurably  demonstrates  the  
agency  upon  which  cognition  depends.  Katz  has  proposed  the  impossible  
driver/car  object,  where  cut-­‐offs  are  amputations.  Instead,  driving,  like  
war,  is  a  field  of  perfect  instrumentality:  the  anticipation  of  extended  
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agency,  roads,  paths,  choices,  times,  actions.  'Her  anger  heated  up  as  she  
glanced  at  the  speedometer  and  noticed  that  we  were  only  going  forty  
miles  per  hour'  (Katz,  1999:  34).  Such  an  emotive  reaction  only  matters  
inasmuch  as  it  count  be  counted.  When  interruptions  occur  in  such  an  
agentist  space,  they  are  strongly  violative,  hence  anger.  
Returning  to  the  theory  of  media  violence,  we  see  attempts  of  
precisely  this  type  of  instrumentality  in  its  correction.  There  is  a  violation  
(the  'offense'  of  media  violence),  a  planned  and  countable  outcome  
(elimination  of  violent  media),  and  the  sincere  belief  that  this  will  
necessitate  a  like  reduction  in  violence.  Although  the  goal  is  very  different,  
the  same  cognate  feelings  in  violence,  driving,  revenge  and  war  exist  
within  this  paradigmatic  solution.  This  example  is  not  meant  mockingly,  
but  according  to  efficacy.  State-­‐based  attempts  to  address  complex,  
cognitive  feeling  problems  as  if  they  are  mechanical  agentic  puzzles  will  
fail  until  the  underlying  feelings  are  addressed,  both  of  the  subjects,  and  
of  those  who  study  them.    
What  we  have  seen  in  the  examples  of  narrative,  video  games,  
sports,  driving,  retribution,  quantitative  studies,  injustice  and  war  are  the  
pleasurable  feelings  of  accomplishment,  which  can  be  understood  only  as  
a  sense  of  an  instrumental  change  via  individual  agency.  In  simple  terms,  it  
feels  good  to  have  done:  a  feeling  that  depends  on  a  world  that  is  
controllable.  The  myth  of  the  rational  masculine  individual  has  been  
much,  and  justly,  critiqued.  In  the  social  world,  the  idea  that  one  person  
could  have  control  of  any  outcome  seems  absurd  on  the  face  of  it,  yet  
remains  the  foundation  of  modern  society.  A  focus  on  the  importance  of  
positive  feelings  through  agency  helps  explain  the  perpetuation  of  both  
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this  myth  and  the  instrumental  fields  around  it,  i.e.  maps,  money,  bullets,  
scores  and  so  on.  In  order  for  an  individual  to  generate  positive  feelings,  
he  or  she  must  exist  in  a  world  with  measurable  and  comprehensible  
outcomes.  The  norms  and  institutions  that  have  arisen  in  the  last  10,000  
years  must  conform  to  the  cognitive  feeling  framework  of  subjective  
agency.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  desire  for  this  agency  that  gave  rise  to  them.       
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Conclusion:  Cause,  Effect  and  Affect  
  
The  core  argument,  that  we  choose  optimally  according  to  how  we  
think  we  might  feel,  is  not  so  controversial,  depending  on  how  broad  the  
definition  of  'feel'  is.  Rational  choice  is  feeling  choice,  at  least  in  the  sense  
that  we  feel  ('feel'  being  defined  as  sensed  or  even  thought)  the  rational  
version  is  better  than  the  irrational—unless,  of  course,  we  feel  the  
opposite.  This  is  why  the  contributory  argument  is  so  important:  what  
feelings  are  associated  with  thought,  especially  causal  thought?  How  do  
they  function?  How  do  they  manifest?  I  have  argued  that  feelings  
generated  by  causal  reasoning,  especially  agency-­‐based  causality,  are  a  
prime  mover  in  choice.  This  paradigm  has  (at  least)  five  distinct  
advantages.  
It  is  able  to  describe  culturally,  historically  and  broadly  defined  
emotions.  The  use  of  the  word  'fear'  has  meant  both  the  type  of  
overwhelming  panic  described  in  Chapter  5,  as  well  as  the  more  
cognitively  based  anticipation  of  a  future  event  ('I'm  afraid  of  that  
outcome')  as  seen  in  Chapter  6.  This  'fear'  can  further  be  tinged  with  
shame  (or  at  least  the  anticipation  of  it),  in  the  way  that  a  soldier's  major  
fear  before  combat  was  being  seen  a  coward.  The  current  approach,  of  
combined  and  conflated  emotions,  is  descriptive  in  that  we  can  
understand  what  happens;  setting  it  within  cognitive  scenarios  has  more  
explanatory  value  as  well  as  a  clear  repeatable  structure.    
Moreover,  this  approach  is  able  to  incorporate  or  describe  things  that  
are  not  called  emotions,  but  probably  are.  The  'probably  are'  here  refers  
to  the  way  in  which  emotions  (if  defined  intentionally)  are  cognitive  
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antecedents  that  lead  to  feeling.  To  resolve  the  horror  film  question,  we  
seek  not  so  much  to  be  afraid,  but  to  be  afraid  with  the  foreknowledge  of  
the  type  of  schemic  resolution  coming  our  way,  the  anticipated  feeling  
state  of  agency  itself.  Likewise,  the  pleasure  of  battle  (Chapter  7),  
anticipates  fear  followed  by  the  rush  of  power  when  one  survives.  The  
horror  film,  especially  in  its  current  iteration  of  'torture  porn',  confirms  
this:  the  characters  do  not  escape,  but  the  audience  does.  We  buy  the  
ticket  not  necessarily  anticipating  the  tension,  but  the  resolution  of  that  
tension  at  the  end,  which  is  always  found  when  the  lights  come  up.  
Crucially,  ideas  of  cognitive  completion  allow  us  to  explain  feelings  
associated  with  rationality,  and  rational  choice.  It  feels  good  to  be  rational  
(just  as  it  feels  good  sometimes  not  to  be),  but  it  is  the  feeling  that  drives  
it.  Although  there  is  some  strong  evidence  that  this  is  an  avoidance  of  
negatively  associated  weak  or  non-­‐masculine  feeling  states,  there  is  a  
carrot  with  this  stick:  the  right  answer,  the  solved  puzzle,  the  perfect  
sentence,  all  are  associated  with  pleasure.  Rational  choice  in  its  current  
state  deems  the  rational  self-­‐explanatory,  and  it  is  hoped  that  this  critique  
will,  at  the  very  least,  generate  greater  attention  to  this  syllogism.    
Rational  choice  has  its  origins  in  economics,  with  a  strong  focus  on  
measurable  results  of  actions  and  countable  rewards.  If  we  forgo  these  
rewards,  either  it  could  be  said  that  we  are  either  choosing  irrationally,  or  
according  to  a  particular  bias.  The  fundamental  error  here  is  that  both  
choices  are  in  fact  internal;  the  actor  is  not  choosing  between  an  
instrumental  and  a  feeling  or  heuristic,  but  between  two  different  
anticipated  feeling  outcomes.  Internal  explanations  can  encompass  
external  ends,  but  not  the  other  way  around.    
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Finally,  this  perspective  is  especially  qualified  to  explain  choice.  
Instead  of  emotions;  it  posits  that  particular  thoughts  generate  feelings.  
These  thoughts,  when  anticipated,  allow  the  feelings  themselves  to  be  
anticipated.  This  process  determines,  or  at  least  influences,  which  action  
the  actor  will  take,  even  if  that  action  is  itself  another  thought,  with  its  
own  associated  feelings  and  so  on.  By  theorizing  emotion  as  cognates,  
they  can  be  understood  easily  by  the  subject  as  future  states  to  achieve  or  
avoid.  This  prioritizes  feelings  that  can  be  scenarized  more  easily.  In  terms  
of  feeling,  it  could  be  said  that  fields  of  instrumentality,  like  money,  rank  
and  territory  make  feeling  decisions  clearer.  Limited  in  present-­‐time  
cognition  to  four,  we  cannot  comprehend  the  difference  between  $1,000  
and  $1,010.  We  choose  the  latter  based  possibly  on  the  feeling  of  agentic  
satisfaction,  possibly  on  the  anticipation  of  the  negative  sense  if  we  don't,  
but  in  either  case,  the  countability  informs  the  decision.  Negative  self-­‐
designated  causal  anticipations  (shame)  are  extremely  easy  to  imagine,  
largely  due  to  the  way  in  which  the  outcomes  appear  so  clearly  in  the  
mind's  eye;  trust,  forgiveness,  understanding,  and  so  on,  become  less  so,  
and  consequently  less  optimal  by  virtue  of  being  harder  to  cognate  as  a  
future  state.  
These  less  scenarizable  feelings  are  a  weakness  contained  herein.  
What  of  love,  trust,  forgiveness,  gratitude  or  even  laughter?37  As  a  theory  
to  describe  motivational  feelings  (feelings  that  affect  choice),  there  are  
                                                
31.  One  way  to  imagine  a  joke  is  when  we  take  a  'jump'  between  how  an  event  is  seen  
through  two  schemas.  This,  naturally,  takes  the  joke  right  out  of  it.  Although  a  
potential  future  area  of  research,  what  amazed  me  in  the  cognitive  emotional  and  
basic  emotions  school  was  the  way  in  which  this  wonderful,  unique  and  powerful  
feeling  is  almost  totally  ignored.  
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many  limits,  some  of  which  are  prescribed  by  the  limits  of  the  research,  
some  of  which  may  never  be  understood,  or  at  least  explained.  This  
preceding  has  been  an  extremely  narrow  theorization  of  feeling  and  
emotion.  Focusing  on  so  many  negatives,  as  in  the  pre-­‐schemic  feelings  of  
not  knowing  usually  associated  with  fear,  or  the  avoidance  self-­‐designated  
causality  through  authority,  has  ignored  the  wide  (though  still  limited)  
spectrum  of  feelings  available.  If  the  soldier  fights  for  the  soldier  next  to  
them,  it  is  a  feeling  of  love  that  motivates—a  bond  that  soldiers  often  say  
can  never  be  replicated  in  civilian  life.  An  exploration  of  the  ontology  of  
love,  which  may  be  the  core  of  all  these  choices,  would  be  necessary  as  
counterpoint  if  nothing  else.  
Another  limit:  where  do  schemas  come  from?  In  a  sense,  nearly  all  of  
them  are  learned  behaviors;  it  would  be  hard  to  credit  the  exchange  of  
money  or  identity  with  a  particular  group,  language  or  ethnicity  being  
biological.  Nevertheless,  the  formation  of  schemas  has  some  type  of  
biological/cognitive  component,  given  visual  acuity  (Heider)  and  the  
manifestation  of  schizophrenia  (McGhee  and  Chapman).  Nevertheless,  the  
thesis  has  barely  addressed  the  way  in  which  these  schemas  might  be  
constructed.  Masculinity  might  be  a  productive  area  of  research  via  this  
perspective,  especially  since  it  has  amassed  a  considerable  body  of  
literature  on  violence.  This  is  with  the  caveat  that  schemic  masculinity  can  
be  understood  situationally:  that  a  man  in  one  place  acts  differently  than  
in  another,  and  further  that  each  man  has  a  different  definition  of  what  it  
is  to  be  a  man  in  those  situations.  Masculinity,  understood  as  a  group  of  
schemas  (how  a  man  acts  as  a  father,  as  a  warrior,  as  a  coward,  as  a  
leader,  ad  astra)  could  be  a  productive  model,  and  a  further  exploration  of  
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how  schemas  function  in  choice.  The  vast  number  of  schemas,  and  the  
situational  way  in  which  they  apply,  does  not  contradict  a  concise  model.  
Violations  and  assignations  of  agency  to  the  self  or  others  manifest,  in  
feeling  terms,  according  to  a  reliable  pattern.  We  are  different,  but  in  the  
same  way.    
Another  piece  of  research  lacking  from  this  thesis  is  the  dual  process  
model  of  cognition  (Kahneman,  2003).  Under  this  theory,  there  are  two  
systems:  system  1,  which  is  quick  thinking  and  always  in  operation;  and  
system  2,  which  is  'rule-­‐based'  and  considerate  (Gilovich  and  Griffin,  2002:  
16).  If  system  1  tends  to  be  seen  on  the  emotional  side  of  the  equation,  it  
might  be  useful  to  consider  the  concepts  of  cognitive  headroom.  It  has  
been  demonstrated  how  cognitive  upset  can  affect  thinking  performance  
(Chapters  5  and  6),  but  how  might  it  affect  change?  In  other  words,  if  we  
are  to  consider  how  a  causal  theory  of  feeling  might  be  implemented,  it  
would  certainly  require  the  considerate  examination  of  the  beliefs  that  
generate  the  feelings,  or  at  the  very  least,  a  closer  look  at  the  difference  
between  the  anticipated  feeling  result  and  the  probable  one.  If  the  brain  is  
processing  agent  type  causality  (who  to  blame,  how  to  correct  their  
motives,  etc.),  it  leaves  less  room  for  system  2  type  cognitions,  which,  in  
turn,  leaves  less  room  for  potential  alteration.  
This  leads  to  a  very  important  issue,  not  unique  to  any  social  theory:  
its  practical  use.  How  can  positive  change  be  implemented  via  a  cognate  
feeling  model?  It  is  arguable  that  the  deconstruction  of  the  concept  of  
injustice  has  led  this  paradigm  to  a  kind  of  moral  relativism,  but  here  we  
can  simply  define  positive  change  as  a  reduction  of  physical  violence.  To  
demonstrate  how  this  might  come  about  in  regard  to  system  1  and  system  
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2  thinking,  consider  one  way  that  this  paradigm  might  be  applied  
historically.  One  subject  of  particular  interest,  and  one  which  has  not  
undergone  this  scrutiny  under  these  criteria,  is  the  Enlightenment.  There  
is  no  controversy  to  the  statement  that  it  was  a  slow  transition  away  from  
religious  doctrine  and  towards  reason  that  characterized  this  great  
explosion  of  real  scientific  advancement.  Yet,  as  with  the  conception  of  
God  as  a  blame  agent  (Chapters  3,  6  and  7),  it  may  be  this  metacausal  type  
of  thinking  that  was  the  impediment  to  the  application  of  the  scientific  
method.  If  physical  phenomena  like  gravity,  fluid  dynamics,  and  the  health  
of  the  human  body  are  related  to  an  intent,  their  mechanics  remain  fixed  
and  obscure.  As  agentic  and  physical  causality  separated  (as  symbolized  by  
the  Deist  conception  of  the  grand  watchmaker),  great  advances  were  
made.  This  is  due  to  both  the  wasted  energy  over  searching  for  a  
metacause,  as  well  as  possibly  the  addition  of  cognitive  headroom  
afforded  without  the  assignation  of  a  blame  agent.    
The  application  of  agentic  causality  to  areas  of  violence,  like  war  and  
criminality,  could  be  especially  productive.  As  noted  in  Chapter  7,  ordinary  
citizens  in  Western  countries  are  most  than  happy  to  trade  retributive  
justice  for  reductions  in  crime.  As  Scandinavian  models  of  criminal  justice  
prove  more  and  more  productive,  we  will  need  to  ask:  is  our  feeling  of  
satisfaction,  which  in  any  case  is  seemingly  never  sated,  more  important  
than  the  our  actual  safety?  'Generally  speaking,  in  this  region,  it  is  
recognized  that  going  to  prison  is  itself  the  punishment  for  crime...rather  
than  being  allowed  to  degrade  and  debase  all  within'  (Pratt,  2008:  119).  
This  reflects  a  counter  against  the  seeming  importance  of  the  shifting  
causal  attribution  (shaming)  prevalent  in  other  models.  The  fact  that  it  
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seems  to  be  having  a  strong  positive  effect  would  underline  the  
importance  of  the  difference  of  these  two  approaches.  
As  far  as  war  decisions  relate  to  future  research,  this  author  is  
currently  working  on  an  attempt  to  reframe  the  decisions  on  the  American  
side  to  continue  in  the  Vietnam  War.  Traditionally  seen  within  the  
'groupthink'  paradigm  (itself  rather  circular—we  form  consensus  within  
groups  because  we  do),  it  is  better  contextualized  in  time-­‐based  feelings  
of  future  self-­‐designated  causality.  This  case  offers  an  immense  amount  of  
archival  material,  allowing  for  a  close  reading  of  what  would  be  qualitative  
in  nature.  The  approach  has  further  advantage  in  that  it  does  not  seek  
emotion  words,  but  particular  beliefs  and  conclusions  that  lead  to  
specified  feelings.  Even  so,  the  feeling  basis  can  be  especially  clear,  as  in  
the  proposed  solution  'Peace  with  Honor',  tying  the  outcome  directly  to  
the  emotion  'pride'.  It  is  hoped  that  future  understanding  of  feelings  
within  seemingly  rational  institutions  and  players  would  better  distinguish  
between  actual  and  anticipated  feeling  outcomes.  
Outside  my  own  area  of  expertise,  cognate/feeling  theory  might  
begin  a  productive  re-­‐examination  of  emotional  theory  in  cognitive  
psychology  and  the  philosophy  of  emotion.  There  seems  to  be  an  
unceasing  debate  over  what  is  or  is  not  shame,  fear  or  anger,  just  as  what  
is  or  is  not  emotion.  This  seems  driven  by  both  the  need  for  
categorization,  but  more  importantly,  the  need  to  deny  feeling,  and  the  
way  in  which  it  seems  to,  or  that  we  fear  it  might,  invalidate  an  argument.  
The  problem  is  less  that  decisions  are  made,  and  essays  written,  under  
feeling  influence,  than  the  contradiction  that  arises  when  we  stake  that  
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they  are  not.  Feeling  does  not  invalidate  an  argument;  we  can  still  rely  on  
lack  of  logic  and  evidence  for  that.    
And  what  of  ethics  and  relativism?  This  system  is  a  strong  critique  
that  all  feelings  of  injustice  are  equivalent:  that  the  rapist  that  feels  
victimized  by  women  is  the  same  as  black  Americans  who  felt  victimized  
by  the  segregation  laws  of  the  1910–1950s,  the  batterers'  paradox  in  
reverse.  I  would  caution  instead  that  what  might  be  true  is  that  they  are  
experiencing  the  same  feeling.  The  best  approach  is  to  specify,  as  best  one  
can,  the  feeling  ends  one  seeks,  so  that  it  is  possible  to  determine  if  the  
action  taken  can  achieve  that.  When  we  attempt  to  justify  it  with  higher  
ethical  systems,  this  leads  to  metacausal  and  agentic  reasoning,  which,  in  
turn,  can  lead  to  the  strong  contradictory  actions  like  murder  and  war.  As  
a  stated  goal,  feeling  states  can  be  achieved;  as  an  anticipated  goal  tied  
with  injustice,  they  cannot.  Instrumental  rationality  can  be  usefully  
applied  if  we  accept  that  feelings  are  the  end,  and  the  search  for  practical  
ways  to  achieve  those  ends.    
It  is  here  on  the  intangible  that  we  conclude.  In  the  beginning,  it  was  
asked  that  the  reader  take  emotion  seriously,  and  it  is  sincerely  wished  at  
this  point  that  this  has  been  the  case.  At  the  end,  one  more  indulgence  is  
requested:  a  reprioritization  of  the  immaterial,  the  bodily,  the  felt.  James  
Scott,  Ian  Hacking  and  the  entire  Science  and  Technology  Studies  field  
have  focused  on  the  importance  of  legibility  and  numeracy  as  motivations  
for  decisions,  and  we  come  to  this  discipline  too  little  and  too  late  in  the  
game.  In  the  above  formulation,  within  a  system  1  and  system  2  paradigm,  
choices  are  not  only  prioritized  over  negative  and  positive,  but  around  
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comprehensibility,  that  like  the  drunk  who  loses  his  keys  in  the  dark,  and  
looks  for  them  in  the  light,  only  that  which  can  be  counted  counts.  
To  explain  how  this  might  be  reconceptualized,  Dietrich  Dörner  has  
proposed,  under  the  very  different  paradigm  of  social  management,  the  
concept  of  goal  degeneration  (Dörner,  1996:  62).  For  Dplain  how  this  
might  be  reconceptualized,  Dietrich  Dörner  has  proposed,  under  the  very  
different  paradigm  of  social  mansolvable  interim  goals,  and  how  they  tend  
to  focus  on  the  small,  less  relevant  goals  at  the  cost  of  their  larger  primary  
ones,  and  often  their  jobs.  With  feeling  and  instrumentality,  we  are  faced  
with  a  similar  goal  degeneration.  For  example,  we  want  to  be  happy,  to  be  
connected,  to  love  (intangibles),  and,  with  this  in  mind,  seek  a  romantic  
relationship.  Once  defined  by  this  instrumental  category  (being  in  a  
relationship),  the  primary  goal  (the  feeling)  becomes  less  important,  and  
we  may  stay  by  virtue  of  the  category  and  not  the  feeling.  So  follows  the  
endless  pursuit  of  fame  and  wealth  and  power,  when  any  of  those  
achieved  have  long  since  worn  out  their  hopes  of  feeling  satisfaction.  To  
resolve  our  moral  question  of  which  feeling  to  pursue,  it  may  be  a  
question  of  focusing  on  the  basic  and  intersubjective:  the  basic  safety  
(physical,  not  schemic)  and  the  love  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  all  our  goals.  
Whatever  we  do,  we  are  pursuing  feeling  in  any  case,  however  unaware.  It  
remains  only  to  be  more  mindful  about  which  intangible  we  choose.       
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